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When superior students hear of the Way
They strive to practice it. 
When middling students hear of the Way
They sometimes keep it and sometimes lose it.
When inferior students hear of the Way
They have a big laugh.
But "not laughing" in itself is not sufficient to be called the Way, and therefore it is said: 
The sparkling Way seems dark
Advancing in the Way seems like regression.
Settling into the Way seems rough.
True virtue is like a valley.
The immaculate seems humble.
Extensive virtue seems insufficient.
Established virtue seems deceptive.
The face of reality seems to change.
The great square has no corners.
Great ability takes a long time to perfect.
Great sound is hard to hear.
The great form has no shape.
The Way is hidden and nameless.
This is exactly why the Way is good at developing and perfecting.
– Daode Jing, Verse 41i
i Translated by Charles Muller (LaoziMuller 2004) 
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Preface
The following thesis is the result of a struggle to find an answer to the question of what it 
means to be a human being in this world. It is a first attempt at an answer, if answer is the right 
word in this context; I would prefer to call it a starting point for further investigation. This quest 
for meaning was the central motivation for my explorations. But why stress the motivational 
aspect at the beginning of a scientifico-philosophical thesis? Should not a work of this kind be 
devoid of all motivation and be purely "rational"? 
Alas,  these  are  but  common  misconceptions  of  what  science  and  rationality  are  about. 
Science, as every human endeavor, is performed by living, breathing, in-the-flesh human beings, 
motivated by very human1 traits  such as  curiosity,  ambition,  creativity,  pleasure,  spirituality. 
Thus, whatever rationality and science are about, they are certainly never without vibrant  life. 
The task ahead is to take scientific results and try to integrate them into our understanding of life, 
meaning, and visions of the future. After all, inquiry into the nature of ultimate reality and the 
meaning of life are one of the main goals of philosophy.
With this set out, some more profane remarks are in order. In the thesis I will try to be very 
clear about core propositions, so that the reader may judge for herself2 if she wants to explore the 
argumentation of the relevant proposition or is prepared to accept it and move on to other topics. 
These propositions will be highlighted in the following way (the example even contains content):
Thesis in One Sentence
The goal of my thesis is to show that, contrary to what many people believe, a 
rational, naturalistic and neutral-monist view of the universe is not detrimental 
to, nay, even encourages creative thought and compassionate action.
I do not want to elicit the impression that these propositions are taken to be dogmatic in any 
way; the emphasis is for the sake of clearness alone, not for the sake of unassailableness.
Concepts should not only be named but rather be conveyed. Only if the concept as such is 
accessible to all participants of a discussion can real exchange of opinion begin. Therefore I will 
illustrate  some  important  ideas  via  graphics  –  seemingly  complicated  ideas  often  become 
obvious when visualized graphically; diagrams convey structural relationships more easily than 
words. Left-to-right/top-to-bottom text imposes a linearity on thought which does violence to the 
very essence of some concepts.
1 Nietzsche would have said "human, all too human."
2 I will switch between male and female pronouns for reasons of gender equality.
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 1.1 One Magisterium
What is this place called the World? How does it work? What is our role in it? Since the dawn of 
humankind, these questions have troubled thinking minds, and rightly so.
Answers were given. They were most often mythical, magical or religious in nature. The stories, 
religions and mythologies thus concocted tried to explain and give meaning to the short lives of 
humans by populating the world with noble spirits, evil wizards and demons, and capricious gods, 
all controlling nature and the fate of men. Another development were philosophical-anthropocentric 
systems replacing the magical view of the world in certain places and times.  This view placed 
humanity in the center of things, not spirits or gods. The ultimate truth was not sought in mystical 
domains of yonder, but in the hidden depths of the mind of man.
Today, there is a new view challenging to obsolete all others: the scientific world view. Rational 
thought and experiment together – neither alone suffices – are taken to give us knowledge – the 
ratio-empirical method can deliver knowledge, and it alone can deliver knowledge, regardless of the 
domain3 of inquiry.  Why this is so will be expounded below. That this bold claim should meet 
resistance from people representing the established mythic and religious views of the world should 
not come as a surprise.
But it is all the more astounding when adherents of the scientific method also join the ranks of 
the apologists. And so we must read with disbelieving eyes the the proclamation of non-overlapping 
magisteria (NOMA) by Gould, a late leading evolutionary biologist:
The lack of conflict between science and religion arises from a lack 
of overlap between their respective domains of professional expertise 
— science in the empirical constitution of the universe, and religion 
in the search for proper ethical values and the spiritual meaning of 
our lives. (Gould 1997)
Gould seems to think that there is a separation of a factual domain, where the scientific method 
is applicable, and another domain where totally different standards apply, namely those of religion.
The  problem is  twofold.  First  of  all,  most  religious  people  would  not  be  happy with  this 
fundamental split. They take their religion to be saying something about the way the world actually 
is: namely, to bring an example, that humans located in the world have souls; that is a claim about 
the factual nature of the world; it is an empirical claim. And while Gould is of the opinion that a 
3 A domain is a problem-dependent section of reality chosen for closer scrutiny.
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soul can't be scientifically refuted4, part of this thesis will show that for a scientifically minded 
person, the concept of a soul is indeed very implausible due to purely empirical considerations. So 
we see that science and religion make contrary claims to a purely factual questions about the nature 
of the world.
The second problem concerns ethics:  while  the empirical  aspect  of  science may not  derive 
immediate ethical  consequences,  knowledge  derived  by  science  certainly  has  indirect ethical 
consequences5. Taking scientific knowledge and certain requirements of rationality seriously will 
lead to ethical claims conflicting with those of (Western) religion. Exempting scientific knowledge 
from applying to the domain of ethics only holds if one has a very reduced view of science in the 
first place.
An eloquent refutation of the claim to separate magisteria is given by Eliezer Yudkowsky, so I 
will  not  try to duplicate  the effort  but  rather  include a  large quotation.  Yudkowsky shows that 
religions, as originally conceived, saw themselves as quite empirical enterprises:
The  earliest  account  I  know  of  a  scientific  experiment  is, 
ironically, the story of Elijah and the priests of Baal.
The  people  of  Israel  are  wavering  between  Jehovah  and  Baal,  so 
Elijah announces that he will conduct an experiment to settle it - 
quite a novel concept in those days! The priests of Baal will place 
their bull on an altar, and Elijah will place Jehovah's bull on an 
altar, but neither will be allowed to start the fire; whichever God is 
real will call down fire on His sacrifice. The priests of Baal serve 
as control group for Elijah - the same wooden fuel, the same bull, and 
the same priests making invocations, but to a false god. Then Elijah 
pours water on his altar - ruining the experimental symmetry, but this 
was back in the early days - to signify deliberate acceptance of the 
burden of proof, like needing a 0.05 significance level. The fire 
comes down on Elijah's altar, which is the experimental observation. 
The watching people of Israel shout "The Lord is God!" - peer review.
4 Gould:
But I also know that souls represent a subject outside the magisterium of 
science. My world cannot prove or disprove such a notion, and the concept of 
souls cannot threaten or impact my domain. (Gould 1997)
5 A step in the right direction is taken by Massimo Pigliucci:
The research program sketched [...] requires ethicists to become conversant 
in the language of science, especially of evolutionary biology, game theory, 
comparative anthropology, and neurobiology. Pigliucci (2003)
Haidt (2006) delivers a wonderful example with his book on how scientific evidence can inform thinking about age-old 
questions such as leading a life of eudaimonia, a core topic of ethics.
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And then the people haul the 450 priests of Baal down to the river 
Kishon and slit their throats. This is stern, but necessary. You must 
firmly discard the falsified hypothesis, and do so swiftly, before it 
can generate excuses to protect itself. If the priests of Baal are 
allowed to survive, they will start babbling about how religion is a 
separate magisterium which can be neither proven nor disproven.
Back  in  the  old  days,  people  actually  believed  their  religions 
instead of just believing in them. The biblical archaeologists who 
went in search of Noah's Ark did not think they were wasting their 
time; they anticipated they might become famous. Only after failing to 
find confirming evidence - and finding disconfirming evidence in its 
place  -  did  religionists  execute  what  William  Bartley  called  the 
retreat to commitment, "I believe because I believe."
Back in the old days, there was no concept of religion being a 
separate magisterium. The Old Testament is a stream-of-consciousness 
culture dump: history, law, moral parables, and yes, models of how the 
universe works. In not one single passage of the Old Testament will 
you find anyone talking about a transcendent wonder at the complexity 
of the universe. But you will find plenty of scientific claims, like 
the universe being created in six days (which is a metaphor for the 
Big Bang), or rabbits chewing their cud. (Which is a metaphor for...)
Back  in  the  old  days,  saying  the  local  religion  "could  not  be 
proven" would have gotten you burned at the stake. One of the core 
beliefs of Orthodox Judaism is that God appeared at Mount Sinai and 
said in a thundering voice, "Yeah, it's all true." From a Bayesian 
perspective that's some darned unambiguous evidence of a superhumanly 
powerful entity. (Albeit it doesn't prove that the entity is God per 
se, or that the entity is benevolent - it could be alien teenagers.) 
The vast majority of religions in human history - excepting only those 
invented  extremely recently  -  tell  stories  of  events  that  would 
constitute  completely  unmistakable  evidence  if  they'd  actually 
happened. The orthogonality of religion and factual questions is a 
recent and strictly Western concept. The people who wrote the original 
scriptures didn't even know the difference.
The  Roman  Empire  inherited  philosophy  from  the  ancient  Greeks; 
imposed law and order within its provinces; kept bureaucratic records; 
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and enforced religious tolerance. The New Testament, created during 
the time of the Roman Empire, bears some traces of modernity as a 
result. You couldn't invent a story about God completely obliterating 
the  city  of  Rome  (a  la  Sodom  and  Gomorrah),  because  the  Roman 
historians would call you on it, and you couldn't just stone them.
In contrast, the people who invented the Old Testament stories could 
make  up  pretty  much  anything  they  liked.  Early  Egyptologists  were 
genuinely shocked to find no trace whatsoever of Hebrew tribes having 
ever been in Egypt - they weren't expecting to find a record of the 
Ten Plagues, but they expected to find  something. As it turned out, 
they did find something. They found out that, during the supposed time 
of the Exodus, Egypt ruled much of Canaan. That's one huge historical 
error, but if there are no libraries, nobody can call you on it.
The Roman Empire did have libraries. Thus, the New Testament doesn't 
claim  big,  showy,  large-scale  geopolitical  miracles  as  the  Old 
Testament  routinely  did.  Instead  the  New  Testament  claims  smaller 
miracles which nonetheless fit into the same framework of evidence. A 
boy  falls  down  and  froths  at  the  mouth;  the  cause  is  an  unclean 
spirit; an unclean spirit could reasonably be expected to flee from a 
true prophet, but not to flee from a charlatan; Jesus casts out the 
unclean spirit; therefore Jesus is a true prophet and not a charlatan. 
This is perfectly ordinary Bayesian reasoning, if you grant the basic 
premise that epilepsy is caused by demons (and that the end of an 
epileptic fit proves the demon fled).
Not  only  did  religion  used  to  make  claims  about  factual  and 
scientific matters, religion used to make claims about  everything. 
Religion laid down a code of law - before legislative bodies; religion 
laid down history - before historians and archaeologists; religion 
laid down the sexual morals - before Women's Lib; religion described 
the forms of government - before constitutions; and religion answered 
scientific  questions  from  biological  taxonomy  to  the  formation  of 
stars. The Old Testament doesn't talk about a sense of wonder at the 
complexity of the universe - it was busy laying down the death penalty 
for women who wore men's clothing, which was solid and satisfying 
religious  content  of  that  era.  The  modern  concept  of  religion  as 
purely ethical derives from every other area having been taken over by 
better institutions. Ethics is what's left.
5
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Or rather, people think ethics is what's left. Take a culture dump 
from 2,500 years ago. Over time, humanity will progress immensely, and 
pieces of the ancient culture dump will become ever more glaringly 
obsolete. Ethics has not been immune to human progress - for example, 
we now frown upon such Bible-approved practices as keeping slaves. Why 
do people think that ethics is still fair game?
Intrinsically, there's nothing small about the ethical problem with 
slaughtering  thousands  of  innocent  first-born  male  children  to 
convince an unelected Pharaoh to release slaves who logically could 
have been teleported out of the country. It should be  more glaring 
than  the  comparatively  trivial  scientific  error  of  saying  that 
grasshoppers have four legs. And yet, if you say the Earth is flat, 
people will look at you like you're crazy. But if you say the Bible is 
your source of ethics, women will not slap you. Most people's concept 
of rationality is determined by what they think they can get away 
with; they think they can get away with endorsing Bible ethics; and so 
it only requires a manageable effort of self-deception for them to 
overlook the Bible's moral problems. Everyone has agreed not to notice 
the elephant in the living room, and this state of affairs can sustain 
itself for a time. Yudkowsky (2007a)
Another simplified sketch of the course of events leading to the idea of separate magisteria 
could go like this: the most important questions pressing human beings bear no delay; the stone age 
warrior is as much afraid of death as the modern business man. But in the dark of night people 
appear who tell of other worlds where there is no pain and no death6 – let us call them, for the 
moment,  priests. The priests gained power because they claim to hold the answers to existential 
questions, and before the advent of the scientific method, there was no organized movement of 
critical thinkers to challenge the dogmatic views of the current – at the respective time and place – 
religion. Indeed, without the knowledge we have today, the religions where even quite plausible. 
But  then the scientific  method arose,  and the priesthood sensed that  they were threatened.  The 
attempt to stifle science failed; a mutual agreement was reached, leaving power hierarchies in place: 
the scientific method should be used for things concerning this world, and religion concerns itself 
with the explication of another, more fundamental world: the separate magisteria had been created. 
Scientists agreed to this  contract because their  position was weak: they were confronted with a 
6 Religion has various functions: emotional comfort, explanation of mysterious facts, and reinforcement of social 
order among them. For discussion see Boyer (2002).
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powerful priesthood having steered the course of men and women for hundreds of years. But now 
the time has come to challenge this division. Power has shifted, and it is time to renegotiate old 
contracts.
People still  demand answers  to  their  questions regarding the meaning of  life,  the nature of 
reality; and many want answers that are not in obvious conflict with reason. Why should we not use 
our best method for gaining knowledge – the scientific method – for the most important questions 
we  face  as  sentient  beings?  Why  use  traditional  religious  knowledge  which  came  to  power 
contingently? The religions some of us hold today simply reflect the historical genealogy of events, 
and not some divine plan. In historical times, where large scale conversions to other religions still 
"happened"7;it may have been possible to believe that there is a "true" religion which everybody 
will sooner or later adopt. But no proponent of a major religion today, be it Christianity, Islam, 
Hinduism etc can seriously believe that we are converging to the "true" religion. 
So it seems that it is time to challenge the view of "separate magisteria". Reality – the world, the 
universe – does not care about what divisions human beings bring to bear on it. Reality, I contend, 
is  unified  in  a  stringent  way,  which  will  be  demonstrated  in  the  following  thesis  with  some 
examples. The scientific world view is essentially one of unification: one in which humans have 
truly arrived in the universe and are not split from it by an additional property such as a "soul" or 
"divine nature". There is only one world, and humans are a part of it; thus, science must address 
questions of meaning.
 1.2 The End of Philosophy or Never Ending Philosophy?
What does philosophy have to say in addition to science? Should it not, as religion, be mute in 
this day and age? Well, not if it restricts itself to certain topics – though it should be stressed that 
these topics do not make up "separate magisteria", as we saw above. It is rather that philosophy 
should aim to take a broader perspective on the world than the special sciences, which have settled 
into  niches of exploration. The philosopher John Heil markedly says what philosophy should not 
be:
Philosophy today is often described as a profession. Philosophers 
have  specialized  interests  and  address  one  another  in  specialized 
journals. On the whole, what we do in philosophy is of little interest 
to  anyone  without  a  Ph.D.  in  the  subject.  Indeed,  subdisciplines 
7 Charlemange, for instance, waged a fierce war against the Saxons – pagans – starting 772 which lasted over thirty 
years, including mass executions (Blutgericht von Verden) and deportations (Bradbury 2004, p. 22). Christianity was 
brutally enforced.
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within philosophy are often intellectually isolated from one another. 
The same could be said for most academic specialities. Historians, 
literary theorists, anthropologists, and musicologists pursue topics 
the significance of which would elude outsiders. What distinguishes 
philosophy is the extent to which philosophical problems are anchored 
directly  in  concerns  of  non-philosophers.  Philosophical  questions 
arise in every domain of human endeavour. The issues have a kind of 
universality that resists their being turned over to specialists who 
could be expected to announce results after conducting the appropriate 
investigations.
The professionalization  of philosophy,  together with  a depressed 
academic job market, has led to the interesting idea that success in 
philosophy should be measured by appropriate professional standards. 
In practice, this has too often meant that cleverness and technical 
savvy  trump  depth.  Positions  and  ideas  are  dismissed  or  left 
unconsidered because they are not comme il faut. Journals are filled 
with papers exhibiting an impressive level of professional competence, 
but little in the way of insight, originality, or abiding interest. 
Non-mainstream, even wildly non-mainstream, conclusions are allowed, 
even  encouraged,  provided  they  come  with  appropriate  technical 
credentials. Heil (2003, p. vii f)
Unfortunately, browsing through the journals of relevance reveals this analysis to be correct. So, 
what  should philosophy  be?  Ideally,  philosophy  should  be  the  unifying  science  –  not  only 
philosophy of  science,  which  is  a  specialized  subtask of  philosophy,  but  a  synthetic  enterprise 
generating knowledge that is then available for executive use in solving local and global problems 
which individual humans or the human species as a whole encounter. This work of integration needs 
to be done specifically. The specialist in the field has a focused skill-set essential for performing 
cutting-edge research in domains ever more remote from day-to-day life; he does not have the time 
nor the skill to perform integrative work.
Philosophy,  then,  could  be  called  the  discipline  of  applying  the  results8 of  scientific 
investigation to human beings in a reflexive and critical way. A division of this broad goal into more 
manageable subgoals may look like this:
8 Not the method: that would be sociology or psychology.
8
• Criticism  of  science:  Criticizing  the  methods  of  the  sciences,  examining  paradigms, 
improving the scientific process and exploring the nature of rationality. These activities are 
in the purview of philosophy of science and is where analytic philosophy can and does make 
excellent contributions.
• Synthesis: Unifying the knowledge of the scientific domains and incorporating philosophical 
reflections;  making sense  of  this  knowledge and what  follows  for  our  personal  lives  – 
performing the task of world view building (Aerts et al. 1994; Vidal 2007). Synthesis is the 
necessary  counterpoint  to  analysis.  Analysis  is  concerned  with  examination,  dissection, 
making distinctions– if one carries this process far enough, at the end one will necessarily be 
left with nothing. This is what happens in some parts of analytic philosophy: the point of no 
return is crossed and one is left in a fractured world. The way to knowledge is the middle 
way, a dialectic, if you like, between analysis and synthesis.9
• Ethics: What is a good life? How should we act? The scientific method refined by constant 
criticism delivers the best knowledge we can hope fore; it is then synthesized in the next 
step into a coherent whole. Finally, in taking account of self-reflexive processes and asking 
questions about what we  want, we arrive at – tentative – answers to ethical questions. If 
ethics  wants  to  strive  to  be  more  than  the  enforcement  of  contingent  power  structures, 
science is essential, to know both about what is possible in the world and how we ourselves 
work  as  psychological  human  being  –  gnothi  seauthon10. Of  course,  in  this  last  part 
philosophy  can't  be  completely  eclipsed  by  science,  because  science  is  first  of  all 
descriptive, and in ethics we seek normative principles; needless to say, going further than 
the results of science does not mean that we will abandon rationality; in a sense, rationality 
can carry us the last steps where science alone does not suffice. A core task of philosophy 
then is to create a viable ethics – a domain often deemed the privilege of religion. Under the 
rubric  of  ethics  philosophers  should  not  shy  away from criticizing  society,  culture  and 
religion.
Some words on the aspect of synthesis are in order. Interdisciplinary dialog is difficult – if not 
impossible – not for lack of enthusiasm, but because there are no common concepts with which to 
communicate.  An academic  discipline  introduces  someone into  a  conceptual  community –  one 
learns a shared way of carving up a particular domain of the world. This is not to be misunderstood 
9 The focus of my work is on the synthetic part.
10  “Know yourself”; allegedly inscribed in the forecourt at the Temple of Apollo in Delphi.
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as embracing some form of constructivism or relativism; it is rather a recognition of the trivial but 
necessary fact that if one develops sophisticated scientific theories capturing lawful processes in the 
world, they have to be communicated via linguistic entities – shortcuts into concepts – between 
human beings. 
Now,  in  some  disciplines  one  might  get  away  with  merely  learning  the  words  without 
understanding the concepts; that is, talking the talk and not walking the walk. At least that is the 
impression one is left with after reading some postmodern work. With science, it is different. The 
difficulty of technically and mathematically oriented disciplines is that one can't eschew learning 
the concepts behind the linguistic entities, mathematical notation for example, without missing the 
essence of the science itself.
Now, when somebody has immersed himself with great effort and years of study in a discipline, 
why should she also "understand" the concepts of other disciplines without going through similar 
eduction? Of course, there may be overlap – the jump from theoretical physics to mathematics is 
smaller than from psychology to solid state physics. But nevertheless – there is no shortcut to doing 
the actual learning, similarities among certain disciplines notwithstanding. Kuhn (1962) calls these 
things  the  "disciplinary  matrix"  of  a  scientific  community,  which  consists  of  symbolic 
generalizations, recognized as natural laws by the community, such as Newton's second law f=ma, 
shared models, values, and "exemplars", that is, paradigmatic solutions of the subdiscipline that 
serve  as  primitive  examples  for  solving  further  puzzles.  In  this  way,  scientists  with  a  shared 
paradigm constitute both a linguistic and a conceptual community.
Let us look at some eclectically chosen concepts from various disciplines:
Discipline Concept
Physics entropy
Information Theory entropy (different meaning!)
Cognitive Science connectionism
Philosophy compatibilism
Psychology affective state
Mathematics analytic function
Logic completeness
Biology Lamarckian evolution
10
If one lectures in front of a mono-disciplinary setting, one can employ the respective words11 
and rely on the audience understanding what you say, because a concept was associated with the 
word  in  their  education.  The  specialist  in  the  field  is  not  only  trained  to  exist  in  a  language 
community be regurgitating the appropriate words when paroled, but also knows which concepts 
stand behind them. But in an interdisciplinary setting, this approach does not work. It does not 
suffice to say that this or that concept exists and is well defined – if the concept is not cognitively 
present in the individual listener, merely uttering the words is as good as making random noises12. 
This situation demands a resolution, one which philosophers are predestined to deliver: with their 
training in conceptual analysis and the habit of tackling fundamental problems, philosophers are in 
a good position to break down scientific concepts in such a way as to quickly convey the essence of 
the  matter  in  interdisciplinary  or  public  contexts.  And  actual  understanding is  a  crucial 
distinguishing feature of science versus dogmatic enterprises: if science is presented authoritatively, 
dogmatically, without elaborating on the conceptual backdrop, it is no wonder that some people 
think that science requires belief just as religion does.
Heil expresses similar sentiments concerning the philosophy of mind:
I mention all this by way of calling attention to the absence of 
formal devices, appeals to purely modal notions like supervenience, 
and invocations of possible worlds in the chapters that follow. If it 
accomplishes  nothing  else,  my  decision  to  omit  such  technical 
trappings will certainly make the book more accessible to the non-
specialist  reader.  In  any  case,  the  philosophy  of  mind,  indeed 
metaphysics generally, is not — or ought not to be — a technical 
exercise. Philosophical theses should be expressible without reliance 
on specialized terminology; and I have tried my best to say what I 
have to say without resorting to such terminology. This strikes me as 
an important exercise for every philosopher. Too much can be smuggled 
in, too much left unexplained when we allow ourselves to fall back on 
philosophical jargon. (Heil 1998, p. xii f)
The tension between analysis and its jargon and synthesis, then, is also present in philosophy, 
albeit in a different guise. There are a myriad philosophical schools, asking deep questions, giving 
different answers, and often vehemently opposed to each other. But why should one be wrong and 
the other right? Is it not more likely that they simply concentrated on different aspects of a problem 
11 In other words: inter-column row jumps in the table above are not permitted.
12 A good account of this problem is given by Yudkowsky (2007b).
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or viewed a subject from different perspectives? Leibniz already found it more beneficial to look for 
synthesis than strife:
"Die Erwägung dieses Systems zeigt auch, dass man, wenn man den 
Dingen auf den Grund geht, in den meisten philosophischen Sekten mehr 
Vernunft entdeckt, als man zuvor geglaubt hat. […] Der größte Fehler, 
den man begangen hat, besteht in dem einseitigen Sektengeist, vermöge 
dessen man sich selbst borniert hat, indem man alle andren Meinungen 
verwarf." (Leibniz 1698) 
Maybe, when viewed from high enough, the perspectives begin to converge – when one can see 
why two seemingly contradicting positions are both right, new insight is acquired. What we should 
be  able  to  perform  is  "rapid  frame  switching"  –  that  is,  adopting  new  robust13 ontologies, 
frameworks, stratifications and perspectives as is required by circumstance. Seeming contradiction 
is then often resolved; some theories capture one aspect of a phenomenon better and vice versa; it is 
no shame to hold many theories tentatively at the same time. When in the history of philosophy and 
science did that insight get lost? 
Definitions and words should not concern us in our journey: we will develop concepts and give 
them names,  but  the important  thing is  the concept,  not the name.  Paul  Graham expresses my 
attitude vividly in his essay "How to do philosophy":
Words seem to work, just as Newtonian physics seems to. But you can 
always make them break if you push them far enough. I would say that 
this  has  been,  unfortunately  for  philosophy,  the  central  fact  of 
philosophy. Most philosophical debates are not merely afflicted by but 
driven by confusions over words. Do we have free will? Depends what 
you mean by "free." Do abstract ideas exist? Depends what you mean by 
"exist." Wittgenstein is popularly credited with the idea that most 
philosophical controversies are due to confusions over language. I'm 
not sure how much credit to give him. I suspect a lot of people 
realized this, but reacted simply by not studying philosophy, rather 
than becoming philosophy professors. (Graham 2007)
So, words are tools to designate facts, concepts and so on. I will try to make an effort to use 
these tools considerately and try to be very clear in my exposition, although it is never possible to 
eliminate all ambiguities for all readers. 
13  What a robust ontology is will be explained later on.
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But there is one sense in which the employed words are important: when we use words which 
are  widely  used,  we  necessarily  always  import  all  their  connotations;  and  these  connotations 
influence the way we subsequently reason about a problem. So while it is quite arbitrary if we call 
something "property A" or "property B", it is not arbitrary if we call something "clean" or "dirty", 
because the latter two words come with rich emotional associations.
I  would like to mention another task of philosophy,  which stands a bit  on its own, as it  is 
subservient  to  the  goals  above.  It  is  the  task  of  conveying  the  knowledge  garnered  in  the 
philosophico-scientific process both to scientists and to the general public, at respective levels of 
sophistication. In the current institutional setup this is only done in a haphazard way – mostly by 
scientists and philosophers writing popular expositions at the end of their career, with the occasional 
science journalist chiming in. But the process of "pushing" information is far more important than 
its neglect would suggest; not only to a democratic public so that it may make informed decisions in 
the political process; but also to the scientific community, which, it seems, is separated into "non-
overlapping magisteria" indeed.
This process of conceptual integration across disciplinary borders and the active propagation of 
results into the public sphere should, I think, be institutionalized as a core task of philosophy. This 
is a never-ending process which is at the heart of a critical and open society; never-ending because 
both the empirical knowledge and the methods of conceptual analysis grow and improve with time; 
and  each  time  desires  answers  given  in  its  time.  Philosophers  divest  themselves  of  this 
responsibility to their own detriment.
So, what we need is scientific philosophy – that is,  philosophy that respects well  supported 
empirical evidence. A scientific philosophy will never be completed; firstly, because our knowledge 
of  the  world  changes  and  new  knowledge  will  modify  our  theories.  Secondly,  because  our 
technology and environment, and, indeed, we ourselves, change so that different problems will be 
relevant at different times. A scientific philosophy will therefore never be a philosophia perennis – 
although  some  results  can  be  expected  to  be  more  stable  than  others.  The  commitment  to 
philosophy as a process – as a never ending journey of thought – is  the most important guard 
against dogmatism:
There is no completed philosophy. A closed system is as good as dead.
What must be ensured, of course, is that on this journey of change the possibility for change 
itself is not undermined. I will take a look at this important problem in section  2.5.4 .
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This,  then,  is  the answer to the question of the section title:  philosophy,  if  it  embraces the 
sciences instead of ignoring them, will not end, but is a never ending process. A "first philosophy" 
or  a  scientifically  ignorant  philosophy,  on the  other  hand,  has  no place  in  today's  science  and 
technology driven global society14.
 1.3 A Scientific Philosophy of Life
Mit Gedanken, die nicht aus der tätigen Natur entsprungen sind und 
nicht wieder aufs tätige Leben wohltätig hinwirken und so in einem mit 
dem  jedesmaligen  Lebenszustand  übereinstimmenden  mannigfaltigen 
Wechsel unaufhörlich entstehen und sich auflösen, ist der Welt wenig 
geholfen. (Goethe MR)
Alles Gescheite ist schon gedacht worden, man muß nur versuchen, es 
noch einmal zu denken. (Goethe WMW) 
It is time to be done with the general remarks and start to speak about the work at hand. The 
philosophy proposed here is one which can be lived; it should inform our every action, our every 
thought, our every living breath. The litmus test of a good philosophy is this: does it change the way 
we view the world, our life, and, ultimately and most importantly, the way we act? Beliefs we hold, 
even if they are not concerned with practical matters, should influence our actions in such a way 
that our actions better contribute to our goals. To deliver such a philosophy in today's complex 
world is, of course, beyond the ability of a single person. All the more so because a single person 
can only give a personal view from a certain time and place – a snapshot of his or her thinking, 
dependent on the idiosyncratic empirical knowledge available at that time; and while philosophy 
should also look beyond the current state of knowledge, an actionable philosophy should be more 
modest, lest it succumb to fantasy.
The core goal of my thesis will be to show that hard sciences like physics and neuroscience can 
integrate well with values important to human beings. When humans accept themselves as creatures 
of the universe, as parts of nature and not opposed to nature, and that consciousness, love, happiness 
14  A remark as to the divide in contemporary philosophy between the analytic and continental tradition is in order. I do 
not see this distinction applying to my work, as I want to arrive at practical answers to important questions – frankly, 
I don't care from which tradition a philosopher comes from; either she has something important to contribute or not; 
unfortunately, in today's philosophical climate such a disclaimer is important, as there are many philosophers who 
simply refuse to venture into the other tradition "a priori". One could say that I follow the analytic tradition in it's 
appreciation of the scientific method and reason, and the continental tradition in my "essayistic" writing style and in 
addressing existential questions, or, put less dramatically, worldview questions. If I draw on mythology and 
archetypes, I do not pretend to be a scholar in them or imbue them with any mystical meaning – they are rather 
metaphors for a precise scientific view which may not yet fully be in our reach.
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etc are constitutive of the material universe, and not an aspect of a god given soul tacked onto the 
world as an afterthought, humans will have finally arrived in the universe – they will have arrived 
home.
The thesis will have a close look at ontology – or meta-ontology – as I am convinced that to 
make sense of  the  world  you have to  get  your  ontology straight,  otherwise confusion will  not 
subside. High-level conceptual confusions have their roots in low-level ontological misconceptions. 
Again, Heil puts it best: 
Attempts to keep philosophy aloof from metaphysics are largely self-
defeating.  Whether  we  approve  or  not,  the  world  has  an  ontology. 
Theorists and theories of the world are themselves parts of the world. 
This homely complication is too often forgotten or ignored by those 
who regard the world as a construct. If the world is theory dependent, 
what  of  theories  themselves?  Do  these  stand  alone,  or  does  their 
existence depend in some fashion on other theories (‘theories all the 
way down’)? Whatever the story turns out to be it will include an 
ontology measurable against competing ontologies. […] I want only to 
note  the  inescapability  of  ontology.  We  can  suppress  or  repress 
ontological impulses. In so doing, however, we merely postpone the 
inevitable.  Honest  philosophy  requires  what  the  Australians  call 
ontological seriousness. […] The test of the overall view is not its 
derivability from uncontroversial truisms, but its power: the extent 
to which it enables us to make sense of issues we should otherwise 
find perplexing. Heil (2003, p. 1f)
The reader should,  after  reading the thesis,  be enabled to strive for a more rational,  happy, 
tolerant and critical life. The present work could be seen as a guide book and stepping stone to 
achieve the above mentioned goals – ample references will aid in this quest, as this text alone can 
only mark the beginning of a journey. Indeed, what I attempt here is only to set the stage for further 
investigations; investigations in which others hopefully will join. I can't and won't present a finished 
solution. The views propounded here should be seen as a vantage point and fulcrum for further 
explorations. This conception also has a drawback, for which I must apologize to the reader: the 
thesis is a travel guide into the land of rational analysis of the meaning of life. The pace will be 
brisk, and much argumentation will be offloaded into the references. This presumes, on the part of 
the reader, either that she is well read, or that she is willing to read lots of books, or – but I do not 
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recommend taking this option – that she is willing to accept some assertions just so. I am unhappy 
with this state of affairs, but it is unavoidable at the current time. 
Filling in  the details  into the  picture  painted here  with broad strokes  will  be the  task of  a 
lifetime. Nevertheless, I thought it important to present the big picture first, before concentrating on 
minor questions. I follow Drescher who engages a similar project but with a more analytic slant 
than mine:
Tackling  one  or  another  of  the  subjects  examined  here  is 
respectable. But assembling so many of them may seem grandiose, except 
perhaps for my sincere acknowledgement of the tentativeness of the 
endeavor. In any event, the latitude is not capricious — matters of 
fundamental  importance,  whether  about  physics  or  about  human 
consciousness, have ramifications that intertwine (or at least appear 
to), making it difficult to adequately address each such matter in 
isolation. And I am hopeful that at least some of the ideas I present 
along the way are novel, interesting, and even approximately correct. 
(Drescher 2006) 
Whereas today one cannot hope to encompass or even oversee all of the available information, 
which is increasing at an exponential rate, what I will try to do in this thesis is to take a global look 
at some pertinent results of science and see what they mean for our lives as human beings. The 
danger of a broad approach is superficiality; the promise is a synthesis. One can never, I think, have 
one without the other. 
Apart from the synthesis, do I expect to contribute something new? At the outset this was of 
course  my  intention  –  though  extensive  reading  has  robbed  me  of  the  illusion  that  this  were 
possible. As Strawson says:
My experience since I first lectured on the ‘mind-body problem’ in 
the late 1980s has been one of finding, piece by piece, through half-
haphazard  reading,  that  almost  everything  worthwhile  that  I  have 
thought  of  has  been  thought  of  before,  in  some  manner,  by  great 
philosophers in previous centuries (I am sure further reading would 
remove the ‘almost’). It is very moving to discover agreement across 
the centuries, and I quote these philosophers freely, and take their 
agreement  to  be  a  powerful  source  of  support.  Almost  everything 
worthwhile in philosophy has been thought of before, but this isn’t in 
any  way  a  depressing  fact  (see  p.  200  below),  and  the  local 
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originality that consists in having an idea oneself and later finding 
that it has already been had by someone else is extremely common in 
philosophy,  and  crucial  to  philosophical  understanding.  Strawson  & 
Others (2006, p. 184f)
And, on the referred page 200:
... to realize that there is really nothing radically new in the 
existing debate — nothing both new and true —, but this is a moment of 
illumination, not defeat. The fundamental positions in the mind-body 
debate have been marked out for a long time, and the quality of the 
present-day  debate  is  embarrassingly  lower  than  it  was  in  the 
seventeenth century.
It does not follow that there is nothing difficult and important 
left to  do; nothing  could be  further from  the truth.  When Pascal 
imagined someone charging him with lack of originality, he replied:
Let no one say that I have said nothing new: the organization of the 
subject matter is new. When we play tennis, we both play with the same 
ball, but one of us places it better. [Footnote 37: c1640-1662, §575. 
‘One might as well say that I’ve used old words’, he continued. For 
‘just  as  the  same  words  constitute  different  thoughts  by  being 
differently arranged, so too the same thoughts constitute a different 
body of work by being differently arranged’.]
The point is of great importance and holds for all the discursive 
arts and sciences, even if it has special force in philosophy. The 
object of philosophy is not just to state the truth in a domain where 
matters are often so very difficult, but to make it shine out. To 
think that Pascal’s dictum reflects badly on philosophy is comparable 
to thinking that the best science never produces new results; or like 
thinking that once someone had painted a picture of the Madonna and 
Child, or the Montagne Saint Victoire, there was no point in anyone 
else doing so.
Maybe, in philosophy, there is indeed nothing new under the sun; but it is important that every 
generation learns the ideas anew,  in  the vocabulary of the present  age.  Even if  everything has 
already been thought up by someone sometime, that does not spare us the necessity of repeating the 
thinking by ourselves.
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My intention, then, has reduced to placing the ball a little differently – only time will tell if it 
has also been placed better.
 1.4 Outline of Thesis
 1.4.1 Introduction
My thesis consists of three parts with regard to content: the first being on rationality and its 
import  in tackling all  questions facing us in our lives,  not only a reduced domain of scientific 
investigation; the second, metaphysical  in nature,  forming an essay on the nature of the world, 
especially as informed by the principles of rationality sketched in the previous part; and the third, 
applying the findings  of the previous  sections  to  sentient  agents (among them humans)  in  this 
universe.
I will argue that this takes nothing away from the richness of our lives, neither in the spiritual 
nor intellectual sense. The thesis wants to reduce resistance to science (Bloom & Weisberg 2007) by 
addressing  some  of  the  psychological  concerns  that  arise  when  people  are  confronted  with 
naturalism.
Another context in which you could view my thesis is “world view building”  (Aerts et al. 
1994). For a shorter overview, see Vidal (2007).
 1.4.2 On Rationality
I will not attempt to lay down “definite” methods of rationality, simply because I don't think 
they exist – that is, at any given moment and for a given person – simply because there is probably 
always something more to discover which will also change our perception of what it means to be 
rational. But for a person who has to decide, at a specific moment in space and time, there will be a 
current set of principles of rationality. In this sense, I will attempt to lay down the principles of 
rationality that have helped me arrive at the consequences of the metaphysical essay.
What about logic, probability theory, falsifiability etc? These are methods of reasoning which 
have  been  developed  over  time  and  which  all  have  their  merit.  Yet  deductive  logic  is  only a 
constraint – it says nothing about which premises to adopt (empirical science of course steps in at 
this moment to supply well-supported premises). Falsification is also only a constraint: it serves to 
weed out false theories, but underdetermination of theories by evidence sometimes leaves too many 
possibilities  remaining.  It  also  seems  to  hamper  scientific  progress  as  unorthodox  theories  are 
decried  as  “unfalsifiable”  a  priori.  Probability  theory  in  the  form  of  Bayesianism  offers  an 
interesting approach, but, for every tool of reasoning one can find a problem for which it won't 
work.
The question now arises: which method do we employ to decide which methods are rational 
and which ones are not (the meta-method)? Why use this rule and not that one? We need some 
answer, but giving a definite answer will immediately violate the first desideratum of not laying 
18
down final dogmatic rules. Thus, in this case, it is good to avoid premature formalization and stick 
with “fuzzy” words.
Our most helpful linguistic servants will be “open minded”, “skeptic” and “coherent”15. The 
trick is to leave the definition of these words to the acting community of scientists and researchers, 
who have to solve the problems at  their  hands, problems of which we may yet  not even know 
anything. At the end of the day, every individual is responsible to his intellectual honesty.
Delegating  this  responsibility  to  the  community  of  scientists  is  not  an  excuse  –  it  is 
unavoidable. “The price of freedom is eternal vigilance”16, and permanent active critical thinking 
can't be dogmatized or institutionalized. It is the curse of the enlightenment project that it will never 
be  completed.  But  the  least  we  can  do  is  to  try  to  improve  on  our  rationality.  As  such,  the 
enlightenment will also never be defeated, as long as there exist beings who enjoy the method of 
reason.
The topic of core interest to any student of rationality should be machine learning – the way 
we mechanize learning on uncertain data; by this, we make explicit the rules we use ourselves when 
encountering new data. “Expert knowledge” that is gained by long years of training, and called 
intuition in human beings, is nothing other than a finely trained Bayesian Brain (Friston & Stephan 
2007). The Copernican Principle (non specialness of one’s own situation) and invariance principles 
are  important,  Occam’s razor  being a  generalization of these ideas.  Other topics of interest  are 
embodiment  and situatedness  (Clark 2001) and cognitive biases  (Kahneman,  Slovic  & Tversky 
1982). I would also like to stress that emotionality is not opposed to rationality but rather an integral 
part of it (Sousa 2007).
I will argue that the rational approach is the best way to approach all questions facing us in 
our lives. Only by being rational can we extract as much information from our environments as 
possible; that is the domain of theoretical rationality. Our best way of gaining knowledge should 
quite naturally also influence our spirituality, our ethics, our view of the meaning of life and so on. 
It is important to apply the open, variable standards of rationality to all areas of interest to humans, 
not only to problems deemed “scientific” a priori.  I  will  especially challenge Gould's theory of 
“nonoverlapping magisteria” (Gould 1997) for science and religion. While we may not be able to 
lay down all principles of rationality, we can at least try to be as rational as we can – there is no 
virtue in doing worse on purpose.
Knowing more  is  not  only good for  thinking;  it  is  essential  for  acting:  the agent  centric 
approach is central for my view of rationality (Russell & Norvig 2003) (see also Hawkins (2004)). 
For individuals, knowledge means having a (hopefully) good mental model of the world: the closer 
to  the  actual  effective  factors  in  the  world,  the  more  potential  there  is  for  action  leading  to 
achievement  of  goals.  Ignorance  condemns  one  to  inaction  and  passivity.  Knowledge,  and 
especially technology as “embodied” knowledge, increases the possibility for action. The litmus test 
for knowledge – and philosophy – is this: does it change the way we view the world, our life, and, 
15 Consistency is a minimal criterion for philosophical thought (paraconsistent logics aside, their concern being better 
addressed by probability). Coherence is a stronger criterion than consistency.
16 Attributed to Thomas Jefferson; 3rd president of the USA (1743 - 1826) 
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ultimately and most importantly, the way we act? That is, do our world models influence our actions 
in the way they consistently indicate, or do we simply hold beliefs as beliefs (Dennett 2006)?
In the view presented in this thesis, rationality, as will be made clear, depends heavily on the 
physical world. The viewpoint of the thesis is strictly naturalistic and ontologically monistic (see 
more below). Naturalism and monism are adopted because of rational reasons themselves – this is 
not circular reasoning, but a necessary way of „bootstrapping“ into the world – a first move every 
cognitive  system has  to  make,  as  meaning is  built  up in  the  inside  of  a  system relative  to  its 
environment (Vollmer 1975). We see that rationality occupies a privileged position despite its heavy 
dependence on the existence of a natural world. In the end, the concepts are strongly entwined.
Will there be a last justification, a final foundation which everybody must accept? No – that 
would be reifying truth – the idea that somewhere there exists a magic box which contains a piece 
of paper, on which, in plain language for everybody to read are written the words: “The ultimate 
truth  is...”  I  adopt  the  pancritical  stance;  in  the  end,  there  can  be  no  justification  –  only  the 
Münchhausen Trilemma (Albert 1991): dogmatism, infinite regress or the vicious circle. The most 
benign form is to embrace the infinite regress and the circle (evading viciousness as possible) in a 
positive way: the goal is to be, at least, metacircularly consistent (Drescher 2006) that is, that the 
methods of reasoning proposed by the theory support the theory at the metalevel (up to infinity) 
instead of contradicting it when applied to themselves. And to avoid dogmatism we will be radically 
self-critical – we will examine our beliefs again and again; and – again.
I do believe that when we seek knowledge, that this knowledge represents something outside 
of us correctly. That is what we call truth. But we admit that we are fallible, so we will never claim 
to have arrived at the final, absolute truth, but rather that not all stories are equally good, and that 
some stories – notably those at which we have arrived by critical inquiry – are better than others, 
that is, they represent outside circumstances in a better way.
One big question remains: is instrumental rationality enough (Nozick 1993)? That is, having 
fixed goals, being rational means optimizing your ways of attaining these goals. But we humans are 
often not sure which goals we should pursue – happiness, spirituality, knowledge? Can all three be 
attained at once? We must apply our knowledge and rationality recursively to define our goals and 
utility functions. What do we really want? This can best be found out by knowing what we are; our 
goals can then best be reached by also knowing how the world works. This leads to the concept of 
wisdom.
 1.4.3 Metaphysics
I will make two commitments: to naturalism, and to monism (see above). Naturalism is the 
understanding that the world is not a supernatural place (Sukopp & Vollmer 2007). A demarcation 
towards religions and superstitions positing entities which are not subject to “natural” laws springs 
to mind, but this raises the very question of what a “natural law” is. In popular culture for instance, 
vampires, which classify as supernatural entities, also obey laws, but different ones than humans in 
the “natural” world. It is for instance not possible for a vampire to survive in sunlight, which is 
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quite lawful of and by itself.
The supernatural is actually never deemed lawless. The crucial difference between naturalism 
and supernatural thinking then seems to be that there are separate realms in a supernatural world 
view – entities belong to different realms, and they are governed (exclusively?) by the laws of their 
realm. So the central claim I make in this thesis is that naturalism, in any non-trivial or question-
begging sense,  must  mean that  there  are  no separate  realms – neither  for  spirits,  gods,  ghosts, 
vampires or minds. So the naturalism I propose here is very closely related to monism.
Monism, the doctrine that there is certain sense of oneness about seemingly differing subject 
matters, is here proposed in a radical form: the oneness of the world, indifferent to categories of 
human inquiry and categorization. Central to my thesis is mind-body monism, the idea that mind 
and matter are not distinct, but different aspects of the same thing (Strawson 2006). What is easily 
dispensed with is a Cartesian substance dualism, but with non-reductive property-dualism, things 
are not so clear. The position I take is that of Russellian neutral monism.
The  core  metaphysical  assertion  of  the  thesis  is  that  ontological  stratifications  can  be 
variously drawn and always come at a price (Smith 1996); that ontic structural realism reduces this 
price (Ladyman et al. 2007; Esfeld 2009a) and that levelism is false and lies at the heart of many 
philosophical  errors  (Heil  2003).  Dispositional  and  causal  structure  are  presumed  to  be 
fundamental.
Considerations  from  philosophy  of  mind  (Putnam  1975;  Dretske  1995) lead  us  to  the 
astonishing conclusion that neither meaning nor qualia are in the head. Meaning and qualia come 
from causally induced representations of the world. This insight is also bolstered by the concepts of 
embeddedness and situatedness from cognitive science; see especially Clark & Chalmers (1998).
How can matter  configurations  derive  meaning  from other  matter  configurations?  A first 
tackling of the problem can be found in Smith (1996) – the relevant process is registering, which 
proceeds through connection and disconnection – abstraction is  then seen as a violent  but also 
creative act of information loss on which new things can be built.
One important point I would like to stress is that the ontological pluralism proposed in this 
thesis  is  not a  relativism in  the  philosophical  sense  of  “anything  goes”.  The  present  position 
occupies a middle ground – it views the world as an open creative universe combined with lawful 
constraints, which are a precondition for stability and continuity,  without which there would be 
nothing indeed.
Is the view proposed here reductionist? We should discern two levels: the ontological versus 
the  epistemological  (other  distinctions  are  possible  too).  Epistemology  is  concerned  with  the 
question  of  knowledge,  and  is  thus  deeply  related  to  understanding.  We  can  only  understand 
systems at the right level of abstraction – not too low, not too high. Thus, the special sciences will 
always have a place of their own, serving to understand high-level phenomena at a level which 
makes sense to us human beings. But understanding, happening in minds and thus part of our being, 
is only a small subset of all being (the ontological realm). In the ontological realm, we should be 
quite satisfied with being reductionist; but not in the sense of giving one description pride of place 
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(for instance particle physics instead of molecular chemistry), but rather in the sense of commitment 
to the ultimate unity of the world.
I  think  complexity  science  will  shed  much  light  on  these  issues,  showing  how complex 
systems result from simple laws. We can then call this phenomenon weak emergence (Bedau 1997), 
which is quite acceptable as it does not introduce additional ontological levels.
 1.4.4 On Persons
This part will, surprisingly, be rather short, as the results will “pop out” for free after the work 
in  previous  parts.  Oftentimes  conclusions  from  science  are  not  applied  to  human  beings  (for 
instance, to preserve “free” will, see below). 
The approach I take is different: humans will not occupy any special pride of place. This for 
the simple reason that there is no clear cut distinction between humans and the world – humans are 
simply part of the world, not extraneous to it. This may be most easily seen by considering the 
development of technology, which will soon be used to change the very nature of who we are. 
Prosthetics are one current application, nanotechnology and molecular biology are contenders on 
the horizon promising a wide variety of further possibilities to interact with and change „human 
nature“ (Berger & Glanzman 2005).
The core driving ideas of the preceding inquiry – rationalism, naturalism and monism – will 
lead to certain insights into the nature of persons and identity. Some of these consequences have 
already been pointed out in the previous literature (Parfit 1984; Noonan 2003), and I would like to 
add to  the  discussion,  especially  in  relation  to  the  qualia-problem also  addressed  by  Chalmers 
(1996a).
Consciousness  and qualia,  in  my view,  are  not  a  prerogative  of  humans,  but  result  from 
certain matter configurations (Koch & Tononi 2008). A more basic form of qualia will be attributed 
to all configurations. We see immediately that humans are only a subset of possible persons and this 
forces  us  to  rethink  our  place  in  the  universe.  Furthermore,  ethics  will  not  require  persons  as 
subjects, but qualia bearers. 
The first ethical category are q-beings, qualia beings (including non-persons), which can be 
targets of ethical concern . Persons will be defined as q-beings satisfying certain criteria. P-beings 
(persons) are targets of ethical norms and enjoy full self-ownership (More 1997). There will also be 
a category of n-beings that are not full persons (children for instance). This is certainly the most 
delicate  category,  as  these n-beings  do not  yet  possess  self-ownership but  should be guided to 
mature self-hood, as opposed to q-beings which will never become a person (such as a toad, for 
instance). Thus the “n” in n-being stands for “nurture” – the correct attitude to adopt to not yet fully 
mature beings which have the potential  to become persons. I would like to stress that  n-beings 
should not be considered in any way less valuable as p-beings; they only do not yet enjoy full self-
ownership due to obvious reasons (not having completed cognitive development, for instance).
If we assign ethical value to q-beings, there must be criteria for deciding what has qualia 
meriting  ethical  consideration and what  not  (Chalmers  1996b).  An interesting  approach can be 
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found in  Tononi (2004). He purports to measure relative information integration as an empirical 
measure of consciousness. His assumptions conform especially well with the metaphysical positions 
adopted in the current work.  This all  leads  to an ethical  conception which avoids any form of 
discrimination according to non-relevant criteria.
Furthermore,  it  follows  from the  metaphysics  that  the  ethics  propounded  here  will  only 
contain hypothetical imperatives, not categorial ones.
A core claim is that there is no essential self, no ghost in the machine; but that the self arises 
as a matter of representation (Metzinger 2003; Sloman & Chrisley 2003; Pollock 2008).
Finally, the concept of free will, where the word “free” actually means anything, is shown to 
be  largely  incoherent:  it  presupposes  the  mentioned  disconnection  of  humans  in  regard  to  the 
universe. I will offer a different concept, optimal will, to replace “free will”. Achieving optimal will 
is a difficult process; but one that is worth pursuing and which will achieve that what (in the limit) 
philosophers probably have in mind when speaking of “free” will (see Pereboom (2001a) for a view 
very related to mine).
 1.4.5 Conclusion 
The ideas which have been expounded above may seem strange to modern ears; but they find 
resonance in ancient texts such as the Dao De Jing –  Smullyan (1977) offers a light-hearted and 
unconventional  introduction.  These ideas  just  go against  deeply entrenched Western  prejudices, 
stemming from Aristotelian and Judeo-Christian roots; prejudices which have come in conflict17 
with science and should be abandoned.
In the universe meaning arises only in relation to the environment. That does not make it 
relative in a nihilistic way, but rather in an exploratory way. We know that here and now, certain 
sets of values befit us and our situation. But it is also possible to transcend them, and the more we 
transcend our current limitations the different our values will become.
We should therefore proceed with Erkenntnisoptimismus – the willingness to know, to learn, 
to change, to understand, to help, and, in all that, never forgetting to be happy (Haidt 2006). We 
should strive to build ever more towers of abstraction (ideas, technology) which enable a richer 
experience  of  life.  In  closing,  a  deeply rational,  naturalistic  view of  the  universe  leads  not  to 
despair, but to hope and to a vision for the future. It seems that we indeed live in the best of all 
worlds (Leibniz 1710).
17 It may be that these very roots gave rise to science in the first place. Nonetheless, now they have become a burden.
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 2.1 Introduction
The goal of the present chapter will not be to define or lay down definite rules for what it means 
to be rational. That is well beyond the scope of a thesis, and, I think, beyond the scope of current 
philosophy.  The  rationality  advocated  here  should  also  not  be  viewed  in  the  tradition  of  the 
rationalism18 of Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza, who are more aptly called intellectualists (Bartley 
1984, p. xxvi). The approach advocated here may best be called ratio-empiricism (Bunge 2006); but 
the word is a bit awkward, so I will use rationality and ratio-empiricism interchangeably in the text. 
Rationality is  a  judicious mixture of empiricism and reason,  inseparably intertwined.  Disregard 
empiricism, and reason loses its grounding in the world and will drift off into the world of poets and 
fantasts;  empiricism alone leads into the strange dream-landscapes of phenomenology and anti-
realism; both approaches may lead to idealism19. The middle way – reason grounded in the real 
world – is the one I take in this thesis20.
The goal of this chapter is firstly to lay down, in a heuristic fashion, what I do and don't mean 
with rationality; and, secondly, to connect with the relevant literature. "Rational" is one of those 
words  which probably possesses  different  overtones  and connotations  for  each reader.  For  this 
purpose, a clarification of what is meant by "rational" is in order.
I will try to both look at the prerequisites for rationality and to home in on core aspects of what 
it actually means to be rational. My thoughts are heavily influenced by artificial intelligence (AI) 
research, which has made more advances on the topic of cognition in recent years than much of the 
armchair philosophizing on the nature of reason and intelligence before. That is the case because it 
18 Seventeenth century rationalism suffered from ascribing too much reliance on the power of introspection and a 
conception of disembodied reason, which allowed it to engage into flights of pure fantasy which were nevertheless 
presented as certainties. Funnily enough, pure empiricism can also degrade into anti-scientific irrationality quite 
quickly, because it puts too much emphasis on the idiosyncrasies of the human sense organs. The abyss into which 
empiricism is in danger of falling is skepticism. For a truly rational world view, it is absolutely essential to take both 
perception and reason into account and not to concentrate on one or the other aspect alone.
19 Idealisms are a form of madness. But that is for another day.
20 One could call it the scientistic stance:
The scientistic stance […] incorporates elements of both empiricism and 
materialism. It retains some features of empiricism, namely the disdain for 
demands for explanation, and their satisfaction by posit, and the hostility 
to non-naturalistic metaphysics. These are just what make empiricism amenable 
to the secularist who regards the religious picture of reality as empirically 
ungrounded metaphysics posited only to explain the existence of the world, 
the meaning of human life and the persistent mythologies of certain cultures. 
From materialism, scientism takes the idea that we should have metaphysical 
picture of the world to discipline scientific methodology, and science and 
education policy, and it should be the one that incorporates and is most 
well-supported by the scientific image. […] According to the above, the true 
empiricist and materialist stances are compatible and their synthesis is a 
scientistic and secular worldview. (Ladyman Forthcoming) 
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is  very  easy to  fool  ourselves  about  our  mental  capabilities,  introspection  being  a  notoriously 
unreliable companion in the quest for self-knowledge. On the other hand, when trying to actually 
build something which shows intelligent behavior, we are forced to think clearly about the most 
subtle of issues. 
To be able to talk of rationality in the sense of the present text, three conditions have to be met:
• Goals
Without  goals,  there  can  be  no  rationality.  This  is  the  case  both  for  theoretical  as  for 
practical rationality. Theoretical rationality concerns rational belief formation, and practical 
rationality concerns right action, given desires and beliefs. For instance, truth is a goal for 
those who seek knowledge; others will settle for empirical adequacy21. A general goal for 
people in everyday life is to acquire beliefs which give meaning to one's life, irrespective of 
their  truth  value.  These  goals  will  influence  the  rationality  of  acquiring  further beliefs 
heavily. For someone interested in truth other items of knowledge will be relevant than for 
someone  who  wants  to  maximize  other  cognitive  values.  
Similarly for practical rationality: what seems right for us to do in certain situations depends 
on the goals and desires that drive us. In human affairs, goals are often implicit, such as the 
goal of general happiness, and thus not noticed consciously by the actors, as opposed to 
more explicit goals such as earning money, eating when hungry etc. Negative goals are also 
possible goals, such as not wanting to live anymore. As human beings, we have the ability, 
at least sometimes, to reflect on ourselves and our goals. The most important question is of 
course which goals to adopt? The pursuit of this question – and the arrival at and adoption of 
answers – is usually called wisdom. Self-reflective agents and goal-reflective agents are 
special cases of agents, and ideally humans should strive to be of this sort. For the moment 
we can adopt a simplistic approach here, considering that goals such as happiness, freedom 
from pain, satisfying social relationships and so on are innate to humans. The first tenet of 
rationality is: without goals, there can be no rationality.
• Agency
As there are no disembodied goals, beliefs and actions, contrary to idealist conceptions of 
the world, we posit  a new abstraction,  an entity which has goals  and beliefs and which 
21 Children are fascinated by the world, they want to become scientists because they want to know how the world 
works – they are looking for the truth. It takes a philosophy degree to lose this interest in the world and settle for 
empirical adequacy.
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performs actions: an agent. Also, contrary to Aristotelian metaphysics, in which everything 
may  be  seen  to  strive  towards  its  final  cause,  we  will  not  speak  of  agents  of  little 
sophistication  as  trying to  achieve goals.  A stone,  a  bridge,  a  house  – here there is  no 
question of rationality. Our requirement on agents is that of material entities of sufficient 
complexity.  We  need  not  concentrate  on  the  question  of  how  much  sophistication  is 
sufficient; for the time being, we will be satisfied with the sophistication of humans and 
maybe higher mammals. This, then, is our second tenet of rationality: there is no rationality 
without an agent.
• Environment
But now that we have introduced agents, the next question immediately arises: where is this 
agent located? The agent has to be situated in an environment – the alternate case, that the 
agent has no environment, could be fulfilled if the agent were a universe of its own. This 
would quickly destroy our project of defining rationality in a sensible way; as the universe 
does not have to react to anything outside itself, and can not acquire any beliefs about things 
outside itself – an agent which encompasses the entire universe can maximally introspect 
and draw rational inferences, but nothing much of our agent concept would be left. So, to be 
rational,  we  require  an  environment  in  which  the  agent  is  embedded.  It  is  about the 
environment  that  the  agent  wants  to  form beliefs,  it  is  about  himself  in  relation to  the 
environment  that  the  agent  has  goals,  and  it  is  on the  environment  that  the  agent  acts. 
Rationality,  again,  is  not  disembodied:  it  depends  essentially  on  the  environment.  The 
environment for us humans is the physical world, the universe. What this environment is 
like  will  concern  us  in  the  metaphysical  analysis;  it  is  of  utmost  importance  as  this 
environment defines which goals are possible and desirable for us. I would like to raise an 
important point at this stage already: that the distinction between environment and agent is 
perspectival and does not represent a fundamental ontological truth about the world.
So, our preconditions for rationality are these:
• Goals
• Agents
• Environment
Firstly,  we  will  turn  to  most  simple  of  the  three  preconditions  for  rationality,  agents.  The 
environment and the goals both merit their own chapter.
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 2.2 The Agent Perspective
Here I will present a simplified model for what it means to be an agent, which will then be our 
working model for the rest  of the thesis. It  will  be a  handle to which we can attach our other 
concepts. I will adopt the model presented in Russell & Norvig (2003) which is quite modular and 
adaptable for numerous purposes. An agent, as far as the following discussion is concerned, is an 
entity which has some degree of "separation"22 from its environment, which receives input from the 
environment via perceptors and is able to act on the environment via actuators.
The basic definition of rationality will be taken in spirit of the agent based approach:
What is rational at any given time depends on four things:
• The performance measure that defines the criterion of success
• The agent's prior knowledge of the environment
• The actions that the agent can perform
• The agent's percept sequence to date
This leads to a definition of a rational agent:
For each possible percept sequence, a rational agent should select an 
action that is expected to maximize its performance measure, given the 
evidence provided by the percept sequence and whatever built-in knowledge 
the agent has. (Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 35 f)23
Space does not permit a full discussion of the agent-model; the reader is kindly referred to the 
excellent text of Russell and Norvig for further details. For present purposes, a sketch of the most 
important points must suffice.
The  performance  measure  can  be  either  intrinsic  to  the  agent  or  given  by  external 
circumstances.  In  the  human  case,  we  have  intrinsic  measures  (e.g.  happiness)  and  external 
measures (e.g. workplace evaluation, which then impacts intrinsic measures). We can equate the 
22 Again: this generalization will be relativized in non-trivial way in the metaphysical part of the thesis.
23 As mentioned in the introduction of this section, this basic model is much more conducive to a clear analysis of 
human rationality than the wide ranging philosophical discourse on the topic, which is still largely preoccupied with 
fighting historically received misconceptions. This is not to say that the philosophical discourse is negligible – it will 
occupy us in due time; it is just that it is not as conceptually clear as the agent-based approach devolved from AI-
research.
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performance measure with the agent's utility function – an utility function represents the agent's 
internal evaluation, that is, intrinsic measure, and that is what we are primarily interested in. The 
utility function assigns numbers to the ordering of preferences of an agent. I will not commit to 
utility theory or decision theory in this  thesis in any paradigmatic way;  there lie pitfalls  which 
would require a thesis of its own24. Nothing special hinges on the adoption of a specific model of 
rationality here.
The prior  knowledge and the  percepts  represent  the agent's  knowledge.  Prior  knowledge is 
acquired by previous experiences, and is  made possible by the agent architecture providing the 
preconditions  for  experience,  to  add  a  little  Kantian  flourish.  In  animals  the  preconditions  for 
knowledge are embodied in the morphology of their bodies shaped by natural selection. 
The  percepts  are  due  to  subconscious  preprocessing  functions  filtering  the  highly  dynamic 
inflow of sensory data from the environment. Filtering occurs at many places: the sense organs 
themselves and their physical makeup, and, to take animals as examples, nerve excitations and brain 
processes performing evaluations higher up in the cognitive chain. 
A rational agent, would then, given his preferences, and given the actions he can perform, act in 
such a way as to maximize his utility function given all the knowledge he currently possesses. Let 
us have a closer look at such a utility-based agent:
24 The literature is populated by paradoxes such as the St. Petersburg paradox, which expounds the problems of infinite 
expected payoff (Bernoulli 1738) (see Baron (2008) for a current exposition), utility monsters which monopolize 
utility (Nozick 1974) and repugnant conclusions which distribute utility so much that it is beyond recognition (Parfit 
1984). These are problems for specific theories of rationality, not for a comprehensive take on rationality per se – 
after all, solutions to the problems will again have to conform to standards of rationality.
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The utility-based agent model is attractive because it comes at a level of abstraction that is ideal 
for further discussion. The agent, in addition to sensors for receiving percepts and the ability to 
perform  actions  via  its  actuators,  has  an  internal model  of  the  world,  which  does  not  only 
correspond to current percepts but also to background knowledge25, and, which is, most importantly, 
not static26. The agent needs to have representational capacity of a certain sophistication to form 
complex  internal  models  –  that  is,  it  must  have  physical  subsystems  which  allow  complex 
encodings  (in  humans  this  functionality  is  supplied  by  the  brain,  but  things  can't  always  be 
separated so easily – more on that below).
The  agent  has  ideas  of  which  laws  govern  the  dynamics  of  the  world,  that  is,  its  time 
evolution27. In its considerations of the world's time evolution, the agent need not only take into 
25 That is, innate knowledge and prior percepts integrated into a model. The possibility of building models in our brain 
is due to our evolutionary heritage, more on that in section 2.3.1.
26 In the diagram, rectangles represent internal states in the current decision process and ovals represent background 
information used for this concrete process – they are, of course, also encoded in internal agent states. 
27 This incidentally highlights the fact why scientific inquiry is so important: science supplies the laws of dynamic 
world evolution, and the better the agent's internal representation of the dynamic rules of world evolution, the 
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Illustration 1: Utility-based agents (Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 52)
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account the dynamic laws which evolve the current state into further states, but also how his actions 
would influence the world – an instance of counterfactual reasoning:
if I would do A, then, in conjunction with world evolution E, B would happen
if I would do C, then, in conjunction with world evolution E, D would happen
The agent can form various plans, and then needs to compute the possible outcomes of his plans 
conditioned on probabilities representing the uncertainty of the future.
if I would do A, then, in conjunction with world evolution E, B would happen with probability 10%
if I would do C, then, in conjunction with world evolution E, D would happen with probability 50%
The assignment of probabilities will most often involve guesswork – based on intuitions which 
are the result  of previous experience (see more on intuition and how it  relates to rationality in 
section 2.4.2). The agent then has to evaluate the possible outcome states for utility and implement 
those actions which maximize utility.
So, to sum up, the agent has the following at its disposal:
• an internal model of the world, encoding its current state; the current state is derived from 
percepts and background knowledge
• dynamic laws governing the evolution of the world state;  ideally derived from (at  least 
indirect) empirical observations
• the ability to form plans, that is, construct actions sequences that impact the world and have 
different outcomes
• evaluation of the outcomes according to the agent's internal measure of utility, taking into 
account the likelihood of the success of the plans; not every plan has equal likelihood of 
successful completion.
A simple example shows this framework in action:
Example1:
Percepts: table, cup of water
World model: tables and cups and water are objects behaving according to "folk" physics; where "folk"  
physics stands for the dynamic world evolution laws the agent has internalized
further ahead it can reliably evaluate action outcomes.
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Utility: the agent is thirsty, and would like to stop being thirsty, because not being thirsty is 
intrinsically valuable for the agent, thanks to evolution.
Planning: Plan A: do nothing. That would not change situation. 
Plan B: If the agent would pick up the cup and drink the water it would not be thirsty 
anymore.
Decision: implement Plan B, as it has greater utility.
An important extension of the utility based agent is the learning agent (Russell & Norvig 2003, 
p. 53). The details of that agent model need not concern us here. The reason why I mention it is that 
I would like to stress that no aspect of the agent – neither the utility function, the world model nor 
any other aspect need be static. All modules are available for  updating via learning. Learning is 
simply  the  process  of  changing  the  inner  structure  of  the  respective  module  (i.e.,  adaptation) 
dependent on outer certain stimuli. More on this in section 2.6.1.
A human agent differs in many regards from the simplified utility based agent sketched above28 
– but unfortunately often to the worse. Humans, for instance, often do not know how to maximize 
their utility – we perform actions which make us unhappy in the long run because of short term 
benefits. Humans are often guided by unconscious patterns and rules, so that they seem more like 
agents which have fixed scripts and action potentials assembled in a haphazard way available for 
certain stimuli, rather than being full-fledged utility-based agents, this being due to our evolutionary 
brain architecture. Being rational – or, at least, trying to be as rational as possible – is the attempt to 
overcome this state of affairs and move into the direction of the utility-based agent.
Anyway, the simple agent model above supplies us with enough of a scaffolding to support the 
discussion of rationality in the rest of this chapter. And that is why we now move on.
 2.3 Natural Rationality
 2.3.1 Bootstrapping
The essential philosophical, ontological and epistemological problems which have concerned 
philosophers for the past millenia are all deeply connected to the fact that we have to bootstrap 
ourselves into  knowing, also expressed by the platitude that "you have to start somewhere". Our 
goal will be a pragmatic one: to reason in this world, not in all possible worlds.
28 An illustrative attempt to model the human mind is the H-CogAff architecture developed by a team in Birmingham 
around Aaron Sloman. A diagram can be found on the web: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/fig/your.mind.png. An 
overview of the model is given in Sloman (2008).
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In a sense, Descartes' "cogito ergo sum" is still our starting point in the bootstrap, although we 
may choose to use less contentious words such as "perceptio ergo sum". So, let us accept that our 
awareness evidently guarantees our existence; skeptics who deny even this29 are beyond reach.
There is of course a little problem tucked away in our being thinking and perceiving beings: 
how it is possible that we can perceive and think in the first place. The underlying problem was 
clearly recognized by Kant, who discerned time and space as preconditions for perceiving and the 
categories as preconditions for concepts and higher thought (Kant 1781). With Darwin's theory of 
evolution and its modern synthesis (Huxley 1942; Mayr 1993; Mayr & Provine 1998) we can take 
the mystery out of the  a priori30: the innate or a priori for the individual represents phylogenetic 
learning,  which  is  of  course  a  posteriori on  the  species  level.  The  a  priori  of  an  individual 
represents the adaptation of a population tracking its environment. The process of evolution delivers 
the initial bootstrap – we do not come into the world without a history. We are all caused beings, 
forged since the beginning of time. For a detailed account of evolutionary epistemology see Vollmer 
(1975); Vollmer (2003). The problem of realism, which remains, as evolutionary fit need not be the 
kind of fit necessary for semantical truth, will be addressed in section 2.9.5.
A critic  will  simply point  out  that  we can't  avoid  circularity by pointing to  the process  of 
evolution, which is itself known to us only a posteriori. This is true, but I do not consider it harmful. 
Not every circle is vicious, and however we construct our knowledge, we have to presuppose one 
thing  or  other.  The  main  point  of  criticism launched against  the  phylogenetic  a  posteriori  will 
certainly be the theoretical underpinnings of the theory of evolution; but there are theories which 
gain plausibility quickly simply due to logical reasons alone and others that need a wide range of 
empirical supporting evidence. The theory of evolution is of the former kind, the theory of relativity 
of  the  latter.  Einstein's  theory  of  relativity  is  generally  accepted,  despite  being  highly 
counterintuitive  and  needing  experimental  verification  of  the  sort  not  easily  accessible  to  the 
layman.  To  understand  special  relativity,  one  has  to  have  mathematical  concepts  of  a  certain 
sophistication at  one's  disposal,  those representing the non-trivial  theoretical  background of the 
theory. Contrariwise, the theory of evolution is heavily contested by certain groups, despite its being 
more easily grasped and with less theoretical assumptions than the theory of relativity. The moment 
we have heredity, variability and selection31, evolution is a fact of logic. Everybody can check this 
29 And I have met them.
30 Kant's Critique (1781) preceded Darwin's On the Origin of Species (1859) by close to eighty years.
31 And it is difficult to deny these three processes, even for the die-hard creationist.
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with simple computer simulations32. So, let us for the moment accept evolution as the bootstrapper 
and look at the process of bootstrapping itself.
A short account of how a bootstrap works on a computer may illuminate the analogous problem 
for human beings; the account below is  to  be seen metaphorically.  A computer  is  made out  of 
physical parts, the hardware. But what makes it so useful as a tool is that it is programmable. Being 
programmable means that one can direct the causal flow of the machine without actually having to 
rewire it physically; the instruction of the machine is performed be inputting a certain sequence of 
symbols. 
To this  end,  the computer  need be prepared to be able to  accept the input  of symbols  and 
subsequently use them to direct its own calculations. That is, we need a bridge from software (the 
symbols which a human enters) to hardware. An oversimplified sketch will do: computers today 
have  a  BIOS,  the  basic  input  output  system,  which  are  basic  code  instructions  specific  to  the 
machine architecture and stored on a memory chip on the mainboard, a central part of a computer's 
hardware. When the computer is turned on, electric current begins to flow, at first following the 
physical pathways present in the machine; the machine is set up in such a way that the basic code of 
the BIOS is activated and get control of the machine, by "directing" electric flow through switching 
gates. The BIOS now "recognizes" the hardware, such as video card and hard disk, and from the 
latter further instructions, such as operating system code, can be read. The machine is escalating 
levels of complexity which it can process. When the operating system is loaded into active memory, 
the system is ready to interpret user input, produce output, operate on data etc. 
Only the  laws  of  physics,  here  especially  electromagnetism are  at  work;  the  design  of  the 
computer hardware and the BIOS code are  structural causes for the correct operation. The BIOS 
and the hardware were of course designed by human beings, who began with simple principles, 
gathered increasing know-how, and organized this know-how into structure visible as hard- and 
software.  We  can  trace  a  causal  history  from every  existing  computer  back  to  the  first  timid 
experiments  of  pioneers  with  vacuum tubes  and  electric  wire.  Nowhere  does  "magic"  enter  – 
causality rules supreme; causality which aggregates into ever more complex structures.
We humans, to make sense of the world, also have to undergo this bootstrapping process; but 
the work has already been done for us. Our hardware, our bodies, and our BIOS, the basic brain 
structure which has the disposition for perception and learning have been shaped by evolutionary 
32 Tierra (http://life.ou.edu/tierra/) is one package out of many.
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forces  in  the  past  4  billion  years.  Those  organismic  "solutions"  which  receive  input  from the 
environment, process it and produce sensible output, that is,  live successfully reproduce, and thus 
stay to leave their mark on the face of the Earth. 
We are not always rational. Sometimes we behave plain stupid, contrary to our interests: the 
stupidity we witness in ourselves and in others is the result of old, violent and powerful energies: 
the unleashing of the fire of the Big Bang, and the tumult which followed thereafter. It is the raw 
and blind energy of primordial time encoded in our brains. Rationality – reason – is the product of a 
cooling  universe,  in  which  order  and  stability  begins  to  prevail  and  brains  learn  to  track  this 
stability.
From the initial bootstrap we will now move on to the source of rationality – why is some 
behavior rational and other behavior not?
 2.3.2 Instrumental and Non-instrumental Rationality
As we saw before, to be rational requires goals, and, in the other direction, if one has goals, 
instrumental rationality is the search for the optimal way to reach these goals. If one renounces 
rationality, one is renouncing one's goals – that position is incoherent or at least very nihilistic. 
So, everybody who is less than instrumentally rational is content with not being prepared to 
satisfy his  goals  and desire.  A skeptic  could argue that wanting to reach one's  goals  has to be 
rationally justified itself, and in this way avoid entering the rational mindset, but that argument is a 
case for section 2.7.1 on the Münchhausen Trilemma; anyway, for the naturalist, this does not pose 
a problem, as this wanting is a given primitive through evolutionary selection pressures; again, one 
has to start somewhere.
If one says what rationality actually is – trying in the best way to achieve one's goals – it is quite 
clear that we need not talk anymore about if we should be rational, but rather, which strategy is 
rational in the current situation. For instance, sometimes in game-theoretic situations33 it is good to 
randomize  one's  behavior  –  random behavior  is  then  a  rational  prescription.  Adopting  random 
behavior  or  seemingly  "irrational"  strategies  because  rational  deliberation  has  come  to  the 
conclusion that this would be the best strategy to adopt are not counterexamples to rationality but 
cases in point. The rational strategy is determined by the environment – it rests on physical facts 
33 The "El farol" bar problem is a classic example (Arthur 1994).
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about  the  world.  That  is  why  instrumental  rationality  is  tightly  connected  to  one's  (hopefully 
correct) physical conception of the world.
The first credo of the rationalist is simple: I want to choose that action that lets me reach my 
goals;  I  will  not  follow normative  constraints  which  will  let  me  behave  sub-optimally  for  the 
problem at hand34. To quote Miyamoto Musashi35:
The primary thing when you take a sword in your hands is your 
intention to cut the enemy, whatever the means. Whenever you parry, 
hit, spring, strike or touch the enemy's cutting sword, you must cut 
the enemy in the same movement. It is essential to attain this. If you 
think only of hitting, springing, striking or touching the enemy, you 
will not be able actually to cut him. (Musashi BFR)
Is  instrumental  rationality  –  the  linking  of  means  with  ends  –  enough?  Nozick  lets  the 
instrumentalist  quip:  "Enough  for  what?"  (Nozick  1993,  p. 133)36.  The  difference  between 
instrumental  and non-instrumental  rationality is  one  of  human categorization  and therefore  not 
fundamentally important: some goals are construed as not being mere means; and a different kind of 
rationality  is  required  to  deal  with  those  goals.  For  instance,  it  is  commonly  held  that  the 
instrumental rationalist can't be used to reflect on the goals itself, and for this, one needs either a 
more  encompassing  kind  of  rationality  or  the  questions  are  seemed  to  lie  beyond  rationality 
altogether. But this presupposes a disembodied metaphysical picture: one where agents do not have 
any a priori desires. We humans are evolved and come prepackaged with a lot of goals and desires. 
When  we  follow  our  a  priori  goals  with  instrumental  rationality,  we  can  arrive  at  values via 
reflection and with insight into the nature of reality – we arrive at a value bootstrap, which is again 
delegated to evolution.
The problem of value rationality could be called, paraphrasing Chalmers37, the hard problem of 
rationality. But it is when we have certain cognitive values – such as that of acquiring true belief – 
combined with our ability to feel pain and pleasure – that we can devise a rational ethics, one based 
34 As two-boxers in Newcomb's problem would; see Drescher (2006) for a concise account.
35 A Book of Five Rings ("Go Rin No Sho"), english translation: http://www.miyamotomusashi.com/gorin.htm. 
Miyamoto Musashi was a superior Japanese swordsman. Eliezer Yudkowsky made the brilliant connection of 
samurai swordsmanship with the art of rationality (Yudkowsky 2008a).
36 He then proceeds to delineate some additional rational factors – symbolic and evidential considerations – 
contributing to utility weighting in addition to purely causative, that is, instrumental considerations. I will not follow 
Nozick in this; a detailed refutation must await another paper.
37 Chalmers speaks of the "hard" problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995).
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on instrumental  rationality and given natural  facts  alone.  Their  need not  enter  any non-natural 
normative facts; more on this in the last chapter.
David  Papineau  places  means-ends  rationality  on  a  firm  analytical  footing  regarding  the 
normativity of conceptual judgments; he highlights that the value of truth is a personal or moral 
value, and thus that judgments that prescribe certain forms of judgments (that is, are normative) are 
no different from other forms of means-end rationality. This lets epistemological norms also be seen 
as  hypothetical  imperatives.  The  essential  point  to  understand  for  the  analytically  trained 
philosopher is that the account given here is not deficient if one takes a naturalist theory of truth as 
a starting point38; normativity is explained in terms of truth, not the other way round  (Papineau 
2003, p. 6f and p. 10f). And this footing can be supplied for all other domains too.
So, at the end of the day, who says what is rational and what not? The core proposition of this 
section is simple:
Normativity lies in nature (environment, other agents etc).
This  is  not  a  problematic  conclusion,  only  difficult  to  accept,  because  it  entails  both  an 
acknowledgement of the natural world as ultimately constitutive for our thought, and a burdening of 
responsibility: because there is no authority anymore who can ordain what is right or wrong – and 
nature is not an authority, it simply is the way it is – we can either accept that we are part of this 
universe and try to achieve our goals, or deny this. It is very much about responsibility and freedom. 
It is the simple insight that when one wants to act in this world and attain goals in this world, one 
has to submit to the natural laws that govern this world. To be clear: the laws to which one need 
submit are not the social norms or legal laws (which can nonetheless be important and mostly are) 
but rather those basic laws of nature which enable the world to be such as it is (that is, they ensure 
persistence and regularity etc).
Again, where does this normativity come from? Laws of nature lay the grounding for the laws 
of thought – as our thoughts track, through natural  law, other natural  laws, a harmony arises – 
because of this harmony I think one could call rationality the "Dao of thinking". The Dao is Chinese 
and can be roughly translated as "the way", and in Chinese thought, one has attained the Dao when 
one is in harmony and balance with the universe.
Normativity arises from reality: real goals, and working solutions to real problems. It is not a 
normativity  as  traditionally  conceived:  an  authority  commanding  what  should  be  done.  It  is  a 
38 Such as teleosemantics (Macdonald & Papineau 2006).
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pragmatic normativity: either follow it, or fail. It simply is. Pragmatism should stop being a derisive 
word in philosophy.
What we can construct in this place is a schema for rational action:
Constraints: how the world is or can be considering physical knowledge: C_i
Goals: how we want the world to be: G_i
Rational action: If G_i is an attainable state according to C_i, bring current world states W_x into alignment with 
G_i through actions A_i, where all A_i39 have to satisfy the constraints of C_i.
So, again to paraphrase Chalmers, goal rationality could then be called the easy problem of 
rationality. It is heavily constricted by the environment, which usually also consists of other agents 
and their beliefs and what exactly one wants to achieve. Philosophers who search for justification 
here will fail: there is none (see also section 2.7.1). To be more precise: there is no justification to 
be found in words or concepts. Words and concepts will always only find other words and concepts, 
while actions and beliefs find their "justification" in their success in the real world. For instrumental 
rationality, justification (and thus normativity) lies in the way the natural world simply is.
 2.3.3 Reasons
We have looked above at the normativity of rational strategies. In the agent-based definition 
above, we can imagine rational agents that act without reasons. But we humans, having the capacity 
for higher-order cognition, usually have and are moved by reasons. For humans, debating about 
strategies is often done via reasoning, either internally with oneself or in a community. 
But from where comes the power of reason? The answer is the same as above, but I would like 
to mention it explicitly. If being rational means to be prepared to be convinced by reasons40, we may 
ask what reasons  are:  or rather from where does the normative power of reasons originate? We 
should distinguish a pragmatic aspect and the real normative aspect. 
First the pragmatic aspect. Reasons for you are reasons for me only if I can make sense of them. 
Reasons  are  propositions  where  the  reasoner  says  "aye,  t'is  true,  and  from  this  I  know  that 
something else, X, is also true". But from where does this sense derive? For a Polynesian hunter-
gatherer, the conservation of energy will hardly be a reason he can accept to exclude some events 
from happening.  It  is  not a reason for him because it  does not  fit  his  world model.  Accepting 
39 Now, the interesting question is of course how to find out the correct A_i; that is the job of science and technology.
40 As opposed to arguments, which may or may not instantiate reasons.
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reasons depends heavily on our environment and the theories we have formed about it, that is, our 
experience and the way we organize our experience.  Mutually intelligible  reasons depend on a 
shared environment and a shared theoretical organization.
That is not to say in any way that reasons are arbitrary – in fact, one could in part describe the 
goal of science as the search for good reasons; as we can't change our environment, at least not at 
the fundamental level of natural law, that means science is about finding the best ways to organize 
the experiential substratum into knowledge – one that is consistent and coherent. So, as soon as we 
have a shared environment, the problem of someone willing to accept a reason or not dependent on 
his  presupposed  theoretical  underpinnings  is  a  pragmatic  problem,  not  yet  an  epistemological 
problem.
Let us concentrate  on the aspect of what makes a reason a  good one,  quite  apart  form the 
pragmatics of understanding, that is, we replace particular real-world agents with ideal epistemic 
agents. So, what makes reasons good ones or bad ones, ones that hold up to scrutiny and others that 
don't?
A reason is only good one if it relates in the right way to the environment, that is, it captures an 
environmental feature41. Good reasons track reality. For some this account may smack of heresy. 
But "relativizing" the power of reason to the environment is actually what again bridges the gap 
between the natural and the normative. Rationality – and the normativity it depends on – is not an 
ideal oozed out of an immaterial domain of Geist, something that exists outside of space and time, 
but something very much grounded in this world42.
 2.3.4 Logic and other Standards
What about traditional criteria for rationality, like logic or falsifiability? Deductive logic is only 
a constraint, it says nothing about which premises to adopt43. Falsification is also only a constraint, 
it  serves to weed out  false  theories,  but  underdetermination of theories by evidence sometimes 
leaves too many possibilities remaining. Indeed, the Quine-Duhem thesis  (Gillies 1998) actually 
sheds some dubious light on the principle of falsification; because falsification is also dependent on 
theories  and concepts,  such  that  a  straightforward  application  of  this  principle  is  not  possible. 
Applied rigidly, it can again all too quickly become dogma.
41 Humans are also part of the environment in the end; environment should be understood in a very broad sense here.
42 To be even more precise: thoughts (and reasons) have spatio-temporal locations; in Cartesian terminology, all res 
cogitans are res extensa – and have material causal histories (more on this in chapter three and four).
43  Put succinctly: One person’s modus ponens is another person’s modus tollens.
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In epistemology one differentiates between defeasible and indefeasible reasons and reasoning. 
Insofar as one holds logic as a purely formal calculus, a matter of following rules, it is indefeasible: 
if one follows all rules correctly, then defeasibility is not a criterion44. Vexing questions crop up as 
soon as one takes into account what is applicable to real world situations. Is a domain properly 
captured by propositional logic? Or first-order logic, or rather some deviant logic? Here, defeasible 
principles come into play immediately.
The most stable and fundamental principles of logic – I will not argue which these should be, 
because all are contested somewhere or other in the philosophical literature – are those that seem to 
apply well in our everyday lives, such as the law of the excluded middle. These basic inferential 
skills are a product of evolution. Is this not reintroducing the psychologism Frege cast out of the 
halls of pristine logical thought? Logic is often seen as the highest principle of rationality,  and 
something that must be the same in all possible worlds. It has always struck me strange as how a 
limited human mind, constrained by evolution in this world, can say something about all possible 
worlds45. 
Van Lambalgen advocates an evolutionary approach:
An exaptationist account of the origin of logical reasoning might 
then run as follows. Planning is a capability shared by humans and 
nonhuman primates, even monkeys. If the above picture of the operation 
of working memory is correct, it requires the animal to represent 
goals  and  actions  as  nodes  in  declarative  memory,  and  causal 
influences as links between those nodes. Humans have language in which 
to  formulate  goals  and  actions,  but  language  also  accesses  the 
representations of goals and actions in declarative memory. Therefore 
one could suppose that the process subserving planning in animals also 
allows  humans  to  draw  quick  conclusions,  and  to  modify  these 
conclusions if the need arises. Since the process is automatic, it 
need not be accessible to consciousness. That is, if for the moment we 
abstract from what we know about humans, it might have been the case 
that logical inference is more like a reflex, a form of low-level 
processing. (Lambalgen 2003)
Logic arises out of causal physical processes in the end: our bodies and our minds have been 
shaped by evolution, tracking reality for millenia. Our reasoning develops from experience in the 
44 But it becomes a criterion as soon as a proof is checked for correctness in mathematical peer-review.
45 If we take the mathematical turn, this problem will become more pressing. But as for now, the statement will suffice.
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physical world. Nowhere is a neuron untouched by prior physical processes. Minds reason correctly 
when they are in tune with reality. Logic represents inferential processes that capture basic modes of 
our  linguistic  perception  of  reality  at  the  mesoscale;  if  we were  quantum creatures  we would 
probably deploy quantum logic, not classical logic.
Also, following Gigerenzer, I do not believe that we can bring helpful general principles to bear 
on all problems:
Norms need to be constructed for a specific situation, not imposed 
upon it in a content-blind way. The reason is that content-blind norms 
disregard  relevant  structural  properties  of  the  given  situation, 
including polysemy, reference classes, and sampling. I also show that 
content-blind norms can, unwittingly, lead to double standards: the 
norm in one problem is the fallacy in the next. The alternative to 
content-blind norms is not  no norms, but rather carefully designed 
norms.
[…]  Content-blind  norms  are  of  legitimate  use  within  a  formal 
system,  such  as  for  defining  subjective  probabilities  in  terms  of 
certain rules like additivity. However, when we go beyond a formal 
system and  want to  find the  best judgment  or choice  concerning a 
situation in the real world of human affairs, we have to construct 
norms  for  this  situation,  taking  its  characteristic  structure  and 
goals into account. In the real world, including the small world of 
textbook problems, the normative response depends on what we know or 
assume  about  the  situation.  The  use  of  content-blind  norms,  in 
contrast, assumes that one does not have to take the situation into 
account. l
This  is  not  to  undervalue  logic,  probability  theory,  decision  theory etc.  But  these  are  only 
general standards to apply to a problem; if one has a concrete problem, the rationalist can't refrain 
from taking into account the specific structure of the problem and defeasibly decide which standards 
he  will  bring  to  bear  –  every  premature  abstraction  brings  with  it  the  danger  of  leaving  out 
something important.
 2.3.5 Coherence
Coherence is also an important criterion for the set of beliefs one entertains – incoherent beliefs 
may be entertained as conflicting models, but not simultaneously as a unified way of thinking about 
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the world. Coherence is more than consistency, but less than strict logical deducibility – it is a 
harmony of beliefs.
I follow  Audi (2001) who holds that we need to distinguish  incoherence from  coherence as 
principles guiding our beliefs. Incoherence is needed to defeat the justification of (some) beliefs, 
whereas we need not strive for coherence as an active principle of justification. This is just as well, 
because coherence is notoriously difficult to pin down. Nevertheless: coherence, while not being 
necessary for justification, should be a guiding principle in the adoption of beliefs, in the sense that 
it is a measure – albeit a vague one – for the degree of unification a world view exhibits. 
A concise definition of coherence – more precisely, a "coherence theory of inference" – is given 
by (Thagard 2002): 
1. All inference is coherence-based. So-called rules of inference 
such as modus ponens do not by themselves license inferences, because 
their conclusions may contradict other accepted information. The only 
rule of inference is: Accept a conclusion if its acceptance maximizes 
coherence.
2. Coherence is a matter of constraint satisfaction, and can be 
computed by connectionist and other algorithms.
3.  There  are  six  kinds  of  coherence:  analogical,  conceptual, 
explanatory, deductive, perceptual, and deliberative.
4.  Coherence  is  not  just  a  matter  of  accepting  or  rejecting  a 
conclusion,  but  can  also  involve  attaching  a  positive  or  negative 
emotional  assessment  to  a  proposition,  object,  concept,  or  other 
representation.
 2.4 The Body
 2.4.1 On Emotions
Emotions result from sub-conscious evaluations of the environment, that is, they reflect prior 
experience; and so it is rational to take emotional states into account when evaluating situations 
consciously. Emotions are crucial both for the interaction with the environment, with other agents, 
and in self-analysis:
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… emotions play an instrumental role in relational activities. In 
other  words,  they  are  crucial  for  the  successful  interaction  of 
autonomous individuals with their (subjective, individual) environment 
(which usually also comprises themselves as well as further similar 
individuals). Affective channels of communication provide continuously 
updated situational and contextual information of an individual's or a 
group's state, including clues about current tendencies to act (e.g., 
whether  intending  to  approach  or  retreat,  whether  willing  to  pay 
attention, whether willing to give in or oppose). By nature, humans 
are highly attuned to the (in part unconditional) pick up of this kind 
of  (partly  unconditionally  published)  information,  which  forms  an 
integral  part  of  the  coordination  of  social  activities.  (Petta  & 
Trappl 2001)
There are  a number of cognitive and neurophysiological  models  of why and how emotions 
work.  A prominent  neurophysiological  theory  is  Damasio's  somatic  marker  hypothesis  (SMH) 
(Damasio 1994; Bechara, Damasio & Damasio 2000):
Somatic markers are taken to function as a biasing device in that 
they  substantially  prune  the  search  space  of  possible  courses  of 
actions by eliminating paths of likely unfavourable outcome. Jointly 
with subsequent deliberate rational decision making, somatic markers 
thus  are  likely  to  increase  the  accuracy  and  efficiency  of  the 
decision process, while their absence also has an explicit, negative, 
effect. An important function of somatic markers is seen in their 
support in overcoming short term horizon effects, as in the choice of 
actions whose immediate consequences are negative, but which generate 
positive future outcomes … (Petta & Trappl 2001) 
Translated into a cognitive model,  this  assigns emotions to evaluative agent states selecting 
between more low-level  fixed action patterns46 (FAPs). Emotions would correspond to groups of 
FAPs and thus function as a pre-selector on FAPs appropriate for a certain situation (Petta & Trappl 
2001).
While  neurophysiological  theories,  such  as  the  SMH stress  the  role  of  the  body,  cognitive 
theories jump a level up and look at the cognitive value of emotion. We need not go into detail here. 
It suffices for our purposes that
46 Our scripts.
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[a]cross  virtually  every  current  theory  of  emotion  there  is  a 
consensus regarding the existence of fundamental, primitive and "pre-
designed" mechanisms that already bring about the flexible reactive 
connectivity between internal or external events with low stimulus 
specificity  and  dynamically  varying  personal  goals  that  is 
distinguishing  of  emotions.  This  characteristic  complements  and 
exceeds the capabilities of either reflexes (highly specific stimulus 
and  low  response  flexibility)  and  physiological  drives  (specific 
stimulus and moderate response flexibility).(Petta & Trappl 2001) 
Emotions are a further step in  the bootstrap from simple organisms to  organisms of higher 
sophistication.  The  hardwiring  is  provided,  of  course,  by  evolution,  and  connects  higher  level 
reasoning skills with lower level stimuli and their biased evaluation. 
The decoupling of reason and emotion, in the extreme form of the separation of body and mind, 
was at the root of Descartes' philosophy and his greatest error. Damasio is explicit:
This is Descartes' error: the abyssal separation between body and 
mind,  between  the  sizeable,  dimensioned,  mechanically  operated, 
infinitely divisible body stuff, on the one hand, and the unsizeable, 
undimensioned,  un-pushpullable,  nondivisible  mind  stuff;  the 
suggestion that reasoning, and moral judgement, and the suffering that 
comes from physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately 
from  the  body.  Specifically:  the  separation  of  the  most  refined 
operations  of  the  mind  from  the  structure  and  operation  of  a 
biological organism. (Damasio 1994, p. 249f)
Descartes,  given his  knowledge,  is excused; today's  scientists  and philosophers are not;  and 
while the mistake is not made by experts in the field – at least not consciously – the dualist intuition 
still underlies most of our thinking everywhere else (Papineau Forthcoming).
What about emotion in science? Emotion is relevant in two regards: firstly, the working scientist 
is a human being and has emotions; and secondly, emotions factor into the acceptance or rejection 
of  scientific  theories.  The  latter  point  is  addressed  in  the  whole  thesis:  I  want  to  help  reduce 
rejection of naturalistic theories due to averse emotional response.
So here I will address the former point, the working scientist. The picture of an emotionless, 
value-neutral machine is obviously false: the adoption of goals, such as epistemic virtue, or simply 
seeking coherent and empirically adequate theories, are already value decisions. Apart from that, it 
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would be ludicrous to try to eliminate emotion from our thinking processes, when, as we saw above, 
thinking is intrinsically emotional:
... we cannot insist that a person's thinking should be emotion-free 
when  it  is  biologically  impossible  for  people  to  think  that  way.
(Thagard 2002)
Thagard  analysed  Watson's  book "The Double  Helix"  (Watson 1969) for  "emotion  words", 
finding the following:
Most of Watson's emotion words (163) occurred in the context of 
investigation. 15 words occurred in the context of discovery, 29 in 
the context of justification, and 28 emotion words occurred in other 
more personal contexts that had nothing to do with the development of 
scientific ideas.
It is important to note that Thagard does not follow Reichenbach's distinction of the contexts of 
discovery and justification distinguishing the "subjective" from the "rational" (a view completely 
orthogonal to the one proposed here anyway), but rather as different  stages of scientific inquiry 
meriting their own label. Emotion and passion are common among successful scientists (McAllister 
1996; Wolpert & Richards 1997). Without passion about a subject and the perseverance in the face 
of necessary setbacks in the course of scientific inquiry, no progress can be made – the emotional, 
the passionate scientist, is the one who enjoys success in the end.
Having said all the above, from where then comes the image of emotions being irrational? That 
is because, as we saw, they are low-level responses and thus very prone to bias. When reflecting 
rationally we need to be keenly aware of this; and while we can't be rational without emotion, we 
should always check if our emotions are appropriate in the current context, drawing on symbolic 
knowledge which has not yet been embodied and is thus not emotionally available. In an ideal 
rational agent who has propagated his knowledge through all associative nets, emotional response 
and rational verdict are in harmony.
I would like to draw up the following matrix:
Emotional Unemotional
Rational OK OK
Irrational Not OK Not OK
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Irrational states are always bad, no matter if emotional or unemotional. Rational states can be 
held with emotion or without emotion – whereas the goal for a fully integrated individual is to move 
to the upper left corner of the matrix, emotional rationality47.
 2.4.2 On Intuitions
Damasio, in his book, sees intuition in close contact with emotions:
As for the knowledge used in reasoning, it too could be fairly 
explicit or partially hidden, as when we intuit a solution. In other 
words, emotion had a role to play in intuition, the sort of rapid 
cognitive process in which we come to a particular conclusion without 
being aware of all the intermediate logical steps. … Intuition is 
simply rapid cognition with the required knowledge partially swept 
under the carpet, all courtesy of emotion and much past practice. 
(Damasio 1994, p. xix)
How much emotion is prevalent in an intuition can certainly vary – a certain amount is probably 
necessary,  because an  intuitive  feeling  that  something  is  correct  corresponds to  past  successful 
knowledge applications and the ensuing emotional reward,  which is remembered.  But there are 
certainly intuitions where very little emotion is involved apart from this reward aspect, and the past 
experience per se is at the fore. I think for instance of intuition in the mathematical domain, where 
one intuits solutions without immediately seeing all the deductive steps.
What I want to make clear in this section is that intuition is neither a spiritual force nor some 
kind of mystical access to a realm of direct and immediate true insight, even if it may seem so to the 
mind having the intuition. If someone has good intuition in a domain, this is because the person has 
either had much practice or (in single-case events) good luck. 
In any case, it is rational to rely on intuition if one has to decide under time constraint, because 
it represents the sum weight of knowledge contained in an agent system – the sum weight of all 
neural connections, the synaptic chemical structure, the hormonal disposition etc. Your intuition is 
your  life  experience,  everything  you  have  ever  heard,  seen,  thought  of,  smelled,  touched  and 
everything that has changed at least one molecular trajectory in your brain. So, you should use your 
intuition because that means harnessing more knowledge than if you only rely on those parts which 
have  manifested  themselves  so  strongly  that  they  have  trickled  up  into  symbol  space48.  Our 
47  For further discussion see Greenspan (2004).
48 I call symbol space that part of knowledge which has crystallized sufficiently that it is explicitly available for 
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intuitions  are  our  background hypotheses  in  the  Bayesian sense (see  2.6.3);  we always  have  a 
probabilistic model of a situation, albeit one that is largely not verbalized/symbolized.
But this means that one should also beware of intuition: as it reflects past experience and not 
access to direct truth, it could be spurious. So it is imperative to always check if your intuitions 
serve you well or if they lead you to wrong answers49, especially if one does not currently operate 
under a time constraint. 
Only  having  intuitive  knowledge  on  a  subject  clearly  calls  for  more:  trying  to  make  the 
knowledge  explicit  so  that  it  is  available  for  reasoned  criticism,  versus  being  encoded  in  an 
indiscriminate neural blob, and engaging with the results of science to check if the intuitions are 
correct. Science guarantees best model building in the end. Having good intuition is no excuse for 
avoiding exposure to scientific evidence.
If one does not even have an intuition on a subject, that means that one has no experience in the 
domain: one should refrain from decision if possible and instead try to acquire knowledge, both 
theoretical and practical.
An excellent computational-algorithmic model of intuition is given by Yudkowsky (2008b).
 2.4.3 Meaning, Understanding and Explanation
I hear and I forget. I see and I remember. I do and I understand. 
Kǒng Fūzǐ (Confucius) 
For cognition using representations, there is a problem of how meaning arises in such a system, 
how beliefs acquire their content. Symbols always need someone who interprets them, and it is the 
interpreter who supplies meaning50. But in a mind, there is no interpreter beyond the mind itself, no 
homunculus waiting to do the mind's work; for us to understand how the mind understands we need 
an account of the involved mechanisms.
First the backdrop which I will presuppose: all of our cognition is embodied51, that is, it depends 
on our morphological/functional physical makeup, and its situatedness in an environment. It is then 
possible for meaning to arise in a representational system through its coupling to the environment 
reasoning and reflection.
49 That is the difference between a well trained and a badly trained neural net.
50 Maybe one which has been agreed upon beforehand, in case of communication.
51 An excellent introduction to the concepts of embodiment and situatedness can be found in (Anderson 2003).
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with  its  (also  represented)  body52.  The  key to  understanding  – which  may occur  through very 
different  high-level  cognitive processes,  such as  "empathy,  metaphors,  analogies  or hypothesis" 
(Mahner & Bunge 1997) – is embodiment; everything that is encountered can ultimately be decoded 
into internal neural structures which are grounded in the body53.
Second a terminological issue: when looking at theories that give an account of how beliefs can 
acquire  content,  we  can  differentiate  between  output-based  theories  and input-based  theories.  
Output-based theories analyze the content of beliefs in terms of the actions they prompt, whereas 
input-based theories focus on the conditions which gave rise to the beliefs (Papineau 2003, p. 26).
Teleosemantics (Papineau 1984; Macdonald & Papineau 2006) is one such output-based theory, 
which I endorse with one caveat: I think that the truth of how meaning arises in representational 
systems lies somewhere in the middle – dependent on both input and output.
Inputs and outputs give positive feedback to certain representations and negative feedback to 
other  representations.  There  is  a  causal  linkage  between  physical  events  strictly  outside  the 
cognitive system, coupling to perceptual neural signals, and finally brain activity (input-side) which 
then leads to neuromuscular activations and actions in the world (output-side). Only if signals, brain 
internal feedback loops and actions form into a coherent whole does meaning – for this concrete 
entity – arise. That was quick. Again, the goal here is not to give an exhaustive treatment of the 
concerned subject, but only a hint that a naturalistic solution is possible54.
Meaning is closely coupled to understanding. When we ask: what does this mean, we implicitly 
ask: I want to understand this. But there are different variants of understanding. 
First, there is a kind of empathy, a relation to another human being: we know how it must feel 
like to be in their situation; we can relate to their emotions and motivations etc. That is not what I 
will speak about, although it is easily integrated into this account.
Another aspect of understanding is what I would like to call  internal understanding, that is, a 
new fact  integrates  into  previous  knowledge.  This  kind of  understanding  is  nothing other  than 
integrating  new  neural  input  into  antecedent  neural  structures55.  Understanding  derives  from 
52 The representation is also done in the body, mainly in the brain.
53 This also holds for abstract domains such as mathematics (Lakoff & Nunez 2000).
54 An excellent review article illustrating the grounding of words from an AI perspective is Roy (2005).
55 In a similar vein, sudden insight happens like this: insight is a spontaneous meshing of previously unrelated concepts 
in a neural system, leading to new embodied knowledge of a feature of the world. It is thus not surprising that 
scientists often report of ideas coming to them during sleep or in the morning after a dream-rich night: the neural 
system is highly active during sleep and performs a multitude of tasks during the different phases of sleep.
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meaning present in the system beforehand, even if it may be combined into novel configurations. I 
am not sure if it is a good idea to call this process "understanding". I will refer to it as the "feeling 
of understanding".
Because there is a problem: just because we feel that we have understood something does not 
mean that we actually do. We accept something when it "feels right"; when it is in harmony with 
our prior knowledge, with our psychological makeup. But this feeling can be deceptive, for instance 
when our cognitive map of the world is already so wrong that an additional fact is integrated into 
this  (dis-)harmony seamlessly without  contributing to  increased  knowledge of  going-ons  in  the 
world. While input-based accounts of meaning can account for the feeling of understanding, output-
based approaches are needed to ground the agent in reality, so that this feeling does not begin to 
deceive her.
Real understanding – I will call it  external understanding – is attained when you can perform 
successful  actions  in  the  world  derived  from  your  new  knowledge  (it  presupposes  internal 
understanding, that is, the neural integration of the knowledge). 
External understanding is present when you can build;  when you can prove; when you can 
transfer your knowledge to other domains. This is the output-based side of meaning. If no actions 
are performed to check if understanding has occurred, the agent may entertain the false belief that 
he understands while in truth he does not. The input-side accounts for our feeling that we have 
understood something, and the output-side guarantees that this feeling is correct56.
Understanding (sometimes) requires explanation; the account of explanation endorsed here is 
the one given by Mahner & Bunge (1997); Bunge (2006); explanation, on their account, should be 
deductions  from  statements  referring  to  regularities  and 
circumstances, in particular law statements and data … the given fact 
to be accounted for is shown to be a particular case of such pattern 
[sic!] … in the case of explanation it [the pattern] is a mechanismic 
hypothesis or theory. (Mahner & Bunge 1997, p. 107)
The explanatory pattern, to be precise, is the following:
56 This account of understanding can also be transferred to communication via symbols: language, writing, cultural 
artifacts etc. The recipient of a message is now not only confronted with a direct impression (say, a fellow human 
standing before her making noises or drawing lines on a paper), but also with a message underlying the symbolic 
content. The message can either be decoded, not decoded, or partially decoded. Understanding depends on the 
receiver relating to the symbols in the correct way, that is, in the way intended by the sender. Understanding will 
never be complete, because the two people communicating don't have the same neural structure encoding their 
concepts; but complete understanding is not required to get along with one another.
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For all x: if Px then Mx; For all x: if Mx, then Qx, Pb  .•. Qb 
(Mahner & Bunge 1997, p. 107)
where Qb is the given fact (the explanandum),  Pb the obtaining circumstance, and the logical 
relations of Px, Mx and Qx are the actual explanatory pattern (explanans). The crucial step where 
the  account  of  Mahner  and  Bunge  differs  from others  is  the  presence  of  M:  M symbolizes  a 
mechanism, where the word "mechanism" is used in a wide sense:
The only condition for a mechanism to be taken seriously in modern 
science is that it be material, lawful and scrutable (rather than 
immaterial, miraculous, and occult). (Mahner & Bunge 1997, p. 108)
The reason why these explanations are truly explanatory while others are not57, are; I contend 
our cognitive grounding in our bodies. Mechanismic explanations merge well with our sensorimotor 
neural apparatus and lead to genuine, embodied understanding.
Difficulties  in  understanding  occur  in  when  we  transcend  the  familiarity  of  our  everyday 
experiential  world;  when we enter  the  domains  of  non-linear  phenomena,  of  multi-hierarchical 
complex  systems;  of  micro-  and  macro-scale  physical  effects  dominating  the  evolution  of  the 
universe at the ultra-small and the ultra-large; these phenomena transcend our cognitive arch; we 
were selected for mesoscale, local interactions at slow relative speeds and short time spans; it is in 
this region where chemically interesting things – life – happen.
If  we  have  difficulty  understanding  scientific  theories  which  transcend  the  domain  of  our 
evolutionary heritage, it means we must work harder to translate this knowledge into our cognitive 
purview; or enlarge our cognitive purview. It does not mean that reality is strange or mysterious; nor 
that our human, all-too human limitations are worthy of celebration.
 2.4.4 Memes
But back to the symbols: the introduction of symbols also opened up a new avenue of spreading 
information via communication nodes which do not possess understanding. Let us consider words: 
we often read and hear them without thinking what they actually mean – indeed, it is often pleasing 
just to use or hear the expected words in a given context, because that smooths social relationships. 
Words seem to acquire a life of their own, quite independent of their meaning. This leads people to 
57 Such as the Deductive-nomological model (D-N model) of explanation (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948). Bunge calls 
the D-N model "explanation by subsumption". It is not a full explanation, because it says how something happens, 
but not why, as in the full mechanismic explanation. The mechanismic explanation subsumes the D-N model.
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recite whole sentences without knowing what they actually mean (meaningless metaphysics58 would 
be one case in point; religious chanting of obscure passages another). But even the scientifically 
minded person will, when in a more reflective mood, discover words that she uses of which she has 
no clear conception of what they actually mean.
This aspect has been recognized by a number of scientists and philosophers such as Dennett and 
Dawkins who employ the term "meme"59. Dawkins not only proposes the thesis that humans are 
mere  survival  machines  for  their  genes,  but  also  proposes  that  memes,  ideas,  replicate  under 
selective pressure and "inhabit" and "use" our brains. A concise definition is given by Bryson:
Memetics refers to the theory that knowledge and ideas can evolve 
more  or  less  independently  of  their  human-agent  substrates.  While 
humans  provide  the  medium  for  this  evolution,  memetics  holds  that 
ideas  can  be  developed  without  human  comprehension  or  deliberate 
interference. Bryson (2008)
The concept of memes has met with criticism60; mostly because the concept of the "meme" and 
its (pre-)theoretical elucidation are too simple to account for the rich variety of human culture and 
ideas and their varied expression in individuals. More sophisticated approaches to the concept of 
cultural evolution can be found in Boyd & Richerson (2005); Richerson & Boyd (2005).
But this is a dispute which goes too deep for our purposes; for the rationalist, it suffices to know 
that culture evolves (variation, heredity, selective pressure) and that memetics is a possible model – 
one that may be too simple for cultural and anthropological studies – but not too simple to construct 
a model which illustrates how ideas can infect populations like viruses; memetic viruses which have 
been bereft of meaning and may be detrimental to the host population.
The critical mind can now use the meme metaphor to screen incoming data and discard purely 
memetic information with no grounding; or, if she believes that the memetic information once had a 
grounding which got lost in the transmission process, try to recover the actual semantics of the 
meme.
58 For instance, Heidegger's famous "Das nichts nichtet"is a symbol concatenation which can't be grounded anymore.
59 Derived from Greek "mimesis" for imitation. The term was introduced in the book "The Selfish Gene" by Dawkins 
(1989).
60 See for instance Sperber (2000).
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 2.5 Things to Watch
 2.5.1 Cognitive Biases
We are not evolved for reasoning but for survival; reasoning is a means for survival, not more, 
not less – at least it was in the beginning. Human beings are not rational animals just so. Rationality 
is something to we have to actively strive for. We have to exert  effort to be rational; we have to 
learn to become rational – we are full of heuristics and biases which were evolutionarily sensible, 
but which may give wrong answers in the modern world. It is therefore necessary that we now have 
a short look at cognitive biases61.
Without bias, we couldn't make sense of the world62: there is simply too much incoming data. A 
list of biases can be found in Baron (2008, p. 56-57). Another list of cognitive biases can be found 
on wikipedia63.  The list is long. This all means that we must be extra careful in exercising our 
thinking skills.
Some classic biases are:
• Bandwagon effect: people believe things for the sole reason that others do.
• Illusion of control: the belief that one has influence of events which are clearly beyond 
one's control.
• Hindsight bias: the belief that past events could have been predicted (in the past)
• Selection bias: Collecting non representative data
• False consensus effect: agreement is assumed where none is had.
• Illusion  of  asymmetric  insight:  people  believe  that  they know more  about  others  than 
others know about them.
Science is one such reflective process which seeks to eliminate bias; the scientific method64 is 
successful, among other factors,  because it corrects for biases, whereas other worldviews do not 
systematically correct for biases.
61 The seminal work on heuristics and biases is Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky (1982).
62 This gains some explosiveness when it does not concern individuals but whole cultures; Wimmer captures this with 
his insight that it is always necessary to adopt some form of centrism; but there are more benign and less benign 
forms (Wimmer 2007).
63 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_biases
64 The individual scientist may well be prone to biases in areas foreign to her specialization or in in her normal life. 
That is of no import, as long as she follows methods that guarantee that no biases will contaminate her scientific 
results.
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As individuals we should also have an interest in eliminating bias – simply because that rectifies 
our view of the world. Good questions to ask that may help us avoid falling into certain cognitive 
traps are: where could I be wrong? What are alternative models for the data in front of me? Why do 
I believe the things I do? How would my belief look to me if  somebody else held it in a similar 
situation? In a different situation? And so on.
Richard Brandt (1979) suggests that an agent has reasons to do something if it is in accord with 
desires that survive cognitive psychotherapy:
(a) Putting aside any of the agent's desires that are founded on 
nonempirical beliefs (such as normative beliefs).
(b)  Subjecting  the  agent's  remaining  desires  to  full  empirical 
information, which may expunge some of the agent's desires and elicit 
some new ones.
(c) Making sure the agent's reasoning is logically correct.
 (Hooker & Streumer 2004) 
This procedure would be apt to remove many biases coloring an agents beliefs and desires, and 
thus ensure a more rational outlook. Of course, in the real world, we will have to settle for less.
So, biases exist, but they do not endanger the project of a rational worldview. On the contrary – 
biases have been discovered via scientific and rational investigation, and only with rationality can 
we hope to overcome them. In a similar vein also Nozick:
In  recent  years,  rationality  has  been  an  object  of  particular 
criticism. The claim has been put forth that rationality is biased 
because it is a class-based or male or Western or whatever notion. Yet 
it is part of rationality to be intent on noticing biases, including 
its own, and controlling and correcting these. (Might the attempt to 
correct for biases self be a bias? But if that is a criticism, from 
what quarter does it come? Is there a view that holds that bias is bad 
but that correcting it is bad too? If it is held to be impossible to 
eliminate bias, then in what sense does charging bias constitute a 
criticism? (Nozick 1993) 
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 2.5.2 The Power of Words
Tsze-lu said, "The ruler of Wei has been waiting for you, in order 
with you to administer the government. What will you consider the 
first thing to be done?"
The Master replied, "What is necessary is to rectify names."
"So! indeed!" said Tsze-lu. "You are wide of the mark! Why must 
there be such rectification?"
The Master said, "How uncultivated you are, Yu! A superior man, in 
regard to what he does not know, shows a cautious reserve.
"If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the 
truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of 
things, affairs cannot be carried on to success.
"When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music 
do  not  flourish.  When  proprieties  and  music  do  not  flourish, 
punishments will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not 
properly awarded, the people do not know how to move hand or foot.
"Therefore a superior man considers it necessary that the names he 
uses may be spoken appropriately, and also that what he speaks may be 
carried out appropriately. What the superior man requires is just that 
in his words there may be nothing incorrect." (Kǒng Fūzǐ65, Lun Yü, 
Book 13(3))66
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather a scornful tone, 
"it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less." 
(Carroll 1871) 
Transparent wording is the essence of a frame that fosters insight. 
(Gigerenzer 2003)
So, Kǒng Fūzǐ advises us to use the right words, whereas Humpty Dumpty is more lax in his 
standards. What does it mean to use words correctly?
65 More commonly known as Confucius.
66 Translation from: http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/c/confucius/c748a/part13.html
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We can interpret this in two ways – either in an epistemological/ontological sense, meaning that 
we should carve the world up in the right way – that is, conceptualize it in the "correct" way, label 
the  concepts  via  words  and  then  use  them when  applicable;  more  on  that  in  the  chapter  on 
metaphysics. Or – and this will concern us here – in a psychological sense. Words are not inert 
symbols with static meaning.
Words have a life of their own, in the sense that every word we learn, we learn by association 
with events in our life. Communication is possible because we humans share our environments, our 
physiology, our ancestral evolutionary history. The more different someones experiences are from 
ours, the more difficult communication will become. When we speak in "normal" words everybody 
has different connotations and associations bundled with them. 
Words both have an intensional and an extensional definition. A short but sufficient explication 
is given in by Yudkowsky:
To give an "intensional definition" is to define a word or phrase in 
terms of other words, as a dictionary does. To give an "extensional 
definition"  is  to  point  to  examples,  as  adults  do  when  teaching 
children. The preceding sentence gives an intensional definition of 
"extensional definition", which makes it an extensional example of 
"intensional definition".
Intensional definitions don't capture entire intensions; extensional 
definitions don't capture entire extensions. If I point to just one 
tiger and say the word "tiger", the communication may fail if they 
think I mean "dangerous animal" or "male tiger" or "yellow thing". 
Similarly, if I say "dangerous yellow-black striped animal", without 
pointing to anything, the listener may visualize giant hornets.
You can't capture in words all the details of the cognitive concept 
- as it exists in your mind - that lets you recognize things as tigers 
or nontigers. It's too large. And you can't point to all the tigers 
you've ever seen, let alone everything you would call a tiger.
The  strongest  definitions  use  a  crossfire  of  intensional  and 
extensional communication to nail down a concept. Even so, you only 
communicate maps to concepts, or instructions for building concepts - 
you don't communicate the actual categories as they exist in your mind 
or in the world. (Yudkowsky 2008c)
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This passage illustrates the difficulty of conveying concepts, of communicating. Concepts are 
not something you can give to someone like a piece of gold. They must be learned the hard way, 
and more often than not, due to slightly different conceptual learning, misunderstanding will ensue. 
The  different  learning  histories  of  concepts  will  also  lead  to  different  inferential  chains  being 
traversed by cognitive entities when contemplating on these things.
For instance, if I learn concept A in association with B, and from B follows C, whenever I hear 
A I will also begin thinking about C. Not so for someone who has learned concept A in association 
with  concept  E,  where  no  connection  with  D is  present.  The  underlying  theory  is  that  of  the 
prototype model of category structure in cognitive linguistics (Croft & Cruse 2004, p. 77-87)
That is why, in mature scientific theories, we use mathematics. In mathematics we try to avoid 
ambiguity by accepting only relationships made explicit in formalisms, computations or structures. 
That is the strength of both mathematics and conceptual analysis (mathematics being more rigorous 
of course); one declares ones frames explicitly and, in the case of mathematics, follows it strictly or, 
in the case of conceptual analysis, hunts for contaminations by other frames.
It  should  be  stressed  that  by  the  maxim of  "using  words  correctly"  I  do  not  intend  some 
totalitarian declaration of what is right and wrong. I have in mind the respect for the partner of 
communication: the cooperative principle and the four Gricean maxims of communication come to 
mind, such as relevance, quality, quantity and manner (Grice 1975).
Even more dramatic is the usage not only of single words but of whole contexts: framing. One 
presents a narrative leading to certain expectations in people which influences their judgment. A 
classic example of this kind originating in the heuristics and biases tradition is the "conjunction 
fallacy". The example is presented thus:
Linda  is  31  years  old,  single,  outspoken,  and  very  bright.  She 
majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with 
issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in 
anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is more probable? 
Linda is active in the feminist movement. (F)
Linda is a bank teller. (T)
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 
(T&F) (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982; Tversky & Kahneman 1983). 
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The respondents were asked to rank the statements according to the degree Linda resembled a 
typical representative of the respective class; the result was that 85% of the respondents ranked in 
the following way: F > T&F > T. So far so good. The problem was that the conjunction (T&F) was, 
in a different test,  also ranked as more  probable (versus only as more representative,  as in the 
former test). The psychological reasoning working with representativeness overrode the extensional 
logic of the probability calculus: the probability that P(A) >= P(A&B) <= P(B), for all A and B; 
adding additional features to a model can only make the model less likely, not more likely. The 
surprising  result  was  that  even  statistically  trained respondents  did  not  outperform  naive 
respondents; the fallacy was pervasive in all participants of the study.
Statistical fallacies can often be corrected when framed differently,  for instance with natural 
frequencies or explicating reference classes (Gigerenzer 2003). These framings can have serious life 
or death consequences when patient decisions are influenced.  An example of how framing can 
convey very different connotations:
...there are positive frames ("you have an 80% chance of surviving 
surgery") versus negative frames ("you have a 20% chance of dying from 
surgery"). My hypothesis is that they have an effect if patients can 
reasonably  assume  that  the  physician’s  choice  of  frame  conveys 
additional information, such as dynamic information. For instance, the 
positive  frame  can  imply  that  surgery  will  increase  the  survival 
chance  from  0%  to  80%,  whereas  the  negative  frame  suggests  that 
surgery increases the chance of dying from 0% to 20%.  (Gigerenzer 
2003) 
Everything said is said by someone, and everything heard is heard by someone. There is a lot of 
leeway for interpretation, guesswork and misunderstanding in that simple chain. That is why we 
must be careful with words and we must be careful with frames, what they suggest,  what they 
highlight, what they will trigger in the brains of the communicative partner. To choose the correct 
words and the correct frames is an important step in the way of the rationalist; not only in relation to 
others, but also in one's own internal dialogue.
 2.5.3 Authority
The fifth-century  Chinese philosopher  Xiaoguang Li  observed that 
ancient civilizations are revered, and yet ancient civilizations are 
not wise like venerable human elders are wise. A civilization further 
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back in time is younger, not older. The current civilization is always 
the senior, because the present enjoys a longer history than the past. 
Incidentally, does it change your opinion if I tell you that Xiaoguang 
"Mike" Li is actually a friend of mine who lives in the Bay Area? 
(Yudkowsky 2007c) 
In human society – at least up until recently – elders have been revered as a source of wisdom 
and knowledge. It is natural, when thinking of your elders as wise ones, to transfer this attribute to 
their forefathers and so on, leading to the apparent wisdom of the peoples of old (one is reminded of 
the Yellow Emperor in Chinese mythology). But this is not so. With death, the wisdom of a person 
is lost save for those pieces of knowledge transmitted to progeny. The wise live on only in their 
pupils.  But knowledge is  accumulated from generation to generation;  experience is  aggregated, 
theories are formed, regularities observed: gradually, knowledge increases. 
That is why the farther back in time we look, the more we should regard our ancestors as naive 
and  unknowing  children.  We  should  not  call  the  past  "times  of  old",  suggesting  wisdom and 
knowledge; we should speak of the past as of the times when humans where still young. We are the 
grown ups – now – and we will be the children for the future generations looking back at us. But the 
moral is clear: we should have trust in today's knowledge. It is the best there is. There has never, 
ever, been more available, and it is increasing every day.
If Aristotle and Descartes would live now, we would not gather around them to listen, except 
maybe to listen to their tales of yore. No – they would go to university and start to learn: they would 
absorb the knowledge that  undergraduates  or  high schools  students  take  for  granted  today and 
exclaim in wonder and rejoice.
But what about the authority of the living? In science, authority is earned by publishing papers 
on one's original research work, the more prolific and exceptional the better; or by holding tenure at 
an esteemed institution, attending conferences and being invited as keynote speaker, by being a 
member in many scientific organizations and thereby exerting influence etc. Now, this authority is 
quite real in the sense that an expert on a topic will usually have a more informed opinion than 
someone new to the area. But one can never exclude that a novel approach captures some aspect in 
a better way than that propounded by the academic tradition. To this end, the rationalist must always 
bear in mind that all arguments must be weighed equally; adhering to academic mainstream is no 
excuse to ignore other positions. 
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Authority also acts as a filter against information overflow. We can't read all the articles being 
published in our field – the name of the author often functions as a guarantee of quality. On the 
other  hand,  one could miss  an  important  idea this  way,  discarding  an  outlandish sounding but 
maybe correct  idea just  because it  is  not  backed by authority.  That  is  one reason why science 
progresses slower than it could.  And it is also true that scientists in the field may not be ideal 
epistemic  agents  –  that  evidence  contradicting  a  research  tradition  to  which  a  whole  life  was 
dedicated is denigrated instead of embraced. But that is only to be expected where humans are at 
work. It does not call into question the truth-directedness of the scientific enterprise as seen from a 
global point of view; it just means that epistemic values have to be fought for every step of the way. 
And that is what young scientists are ideally trained to do.
 2.5.4 A Cult of Rationality
Maybe  the  most  intriguing  turn  of  events  in  the  history of  rational  thought  is  Ayn  Rand's 
Objectivism, showing that even rationalist programs can degenerate. Ayn Rand was a novelist who 
outlined her philosophy of objectivism in the book "Atlas Shrugged" (Rand 1957). Shermer sums 
the philosophy up:
Ringing throughout Rand's works is the philosophy of individualism, 
personal responsibility, the power of reason, and the importance of 
morality. One should think for one's self and never allow an authority 
to dictate truth, especially the authority of government, religion, 
and other such groups. Success, happiness, and unrestrained upward 
mobility will accrue to those who use reason to act in the highest 
moral fashion, and who never demand favors or handouts. (Shermer 1993) 
But that, alas, was not the end of it. The movement progressively degraded into a cult; Shermer 
quotes Branden, an ardent follower of Ayn Rand, who described some of the beliefs the followers of 
Rand came to hold
• Ayn Rand is the greatest human being who has ever lived.
• Atlas Shrugged is the greatest human achievement in the history of the 
world.
• Ayn Rand, by virtue of her philosophical genius, is the supreme arbiter in 
any issue pertaining to what is rational, moral, or appropriate to man's 
life on earth.
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 (Branden 1989, p. 255f):
From a rational point of view, it is quite unclear how anyone could still follow this "philosophy 
of reason"; needless to say, many people abandoned the cause. But to guard against such failings in 
the future, it is more interesting to look at the fundamental flaw of Objectivism that could lead to 
such pronouncements. 
The problem of Objectivism was that the philosophy proposed that through reason absolute, 
final, unassailable truths could be found. It did not have the corrective of fallibilism and criticism 
built into its basic structure.
It is a lesson in what happens when the truth becomes more important 
than the search for truth, when final results of inquiry become more 
important  than  the  process  of  inquiry,  and  especially  when  reason 
leads to an absolute certainty about one's beliefs such that those who 
are not for the group are against it. Shermer (1993)
Shermer characterizes a cult in this way:
In this context, then, a cult may be characterized by:
Veneration of the Leader: Excessive glorification to the point of 
virtual sainthood or divinity.
Inerrancy of the Leader: Belief that he or she cannot be wrong.
Omniscience of the Leader: Acceptance of beliefs and pronouncements 
on virtually all subjects, from the philosophical to the trivial.
Persuasive Techniques: Methods used to recruit new followers and 
reinforce current beliefs.
Hidden Agendas: Potential recruits and the public are not given a 
full disclosure of the true nature of the group's beliefs and plans.
Deceit: Recruits and followers are not told everything about the 
leader and the group's inner circle, particularly flaws or potentially 
embarrassing events or circumstances.
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Financial and/or  Sexual Exploitation:  Recruits and  followers are 
persuaded to invest in the group, and the leader may develop sexual 
relations with one or more of the followers.
Absolute Truth: Belief that the leader and/or group has a method of 
discovering final knowledge on any number of subjects.
Absolute Morality: Belief that the leader and/or the group have 
developed a system of right and wrong thought and action applicable to 
members and nonmembers alike. Those who strictly follow the moral code 
may become  and remain  members, those  who do  not are  dismissed or 
punished.
(Shermer 1993)
Objectivism was a cult.  It  was identical  to religion except in name. We should take it  as a 
warning: there never can be a final doctrine for reason and enlightenment. It is reasoning itself 
which must be taught to people, reasoning as a process. Everybody must work at improving himself 
or herself to attain this goal; it can't be delegated. Every individual is summoned on his and on her 
own.
If eternal doubt, the willingness to rethink your most fundamental results always anew, to assail 
your  most  cherished  truths  with  new  empirical  evidence  and  new  logical  objections,  is  also 
dogmatism, then so be it. But it is unclear what more a thinking mind can offer; and unclear what 
should come in its stead. There are only heuristics for thinking critically, always evolving. That is 
not to say that there is no truth and objectivity, as some relativist thinkers would have it. Those 
invariances of the world that survive constant assault are our tentative truths. But we do not cherish 
them, we cherish the method.
An afterthought: Objectivism took itself too seriously; it could not laugh at itself; and in the 
same way, ideologies and religions can't laugh at themselves. Maybe our slogan should simply be: 
With humor, but without dogma. Where dogma prevails, thought is stifled; but where laughter is 
heard, the thoughtful mind is not far.
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 2.6 Updating
 2.6.1 Learning
Men  are  born  ignorant,  not  stupid;  they  are  made  stupid  by 
education. Attributed to Bertrand Russell 
The most important feature of intelligent systems – maybe the defining feature – is the ability to 
learn. Shane Legg defines intelligence informally as: 
Intelligence measures an agent’s ability to achieve goals in a wide 
range of environments. Legg (2008, p. 6) 
To achieve goals, one has to acquire correct beliefs about the environment and correct means to 
achieve one's ends. Both are either innate, for instance through evolution in case of natural agents or 
they have to be learned by the individual. 
Learning is the adaptation of internal representative structures of a sufficiently sophisticated 
agent to outside patterns. In this sense, learning has much to do with evolution: while evolution 
proceeds via selection on individuals and learning happens at the population level,  learning in the 
normal sense of the word (that is,  at the level of the individual) is  evolution of theories in the 
individual agent67. Karl Popper is well known for articulating this position with the sentence: "let 
our theories die in our stead" (Popper 1972, p. 78).
In humans, learning proceeds via long term potentiation (LTP) of synapses, that is, synaptic 
change68. As a shortcut, I will henceforth use the term neural reweighting for "learning", to stress 
the structure-changing nature of the process.
This  picture  opens  up another  interesting  way to  view the  relationship  between power and 
learning. We have defined learning as the mirroring of outward processes in internal agent structure. 
Having power means that one does not need to adapt – need not change one's internal structure – 
instead, one changes the environment69. The danger, of course, is that this leads to inner rigidity; 
and that there will come a time and place when power has waned and the ability to learn too. Of 
course,  we must not neglect the importance of power: if one learns and use this  knowledge to 
67 Vriend (2000) offers a nice introduction into the relevant literature as well as some criticism.
68 Nothing rests on a specific mechanism of learning: what is important is simply to realize that learning corresponds 
to structural change in the learning agent.
69 Karl Deutsch said that power is the ability not to have to learn anything (Deutsch 1963).
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change the world, one must also acquire power. Power and learning, as all things, should be in 
balance.
 2.6.2 Models and Kuhn
There is nothing more practical than a good theory. Attributed to 
Kurt Lewin.
We get impressions from the world, and start thinking about what all that could possibly mean: 
we construct  a  model,  a  representation of  reality which captures  some aspects  of  the  latter  by 
similarity, partial isomorphism etc. Common-sense evaluations of worldly goings-on are models. 
Religions are models. Ideologies are models. Science is a method of arriving at good models. Good 
models let us predict occurrences in the world. That is, when we form beliefs about what we think is 
going to happen and these circumstances then come to pass, the confidence in our model grows. If 
our expectations are repeatedly frustrated, that is a good indication that our model of the world 
needs updating. Models are not only about prediction, but also about  understanding the world – 
understanding is tightly connected to the visualization of causal mechanisms that operate to produce 
the phenomena in question. An excellent model should combine both prediction and understanding; 
if a model encompasses only one of the aspects, that is another indication that it is preliminary and 
will be supplanted by a better model in the future.
One of the most important tasks in good modeling is to make relevant variables  explicit. In 
ordinary  language  so  many  assumptions  are  implicit that  it  is  difficult  to  detect  fundamental 
disagreements which are often masked by a shared vocabulary. A first step in a rational discussion is 
to make everything explicit. Only propositions or parts of models that are explicit can be recognized 
and criticized. Invisible shared or unshared assumptions will lead to false conclusions and failure of 
communication.
An adherent of the scientific method will acknowledge that every model fails to capture reality 
completely;  and  therefore,  he  will  be  careful  in  judgments  on  outcomes  of  complex  physical 
processes. Outcomes are influenced by all of reality, not by the part we currently choose to model. 
Little physical differences can go a long way.
In the philosophy of science the word "model" also has a technical meaning, which comes to 
prominence in the semantic view70 of scientific theories (Suppes 1960; French & Ladyman 1999). In 
70 As opposed to the received view or syntactic view associated with the logical positivists, which views scientific 
theories as collections of linguistic propositions, with a partial empirical interpretation.
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this  view models  are  considered  to  be  extra-linguistic  entities,  structures  which  satisfy certain 
linguistic descriptions but are not identical to them; also, they are not constituted by the syntactic 
aspects of a theory, but only described by them. Many structures can satisfy a certain linguistic 
description (axiomatization), entailing that a linguistic theory corresponds to a family of models. 
This is an important point, because misunderstanding this puts too much emphasis on linguistic 
issues, which, in science and the quest for finding good models of reality, are usually beside the 
point. The semantic view is an important move away from narrow conceptions of theories and a 
first move into relationalism, which will concern us in chapter 3.
How should we select between different models? Explanatory value and predictive success have 
already been mentioned. Coherence with models in other domains of science is another criterion. A 
nice formalization of some of the intuitions underlying model selection is Bayesian Theory. 
But before we have a look at that, I want to deal with one obvious objection: that theories from 
different  paradigms are  incommensurable  (Kuhn 1962).  In  the third  edition of  his  book,  Kuhn 
elaborates  on  this  point  in  the  postscript71.  Kuhn  details  that  he  does  not  think  that  paradigm 
changes are irrational; only that in a paradigm change the scientist  has to bridge linguistic and 
conceptual barriers; and that this requires certain techniques, but:
the techniques required are not, however, either straightforward, or 
comfortable, or parts of the scientist's normal arsenal. Scientists 
rarely recognize them for quite what they are, and they seldom use 
them for longer than is required... (Kuhn 1962, p. 201f)
The techniques required to bridge paradigm clashes are those of translation, and:
[f]or most people translation is a threatening process, and it is 
entirely foreign to normal science. (Kuhn 1962, p. 203)
These techniques of translation are  not irrational; maybe they do indeed not yet belong to the 
tools of the ordinary scientist, but then it is high time that they should be made so; the ability to 
translate is the ability to switch ontological or theoretical frameworks, something of utmost import 
as  we  will  see  later  on.  Kuhn  is  somewhat  negligent  in  his  vocabulary,  when  he  speaks  of 
"persuasion" and "conversion" to a new paradigm, which suggest faith-based processes. On the 
other hand he acknowledges that paradigm changes are effected via reasons, possibly dependent on 
values the scientists have, such as simplicity and scope of theory.
71 Kuhn tries to distance himself in the postscript from the relativist reading of his book.
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At this point it is enough to say that Kuhn's incommensurability only applies between linguistic 
and  conceptual  communities  in  regard  to  one  another  if  they  insist  on  staying withing  their 
respective framework. If one has the courage to move beyond one's current framework, rational 
discussion of differences is again possible, because there is something we all share – our physical 
environment. That Kuhn's thesis of incommensurability was interpreted as making paradigm change 
irrational did not follow from Kuhn's thesis alone but rather from the logical-positivist environment 
which  had  equated  scientific  theorizing  with  linguistic  constructions;  then  the  switch  between 
different linguistic constructions could indeed not be accounted for by a scientific process.
Incommensurability is  not  a  problem for  the  rationalist,  who is  not  interested  in  defending 
theoretical constructs, but in knowledge, and for knowledge the yardstick is reality and not some 
linguistic-conceptual  entity.  Everything  is  commensurable  with  reality.  Commensurability  is 
guaranteed by the world, which is the repository for referents; and the referents don't change when 
the theory changes72. 
Indeed,  when we look at  it  this  way,  it  seems that  commensurability is  at  the  forefront  of 
paradigm changes,  not incommensurability.  Theory change is  usually only accepted if  the new 
theory explains more than the old one and more facts are unified in the same framework. We can 
say, contra Kuhn, that commensurability is the driving force behind paradigm changes: Maxwell 
unified electricity and magnetism; Newton sublunar and celestial mechanics; Einstein space and 
time.  In  all  these  cases,  the  paradigm  change  led  to  more  phenomena  of  the  world  being 
commensurable than was possible before. 
Given that I do not see any problem in principle with comparing theories – as to how they fare 
in  prediction,  accuracy,  explanation and unification of empirical  facts  – it  is  time to  honor the 
promise  made  above  and  look  at  a  formal  approach  of  how  to  perform  this  comparison  – 
Bayesianism.  The  following  section  is  a  bit  technical  and  may  be  skipped  without  much 
repercussions later on.
 2.6.3 Bayesianism
So, what is the core of Bayesianism73? Bayesianism asserts the following:
• beliefs come in degrees
72 Ok, that was quick: a detailed discussion will follow in section 3.1.1.
73 For a technical overview, see Joyce (2004) or (Joyce 2008).
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• all beliefs must be concurrently consistent with the laws of probability, as axiomatized by 
Kolmogorov (1933) and are  represented  by a  probability function.  This  is  a  synchronic 
consistency criterion, violation of which leads to susceptibility to a Dutch Book74.
• beliefs,  held  with  prior  knowledge  at  time  instant  t  are  updated75 with  incoming  new 
evidence to form a new belief at time instant t+1 via the process of conditionalization76, for 
instance  Jeffrey  conditionalization. If  a  person  receives  new  evidence that  sets  her 
confidence in a proposition E to probability q, then she should change her posterior belief in 
the hypothesis h in the following way
Pnew h =q×P h | E 1 − q×P h |¬E .
where P is  a probability function obeying Kolmogorov Axiomatization representing the  
agent's  beliefs  and P h | E  is  the  probability  of  the  hypothesis  relative  to  the  
proposition77.  The  notion  of  confirmation  of  a  hypothesis  by  E  can  then  simply  be  
stated as: 
E confirms h⇔Pnew hPold h
An important constraint on "open-minded" probability functions is that they should be regular,  
which means that a probability of 1 is only assigned to logical tautologies and 0 only to outright 
contradictions; all other beliefs are never assigned a 1 or a 0, which would be tantamount to strong 
overconfidence which is never advocated in an uncertain world78.
74 A Dutch book is a series of bets an agent is prepared to buy and sell at a "fair" price according to his beliefs in their 
probability, which will let the agent lose money because he violates a law of probability with his beliefs, say, 
additivity.
75 Belief updating is the process of learning.
76 Failure to condition properly makes one susceptible to a diachronic Dutch book.
77 This value, here with evidence as primitive instead of a proposition, can be calculated by Bayes' Theorem out of 
usually much less controversial likelihoods; as to the priors, see below. Bayes' Theorem (in one of its many guises):
P h i |e =
P e |hi×P hi
∑
i=1
n
P e | hi×P hi
where P is as as above, the h i  represent various hypotheses an agent entertains, where i is the index ranging over the 
number of  theories,  the  P e | hi are  the likelihoods of  evidence occurring given  the  respective hypothesis 
(which  should  fall  out  of  the  theory in  question),  the  P h i  are  the  prior probabilities  of  the  respective 
hypotheses, read: an agent's subjective confidence in these hypotheses being correct given her general background 
knowledge; and the P h i |e  then are the posterior probabilities of the hypotheses given evidence e.
78 Two further possible constraints on one's credences are given by Lewis's Principal Principle, roughly saying that 
subjective degrees of belief should track objective chance (Lewis 1980) and Van Fraassen's Reflection Principle, 
saying that one should commit to one's future beliefs (Fraassen 1984). An elaboration would lead too far; the 
interested reader is kindly referred to the literature.
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Bayesian  learning,  that  is,  belief  revision  and  the  adoption  of  a  new  posterior  probability 
function, proceeds in two stages: a causal process impinging the epistemic system – for instance 
perception – which leads directly to altered beliefs; and a second, inferential step, propagating the 
impact of the new perception through the belief system.
What  makes  Bayesian  epistemology  attractive?  Hajek  &  Hartmann  (Forthcoming) list  the 
following points in favor of Bayesian epistemology versus traditional epistemology79:
1) Bayesianism works with subjective degrees of belief and can therefore easily connect 
with decision theory.
2) Observations  do  not  give  definite  evidence,  but  come with  an  associated  degree  of 
uncertainty. Jeffrey conditionalization takes this into account.
3) The criteria for knowledge in traditional epistemology are too strict, giving the skeptic 
too much foothold.
4) Degrees of belief  seem more apt to represent complex mental  states than the binary 
distinction of "belief" and "knowledge" in traditional epistemology.
5) Deductivism  does  not  capture  our  ordinary  reasoning  processes  which  work  with 
evidential support and not logical entailment.
6) Bayesianism has a vast formal apparatus at its disposal,
7) which  is  actively  used  in  the  social  sciences,  engineering,  artificial  intelligence, 
cosmology etc
8) There is a multitude of arguments, which – to employ the exact wording of Hayek and 
Hartmann – "collectively provide a  kind of triangulation" to Bayesianism. The most 
prominent  is  certainly  the  Dutch  book  argument,  which  shows  that  an  agent  not 
conforming  to  probabilities  in  her  beliefs  will  exhibit  betting  behavior  that  will 
guarantee her to lose.
9) Bayesianism is a simple theory with high explanatory value, for instance explaining how 
confirmation works.
Hajek and Hartmann (op. cit.) go on to list problems with Bayesianism, mostly as it fares in 
comparison with traditional epistemology, which is of little interest here. More severe are objections 
79 Which stresses the arrival at justified true belief, and distinguishes in an all-or-nothing way between belief and 
knowledge.
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concerning the subjective nature of degrees of belief. Does this mean that by adopting Bayesianism 
we are importing some kind of subjectivism or relativism into the halls of science?
Against the charge of subjectivity, one can only respond that every evaluation must be done by 
someone; it is only honest to factor this into epistemology. When a scientist holds a theory as more 
plausible as another, this of course depends on the sum of her knowledge and experience; the same 
holds for the scientific community as a whole, being constituted by human scientists. This is a fact 
about  the world which is  can't  be eliminated by  avoiding talk  of prior  beliefs  and background 
knowledge in epistemology. On the contrary: avoiding explicit factorization of this circumstance 
would violate our desideratum of rationality to make everything as explicit as possible. Only the 
recognition  that  acceptance  of  theories  is  necessarily conditioned  on  the  sum  of  one's  prior 
knowledge and does result from some impersonal standard, a view from nowhere and nowhen, will 
make one more vigilant to possible errors in thinking. As Yudkowsky points out:
Jaynes used to recommend that no one ever write out an unconditional 
probability: That you never, ever write simply P(A), but always write 
P(A|I), where I is your prior information. I'll use Q instead of I, 
for ease of reading, but Jaynes used I. Similarly, one would not write 
P(A|B) for the posterior probability of A given that we learn B, but 
rather P(A|B,Q), the probability of A given that we learn B and had 
background information Q. You can't unwind the Q. You can't ask "What 
is the unconditional probability of our background information being 
true, P(Q)?" To make that estimate, you would still need some kind of 
prior. No way to unwind back to an ideal ghost of perfect emptiness... 
[…] But there's nothing wrong with that. It's not like you could judge 
using something other than yourself. It's not like you could have a 
probability assignment without any prior, a degree of uncertainty that 
isn't in any mind. Yudkowsky (2008d)
Is  probability  itself subjective80? That  is,  are probabilities  always only degrees of belief,  an 
epistemic state of an agent trying to predict what will happen next? Objective probabilities would 
be propensities of events, that is, of ontological significance: a propensity does not depend on agent 
beliefs.  This is  a  difficult  question,  and I  will  refrain from tackling it  here.  All  in all,  even if 
probabilities were objective, that is, real propensities, our knowledge of them would have to be 
encoded in our brains and would thus be subjective, ideally tracking the objective propensities.
80 Subjective does not mean it is arbitrary – it only means that it is an epistemic aspect of the world – more on this in 
section 2.7.2.
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The charge  of  subjectivism is  especially glaring  in  standard Bayesianism,  where  the  agent, 
while having to strictly conditionalize on incoming evidence, is perfectly free in her choice priors81. 
Convergence theorems are of not much help, because one can always chose sufficiently perverse 
priors such that convergence does not happen. As to the assignment of concrete numbers to degrees 
of belief, I think this would feign more knowledge than we actually have, giving a false sense of 
precision and exactness. What we can do is impose an ordering on the theories. In this we will have 
to operate with some concept of plausibility. As soon as we go outside the domain of mathematics 
and enter the physical world, so many uncertainties creep in that assigning an ordering is the best 
we can do; and usually we can classify some theories as very much more likely or less likely than 
others; that is often enough.
Does  this  make things  look bleak?  No – as  we noticed at  the  outset,  for  every method of 
rationality we can find, if we look hard enough, counterexamples or weak points. Actual rationality 
– the process of thinking in the concrete instance – is not easily captured in a definite way. Where 
does that leave us now with Bayesianism? I would like to follow Horwich (2005) who suggests that 
we adopt Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as therapeutic in this instance; that is, we take 
Bayesianism as therapeutic. According to Horwich, Bayesianism need neither address all criticisms 
leveled against it, nor deliver a true or complete theory of inference; it is enough if it illuminates 
some problems not tractable with traditional epistemology.
Another point speaking in favor of Bayesianism are developments in cognitive science, which 
suggest that low level brain operations, such as perception and sensorimotor control, are Bayesian 
in nature (Knill & Pouget 2004; Doya et al. 2007). If these results prove robust, it would constitute 
a nice symmetry that conscious reasoning processes are measured against the same standards as 
low-level unconscious brain operations.
To close the section with a word from Joyce:
For all its shortcomings, Bayesianism remains without peer as a 
theory of epistemic reasons and reasoning. As long as we use it for 
this purpose it will serve us well. (Joyce 2004, p. 153)
81 Objective Bayesianism advocates restrictions on priors which have to be fulfilled before a belief may be deemed 
rational (Jaynes 2003).
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 2.7 Standard (Non-)Issues
 2.7.1 Münchhausen Trilemma
The Münchhausen Trilemma is well described in Albert (1991, p. 13f). Classical epistemology 
asks why beliefs are justified. But this will lead, in the end, to the following trilemma: 
• infinite regress: every proposition is in need of justification, and that justification is again in 
need of justification, and so on.
• logical circle: conclusions are used to justify premises.
• abortion  of  process  of  justification  at  some arbitrary point  –  say,  where  things  become 
"evident" or "intuitive". This is actually a fallback into dogmatism, the principle of sufficient 
reason is suspended in its applicability.
The response of critical rationalism is to abandon the quest for ultimate justification and rather 
turn  to  the  principle  of  criticism.  There  is  never  an  instance  of  justification  beyond  criticism, 
everything is fallible. Of course, in criticism one also breaks off at some point, where the utility of 
further criticism does not contribute to solving any problem at hand. But there is nothing exempt 
from criticism a priori. Everything is regarded as fallible. The approach is pragmatic. 
There is neither justification for rationality nor for the critical mindset. We simply observe the 
approach to be highly effective. We are also do not look for self-evidence or justification, but for 
grounding in reality. If we are aware of this grounding in principle, we are also free to question 
"evident" perceptions as possibly false.
 2.7.2 Truth
An error does not become truth by reason of multiplied propagation, 
nor does truth become error because nobody sees it. Truth stands, even 
if there be no public support. It is self sustained. (Gandhi 1927) 
You’re  entitled  to  your  own  opinions,  but  not  your  own  facts. 
Anonymous 
The Ch'an Master went for a walk with Huang Shan-Ku, the Sung poet. 
When they walked past a mountain laurel in bloom, the Master asked, 
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"Do  you  smell  it?"  The  poet  answered,  "Yes."  The  Master  replied, 
"There! I have nothing to hide from you." Taoist Tale82
If one instrumental goal we adopt is the arrival at true beliefs83 – we must at least look shortly at 
the  concept  of  truth84.  The  question  of  truth  arises  at  the  moment  where  we have  beliefs  and 
representations. For a fact in the world, the question of truth does not arise – it simply is. We can 
encode beliefs, representations etc in propositions, and reduce the question to what makes these 
propositions  true.  The  accounts  given  for  truth  are  numerous  and  varied  (Lynch  2001).  The 
theoretical picture most naturally underlying any conception of truth is the correspondence theory 
of truth, that is:
t {t is true iff ∃ x [tRx and x obtains]} (Kirkham 1992, p. 132)
where t ranges over (unspecified) truth bearers, x is a fact or state of affairs85, and R is a relation 
connecting the two, depending on the nature of t (say, beliefs, or sentences or whatever).
It is important to stress that the relation R is nothing mysterious. As we read in on in Kirkham:
'Correspondence' serves as nothing more than a handy summing up of a 
theory in which no such special relation makes any appearance. […] A. 
N. Prior has reached a similar conclusion. It is appropriate, he says, 
to use the word 'correspondence' in describing truth, although the 
word does not appear in his own definition of truth: "To say that X's 
belief that p is true is to say that X believes that p and (it is the 
case that) p. There seems no reason to see any more in 'correspondence 
with fact' than this" (Prior 1971, 21-22). [Prior, A.N. 1971. Objects 
of Thought. OUP.] (Kirkham 1992, p. 135)
Another criticism often leveled at correspondence theories is that "fact" (or states of affairs) is 
not well defined, or even if they were, while there were facts making beliefs true, one can also hold 
negative, conditional or disjunctive beliefs, and there are no facts of that kind. While the answer to 
the first question must wait for the metaphysical analysis, the second objection can be answered 
82 Retrieved from http://davidlavery.net/Imaginative_Thinker/quotes/nquotes/noneed.htm; 27.08.2009
83 The goal of theoretical rationality as traditionally conceived is knowledge – "justified true belief". This account is 
both too strict (that is why we have adopted therapeutic Bayesianism above) and seems to be broken anyway 
(Gettier 1963; Floridi 2004). See the appendix for an alternative account by Bunge.
84 The wish to relativize the very concept of "truth" results from day-to-day power games and monopolizations of truth 
by certain groups. It is important to note that the adherence to a sensible conception of truth is not in any way 
intended to dogmatize certain propositions by ascribing truth to them. There is no danger because truth is always 
only a tentative ascription in scientific and rational discourse. 
85  A state of affairs is a set of facts.
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now: while the problem may pose itself if one wants to formalize the correspondence theory, it is 
not a problem for ordinary language usage, as here we can simply posit that truth in the relevant 
cases is derived from facts together with logical inferences. For instance, if I hold the belief that I 
am not seeing a pink elephant, the truth of this belief would derive from the sum of my perceptions 
and the additional assumption that these are exhaustive. This conglomerate would then indirectly 
correspond to the truth of the negative belief.
Truth is always evaluated by an agent. So truth is always "from a certain point of view", because 
it is in relation to the one doing the evaluation in accordance with his conceptual schemes. But that 
does not mean that truth is relative in a harmful way; because, if the truth bearer is indeed true, 
there will be methods of translation. – for instance, translations which respect structural invariances 
in the respective conceptual domains. If an object appears red to me, but green to you because you 
are under influence of a psychedelic drug, we can check how the drug affects visual perception and 
what mechanisms are responsible for changing color perception; the different truth values of color 
do not entail its arbitrariness; on a higher level, the truth values pop out the same. 
That different agents will come to highly varied accounts of the world is not a challenge to 
truth: it is only a challenge to the scientifically minded problem-solver, who will immediately start 
the search for mechanisms entailing possible translations and unifications. There is often more than 
one good theory describing a phenomenon. Different theories simply capture different aspects of 
complex systems, and theoretical  diversity more reflects  our cognitive structure and capacity to 
think about things than the actual world in want of representation. There is no danger in recognizing 
the aptness of many different theories for describing reality. This will not lead to relativism, because 
there are always many more falsehoods.
The clearest account of truth is given by Bunge, where truth is defined via partial knowledge of 
epistemic  agents  tracking the world with cognitive processes.  The truth of propositions  is  then 
parasitic on the underlying brain processes (see the Appendix for more).
 2.7.3 Truth Maintenance Systems
It  is  time  to  move  on  to  an  important  observation:  humans  are  not  "Truth  Maintenance 
Systems".  The  concept  of  truth  maintenance  comes  from AI systems  that  represent  knowledge 
propositionally. Propositions stored in the system's knowledge base are called facts, and the systems 
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also exhibit inferential rules with which they can infer further facts from those presented to the 
system explicitly. 
Inevitably, some of these inferred facts will turn out to be wrong 
and will have to be retracted in the face of new information. This 
process is called belief revision. [...] Truth maintenance systems, or 
TMSs, are designed to handle exactly these kinds of complications. 
(Russell & Norvig 2003, p. 360)
But this task is not trivial – it is, in fact, at least NP-hard86 (op. cit. p. 362). 
We humans, in fact, nearly never make wide-scale belief revision in our knowledge base. When 
we are shown an inconsistency in our thinking, we only perform "local" updating, that is, revise 
those beliefs that come in immediate and actual conflict with the new belief. If we are in reflective 
mode, we may be inclined to think through some consequences of the new information and revise 
some further beliefs which have greater inferential distance. But generally, we don't sift through 
everything we have stored in our brains to weed out inconsistencies with the new information. This 
would not even be possible for us because knowledge recall in our brains works associatively87. 
Humans are an evolutionary bricolage – cobbled together to satisfice environmental constraints and 
optimize  performance  in  naturally  occurring  situations.  It  is  probably best  to  think  of  humans 
having "scripts"88 for situations (see also above) which are executed on demand, and these scripts 
can be quite contradictory when scrutinized at a global level.
This failure of global updating is what Peter Strawson has in mind when he writes the following 
in regard to a difficult philosophical point with important ramifications89: 
It takes time to assimilate it fully. It cannot be simply read off 
the page. (Strawson 2006)
To know this – at a gut level – is very important for the aspiring rationalist90. Firstly, because it 
lifts into reflective state the meta-rule that only hearing about a logical or statistical relationship will 
not make the rationalist behave differently or take this new evidence into account everywhere where 
86 Informally, problems of this class (or more difficult ones) have no efficiently computable exact solutions.
87 The illuminating Jets and Sharks model (McClelland & Rumelhart 1988) can be explored here: 
http://www.itee.uq.edu.au/~cogs2010/cmc/chapters/IAC/index4.html 
88 What I call scripts here corresponds very closely to the concept of cached thoughts explicated in Yudkowsky 
(2007d).
89 The point will concern us in the metaphysical section concerning the structural nature of physical knowledge.
90 Important reading is also Gelder (2005) who illustrates the difficulty of teaching critical thinking which is closely 
related to the problem of global updating.
74
it should be taken into account. The really difficult task when hearing new knowledge is to embody 
it, that is, transfer it to all relevant scripts which are called up in appropriate situations. This requires 
practice, meditation, real-world and hands-on experience etc. Knowledge of the meta-rule can help 
achieve global rationality by prodding one to questions one's beliefs in every situation in light of the 
new evidence – although one has to make a preliminary91 heuristic evaluation if this situation calls 
for  reflecting  on  the  new  evidence  in  the  first  place,  which  is  costly  (the  process  applied 
indiscriminately would be taxing, time-consuming, and largely fruitless). 
Secondly, this fact also explains how highly intelligent scientists can often hold very parochial 
views on religion or other domains foreign to their specialty. The reason for this is that parts of 
cognition which are affectively loaded in a high degree are not available for belief revision (Buggle 
1992).
So, human beings, even those striving actively for global rationality, are, at most times in their 
lives (probably always) inconsistent in the sense that they hold mutually incompatible beliefs. Belief 
revision does not ensue the moment new beliefs enter the system, but only when inconsistencies 
can't be upheld any longer due to environmental pressure – in the case of the rationalist intellectual  
pressure upon discovery of the incompatibility. Some people do not even update in the case of 
environmental pressure92. 
All of the above illustrates the importance, in philosophy, to sometimes say trivial things. We 
have to say trivial things and then apply them in other contexts, where suddenly, they do not appear 
trivial at all. That is how we humans update our knowledge base. That is also why knowledge can 
not be simply read off of a paper. Take for instance the simple fact that you are made up of physical 
parts. That is quite a trivial thing to say – but what follows, alas, is painful to bear; at least on a first 
take. Many choose not to think this thought to the end. We will do so in this thesis.
Knowledge does not come easily – you have to think about it, meditate on it, act on it, embody 
it, in short: become it. Only then will understanding ensue. That is the difficult part. Concepts and 
ideas,  as  opposed  to  words,  are  not  arbitrary.  The  distinction  between  memetic  and  embodied 
knowledge is relevant here (Bryson 2008). While the advent of pure memes (not grounded directly 
in experience but only semantically grounded) enriches cultural-evolutionary design space, it opens 
up all new kinds of possibilities for error; semantic grounding being one step removed from the 
91 The preliminary evaluation can be wrong, but that is what fallibility is about.
92 Such as people continuing the practice of praying for personal boons despite prayer not showing any effects in 
clinical studies (Krucoff et al. 2005).
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world, as opposed to embodied grounding. So a task of philosophy is to destroy scripts which are 
only semantically grounded but have no referents in the real world.
 2.7.4 Objective and Subjective 
An important distinction is that between the "objective" and the "subjective". Objective and 
subjective have nothing to do with truth. There are subjective truths and objective falsehoods93.
Let us proceed in an orderly fashion. When I speak of ontological situations, I will speak of 
facts. Facts are the real thing, out in the world. Facts are what make propositions true.94 Propositions 
are the statements with which sentient agents express their beliefs about the world. Only when we 
enter the domain of propositions and beliefs do question of objectivity and truth arise. Truth and 
falsity are then, as above, roughly construed as a correspondence of propositions with the facts, or, 
more accurately, a tracking of environmental patterns by brain states identical with the utterance of 
propositions.
The  question  of  objectivity  and  subjectivity  adds  a  new  dimension  to  the  analysis  of 
propositions and beliefs. "Subjective" is every proposition concerning the internal side of cognitive 
states of agents, whereas "objective" is everything that is independent of such cognitive states. Note 
that  objective is also different from intersubjective – there are belief  systems, say,  Christianity, 
which  are  shared  intersubjectively but  are  not  objective  in  the  sense  that  the  belief  system is 
independent of human minds.
Bunge defines "objective" knowledge in this way (see also Appendix A: Terminology of Mario
Bunge:
Let p designate a piece of knowledge. Then p is objective if, and only 
if, 
(i) p is public (intersubjective) in some society, and
(ii) p is testable either conceptually or empirically.
Mahner & Bunge (1997, p. 67) 
93 This is a nonstandard view propagated by Bunge, which I endorse. Nothing much rests on it though, as it is a simple 
quibble over words. The excellent analysis of Nozick (2001) of what constitutes objectivity can, for instance, be 
easily transferred to this system (it won't work for subjective truth though: which is why I follow Bunge and not 
Nozick).
94 Although they can't be defined as truth-makers of propositions, see our short discussion of negative, disjunctive and 
conditional propositions.
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Subjective and objective are classifications of propositions; the ontological category is that of 
fact. There is nothing "less true" about the subjective than the objective, it is just that the subjective 
is not verifiable by other subjects. And verifiability is an epistemological concept.
Yudkowsky classifies a little differently:
If  you  can  change  something  by  thinking  differently,  it's 
subjective; if you can't change it by anything you do strictly inside 
your head, it's objective. Yudkowsky (2008d)
It's  a good rule  of thumb, but  does not discern between beliefs  themselves and contents of 
beliefs. For instance, I can change my belief about whether the Earth is round or flat inside my 
head,  clearly  labeling  my  belief  itself  as  subjective  –  but  the  content  of  my  belief  concerns 
something objective. So there are some subtle issues involved, explaining the confusion reigning in 
the subjective-objective issue.
Now, we may consider also separating facts into objective and subjective ones; I do not think 
that this is helpful. The distinction objective-subjective should not be applied to facts. Facts, as I 
wrote above, simply are. Thus, if I am currently happy, this is simply a fact. The proposition "I am 
happy" is a subjective claim though; and a true one if I really am happy.
There is something important to bear in mind: even a subjective and false belief, when held, is 
part of reality and can have causal effects. Science is the project of trying to attain true beliefs and 
avoid false beliefs; science is primarily concerned with objective propositions, as only those can be 
reliably communicated. But the rationalist must also concern himself with subjective propositions, 
as they refer to facts that are no less real.
A system of subjective and objective beliefs can be called a  perspective  on  reality. What is a 
good perspective on reality? A perspective is good if it provides a consistent and enactable mapping 
of the world: that is, the inferential structure of the perspective tracks the causal structure of the 
world. The perspective will be good if it approximates truth, that is, it is in accordance with the 
facts.
 2.7.5 Science, Rationality and other Domains of Inquiry
Can we be rational in a stronger sense than the scientific  ideal prescribes? I am not sure. But 
what we can do is try to do better than mere scientific practice, because that is nothing other than an 
evolutionary algorithm for ensuring that it works for the  population of scientists. Describing the 
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scientific  process  in  such  a  way could  go  like  this:  there  is  mutation  (creativity  of  individual 
scientists), heredity (training in a scientific discipline) and selection (according to methodological 
rules and comparison with experiment). 
Evolutionary  algorithms,  when  operating  on  non-cognitive  entities,  explore  blind  alleys  by 
necessity. But we humans are cognitive individuals with insight and planning abilities, so we can try 
to do better at a local level than the algorithm at the population level. The synthesis of knowledge 
of  diverse  disciplines  in  a  single  human may be  conducive  to  weeding  out  theories  that  seem 
acceptable  from  within a  discipline.  A caveat:  whenever  we venture  outside  the  domain  of  an 
established empirical discipline, extreme caution is urged. Paradigms and entrenched theories are 
usually there for good reasons, and, even if the rationalist may at times take the high perspective, 
she must always keep in mind that what may seem obvious from afar may be ruled out by some 
empirical detail unbeknownst to her. 
And what we can do in any case is extend rational and scientific reasoning into other domains of 
inquiry. We can try to extrapolate from the empirical sciences and  structure domains of inquiry 
which have up to present been the territory of unreflected, naive and historically grown discourse. 
The following diagram should clarify my point (it is not intended to be in any way canonical, only 
illustrative): 
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As we move outward from the inner core (A) things get less and less certain. But uncertainty 
does not exempt one from reasoning. Especially in the (D) section ideas for new experiments may 
arise; or even new conceptual structures for unification of theories. 
(D) is the fecund field for discovering new knowledge and making sense of the world; it is the 
field of scientific philosophy. The problem is that most people who don't agree with the kind of 
reasoning performed in (D) don't argue from (A), (B), or (C); nor from (D). Criticism is raised 
coming from (E), (F) or (G) – the dominion of pre-scientific world-models fighting their last battle 
against reason. While science may not yet have enough empirical detail to analyze every aspect of 
the world, that does not mean that we are free to believe whatever we see fit in the white areas on 
the map; on the contrary, we are urged to exert even more care and restraint on belief in these areas 
than anywhere else.
 2.7.6 Limits of Knowledge
That there are limits of scientific and rational knowledge does not mean that there are other 
methods to come by this knowledge. We have defined science and rationality such that these are the 
optimal ways of acquiring new knowledge. If new methods of discovery are found, they will be 
immediately integrated into the rationalist tool set.
Limits of knowledge are exactly that: limits95. You can't dream or intuit or make up answers96; 
humans are afraid of uncertainty, and that is why they prefer an imaginary answer over no answer at 
all.  But  an  imaginary  answer  does  not  make  the  answer  true  or  helpful  beyond  some  initial 
psychological soothing.
And it should not go unappreciated that limiting results of science like the Halting Problem in 
computer science or no-go theorems in quantum mechanics also constitute a form of knowledge – 
we know what  is  not  possible.  Limiting results  are  knowledge about  limits  which  no one can 
transcend. 
Limiting  results  often  have  counterintuitive  consequences.  Take  Gödel's  incompleteness 
theorem for instance, which is often presented as a negative result. But there is a different reading:
This positive implication of the incompleteness theorem is that we 
have a way of extending any system of axioms for mathematics that we 
recognize as correct to a logically stronger system of axioms that we 
95 An interesting article exploring such limits is Svozil (2007).
96 What about revelation? Well – how to discern revelation from imagination? More on that in section 2.9.6.
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will also recognize as correct, namely by adding the statement that 
the old system is consistent as a new axiom. That the resulting system 
is  logically  stronger  than  the  old  system  means  that  it  proves 
everything that the old system proves, and more besides. Thus our 
mathematical knowledge would appear to be inexhaustible in the sense 
that it cannot be pinned down in any one formal axiomatic theory. 
(Franzen 2004) 
So, mathematics definitely won't get boring – what starts out as a limiting theorem becomes a 
paragon of creativity.
An objection often raised when the rational exploration of the universe is proposed is that we 
should not know everything. Apart from the dubious origins of that "should"97, we can answer in a 
very pragmatic way: exposing all questions to rational inquiry does not mean that everything will be 
solved at some future time and that life will become dull.  The more we know, the more we can 
combine; knowledge is like a puzzle where each new piece enlarges the game. In the same way we 
may regard the open-ended nature of the universe as it presents itself to us in our current scientific 
inquiry – there always seem to be more problems; and when those have been solved, new ones will 
arise.  Maybe  people  fear  knowledge  because  they  think  it  disenchants  nature.  But  the  true 
enchantment is that as knowledge grows, every new piece of knowledge can be combined with 
previous ones in an unending kaleidoscope of beauty98.
A limit which is very baffling is the following: why these laws of nature, and not others: I think 
that at the moment this is still  too difficult to answer99. There is no satisfying unified theory of 
quantum mechanics and general  relativity yet;  cosmological  observations are  getting better  and 
better and will change our models of the universe in the future. We know very little. It should just 
be made clear that anybody who offers an explanation – such as religions do – doesn't have more 
knowledge  than  scientists,  but  usually  less,  so  even  less  credence  should  be  assigned  to  their 
proclaimed views.
97 The idea is that there is some magical border beyond which no inquiry is permitted; but who should delineate this 
border? It boils down to censorship and authoritarianism. The intention of course is to protect group biases (ethnic, 
religious etc) from science; we have seen this in action above in the section on "separate magisteria", a distinction 
which is, as argued, untenable. 
98 And, as we will see in the metaphysical section, while reality is knowable, it is also inexhaustible – because one can 
"cut it up" in an infinite matter of ways and always discover knew interesting relations; without, to be clear, 
embracing relativism.
99  The anthropic principle aside, which should only be a last ditch explanation. Interesting ruminations on why 
something exists at all, instead of nothing, can be found in Tegmark (1996); Carlson & Olsson (2001); Witherall 
(2006).
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 2.8 Naturalism
If you would learn to think like reality, then here is the Tao: 
Since  the  beginning  not  one  unusual  thing  has  ever  happened. 
(Yudkowsky 2007e) 
There are a number of definitions and variants of naturalism floating around (Sukopp & Vollmer 
2007).
But at the core of naturalism, I think, are two ideas:
1) The world is lawful. There are no unlawful events. Maybe there are random events, but then 
appeal  is  made to  stochastic  lawfulness.  Either  way,  no miracles  are  permitted.  This  of 
course raises the problematic issue of what a law of nature is. Criteria are given in (Vollmer 
2003). I favor the mechanismic account of Bunge (see Appendix A).
2) Humans do not occupy some special place in the order of things. This is actually only a 
special mention of the fact that humans are part and parcel of the world, that there are no 
discontinuities involved; humans are self-aware matter configuration, nothing more, nothing 
less. It deserves special mention because humans are very prone to conceptualize themselves 
as in some way apart from the world.
Now, the commitment to naturalism can be adopted either a priori or arrived at a posteriori. A 
posteriori  is  of course the only serious method of arriving at  naturalism. After careful personal 
observation of the world, diligent weighing of the scientific evidence and moderate knowledge of 
human psychology and its proneness to biases, a rationally minded person will sooner or later adopt 
naturalism100. Again, this is a kind of bootstrapping, but nothing objectionable lies therein from a 
methodological point of view; it is inevitable, and what is the use of objecting to the inevitable? 
This principle of naturalism is then a powerful heuristic for evaluating new incoming evidence. 
After one has "learned" naturalism from observation, one can use it to classify further observations.
Ants are natural. Their nests are natural. Humans are an integral part of the natural world. They 
build  cities  which  invite  analogies  with  ant  nests.  So  why  should  we  not  call  their  cities, 
technologies and artifacts natural? The distinction natural/artificial is sometimes interesting – for 
instance, when we stumble upon an artifact on an alien world, this is astounding not because an 
artifact were something supernatural, but because an artifact suggests an artificer – an intelligence, 
100That science is apt to test supernatural claims and rule them out is argued convincingly in Fishman (2009).
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an  agent,  which  made  it  –  a  natural  being  of  some  sophistication.  But  the  distinction 
artificial/natural does not have ontological import. In the universe, everything is natural.
Since everything is natural, note that also the humanities form only a part of the inquiry into the 
natural world:
The  so-called  moral  sciences  or  Geisteswissenschaften  (literally 
sciences  of  the  spirit)  are  re-conceived.  Anthropology,  economics, 
political  science,  and  sociology  study  the  thinking  and  being  of 
social  animals,  not  collections  of  radically  autonomous  Cartesian 
agents, not of beings running on Geist — on spiritual fuel in the 
spooky sense. The uniﬁcation of the sciences that study persons […] is 
made possible by the insight that all these sciences are all engaged 
in studying various aspects of the thinking and being of a certain 
very smart species of social mammal. (Flanagan 2007, p. 3)
The naturalistic study of music or literature, to give examples which are traditionally associated 
with the humanities, is well underway (Gottschall 2007; Ball 2008).
The thing with naturalism is this: the position is, once adopted, near obvious; all supernatural 
explanations would introduce additional, unneeded entities101. But naturalism is contested because 
there is significant emotional resistance to this position.  Bloom and Weisberg have investigated 
childhood origins for adult resistance to scientific thought:
...both adults and children resist acquiring scientific information 
that  clashes  with  common-sense  intuitions  about  the  physical  and 
psychological  domains.  Additionally,  when  learning  information  from 
other  people,  both  adults  and  children  are  sensitive  to  the 
trustworthiness  of  the  source  of  that  information.  Resistance  to 
science,  then,  is  particularly  exaggerated  in  societies  where 
nonscientific ideologies have the advantages of being both grounded in 
common sense and transmitted by trustworthy sources. Bloom & Weisberg 
(2007)
The results apply equally to naturalism, which is simply consequent application of scientific 
thought to all domains of life. Rationality and naturalism challenge us at a very deep level as human 
101If one does not adhere to some principle of simplicity in theory selection, one can, of course, believe everything; for 
instance, that every event, no matter how insignificant, is caused by a god manipulating matter.
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beings  and the way we view ourselves  as  persons  in  the world.  Embarking on the  journey of 
complete naturalization is not undertaken lightly, and even highly intelligent people may recoil102.
 2.9 Opposition to Rationality
 2.9.1 Variants of Opposition
Reason – so difficult has it come to this universe and to humanity, so great have been its benefits 
– and yet … the moment one pronounces the attitude that all domains of inquiry are and should be 
open to  rational  discussion and scientific  investigation,  vehement  opposition is  not  long in  the 
waiting. 
The reasons for opposition are varied, and sometimes one is not sure if there are reasons at all. 
But one can classify some kinds of opposition:
1. image of the self
2. misconceptions about rationality
3. charges of overconfidence
4. anti-authoritarianism
5. religion
6. ludditism
That scientific results challenge our self-image is the backdrop of my whole thesis; whereas for 
instance the  big bang as a theory about the origin of the universe is uncritically accepted by the 
populace  and  many  physicists  because  it  merges  well  with  traditional  Western  religious 
cosmogeny103, other results suffer widespread rejection because they challenge our self-conception 
as  special  creatures  of  the  universe.  Underlying  this  resistance is  oftentimes  a  kind of  human-
species self-love which would disgust us if displayed in an individual: human beings are seen as 
"creation's crowning glory", as a teleological goal of a guided universe – that is narcissism taken to 
extremes. 
102A fascinating account of this phenomenon is given in Buggle (1992, p. 325f), who shows how people of such caliber 
as the physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizäcker use sub par reasoning to justify their religious beliefs due to 
psychological constraints on their thinking and the need to "protect" deep-rooted emotional indoctrinations. 
103The big bang is, as so much in modern physics, heavily theory dependent. There are far more interesting 
cosmological models, for instance the cyclic universe (Steinhardt & Turok 2002), in line with Hindu mythology.
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Science is a path with a goal – knowledge – but no destination, and indeed, even the path may 
seem to fade before one's eyes when the journey is long and arduous. It is an attitude of not wanting 
to relent in the quest for knowledge; not to be content save with the best we can do. A will to think, 
and always think anew. Adopting the scientific world view primarily means relinquishing any claim 
to possessing truth; relinquishing above all the dearly held truths which stand between oneself and 
the void. This makes people fearful – and that is the origin of opposition to science. Cherished 
thoughts, traditional world views, power structures – all crumble before the advent of the rational 
mind. But we can conceive of reality in ways which is more in accord in science than traditional 
pictures of the world. I deal with this in chapters 4 and 5, so not much more need be said here.
Points 2 and 3 are easily shown to be wrongheaded; they have been partly addressed above. 
Point  4,  anti-authoritarianism  will  be  looked  at  closely,  especially  in  its  guise  of  radical 
constructivism.
Point 5 is about a vested interest in not accepting rationality, religion, which will also be looked 
at in a little more detail.
Point 6 is, contrary to the other points, logically coherent, but dangerous in the universe we live 
in.
Rationality  is  about  taking  the  consequences  of  one's  beliefs  into  account.  All  irrational 
positions suffer from the malady of not doing this. It begins that their very starting point, that is, 
"arguing" against rationality, is already incoherent. If one decries reason, why bother arguing? The 
only honest objection against the rational world view is a shotgun.
 2.9.2 Misconceptions
A quote in case is George Bernard Shaw's104 phrase: 
The reasonable man adapts himself to the conditions which surround 
him.  The  unreasonable  man  persists  in  trying  to  adapt  surrounding 
conditions to himself. ... All progress depends on the unreasonable 
man.
This is the kind of reasonableness the rationalist definitely does not have in mind. The phrase 
"be reasonable" may be a rhetoric tactic in everyday life to make other people conform to one's 
104It is attributed to George Bernard Shaw in Bartley (1984), and diverse sources on the Internet. I was not able to track 
down the original source. In any case, the quote is illuminating even if it's not from G.B. Shaw.
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wishes; but it has nothing to do with the art of rationality; indeed, the rationalist will often act very 
"unreasonably", that is, contrary to convention, in day to day situations. But this encounter with the 
word "reasonable" may well predispose people to react negatively when confronted with the appeal 
to exercise reason at all times.
Other misconceptions, such as "lack of emotionality" or not taking intuition into account have 
been dealt with above.
Some people seem to mistake rationality for sophistry. Maybe, for clarity, we should distinguish 
sincere  rationalists –  henceforth  simply  called  rationalists  –  and  manipulators.  The  difference 
would be that the former are interested in knowledge, understanding, explanation and ethics etc – 
while the latter are simply trying to push a (most probably hidden) agenda, a doctrine of their in-
group for example. But it should not be too difficult to distinguish between the two in practice; the 
simplest criterion being if the person in question considers new evidence or not.
But the danger of falling into the trap of a manipulator, can't be side-stepped by avoiding a 
rational attitude. Even in a social environment favoring imprecise speech, there will come a time 
when problems will have to be solved in the real world (remember: as long as there is no need to act 
there is in principle no need to be rational; rationality is a requirement imposed upon us by the 
physical environment and the desire to reach goals in this environment).
And problem-solving requires commitment to some mental model of the world, which may be 
more or less accurate, and which has to be communicated and justified. But what now? How to 
avoid a rational attitude?
Even  by  renouncing  reason,  it  could  still  be  that  influence  is  spread  via  other  channels 
(manipulation need not go by way of argument); maybe a manipulator is saturating the environment 
with pheromones that inspire trust. One can never exclude that one is being manipulated. But the 
best one can do – and indeed, that is all the rational method demands, that one does the best one can 
do – is to start thinking rationally yourself.
 2.9.3 Overconfidence
Another challenge of often raised is that the rationalist is overconfident in his application of 
reason; that the answer is probably unknown. Again, this criticism quite misses the point, because, 
when  we  are  doing  science  or  scientific  philosophy,  fallibilism  is  always  presupposed  –  the 
understanding that we are constructing models that are most probably in some, maybe even all, 
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aspects, but nevertheless better  than competing models. In science we always attempt to weigh 
theories with respect to one another, given what we know, not more, not less.
That is actually the difference between science and rationality versus other undertakings of the 
human species like ideology or religion: the people participating in the former are always aware that 
we are just in a state of approximation, and that there are facts of which we are currently quite 
ignorant.105 
An example of how rational reasoning may look from the perspective of someone decrying the 
approach, and ways the rationalist could respond might go like this:
Imagine a rationalist weighing certain propositions, A, B and C assigning them a probability 
ordering, and coming to the (conditionalized) conclusion D. The skeptic is patiently (more often, 
impatiently)  listening  and  thinking  that  this  is  all  to  no  avail  because  the  rationalist  has  not 
considered propositions E and F and apart from that, many unknown relationships and facts may 
enter the picture in the future. 
But,  again,  the skeptic is being inconsistent if he denies the rational approach to questions: 
because  if  he  has  thought  of  propositions  E  and  F,  he  must  reason  why they  apply,  and  the 
rationalist will happily accommodate. As to the unknown relationships and facts invoking them is 
an unfair move because they are per definitionem unknown; the rationalist takes these possibilities 
into account with the fallibilist stance. 
A rationalist who does not act in the above way – that is, flexibly adjusting to new propositions 
ventured  or  being  too sure  about  his  conclusions,  is  not  a  true  rationalist.  Is  this  a  "no  true 
Scotsman"106 argument? No, because being a rationalist is not like being a member of a political 
party or a religious movement or having certain ancestry, where those criteria are constitutive of the 
105In Bayesian terms, we would ascribe a large portion of prior probability to an "unknown true theory" and make sure 
that our updating rule would guarantee that this slice never shrinks to zero. Of course, in practice, as we use 
Bayesianism to compare existing hypotheses, we might as well drop this procedure altogether and just calculate the 
relative posteriors. But it is good to keep the above procedure in mind when thinking of our brains as Bayesian 
inference machines, and how the very brain states of a rationalist would incorporate the fallible nature of our 
knowledge.
106This fallacy is described in Flew (1975) 
Imagine Hamish McDonald, a Scotsman, sitting down with his Glasgow Morning 
Herald and seeing an article about how the "Brighton Sex Maniac Strikes 
Again." Hamish is shocked and declares that "No Scotsman would do such a 
thing." The next day he sits down to read his Glasgow Morning Herald again 
and this time finds an article about an Aberdeen man whose brutal actions 
make the Brighton sex maniac seem almost gentlemanly. This fact shows that 
Hamish was wrong in his opinion but is he going to admit this? Not likely. 
This time he says, "No true Scotsman would do such a thing."
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respective label. Being rational is a method to which you can adhere to or not (in varying degrees); 
solely the application of this method makes you a rationalist or not. 
When a scientist or a rationalist are very certain about something, it is usually because they have 
considered a lot of available evidence and pondered long and carefully over possible alternative 
hypotheses. They will not repeat the long chain of argument every time they present some theory, 
simply because this is not possible. From this may come the false impression of certainty without 
sufficient backing; the skeptic who is of a different opinion than the scientific establishment is well 
advised to embark equally upon a quest of learning and thinking. Simply shouting "overconfidence" 
will not to the job.
 2.9.4 Anti-authoritarian
Another variant of resistance to science,  one unfortunately meeting with much sympathy in 
some academic circles,  are  those of the deconstructivist,  postmodernist  and relativist  slant.  But 
while the original intention of these movements may have been noble – to uncover oppressive 
structures and pave the way for new avenues of thinking – the approach does not work.
While it may be feasible to be a relativist in an academic seminar, at the very moment where 
one has to  solve real-world problems,  where one has to  take action and make decisions,  these 
"philosophies" do not provide any guidance for resolving conflict. Such situations will immediately 
degenerate into a power struggle. 
What does it actually mean to place a subject outside of science and rational discourse? People 
who are not willing to be rational on certain subjects but have opinions nonetheless are actually 
playing a game of power.
The answer to the problem of entrenched opinion, dominance and authority is not to advocate 
relativism,  but  to  advocate  reason.  Problems  never  arise  because  of  too  much  reason,  always 
because of too little reason107. It is time to look more closely at one of these "philosophies" (as a 
proxy for all of them), namely, radical constructivism.
107This is also my answer to Horkheimer & Adorno (1947) ("Dialektik der Aufklärung") – what they attempt to 
criticize, albeit in unclear words, is lack of reason, not abundance of it.
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 2.9.5 Radical Constructivism or Reason gone Wrong
"Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go 
away." Philip K. Dick108 
Before  I  had  studied  Zen  for  thirty  years,  I  saw  mountains  as 
mountains, and waters as waters. When I arrived at a more intimate 
knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not 
mountains, and waters are not waters. But now that I have got its very 
substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again 
as mountains, and waters once again as waters. - Ch'uan Teng Lu (22)
The Zen quote above illuminates the transformations an epistemic agent undergoes. The first 
stage, when mountains are mountains and waters are waters, is naive realism. It is the child's view 
as  soon as  it  learns  concepts;  a  car,  a  cat,  those things  are  real  in  virtue  of  the way they are 
conceptualized; there is no process of critical reflection. 
Adults usually transcend this stage at some stage of their life, and reflect on their concepts and 
come to realize that a concept must not necessarily correspond to a thing in reality109. One sees 
through  language  concepts  and  societal  concepts;  many  things  learned  at  school  and  the 
conventions of human society are seen to be arbitrary categorizations; reality becomes richer, more 
open to opportunity,  for creative action,  but also less anthropocentric,  less homely.  Few people 
attain  complete  dissolution  of  all  concepts,  including  their  very personal  "essence"  –  but  only 
complete dissolution opens the way to stage three. Incomplete dissolution, that is, seeing through 
the fabrication and construction of some constructs but leaving others (unconsciously) intact leads 
to problems.
The third stage is attained only after painful processes of personal transformation. Things are 
now again seen as they are, in immediate experience. Concepts are seen as sometimes helpful and 
benign, but are dropped when recognized as harmful to progress. Reality becomes malleable to the 
mind without becoming in any way relative or subjective: rather, one attains the skill of drawing up 
conceptual borders at will around more or less stable features of objective and invariant reality. 
Achieving this third stage is very difficult – it does not suffice to read about theoretical results of 
108"How to Build a Universe That Doesn't Fall Apart Two Days Later" by Philip K. Dick, 1978. Online: 
http://deoxy.org/pkd_how2build.htm
109Of course, many concepts are protected from critical reflection, as delving too deep causes fear: concepts relating to 
one's identity, for instance. Some central tenets of religion, like the possession of a soul, are often too painful too 
drop. Here, conceptualization remains naive.
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science and philosophy of science. The hard part, as always, is integrating this knowledge into the 
deep neural structure of one's brain. Sometimes, one can't attain deep insight alone; one must seek 
teachers, mentors or therapists.
A  philosophical  position  which  as  a  whole  failed  to  attain  the  third  stage  is  radical  
constructivism  (RC).  Radical  constructivism  asserts  that  nothing  in  the  world  is  knowable  – 
epistemological  solipsism.  All  is  only construction  of  the  mind.  Reality  in  itself  is  not  denied 
though, as in ontological solipsism, but it is unclear what is gained by that move.
Radical Constructivism is not only an old hat – it is extreme scepticism in a new guise – but also 
dangerous, because it is a straightforward leap into relativism. It evokes concern in the literature:
Der sogenannte 'Konstruktivismus' ist … die gefährlichste moderne 
geistige Tendenz, und, so darf man wohl sagen, eine der am weitesten 
verbreiteten Auffassungen. Er verbindet zwei Kantsche Ideen mit dem 
modernen Relativismus, nämlich die Idee, dass wir die uns bekannte 
Welt mit Hilfe unserer Begriffe herstellen, und die, dass wir eine von 
uns unabhängige Welt durch unsere Erkenntnis nicht erreichen können. 
(Albert 1996, p. 15f)
And:
Constructivism has recoiled from Realism, that is, only to succumb 
to its equally untenable opposite. … a failure of imagination: an 
inability to talk about the world except in terms subsequent to the 
registrational  achievement.  And  that  in  turn  has  led  to  three 
insurmountable problems. First, it has meant that the constructivist's 
only option in describing the world prior to the act of registration 
is to deny that what was only then registered ever existed (this is 
the source of the shock). Second, even more seriously, it supplied no 
apparatus with which to describe the true nature of the registrational 
achievement,  thereby  somewhat  ironically  denying  the  constructivist 
any  way  to  describe  the  metaphysically  constitutive  act  of 
construction. Third – this was perhaps the most obvious of all, to the 
outsider – it failed normatively, giving one no handle on what was 
important or significant. (Smith 1996, p. 353)
It should be stressed that Smith does find positions of merit in constructivism – as I do; but 
radical constructivism simply goes one step too far; or, staying in the imagery of the Zen quote 
above, one step too few.
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The philosophy only works if there is a radical cut between knower and known, and, despite 
proclamations  to  the  opposite,  assuming  this  cut  essentially  underlies  radical  constructivism110. 
Maturana & Varela (1987) develop the metaphor of a person sitting in a submarine submerged in an 
ocean, and reading values off of controls. The person always only sees control readings, never the 
ocean outside;  and this  example  servers  to  "illuminate"  the epistemic  cut  between knower and 
known. I think it is no coincidence that this metaphor is reminiscent of the homunculus so pervasive 
in naive conceptions of the self. The position of RC is usually presented as absolutely revolutionary. 
But the assumption of closed cognitive entities which have no direct access to an external world is 
actually a very deep Cartesian intuition which underlies much of Western philosophy;  it  is  not 
revolutionary, but quite mainstream.
Among the core tenets of the constructivist approach, as taken from Alex Riegler's guidelines111 
for submissions to the Journal "Constructivist Foundations", are the following:
• According  to  constructivist  approaches,  it  is  futile  to  claim  that 
knowledge approaches reality; reality is brought forth by the subject 
rather than passively received;
• Constructivist approaches entertain an agnostic relationship with reality, 
which is considered beyond our cognitive horizon; any reference to it 
should be refrained from;
• Therefore, the focus of research moves from the world that consists of 
matter to the world that consists of what matters;112
The first point above shows clearly that, despite assertions to the contrary, the subject/object 
dichotomy is upheld. The traditional view of knowledge being passively received is supplanted by 
the complementary and dialectically linked view that the subject brings forth what is perceived. 
Both positions are false. There are only relative configurations, but more on that below. Knowing is 
a  mode of reality, not something separate from it. And while of course everything we know quite 
trivially is dependent on the state of our mind, the distinguishing feature between knowledge and 
fantasy is that the former exhibits a certain harmony with external affairs, whereas the latter do not. 
I do not know what is intended by blurring the distinction between the two. That the world has no 
knowable structure is  the naive assumption of some structured entities  in  the structured world. 
110There is no such cut. More on that below.
111 http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/journal/faq.html#denominators
112 Riegler (2001) offers a clear and concise overview of core constructivist positions.
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Structure  is  necessary  for  memory,  thought,  identity,  everything  what  makes  persistence  of 
cognitive entities possible. Without structure there is no doubt, making the doubting of structure 
self-refuting.
Points  two and  three  are  even more  revealing:  given  those,  it  is  not  clear  why we should 
continue to practice scientific research. Why not leave the construction of knowledge to artists and 
poets? While this may be appealing to some people, the drawback is of course a purely practical 
one: poets will not help it getting real problems solved, such as building bridges that don't collapse, 
nourishing people that are starving, battling diseases and what have you. 
If we dispense with an ontological scratching post (that is, reality), we can believe anything we 
want. Science is not necessary anymore, and any thought of Enlightenment must be relinquished, a 
prospect welcomed by some, for whatever reasons and agendas.
The  reason  for  positing  points  two  and  three  above  is  the  purported  cognitive  closure  of 
epistemic systems derived from biological considerations. The objection is obvious: if cognitive 
closure follows from empirical science, but this empirical science is actually only a construction 
due  to  cognitive  closure,  it  can't  be  epistemically  relevant:  radical  constructivism,  once  more, 
refutes itself. 
Schmidt (1987, p. 39f) recognizes this; the rebuttal he offers is not an argument though, but 
mere  restatement  of  ideology:  the  status  of  empirical  theories  is  declassified  as  mere 
"intersubjectively shared operational knowledge"; but the question immediately arises:  shared by 
whom? As radical constructivism is construed as epistemological solipsism, why take other human 
beings  seriously?  They are,  after  all,  also "only"  constructions;  why offer  other  human beings 
special  privilege in  the epistemological  landscape?  The sleight  of  hand usually goes  unnoticed 
because  we  conceptually  weigh  humans  higher  than  other  entities  of  the  world.  Radical 
constructivists should undertake the project of delineating the difference between epistemological 
and ontological solipsism. For all practical purposes, as mentioned above, the two should collapse.
The grounding in the world needed to share experience and ensuring a correct grip on reality 
was  provided by the blind  algorithm of  evolution.  An account  for  how this  leads  to  epistemic 
success is given, as mentioned above, by evolutionary epistemology (Vollmer 1975; Vollmer 2003). 
The Kantian conditions for the possibility of experience would be given a simple explanation in 
evolutionary epistemology. Sense organs and neural structures would evolve in such a way, as to be 
able to know the very reality of which they are a part of.
91
Living in a Natural World
An illuminating example of how organs adapt to external situations in the world is the eye: we 
perceive those frequencies of the light spectrum of the sun which penetrate the atmosphere and thus 
are available for tracking the environment. 
The light frequency on Earth attains its maximum at wavelengths between 400 and 800nm – this 
depends on the elemental composition of the sun, its age and its size, the distance of the Earth to the 
sun and the composition and thickness of the Earth's atmosphere etc.  Our eyes perceive in the 
spectrum of 380-760nm (Vollmer 1975, p. 98). The connection is obvious. And there seems to be no 
evolutionary advantage of being able to see the minimal amounts of UV-light or gamma radiation 
present  in  our  environment  at  the  current  geological  development  of  the  Earth  and  stellar 
development of the sun/solar system – although evidently it would be great fun to be able to do that.
Evolution works with what it is has – new structures avail themselves of older ones, leading to 
exaptation  and  other  evolutionary  phenomena  such  as  suboptimal  design  of  organs113.  A 
constructivist  could  argue  that  maybe  evolutionary  suboptimal  branches  selected  for  at  the 
beginning and which track reality wrongly would rule out "correct" knowledge of reality. One thing 
speaks against this: analogous development, that is, convergent evolution, for which constructivism 
necessarily can give no satisfactory account. The independent development of the eye in vertebrates 
and cephalopods is a case in point (Futuyma 1998, p. 110f). The existence of analog development of 
organismic features is a powerful indicator that there are states of affairs "out there" which are 
attractors for evolution.
And even  if an initial "fit" were a simple instance of satisficing, and not a mapping of real 
structures  onto  internal  models,  nothing  would  prevent  evolution  from discovering,  with  time, 
species which were better adapted to exploit features of reality and dominate species which only 
exhibited an adequate "fit". In fact, this did happen: humans developed the most sophisticated mind 
on the planet, an organ which lets them plastically map real world structures in near real time, as 
opposed to the gradual generational adaptation of evolution; the result is near complete domination 
of the planet114. 
Evolution  also  enters  from  another  angle.  Even  RC  can't  do  without  a  basic  notion  of 
consistency.  But from where does this criterion of consistency come from? From an immaterial 
113 A well known suboptimal design is the optic nerve leaving the eye, leading to an absence of retina at that location 
which then leads to a blind spot in vision. (The brain fills the blind spot in, so that it is not noticed in ordinary vision 
tasks.)
114 This remark is to be read in an ethically neutral way. It is simply a statement of fact.
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mindspace independent of corporeality – that would be a strange commitment for someone denying 
basic reality. 
The ability to recognize consistency and inconsistency in the first place is due to our having 
implicit models115 of what is consistent – these models having their grounding in basic perceptual 
skills which we owe, again, to our evolutionary heritage. The empirical evidence for this can be 
extracted  from number  skills  present  in  infants  and even animals:  innate  arithmetic (Lakoff  & 
Nunez 2000). Basic numerical skills are present in many living beings before any mathematical 
training is performed – not only in humans but also in animals. As animals can't talk this requires 
some ingenuity in experimental setup and of course contains some interpretative leeway, but the 
description of the experiment is suggestive:
Rhesus monkeys in the wild have arithmetic abilities similar to 
those  of  infants,  as  revealed  by  studies  with  the  violation-of-
expectation paradigm. For example, a monkey was first presented with 
one eggplant place in an open box. Then a partition was placed in 
front of the eggplant, blocking the monkey's view. Then as second 
eggplant was placed in the box, in such a way that the monkey could 
see it  being put  there. The  partition was  then removed  to reveal 
either  one  or  two  eggplants  in  the  box.  The  monkey  looked 
significantly longer at the "impossible" one-eggplant case, reacting 
even more strongly than the babies. (Lakoff & Nunez 2000) 
Even the Rhesus monkey, it seems, has some sort of consistency constraint on his worldview: 
the multiplication of an eggplant without any kind of visible cause was surprising for the animal; we 
may speculate if this surprise requires  some empirical input or if it is entirely innate, but that is 
beside the point: both are anchored in the physical world. 
If we would live in a world where things popped out of and vanished back into thin air, we 
would  not  be  surprised  by  the  eggplant  scenario.  I  contend  then  that  the  very  criterion  of 
consistency, also as it finally appears in logic (such as the law of excluded middle), is an abstraction 
derived, ultimately, from the physical world we live in. The underlying pattern for the abstraction of 
consistency is nothing less than the stability and structure of the physical world. The only criterion 
to which the constructivist may appeal to defend himself against the objection that his philosophy 
can't even distinguish between stable constructions and pure fantasy – consistency – finds its roots 
in the very external world he wished to abolish. Constructivism operates with concepts such as 
115 And from which more complex forms may bootstrap.
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viability and usefulness  and consistency:  but  what  are  these if  not  impingements  of  reality on 
constructivist fantasy? Enough of evolutionary considerations and on to motivational issues.
A motivation  advanced  by  philosophers  advocating  radical  constructivism  is  the  apparent 
liberating effect of the doctrine – a liberation from a "constraining reality" which grounds truth and 
where "claims to absolute truth necessarily lead[ing] to oppression"116 (Schmidt 1987, p. 47). But 
this,  firstly,  misconstrues the aims of  science,  which,  while  aiming at  truth never  gives  up the 
postulate of the tentativeness of its knowledge. That is the essential difference to claiming to be in 
possession  of  absolute  truth,  as  we saw in  section  2.5.4.  Also,  the  claim hat  there  can  be  no 
knowledge/truth is already a dogma: it’s formal structure – it being an indefeasible paradigm – 
makes it  a dogma, even if  it  asserts  it’s  own contradiction.  Whenever we take RC seriously,  it 
refutes itself. That is the sign of a defective philosophy.
Most importantly, the fear constructivists have of real knowledge – that is, that propositions that 
correspond to external reality necessarily lead to oppression – is entirely misguided. Our physical 
environment  and  it's  exploration  provides  a  common  space  for  agents  to  build  a  community; 
knowledge is the basis for communication, for being able to relate to the other being and take her 
concerns seriously. The constraint reality provides is not be lamented but to be acclaimed: it is what 
makes interaction possible. An unreal world open to arbitrary construction is one where every agent 
is damned to live in solitude and isolation. To put it harshly: radical constructivism is inimical to  
love of the other.
We may draw up the following diagram:
One the one hand, there is communicative exchange – interest in what the other has to say; on 
the other side there is total disinterest in the other sentient being, which can express itself as either 
116Translation from German by the author.
94
Illustration 2: The Middle Way of Rationality
Power Game
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Indifference
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Dogmatism Relativism
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indifference, which ultimately underlies all forms of relativism (the other is even denied the right to 
be wrong); or as power struggle, that is, the imposition of the will of the stronger agent on that of 
the weaker agent. 
The area of communicative exchange is maximal where rationality – which only makes sense if 
it  is  grounded  in  realism,  as  we saw above  –  prevails.  The  refusal  to  apply  rationality  is  the 
proclamation of a willingness to exert power117. Rationality, on the other hand, is the commitment 
not to apply power, but reason. 
A qualification is in order: rationality must ensure, if it wants to endure, that it is not swept away 
by more primitive systems exerting power. Rationality is a way of structuring discourse in such a 
way as to lead to maximal amount of sustainable diversity in intellectual and social life. So, to be 
precise,  one can't  evade power games completely,  but  one can structure them and reduce their 
domain of applicability. But the rational way is not just any structure. The fundamental asymmetry 
of the rational way that makes if  different from other ways is  this:  the rationalist  can be quite 
comfortable with other opinions, as long as they do not seek complete domination of discourse; the 
dogmatist,  on the other  hand,  is  never  content  with variety.  And the  relativist  (like  the radical 
constructivist) has no arguments and no persuasive power against the dogmatist or fundamentalist; 
relativism is not sustainable: it is powerless in the face of an aggressive doctrine. Being rational 
means being able to sustain diversity robustly.
Another  attraction to  constructivism may come from the simple  fact  that  social  norms and 
conventions are constructed. That human laws, norms, traditions and mores are constructions of the 
human mind is trivially true (that they may not be arbitrary is another question, one whose answer 
may be found in evolutionary game theory). Most power exerted today via hierarchies is based on 
constructions; but their  power is no less real than the kinetic energy of an incoming meteorite: 
whereas the latter can be modeled by Newtonian physics, the former may be approximated via 
complex systems modeling.  The power immanent in social hierarchies is historically grown via 
human interactions over generations and the patterns of these interactions being present in human 
brains; their power results from intentions of agents in accordance with those constructions.
Scientific realism is the intellectually more honest and satisfying response to the issues raised 
above;  scientific  realism  rejects  all  our  naive  preconceptions of  reality  but  does  not  rest  in 
117 Indeed, I was myself a bit surprised at the atmosphere prevalent at a conference concerning radical constructivism: 
discussions where heated and dogmatic; the difference to a physics conference in the same year, where appeal to 
experiment and reason were made, couldn't have been more different. Such is the price one has to pay if one is 
prepared to relinquish the objective and the rational.
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complacency;  it  is  a  call  to  inquiry,  not  a  lulling  ideology.  For  scientific  realist,  academic 
respectability is not enough for taking a theory seriously; it must be applicable to the real world and 
help solve real problems. Every model remains fallible; will be criticized, changed, replaced. But 
models will not be replaced arbitrarily. They will be replaced because better models are found, and 
the criterion for "better" is a more precise tracking relation to the external world. 
Constructions have their place in this view. As acknowledged above, every thought is trivially a 
construction in the sense that brain states of the cognitive entity are necessarily involved in every 
cognitive act performed by a material being. Where humans tell stories about the world, there is 
construction.  Science  is  about  building  robust  constructions,  robust  in  the  sense  that  they 
correspond  to  actual  patterns  in  the  world,  and  the  scientific  realist  can  account  why  some 
constructions are better than others, namely by appeal to external reality. And thus the history of 
science is not only about construction, but also about deconstruction of naive world models. Have 
not the best achievements of science radically overturned the way we view ourselves and our place 
in this universe?– science is first of all a destroyer of constructions. Science has driven traditional 
world views away wherever it has ventured (geocentric cosmology, absolute time and space, divine 
origin of humankind etc etc).
The lesson, then, to draw from the misguided philosophy of radical constructivism is this:
The alternative to rationality – the willingness to engage in reasoned 
communication, reason deriving from a shareable environment – is unstructured 
power struggle and domination.
 2.9.6 Religion
Science can destroy religion by ignoring it as well as by disproving 
its tenets. No one ever demonstrated, so far as I am aware, the non-
existence of Zeus or Thor - but they have few followers now. (Clarke 
1953) 
Some of you say religion makes people happy. So does laughing gas. 
So does whiskey. Clarence Darrow118 
What about religion? Religious people often claim that their knowledge is of a different kind 
and  not  amenable  to  rational  criticism.  From  the  rational  point  of  view,  taking  into  account 
118 http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Clarence_Darrow; Quoted in an eulogy for Darrow by Emanuel Haldeman-Julius 
(1938). Retrieved 22.08.2009.
96
everything we know about evolution, society, in-group ethics, human psychology, biases etc this 
claim is  obviously a claim designed to  protect  propositions from revision,  and would merit  no 
further discussion.
But due to practical considerations, that is, the real force this kind of argument has on people 
not trained in the art of rationality, some words are in order119. The following exposition is a reduced 
version of Gowder who asks the question if the pope should be Catholic120 and argues as follows:
Basic 1: Theological claims are beliefs -– they are statements with 
propositional content that refer to the world.
Basic 2: Beliefs should be held for reasons. ... (normative, rather 
than explanatory reasons).
Basic 3: Beliefs have objective and universal truth-values. It is 
flat-out incoherent to utter sentences like "God exists for me but not 
for  you."  This  might  not  be  true  about  everything,  but  it  is 
manifestly true about ontological claims about the world, historical 
claims, etc. (Gowder 2008) 
The pope certainly believes that he has reasons for his beliefs; also, he should acknowledge that 
whatever reasons he has, these reasons are probably available to people of other denominations as 
well; or he could believe that the evidence leaves the possibilities open, but then again, he should 
take others seriously. All these points merit more discussion, but are not of the essence. The most 
interesting point raised by Gowder is this:
[The pope] believes he has access to reasons that are fundamentally 
incommunicable. Gnosis. There are two worries about this claim. First, 
is truly incommunicable belief really impossible? Agents ought to be 
able to communicate the fact of their gnosis: the pope ought to be 
able to turn to the mullah and say "I experienced a gnosis, and so did 
these millions  of other  people," and  that ought  to count  for the 
mullah, if the mullah holds his beliefs for reasons ... Second, if it 
doesn't  count  for  the  mullah,  maybe  it's  because  the  mullah 
119 Of course, for those who renounce reason altogether – at least on this subject – there is no path out of the religious 
worldview, except maybe in-depth personal discussions of what is actually at stake.
120The post was inspired by the Pope Benedict's statement that an interreligious dialogue is not possible 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/world/europe/24pope.html?_r=2&hp). A fortiori, a dialogue with scientists 
who grant even less commonalities with the Pope than adherents of other religions among is equally not possible.
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experienced a gnosis too, and that possibility, of course, ought to 
count for the pope121. (Gowder 2008)
This  is  the  fundamental  dilemma  of  the  religious  person:  that  even  if  he  claims  that  his 
knowledge has some special epistemic status (implanted directly by God), the very possibility of 
this  act (of God) must allow him to speculate that another person could also have received his 
beliefs directly, through an act of God. 
Now when he encounters different persons, A, B, and C, of which only A agrees with his beliefs, 
but  B, and C voice different beliefs,  but also justifying them with a  gnostic  event,  there is  an 
impasse. The rationalist,  not believing in such epistemic miracles, can readily deal with such a 
situation: he can give naturalistic accounts of how the people have arrived at their  beliefs. The 
religious person would require the following argumentation:
1. Gnosis is possible.
2. I have experienced Gnosis, and I know which parts of my knowledge base is gnostic 
(that is, the gnostic knowledge includes meta-knowledge about what is gnostic).
3. The persons  with  different  religious  beliefs  only think that  they have  experienced a 
gnostic event. In fact, they are deluded, and are suffering from a fantasy.
The problematic proposition is of course 3: it  encodes the belief  that  one is in a privileged 
position, namely, the only person having had a real gnostic event and knowing it as such. Of course, 
one is free to believe such a thing. But everybody must decide for himself if such a strategy is 
satisfying. Stephen F. Roberts put it simply122:
I contend that we are both atheists. I just believe in one fewer god 
than  you  do.  When  you  understand  why  you  dismiss  all  the  other 
possible gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours.
Worrall puts the point another way:
Finally, I have made it clear that my whole argument rests on the 
assumption  that  a  rational,  scientific  person  needs  good  evidence 
before admitting god into her worldview, just as she would before 
admitting, say, electrons into it. Alvin Plantinga has mounted a well-
known  defence  of  the  striking  claim  that  belief  in  god  can  be 
121These are actually two points. I will concentrate on the latter, the possibility of multiple gnostic events.
122 http://freelink.wildlink.com/quote_history.php. Retrieved 01.08.2009
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‘properly basic’ – that is, taken to require no evidence. [Footnote 
12: See, for example,  Plantinga (1981)] Although again it requires 
detailed  treatment  which  I  cannot  give  here,  I  should  at  least 
indicate  my  response.  This  is  that,  on  analysis,  Plantinga’s  view 
amounts to no more than the obviously true descriptive claim, that 
some people as a matter of fact take belief in god as basic. But this 
is  no  news,  the  question  of  course  is  whether  or  not  they  are 
justified in doing so; and, in so far as Plantinga has anything to say 
about  this  issue,  it  seems  to  rest  on  the  sort  of  simple-minded 
relativism that I have throughout taken to be eschewed. His response, 
for example, to the obvious question of why in that case one couldn’t 
take belief in a flat earth (or come to that, the innate superiority 
of the ‘Aryan’ race) as ‘properly basic’ seems to be simply that no 
Christian would in fact take – or is under any obligation to take - 
such beliefs as ‘properly basic’. This, however, is plainly not the 
issue – the question is what such a Christian would say to someone who 
did assert as ‘properly basic’ (that is on no basis at all) a claim 
that s/he, the Christian, found abhorrent – and, assuming that she 
would want to challenge that claim how s/he would deal with the tu 
quoque objection. Long live evidentialism! ...(Worrall 2004) 
 2.9.7 Ludditism and Existential Risks
The current  technological-global  situation  is  very unsafe:  there  are  a  multitude  of  different 
nations, religions, ethnicities, and tribal thinking with in-group and out-group ethics is still very 
much alive. In bygone ages tribal thinking discharged itself into local wars. Bad enough as these 
were,  the risk is  incomparable to today,  where the deployment of weapons of mass destruction 
looms.
Renouncement of science, technology, the progressive-rational view of the world and a return to 
simpler ways of living – ludditism123 – may seem like a valid response, if only theoretical in nature. 
But it is a  possible argument against human achievement and further progress and that is why it 
shall be shortly addressed. 
Every new bit of knowledge, every new useful conceptualization makes the world an agent lives 
in bigger. Knowledge expands the possibilities an agent has at her disposal, be it potential for action 
or pursuit of the arts. But what holds for a single agent holds all the more so for humanity as a 
123 There is a neo-luddite movement (Sale 1996).
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whole: knowledge expands our possibilities. An obvious case in point is medical research, where 
each new discovery leads to ease of suffering and new hope for patients: already in this "local" 
sense, scientific research is a moral duty (Harris 2005)., where the luddite is hard pressed arguing 
for a return to simpler ways of living.
But there is also a bigger, more dramatic sense in which scientific research is a moral duty: 
existential risks. There is an increasing awareness building up in academia regarding these problems 
(Bostrom 2002; Posner 2004; Hanson 2007; Bostrom & Cirkovic 2008). Existential risks, while 
including man-made risks such as threat of nuclear war, also concern purely natural events. For 
example, over geological time periods in Earth's history, there have been several mass extinction 
events  (Raup & Sepkoski 1982)124. Nature is more inimical to life than today's environmentalist 
romanticism would have it. 
Simple reasoning shows us that everybody who values human civilization at all can't advocate a 
turn away from technological development.
Life as evolved on earth depends on earth-like conditions persisting. While gradual shifts can be 
compensated, a rapid change in the environment can't be evolutionarily countered. Also, there does 
not seem to be a jumping point from water-based life on earth to life in a vacuum;  evolutionary 
conquest of space remains,  as seen from today's  knowledge of biology, the purview of science 
fiction.  That  is,  there  is  no  natural  solution  which  guarantees  ultimate  survival  of  life  when 
environmental changes on the planet occur that are too harsh and rapid.
The conditions on earth will change radically and inevitably sometime in the future; at the latest 
when our sun dies125. Call this event event x. This is a purely abstract event not corresponding to a 
single physical event to which one could easily point. A possible exception would be a large-scale 
meteorite impact.
So, if we want life to persist past  event x (not only human life, but all life including plants, 
animals, bacteria etc), we have to develop technology at some time point y temporally prior to event  
x which enables us to avoid extinction.
Now, why postpone time point y to some indefinite future? We have surplus existential risks 
through certain technologies at the moment, so it is highly advised that we transit through this state 
124 Bambach, Knoll & Wang (2004) present a modern view.
125 See Bounama, von Bloh & Franck (2004) for an analysis of why life on Earth will have failed much earlier than 
previously supposed.
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rapidly126. Given the above reasoning, everybody who wishes life to continue indefinitely and not 
end at a far future but definite point can't advocate a return to an anti-technological age. Therefore 
only one alternative remains: the way forward.
Following through on such a project of countering existential risks – for instance in the form of 
increased  funding  of  space  exploration  and colonization127 –  would  also  provide  the  additional 
benefit of bringing a grand vision to a global society. And humanity needs a new frontier.
 2.10 Rationality, the Dao of Thinking
If you want to understand, really understand the way things are in 
this world, you’ve got to die at least once. And as that’s the law, 
it’s better to die while you’re young, when you’ve still got time to 
pull yourself up and start again. (Bassani 1962) 128
Sapere aude!129
Becoming a rationalist is a bit like dying – that is, the former person you were dies, and a new, 
stronger person is born in its stead. The rationalist eliminates all his beliefs that do not hold up to 
scrutiny and starts looking at the world without fear. The algorithm of inquiry never halts. There 
will never be a time when all problems are solved and the enlightened society is completed; when 
somebody from the Outer Heavens arrives with chariots and trumpets and proclaims: "well done, 
humanity!".
The enlightenment – the will to think – is a process which demands commitment, again and 
again.  That is  the true challenge posed to beings wishing to  follow the path of rationalism: to 
126 Modernity and technology have caused a lot of problems, be it environmental pollution or social upheavals. But 
every problem created by technology is transitory – either because the technology will be abandoned or because, as 
the problems are being recognized, new technologies are created to cancel out negative effects of the previous 
technology. But the transition needs to be done via technological development, aided by scientific inquiry which 
proceeds rationally.
127 In a similar vein Lamb:
Recognition of the precarious status of life on Earth may herald a renewed 
interest in colonization. Repeated warnings of asteroid collisions with the 
Earth and similar global catastrophes which, in the past, have decimated life 
on Earth, may drive home the point that the human race has too many eggs in 
one fragile basket. For if we are alone it might be argued that we have a 
duty to export life. Lamb (2001, p. 197)
128 Inspired by Riemen (2008).
129From Epistle II of Horace's Epistularum liber primus: "Dimidium facti qui coepit habet: sapere aude: incipe." ("He 
who has begun is half done: dare to know: begin." Translation based on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sapere_aude, 
retrieved 24.06.2009). The phrase was popularized by Kant (1784).
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engage actively in uncertainty; to seek uncertainty, not for the sake of it, but as a method for gaining 
knowledge – “the price of freedom is eternal vigilance”130.
A short summary of the principles sketched above – also giving them a somewhat different slant 
– to which a rationalist should adhere is given below:
• Take into regard the fallibility of our senses, but also their adequacy in principle due to 
evolutionary pressure.
• Be aware that all knowledge of reality comes in the form of models – not only scientific 
models; religions and ideologies also only have models at their disposals.
• Know about biases and common inferential errors; acquire at least the basics of statistical 
reasoning and pitfalls that lie in that domain. 
• Be prepared to face reality as it is, not as you would like to have it. Take heed of empirical 
results, especially if they contradict your own position. The rational actor can change the 
world in a second step, but the first step is always to know how it actually  is.  Constantly 
ask: what could be wrong with my way of seeing things? Be prepared to revise beliefs 
relentlessly;  update  models  with  incoming  evidence;  use  plausible  reasoning,  where 
plausibility  means  integrating  (cohering)  all  knowledge  and  not  deliberately  ignoring 
knowledge. Consistency is a minimal criterion, coherence a desirable criterion.
• Update everything, but not everything at once (scepticism without dogmatic adherence to 
scepticism)
• Be clear and precise in what you think and what you say.
• Criticize and receive criticism; the ability to criticize presupposes broad readings in a large 
number  of  disciplines  to  get  the  "big  picture";  the  ability  to  handle  criticism  includes 
decoupling personal value from beliefs held.
• Employ  diverse  scientific  heuristics,  never  adhere  to  only  one  of  them:  verification 
(confirmation), falsification, unification, invariance, explanation; and even more contentious 
principles such as simplicity, elegance, symmetry and beauty. While in science the use of 
formal methods, especially logic and mathematics, is indispensable for being precise and to 
figure out what inferentially follows from certain theories, these are only  tools for being 
rational.  Observing  logic  rules  of  inference,  the  probability  calculus,  and  heeding 
130 Attributed to Thomas Jefferson; 3rd president of the USA (1743 - 1826)
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empirically quantifiable  relationships  are  prerequisite;  this  does  not  exhaust  the  rational 
mindset.  Rationality is  more than adhering to content-blind norms or to an allotment of 
norms  depending  on  situation:  rationality  is  about  clear  thinking  and  observation; 
intellectual  honesty and epistemic  virtue;  rationality is  a  skill  which takes  a  lifetime of 
practice. Rationality is about recognizing one's limitations and still bringing the best to bear 
on the problem one can.
• Construct  causal  models  which  lead  to  explanation,  understanding  and  the  ability  to 
intervene in physical processes. Guiding principles in theory construction: Where does it 
come from? Why? Which purpose does it have? Always consider evolution.
• The goal is the search for truth not finding it – that would be stagnation and dogma.
• Do not  believe something because of authority or tradition (only use it  as  a  very weak 
heuristic).
• Train introspection.
• Be creative. Elimination of theories is one aspect of rationality, conjecture is another131.
• Apply everything recursively and iteratively.
Note that we always only deal with hypothetical imperatives, as there is no obligation to pursue 
truth in the first place. Imperatives of rationality and critical thinking only follow if one adopts the 
wish to know the world in the first place. If one does not want to do this, one is free to follow 
arbitrary epistemic principles, or none at all.
If one adheres to the above principles one can hope that one's beliefs will track the world ever 
more accurately. Rationality, in short, is the Dao of Thinking: inner thoughts being in harmony with 
outer events. Let the following be our ultimate principle; the Dao of Rationality:
If nothing within you stays rigid, outward things will disclose themselves.
131 A fruitful way of arguing inspired by Chalmers philosophical humor page (subsection "Proofs that P" at 
http://consc.net/misc/proofs.html)goes like this:
If not P, then what? Q_1? Q_2? q_N? therefor P.
The heuristic of presenting "insensible alternatives" is designed to foster the creative process to find alternative sensible 
models, thus contributing to the multitude of hypotheses. The mode of argumentation presented highlights the fact 
that we must look at all possible alternatives, and try to argue why some are absurd and others are not, and 
encourage the search for other hypotheses. People not content with P will try to come up with other Q's. This 
process is rational – looking for alternatives in hypothesis space is a basic requirement of rationality. 
The cited page is hilariously funny and well worth a visit. The inspiration for the "creative argument" above was taken 
from the following parody on the argumentation style of Morgenbesser proving that p: "If not p, what? q maybe?".
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I have now laid out some principles of thinking and rationality. I will not systematically refer to 
these principles of rationality in the following chapters, but the investigations below where guided 
by them.
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 3.1 The Ontological View
 3.1.1 Dereferencing Reality
When the wild bird cries its melodies
from the treetops,
Its voice carries the message of the
patriarch.
When the mountain flowers are in bloom,
Their full meaning comes along 
with their scent. 
(Smullyan 1977, p. 15)132
One of the central questions in the philosophy of science is the attitude one takes to realism. The 
question is not intended in the sense of "is there reality at all?", whatever that should mean133 – but 
in the sense of in what degree one should take one's theories at face value; how much ontological 
commitment one is prepared to make. For instance, if a theory speaks of atoms or molecules, does 
that mean that these atoms or molecules really exist in a literal way, such as when we speak of 
"tables", we take tables to exist? An anti-realist stance (instrumentalism for example) would be 
content to say that atoms and molecules are simply useful fictions that make theories work, but 
remain agnostic as to wether these entities really exist.
In this thesis, I propose a minimalist ontology:
There exists a world, and it is independent of human beings and, specialiter, 
human minds. Everything else is up for negotiation.
Maybe it helps to discern two words: reality, and existence. I will use the word "reality" when I 
refer to the simple proposition that something exists and that this is not dependent on the human 
132 Quoted from Chung-yuan (1970).
133Some say one can't prove that reality exists. But what could it possibly mean to prove its existence? And, for 
goodness sake, what could it mean to disprove it?
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mind. In this sense, reality, while not being strictly defined, certainly has a discernible meaning, 
countering objections that "reality" is a word too vague to use in serious discourse.
Existence, on the other hand, will be used in a more technical sense. We must, from case to case, 
decide what exists; existence of entities is a scientific question. For instance, you can assert with 
some certainty that the text you are currently reading and you yourself exist. But what about the 
past? The future? What about imaginary entities? What about abstract concepts? But more on that 
later; first to reality per se.
As mentioned above "reality"  is  not,  as  some would have it,  a  vague concept.  "Reality"  is 
actually not a classical concept, so maybe it is confusing because of this. Concepts are abstractions 
– abstractions which are either contingent or convenient, as much of our knowledge of the everyday 
world; or abstractions which exhibit an underlying lawfulness of their own, such as the beauty and 
hidden symmetry of mathematics.
But how could one abstract from reality? Is not the very instant where you form a concept of 
reality already another aspect masked134? We can conceptualize reality a little bit: when we speak of 
reality, we do not mean a category learned by our brains such as "duck" or "tiger". It is rather that 
we mean the  yardstick with which we measure our theories. Reality is the invariance that always 
springs up when we stratify the world in a way which still merits the name "theory". We all know 
what we mean by reality because we are part of this reality; in the same way that we all know what 
it means to be conscious. 
Trying  to  explain  these  things  –  reality,  consciousness  (in  their  givenness,  not  in  some 
functional sense) – is to hit a bottom. Descriptions, theories, knowledge – those are how we make 
our  knowledge explicit,  so  that  we can  communicate;  communication  succeeds  because  of  the 
shared reality; but not all forms of being are communicable; the inside view – the first person point 
of view in case of agents with a personality structure – is ineffable in the sense that it is raw being. 
Every communication about it is necessarily an abstraction and will fail to capture some aspect of 
this raw being.
The philosophical position of skepticism – that the world is unknowable – rests on the false 
matter-mind dichotomy. We can know this world because the disconnection so commonly assumed 
is a misconception. Being is already a form of (unpropositional) knowing, namely, what a certain 
134 This actually also concerns abstractions from regions of reality.
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physical configuration looks from the inside135. So we are part of this reality. There never has been a 
division between man and nature. Nature is not a stage into which man136 has been placed.
Now,  since  Kant  (recently),  but  actually  since  Plato  (not  so  recently),  it  has  become 
unfashionable to attribute a fundamental role to immediate perception, which is derided as mere 
appearance and not being the "real" reality, the "thing in itself", which is an unknowable noumena. 
Actually, there is neither noumenon nor appearance. Reality is, when perceived, simply that. This is 
not some form of naive realism. Naive realism is the position that things "out there" are perceived 
as  they  are;  the  present  position  is  also  not  a  kind  of  sense-datum  realism  where  privileged 
knowledge of  internal  states  is  assumed.  The position  advocated here says  that  the  sum of  all 
physical  events  leading  to  the  current  physical  configuration  lead  to  a  certain  qualitative 
experienced state – that is how the state feels like. The important thing is the total abolition of any 
kind of subject-object dichotomy and also of the mental-physical dichotomy. The mental is simply 
seen as the "inside" view of a certain physical configuration; some of these inside views being more 
interesting than others. The consequences of this will be explored in section 3.2.
Back to the conceptualization of "reality":  the word "reality" works in a similar  way as the 
indexicals "here",  "now, and "I";  more poetically,  we could speak of  suchness.  It  is the simple 
difference between reference and representation. A reference is simply a pointer to something else 
with no intrinsic information. For instance, a signpost saying "Vienna" and pointing into the correct 
direction  would  be  a  reference.  A representation  (such  as  map  of  Vienna,  or  mental  images, 
concepts,  ideas) contain intrinsic information.  "Reality"  is  not a  representational concept,  but  a 
referential one137.
The pointer nature of the word "reality" and the false grammatical possibilities the word "be" 
offers in the Indoeuropean languages138 have lead to a multitude of philosophical confusions on the 
topic. That reality simply is and can't be captured fully in words need not worry us; language is only 
part of reality, not the whole of it. Reality as a whole does not care about our language. If we get 
confused because we misuse our language, because it leads our thinking into obscure paths, that is 
135 One is reminded of Russell's knowledge by acquaintance. But his stratification of matters was different than the one 
proposed here, and the ensuing literature has more to do with philosophy of language than ontology.
136The chauvinistic "man" is chosen here on purpose.
137Incidentally, mathematics is difficult to learn because its symbol are referential – they refer to concepts which have 
to be learned independently of the symbols; of course, good notation can incorporate some intrinsic information, but 
only relative to other symbolic knowledge.
138I am not qualified to speak about other languages.
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not the problem of reality or the world; it is only our problem because it hinders our epistemic 
success and subsequently will lead to problems when we try to reach our goals.
Confusion  arises  when  models  are  created  at  different  levels  and  then  compared  with  one 
another in their own respective languages. Reality does not contradict itself. Reality is one, is a 
unity; it has no levels (Heil 2003). Only models can contradict themselves. 
At the bottom of many confusions lies the Picture Theory, as Heil says:
Although my focus is on fundamental questions in ontology, I have a 
good  deal  to  say  about  the  relation  language,  or  thought,  or 
representation bears to the world. My contention is that metaphysics 
as it has been conceived at least since Kant has been influenced by an 
implicit adherence to a Picture Theory of representation. (Heil 2003, 
p. 5)
What is the picture theory?
As I conceive of it, the Picture Theory is not a single, unified 
doctrine, but a family of loosely related doctrines. The core idea is 
that  the  character  of  reality  can  be  ‘read  off  ’  our  linguistic 
representations  of  reality—or  our  suitably  regimented  linguistic 
representations of reality. A corollary of the Picture Theory is the 
idea that to every meaningful predicate there corresponds a property. 
If, like me, you think that properties (if they exist) must be mind 
independent,  if,  that  is,  you  are  ontologically  serious  about 
properties, you will find unappealing the idea that we can discover 
the properties by scrutinizing features of our language. This is so, I 
shall argue, even for those predicates concerning which we are avowed 
‘realists’. (Heil 2003, p. 6)
The picture theory then quickly gives rise to a hierarchical view of reality:
Once  set  on  this  course,  we  quickly  generate  hierarchies  of 
properties. We discover that most of the predicates we routinely use 
to  describe  the  world  fail  to  line  up  with  distinct  basic-level 
physical  properties  or  collections  of  these.  We  conclude  that  the 
predicates in question must designate higher-level properties. Now we 
have arrived at a hierarchical conception of the world, one founded on 
the inspiration that there are levels of reality. Higher levels depend 
on, but are not reducible to, lower levels. My contention is that the 
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idea that there are levels of reality is an artefact spawned by blind 
allegiance to the Picture Theory. (Heil 2003, p. 7)
We  can  slice  reality  up  in  many  ways.  I  can  model  an  object  at  the  Newtonian  level 
(representing the object as a rigid body), at the level of molecules, or at the level of quarks and 
leptons,  or  an  infinity  of  other  levels  –  these  are  only  descriptional issues.  Needless  to  say 
ontological levelism is rejected by Heil. Of course, apart from computational difficulties that arise 
when we go to ever more fine-grained levels, the calculations, if our theories are correct, should be 
in general agreement (quantum indeterminacy will be dealt with below); they need not be in exact 
agreement, because abstractions at higher levels buy their power of abstraction exactly by letting go 
of the tracking of fine-grained causal structure, so that, with time, deviations from finer-grained 
models  will  arise.  If  levels  are  merely  descriptional  and  are  not  imbued  with  ontological 
commitment, then we may ask about what we should be realists? The answer is that our theories 
capture real relations between material things, and it is about those that we should be realists. Being 
a realist about an electron does not mean imagining a tiny ball buzzing around a bigger ball (the 
proton),  but  being  a  realist  about  what  the  theory says  the electron will  do.  This  is  not  to  be 
confused with instrumentalism, but to spell out the exact details will have to wait a few paragraphs.
Names – given to concepts, predicates – let us pick us out particular things and relations. But 
concepts are learned, because they are useful in relation to us humans. That is why we have the 
concept of the tiger but not the concept of a neutrino (except if we learn about physics); but the 
neutrino  is,  relationally  seen,  no  less  real  than  the  tiger.  Names  and concepts  only reflect  the 
attention of the namer and not the "ultimate reality" of the objects named. The ultimate reality lies 
in the sum of all relations a region of reality has with all other regions. Every "name" of reality will 
fail to capture it because reality is the plenitude of all relations. Language fails, but this does not 
mean that there is not an objective reality or that it is unknowable. It just means that when we turn 
our eye on one aspect, we will neglect another. We are free to turn our attention to another aspect in 
the next instant.
When we dereference a reference, we look at the value which the pointer points to. For instance, 
dereferencing the "Vienna" signpost in the example above will lead us to Vienna. Now, in language, 
we can reference to other language constructs. For instance we can say that x is a pointer to "hello", 
and every time we invoke 'x' we actually insert "hello". When we dereference to reality, there are no 
words, there is no data, no system of abstractions – it is basic, uncommunicable, wordless being – 
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but it's not a bug, it's a feature! This dereferencing from language to not-language is what seems to 
cause  a  lot  of  confusion  in  the  literature  (in  fact,  this  certainly  contributed  to  the  origin  of 
skepticism, relativism and many other -isms).
Here we can connect with the objective/subjective distinction given by Mario Bunge. We will 
call propositions objective, when we expect that a dereferencing operation will be possible for both 
of us and lead to the same result.  We will  call  a proposition  subjective,  if  not every agent can 
dereference in the same way. Again we see that objective/subjective has nothing to do with "real" 
versus "imaginary" or "true" vs. "false". It is simply a categorization of statements in regard to their 
dereferencing conditions.
But does the above mean that we are completely free in our conceptualization of the world? 
Would that not entail relativism? The case is this: while we are of course free to conceptualize the 
world any way we want, there a better and worse ways to do this. A good criterion is given by 
Wimsatt who suggests the scientific criterion of robustness139:
Things are robust if they are accessible (detectable, measureable, 
derivable,  defineable,  produceable,  or  the  like)  in  a  variety  of 
independent ways. Wimsatt (1994) 
Heil, differently:
Our cat concept and our electron concept, in common with many of our 
concepts, are products of ongoing scientific exertion. Neither concept 
was invented by dreamers. Both concepts reflect serious engagement 
with the world. Both concepts circumscribe genuine mind-independent 
similarities and important worldly divisions. (Heil 2005a) 
As always, Yudkowsky is especially lucid. He employs the word Thingspace which is a kind of 
configuration space140:
The way to carve reality at its joints, is to draw simple boundaries 
around  concentrations  of  unusually  high  probability  density  in 
Thingspace.
Otherwise you would just gerrymander Thingspace. You would create 
really  odd  noncontiguous  boundaries  that  collected  the  observed 
examples, examples that couldn't be described in any shorter message 
139 See also Ross' rainforest realism (Ross 2000); or Nozick's invariances (Nozick 2001).
140 See Yudkowsky (2008e) for a more detailed description.
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than your observations themselves, and say: "This is what I've seen 
before, and what I expect to see more of in the future."
In the real world, nothing above the level of molecules repeats 
itself exactly. Socrates is shaped a lot like all those other humans 
who were vulnerable to hemlock, but he isn't shaped exactly like them. 
So your guess that Socrates is a "human" relies on drawing simple 
boundaries around the human cluster in Thingspace.
...
Presenting us with the word "wiggin", defined as "a black-haired 
green-eyed person", without some reason for raising this particular 
concept to the level of our deliberate attention, is rather like a 
detective saying: "Well, I haven't the slightest shred of support one 
way or the other for who could've murdered those orphans... not even 
an intuition, mind you... but have we considered John Q. Wiffleheim of 
1234 Norkle Rd as a suspect?" Yudkowsky (2008f) 
and
A natural cluster, a group of things highly similar to each other, 
may have no set of necessary and sufficient properties - no set of 
characteristics that all group members have, and no non-members have.
But even if a category is irrecoverably blurry and bumpy, there's no 
need to panic. I would not object if someone said that birds are 
"feathered flying things". But penguins don't fly! - well, fine. The 
usual  rule  has  an  exception;  it's  not  the  end  of  the  world. 
Definitions can't be expected to exactly match the empirical structure 
of thingspace in any event, because the map is smaller and much less 
complicated than the territory. The point of the definition "feathered 
flying things" is to lead the listener to the bird cluster, not to 
give a total description of every existing bird down to the molecular 
level.
When  you  draw  a  boundary  around  a  group  of  extensional  points 
empirically  clustered  in  thingspace,  you  may  find  at  least  one 
exception to every simple intensional rule you can invent.
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But if a definition works well enough in practice to point out the 
intended  empirical  cluster,  objecting  to  it  may  justly  be  called 
"nitpicking".(Yudkowsky 2008f)
Note that the talk of levels in the quoted passage above is only endorsed in an epistemological 
sense (I am not sure how far Yudkowsky's commitment would go). This conception of reality as 
presented above is not easily assimilated. Words are only words. Insights can't be pocketed as a 
Dollar or an Euro; they have to be constructed in one's own mind – new neural connections joined, 
others pruned. Such is the way of mind.
To convey to you what I mean I would like to introduce some Zen Koans. I urge you to think 
about them yourself, meditate upon them if you will. The basic reality of the world, when not cast 
in language – is nicely demonstrated by these two Koans from the Mumonkan:
Case 7. Joshu's Washing the Bowl
A monk told Joshu, "I have just entered this monastery. I beg you to 
teach me." Joshu asked, "Have you eaten your rice porridge?" The monk 
replied, "I have." "Then," said Joshu, "Go and wash your bowl." At 
that moment the monk was enlightened.
Case 40. Kicking the drinking water jar.
During his stay under Master Hyakujo, Isan was a cooking monk. As 
Master Hyakujo wished to send a monk to found the new monastery called 
the Great Mount I, Master Hyakujo told the chief monk and all other 
monks that he would choose the one who would demonstrate himself as 
the best among them. Then Master Hyakujo brought out a drinking water 
jar, put it down and said, "You cannot call it a water jar. Then, what 
will you call it?" The chief monk said, "One cannot call it a wooden 
stick." Then, when Master Hyakujo turned to Isan, Isan kicked the jar 
and walked away. Master Hyakujo laughed and said, "The chief monk lost 
it to Isan." He made Isan the founder of the Great I-San Monastery.141
In the scientific literature of the West, there is a wonderful book which could well be called a 
manual for a Daoist ontology. It is Smith's "On the Origin of Objects" (Smith 1996). Nothing short 
of a full reading can capture the essence of this book; but I will try to draw from few core passages 
141Translations taken from http://www.angelfire.com/electronic/awakening101/mumonkan.html
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which will  be absolutely essential  to understanding my further  argumentation.  I  have put  more 
elaborate excerpts into Appendix B: On the Origin of Objects.
Smith calls my "reality" an "ineluctable deictic flux" (IDF) – I will adopt this terminology and 
speak of IDF-reality henceforth.  IDF-reality is  the unified real  thing.  Analysis,  categorization – 
fracture – is always the operation of epistemic agents who mistake their knowledge for the way the 
world really is.
First of all, Smith endorses the metaphysical principle of irreduction: 
...I embraced a methodological criterion that, following Latour, I 
call  a  principle  of  irreduction.  Essentially  a  standard  of 
metatheoretic  accountability,  it  mandates  that  no  theoretical 
assumption  –  empirical  premise,  ontological  framework,  analytic 
device,  instigative  equipment,  laboratory  tool,  mathematical 
technique, or other methodological paraphernalia – be given a priori 
pride of place. Every piece of metatheoretic apparatus should be "left 
open" in order to be subjected to critical assessment, raised up for 
skeptical analysis, and potentially revamped or set aside. Unless one 
is willing to adopt this strict a standard of suspicion, ontological 
biases and unwarranted metaphysical assumptions will slip through and 
derail subsequent analysis. (Smith 1996, p. 77f)
Note how similar in tone this is to Heil's ontological seriousness142 mentioned in section 1.3.
Smith goes on to give the irreduction principle a metaphorical commercial slant which I will use 
henceforth because it makes for vivid imagery:
that for each theoretical assumption (premise, framework, etc.), one 
be prepared to say:
1. Where one bought it;
2. How much one paid; and 
3. How one got it from there to here (Smith 1996, p. 78)
Point one is intended to be seen as a reflexion on the theoretical backdrop in which a concept 
arose; point two on what one loses in making a certain distinction (one abstracts aways from finer 
142 And to the tenets of critical rationalism (Niemann 2008).
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distinctions in reality) and point three is a reflexion on how a transfer from one domain into another 
affects a distinction.
Smith also takes a clear stance against forms of relativism, which he calls "politics of pluralism 
in the large":
If your culture is different from mine, I can say that we are 
incommensurable, but I can say nothing more, nor can I learn anything 
from you, nor can I interpret my scheme for you, or anything else. In 
spite of its protestations, pluralism-in-the-large does not require a 
theoretical commitment to make diversity a central metaphysical focus. 
(Smith 1996, p. 112).
Smith differentiates "particular" – a located patch of metaphysical flux:
By  'particular,'  that  is,  I  mean  something  like  'occurrent': 
something that is located or that happens, something that is embodied, 
something for which there is a Steinian "there there." (Smith 1996, p. 
117)
from individuals which are already the domain of abstraction:
By individuality, on the other hand, I mean whatever it is about an 
entity that supports the notion of individuation criteria – something 
that  makes  'object'  a  count  noun,  something  that  makes  objects 
discrete.  Somehow  or  other,  an  individual  object  is  taken  to  be 
something of coherent unity, separated out from a background, in the 
familiar "figure-ground fashion. (Smith 1996, p. 119)
to then posit the Criterion of Ultimate Concreteness:
No naturalistically palatable theory of intentionality – of mind, 
computation,  semantics,  ontology,  objectivity  –  can  presume  the 
identity or existence of any individual object whatsoever.
The  name  "Criterion  of  Ultimate  Concreteness"  is  appropriate 
because, as will soon be evident, one of the things that individuals 
have,  that  physical  phenomena  lack,  is  concreteness's  opposite: 
abstraction. (Smith 1996, p. 184)
Now we can introduce the important concept of registration:
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Given  …  the  commitment  to  honor  the  Criterion  of  Ultimate 
Concreteness, that translates into the following more specific goal: 
to understand how a conception of objects can arise on a substrate of 
infinitely extensive fields of particularity. 
Except of course that this is an untenable way to phrase it. To say 
"a conception of objects" makes it sound as if the achievement is the 
subject's,  by  assuming  a  split  between  conception  and  what  is 
conceived of. It also fails by making it sound as if the achievement 
is cognitive. Nor is anything gained by striking a more traditionally 
realist stance, and asking "how objects can arise on a substrate of 
infinitely extensive fields." That puts the achievement too squarely 
on the object. Both ways of putting it violate the mandate of avoiding 
an  a  priori  subject-world  split.  In  place  of  these  dichotomous 
formulations, therefore, I will speak, unitarily, of registering the 
world. 
...
By 'register' I mean something like parse, make sense of as, find 
there to be, structure, take as being a certain way – even carve the 
world into, to use a familiar if outmoded phrase. (Smith 1996, p. 191)
The  anti-essentialism  underlying  this  metaphysical  view  is  mirrored  by  epistemological 
pluralism. One should use different ontologies for different problems. An ontology is a way of 
ordering the world. From computer science we know that certain forms of knowledge organization 
(data structures) are more conducive to solve specific problems than others. An ontology is nothing 
more than a data structure for ordering the real world. So what we need in fact is a meta-ontology: a 
set of rules for constructing useful ontologies. A world-view building algorithm, so to speak.
With these concepts in mind, we are safe to proceed, and have a look at levels of reality anew.
 3.1.2 Reductionism, Emergence and Complex Systems
... ontological pluralism sustained by metaphysical monism.
There is only one world - that is what was important about realism. 
But its unity transcends all ability to speak. (Smith 1996, p. 375)
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The reductive commitment I  make is,  again,  to  one world;  that  there is  no such thing as a 
stratified reality, split into different layers according to better or worse descriptional skills.
Of course, it is as always helpful to discern at least the epistemological and the ontological side. 
Epistemology  is  concerned  with  the  question  of  knowledge,  and  is  thus  deeply  related  to 
understanding. We can only understand systems at the right level of abstraction – not too low, not 
too high; but this is not an intrinsic feature of the world – the world need not be understood in and 
of itself – that is a human desire, accomplished in human minds with human cognitive limitations. 
Especially our limitation in holding many conceptual items in memory at the same time forces us to 
abstraction and to finding regularities in aggregates. 
The ontological side of the equation is at the same time much more simple and much more 
complex: simpler in that it is unified, thus obviating any need to account for downward causation, 
epiphenomenalism or other metaphysical atrocities. More complex, because the actual world that 
arises by the playfulness of the metaphysical  waves whipping in the storms of creation can be 
infinitely divided up into different description levels, and still fail to be captured completely.
Now,  what  about  emergence,  a  term  which  is  resurfacing  in  current  debate  and  reaching 
inflationary levels? It is, in fact, a non explicatory concept – Yudkowsky would call it a semantic 
stop sign (Yudkowsky 2007f).
The  descriptional  concept  of  epistemological emergence  is  not  objectionable  –  that  is  just 
asserting the above mentioned fact that for understanding different domains we have to employ 
different description languages due to our cognitive limitations. To describe individuals or societies 
we will always need psychology or sociology in the future: the essential thing is to recognize that 
these sciences do not introduce new levels; and also that the "physical" is not actually the "real" 
level; it is just another method of description. The seeming priority physics enjoys is because it is 
more fine-grained, and thus can explain deviations from regularities discovered at a more coarse-
grained look at reality.
The way abstraction works independent of ontological concerns can easily be visualized with a 
computer system: if  we want  to program a word processor,  we don't  use assembly or machine 
language, but C++ or Java. For programming web pages, we use PHP, Python, we present in HTML 
etc... Abstractions can be seen as levels of organizing causal forces to get large-scale work done. 
Causal  organization  has  been  historically  anticipated  by  other  humans  (compiler  programmer, 
keyboard designer, OS and driver programmers, the coding of tables for keystrokes etc). But in the 
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end – in the actual, real-world computer, the same electrons143 get shoved around, no matter which 
language is used to direct their movement. The programming languages have been developed to 
abstract  certain  commands;  and  they work  because  of  the  intellectual  power  invested  into  the 
compiler  translating  one  language  into  another,  all  the  way down to  machine  code.  This  even 
transfers to intentional behavior: if we are playing a computer game against an AI, we do not try to 
calculate the machine code; we watch how the AI behaves, and compete against it in the way we 
model the AI.
So, the hierarchy of abstractions we encounter in scientific investigation, but also in daily life, 
are  only  epistemological  in  nature.  There  are  no  ontological  levels.  From this  also  follows  a 
devastating blow against functionalism; but more on that below. A scholarly account of the issues 
can be found in Floridi (2008a), who also favors dismissal of ontological levelism, but advocates 
the use of epistemological levelism.
There  is  also  a  kind  of  ontological  emergence,  but  different  from  how  it  is  usually 
conceptualized: the traditional way to picture ontological emergence is to suppose that when certain 
conditions are met, a new level "arises". In the conception proposed here, ontological emergence is 
simply  the  triviality  that  aggregates  will  behave  differently  than  "isolated"  matter.  I  have  put 
"isolated" in parentheses because there is of course no truly isolated matter. A better way to put it 
would be to contrast highly interacting matter and matter which does not interact, or only weakly144. 
When I refer to this I would like to speak about the  graininess of reality. We can zoom into the 
details, and look at reality at a very fine-grained level, or zoom out, and look at it in a coarse-
grained way. Again, the zooming imagery avoids thinking of hierarchies; when one zooms into and 
out of a picture, the picture itself is the same, only viewed at different degrees of detail. And when 
we zoom out, we see that micro-patterns often form astonishing macro-patterns.
Again, saying that something is emergent does not add toward understanding of the phenomena 
involved:  it  simply says:  "Something  has  changed."  Apart  from that,  ontological  emergence  is 
actually ubiquitous (thus underscoring the charge of triviality): water could be said to emerge from 
the interaction of H2O molecules; weather emerges from large-scale planetary matter interactions; 
humans emerge from aggregations of carbon, water, and a multitude of other elements; civilization 
emerges from an aggregation of humans with common goals; and, to jump back to the ultra-small, 
143 Electrons equally do not enjoy a priori pride of place. But we have to name some aspect when speaking about 
particulars, because to speak about them we have to individuate.
144Not intended here is the physical technical term of "weak interaction".
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in quantum field theory, the very particles which seem to account for rock-bottom grounding can be 
said to only "emerge" from field excitations145.
I think we should throw the concept of "emergence" into the philosophical trash can and live 
without  it;  if  inevitable,  we  should  only  use  weak  emergence  (Bedau  1997),  which  is  quite 
acceptable as it does not introduce additional ontological levels. We should recognize that reality 
behaves in many complex ways, a feature that is studied by the aptly named new paradigm of 
complex  systems  science (Heylighen  2001;  Heylighen,  Cilliers  & Gershenson  2007),  and  here 
especially  complex  adaptive  systems (CAS).  Complexity  science  is  about  constructing  models 
which show how coarse grained regularities arise through fine-grained interactions. 
What is a CAS? A definition is given by Holland (1995, p. 10f):
He proposes four properties and three mechanisms that are common to all CAS.
The four properties are:
• Aggregation (of similar elements)
• Nonlinearity (that is, behavior is not simply the weighted sum of inputs)
• Flows (multiplying and recycling effects known from economics)
• Diversity (product of progressive adaptations)
An the three mechanisms are: 
• Tagging (used to manipulate symmetries; visualize a rallying flag)
• Internal Models (agents predict and anticipate and behave accordingly)
• Building Blocks (decomposition of features to enable powerful internal models)
The  tool  of  mathematics,  and  now  computational  modeling,  so  successful  in  the  physical 
sciences, is becoming increasingly relevant to the social science via CAS and agent-based models 
and underlying theories (Epstein & Axtell 1996; Turchin 2003; Grimm & Railsback 2005; Epstein 
2006; Newman, Barabasi & Watts 2006; Turchin 2008). A seminal work was Schelling (1978) who 
studied human segregation. This area is vital to understanding human complex systems, because the 
world we humans live in is largely dictated by "emergent" phenomena: cycles of economy, peace 
and war, demographical cycles, norms and the mores regulating our daily lives. We humans are 
more dominated by the emergent macro structure of our society than most other animals (with 
145See Kuhlmann (2006) for an introduction.
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exception  of  ants,  bees  and  other  hive  ecologies):  our  culture,  our  ideas,  and  their  rapid 
dissemination through modern technologies,  impact our lives in ways unimaginable to previous 
generations146. 
 3.1.3 An Eclectic Structural Realism
No Water, No Moon.
When the nun Chiyono studied Zen under Bukko of Engaku she was 
unable to attain the fruits of meditation for a long time. At last one 
moonlit night she was carrying water in an old pail bound with bamboo. 
The bamboo broke and the bottom fell out of the pail, and at that 
moment Chiyono was set free!
From Shaseki-shu (Collection of Stone and Sand), 29147
Structural realism, as a position in the metaphysics of science that 
is a form of scientific realism, is committed to causal structures. 
The metaphysics of causal structures is supported by physics, and it 
can  provide  for  a  complete  and  coherent  view  of  the  world  that 
includes all domains of empirical science. (Esfeld 2009a) 
Now is the time to first present the core metaphysical claims of this thesis: the commitment to 
an  eclectic  form  of  causal  structural  realism.  The  world  is,  at  the  finest  level  of  detail, 
causal/dispositional  and qualitative in nature.  While relation is  all  that  we can know "from the 
outside" – that is, physics tells us how properties relate, we also have a direct inside view – what it 
feels like to be a relational structure; that is what we call, in sufficiently complex arrangement of 
material entities, mind. The view is monist – mind and matter are seen to be the same thing, only 
viewed from different perspectives, and, because each dispositional property is also qualitative the 
view leads to panpsychism. I prefer to call it  panqualicism, because this word is more apt. The 
monist  and  panqualicist  aspect  will  be  explored  in  section  3.2.  In  this  section,  it  is  time  to 
concentrate on structures, dispositions and relations. But first  a small  detour into the debate on 
scientific realism.
Of what nature is our knowledge? The attitudes taken to our scientific theories in the literature 
are diverse, too diverse to consider them all. Prominent are Van Fraassen's anti-realist constructive 
146 An introductory work addressing these issues is Mainzer (1997).
147 http://www.ashidakim.com/zenkoans/29nowaternomoon.html
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empiricism (Fraassen 1980) which seems to me to collapse rather  rapidly due to the untenable 
observable/unobservable  distinction;  but  as  always,  arguments  go both ways148.  Unobservable149 
entities often get center stage, but I think this is a red herring. Why should unobservability be a 
property conferring special  epistemic  status to  entities? Appealing to  the abilities  of  a  "normal 
human being" begs the question of what is normal and may lead into dubious ethical argumentation. 
Human  enhancement  –  through  technological  means,  be  they  mechanical,  biomolecular, 
nanotechonological or otherwise in nature – will further erode any attempt to define a "normal" 
epistemic  agent.  Agents  have  different  epistemic  abilities,  and  different  abilities  will  lead  to 
different definitions of what an agent will consider as observable or unobservable. Thus, it can't be a 
serious criterion for differentiation in a serious epistemology.
On the other end of the spectrum of the debate are more traditional scientific realisms (Psillos 
1999) and candidates which everyone can live with like Fine's natural ontological attitude  (Fine 
1984). 
But the most serious current contender to the whole debate is, I believe, structural realism. What 
does structural realism claim? Knowledge, theories, models – in the end they boil down to relations  
between the entities to which they refer, and relations constitute structures. Words which do not 
refer  to  relations  or  concepts  are  empty.  Scientific  theories  are  mature  when  they  contain 
mathematics describing features in the world correctly; that is, the theory is useful for prediction. 
Every physical analysis considers the world in terms of relations; mathematical formulas refer to 
physical entities and say how the referred entities vary (or stay equal) in relation to one another or 
with time (where time can be seen as the aggregate over the relations with all other things in the 
universe).
Let us have a look, for the moment, at a red Ferrari150. We move towards the car and touch it – 
the owner is nowhere to be seen. The car seems quite solid. But that the car has tangibility for us is 
a  relational  fact:  both  the  car  and  we  humans  are  "electromagnetic"  entities,  made  up  of 
protons/neutrons  and  electrons;  therefore  participating  in  the  electromagnetic  interaction.  The 
neutrino, on the other hand, even though we can't touch it because it (roughly) doesn't share the 
same interaction space with us, is no less real. When we start to inspect tangible "things" more 
148 The problem with philosophy is indeed that everything is arguable. To decide what is a good and what is a bad 
argument already seems to presuppose some stance taken on the world; we are confronted by the hermeneutic spiral.
149 When I write about observable/unobservable, this is not intended to exclude the other senses. Vision is only a 
paradigmatic case.
150 Insert your favorite cool car here.
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closely, they disappear. The atom is largely empty, the protons and neutrons are actually composed 
of quarks held together by gluons and so on. In quantum field theory,  particles, the very basic 
matter-stuff of the universe, are modeled as field excitations; or irreducible ray representations of 
groups.  Everywhere  we look we are  confronted  by a  relational  structure;  indeed,  we can  only 
interact with things that stand in relation to us. Interaction depends on relational properties.
Structural  realism draws the consequence: in regard to external things,  only relation can be 
known, nothing else. Structural realism can account for the increase of knowledge even after drastic 
theory changes (Worrall 1989), which motivated its development in the first place:
Perhaps, if we are to believe that the mathematical structure of 
theories  is  what  is  important,  then  [...]  we  need  a  different 
semantics of theories: one that addresses the representative role of 
mathematics directly. The advantage of adopting such a view is that we 
would then be content with the continuity of mathematical structure 
that is found even between theories that differ radically if taken 
realistically,  and  so  would  not  be  confounded  by  theory  change. 
(Ladyman 1998).
Structural  realism  can  either  be  conceived  in  an  epistemic151 variant  or  an  ontic  variant. 
Epistemic structural realism concentrates on what can be known of the world – its structure – but 
that there is something beyond structure which is unknowable. The possibility of some unknowable 
noumenal reality (Platonic Ideas, Kant's Thing in Itself) forever hidden from prying eyes remains. 
Ontic structural realism asserts that the world actually is structure.
I advocate a middle way: that structure, while being indeed all that what we can know about 
external things, captures only a "part" of reality: the other part being the inside view of structures 
(the qualitative side), and thus quite knowable, from the first person perspective. 
What does ontic structural realism (OSR) say about the world?
Ontic  structural  realists  argue  that  what  we  have  learned  from 
contemporary physics is that the nature of space, time and matter are 
not compatible with standard metaphysical views about the ontological 
relationship between individuals, intrinsic properties and relations. 
On the broadest construal OSR is any form of structural realism based 
on an ontological or metaphysical thesis that inflates the ontological 
151 Purely empirical structural realism has some problems (Ainsworth 2009), which need not concern us because it is 
not the position adopted here.
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priority of structure and relations. The attempt to make this precise 
splinters OSR into different forms …(Ladyman 2007) 
Conceiving of the universe as essentially structural in nature addresses the conundrum raised by 
many a thinker, most notably by Wigner (1960), pondering the "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of 
Mathematics in the Natural Sciences". 
Structural realism tackles this question head on by remodeling our conception of the world, moving 
away from "naive" object conceptions of the world and incorporating a physically more complex 
picture, namely, structures of quantum entanglement and spacetime metrics:
Its  [OSR]  main  motivation  is  to  develop  a  tenable  version  of 
scientific realism in form of an ontology that meets the challenges of 
modern physics, giving an account of entanglement in quantum physics 
and of spacetime in the theory of general relativity. The claim is 
that there are structures of entanglement instead of objects with an 
intrinsic identity in the domain of quantum physics [ … ]and metrical 
structures,  which  include  the  gravitational  energy,  instead  of 
spacetime  points  with  an  intrinsic  identity  in  the  domain  of  the 
theory of general relativity[ … ].Esfeld (2009a)
Everybody who denies the aptness of mathematics to describe reality is welcome to present 
more plausible alternatives for the effectiveness of mathematics. In this sense, even if structural 
realism were wrong, it would be a good catalyst for further philosophical inquiry. Wigner's question 
remains most pressing for the traditional Platonist, who is at a loss to describe how physical brains 
of  mathematicians  should come to  know about  acausal,  atemporal  abstract  objects;  and for the 
working empirical physicist, who is using a tool which "magically" and inexplicably – simply – 
works.
But there is a problem with ontic structural realism. When we refer in physical theories, we see 
that the referents obey these relations. We seem to need relata in addition to the relations. There is 
an eliminative ontic structural realism that says that the  relata are only nodes in structures; the 
nodes  either  being  "emptinesses"  or  there  being structures  "all  the way down"152.  This  is  a  bit 
mystical. There are, of course, responses153:
 a more moderate version of ontic structural realism has recently 
been developed in reply to that objection, proposing that physical 
152 For an intriguing conception, see Dipert (1997), who models the world as a graph.
153 See also Esfeld & Lam (2008).
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structures are networks of concrete, qualitative physical relations 
among objects that are nothing but what stands in these relations, 
that is,  do not  possess an  intrinsic identity  over and  above the 
relations in which they stand (Esfeld 2009a).
I  opt  for a slightly different  path – grounding reality in  "powerful  qualities"  (more on that 
below); as to how these approaches differ, there is already strife in the literature (Heil 2006; Lam 
2006). Differences are slight, and in danger of becoming squabbles over words; so I will not pursue 
these matters here.
A third  interesting  version  of  structural  realism  which  is  close  to  my  position  is  Luciano 
Floridi's Informational Structural Realism (ISR) (Floridi 2008b), which, it should be stressed, is not 
to be equated in any way with the conception of the universe as a Turing machine, a view which he 
rejects:
Digital  vs.  analogue  is  a  Boolean  dichotomy  typical  of  our 
computational paradigm, but digital and analogue are only “modes of 
presentation” of Being (to paraphrase Kant), that is, ways in which 
reality is experienced or conceptualised by an epistemic agent at a 
given level of abstraction. A preferable alternative is provided by an 
informational  approach  to  structural  realism,  according  to  which 
knowledge  of  the  world  is  knowledge  of  its  structures.  The  most 
reasonable ontological commitment turns out to be in favour of an 
interpretation of reality as the totality of structures dynamically 
interacting with each other. (Floridi 2009)
The good thing about ISR is the natural accommodation of Smith's take on ontology: reality is 
always more than the computational description at one level or another, although patterns are to be 
found throughout. Now in addition to this relational description of reality as "structures" imbued 
with more or less ontological significance154, we need also account for the dynamics: and here is 
where dispositions come in.
What we need to add to make the universe work – accounting for the dynamics – is causation 
and dispositions, causality being dependent on dispositions. We need a connection from structures 
to causal effectiveness155. 
154 The traditional ontological commitment is foreign to the way ontology is done here. We commit to ways of doing 
ontology, not a specific ontology. There will be an exception: fine-grained dispositions – more on that below.
155 That is also the difference between physical structures and mathematical structures, the latter which are only insofar 
causally efficacious as they are described on a different level (brain processes constituting the current thinking of a 
mathematical structure etc).
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Ontic structural realism is the view that structures are what is 
real in the first place in the domain of fundamental physics. The 
structures are usually conceived as including a primitive modality. 
However, it has not been spelled out as yet what exactly that modality 
amounts to. [...] the fundamental physical structures possess a causal 
essence, being powers. Esfeld (2009a)
We adopt causal structural realism, which, alas, comes in many versions already  (Shoemaker 
1980; Hawthorne 2001; Mumford 2004; Bird 2007; Chakravartty 2007). I will mainly follow Heil 
(2003); Esfeld (2009b,a). What is a disposition156? Dispositional properties are usually juxtaposed 
to categorical properties (where I will call categorical properties qualitative ones, following Heil). 
A classical dispositional property mentioned in the literature would be fragility – the disposition to 
break upon rough handling. A categorical property discussed in the literature would be triangularity 
– which I do not endorse, but more on that below.
One definition of dispositions would go like this:
Entailment.  F expresses a disposition iff there are an associated 
manifestation and conditions of manifestation such that, necessarily, 
an object is F only if the object would produce the manifestation if 
it were in the conditions of manifestation. (Fara 2006)
I am unhappy with the word entailment, because it clearly shows the heritage of the definition 
out of analytic philosophy of language,  where dispositions are analyzed in terms corresponding 
subjunctive conditionals157. Well, so be it. Mellor then goes on to show that this definition shows 
that all properties are dispositional (Mellor 1974). We need not go into the details of the argument, 
which  is  quite  direct.  A simple  argument  will  suffice:  if  categorical  properties  do  not  have 
manifestations,  how  should  we  come  to  know  of  them?  But  this  does  not  mean  that  a 
qualitative/categorical side of things is denied; indeed, the position I take is that dispositions and 
qualitative properties are actually the selfsame. I follow Heil's identity theory:
If  P  is  an  intrinsic  property  of  a  concrete  object,  P  is 
simultaneously dispositional and qualitative; P’s dispositionality and 
qualitativity  are  not  aspects  or  properties  of  P;  P’s 
156 Another name for a disposition is a power; I will use the two names interchangeably.
157 We should note that counterfactuals enter the situation here: this is metaphysically intriguing, as counterfactuals 
also crop up in quantum mechanics. The subject warrants scrutiny, although I can't pursue this matter here. For an 
introduction, see Dorato (2006). Of course, as Heil says:
Conditionals provide a defeasible, rough-and-ready way to pick out 
dispositions, not a reductive analysis. (Heil 2003, p. 196)
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dispositionality, Pd, is P’s qualitativity, Pq, and each of these is P: 
Pd = Pq = P.(Heil 2003, p. 111)
So, an entity has properties; these properties are powerful and qualitative in nature158. A power 
is the ability to be causally effective, to exert influence (we will look at the qualitative side later on). 
One remark on the relationship between properties and substances. One could say the following:
Substances are bearers of properties; properties are ways substances 
are. (Heil 2005a) 
Substances in Heil's conception (he also calls them objects) are not to be conceived of as simple 
indivisible  entities  ("billiard  balls"),  but  rather  as  basic  explanatory  entities.  Substance  and 
properties are intertwined in a sort of way that makes it irresponsible to speak of substance without 
properties or properties without substance.
One more thing – the properties are conceived of as modes, in line with particularity:
Suppose the world comprised objects distributed about in space–time. 
These objects possess properties in virtue of which they behave, or 
would  behave,  in  particular  ways.  Objects’  properties  are  not 
universals or instances of universals, they are what, in Locke’s day, 
were called  modes; what others [...] call tropes. Modes endow their 
possessors with particular qualities. Modes are qualitative. But modes 
are, as well, powers. Think of modes as powerful qualities. Objects in 
the  envisaged  world  are  similar  by  virtue  of  their  possession  of 
similar  modes.  Modes  are  similar  –  or  not  –  tout  court.  Similar 
objects  will  behave  similarly  in  similar  circumstances  because  a 
condition on their being similar is their possessing similar modes; 
and mode similarity is simultaneously qualitative and dispositional.
Complex objects in the world we are imagining are made up of simpler 
objects.  Characteristics  of  complex  objects  are  unproblematically 
fixed  by  characteristics  of  their  constituent  parts  and  relations 
these parts bear to one another. From this distance we cannot tell 
whether  our  imagined  world  is  granular  –  consisting  of  distinct 
objects arranged in space – or unified – consisting of one or more 
fields with distributed ‘thickenings’ corresponding to more familiar 
objects. [Footnote 4: If this is right, we are in no position to 
158 The distinction "categorical" and "dispositional" continues to apply to predicates (linguistic entities).
126
ascertain a priori whether familiar objects man beings, trees, rocks, 
electrons) are, at bottom, substances or modes.] (Heil 2005a) 
The rejection of universals is not as problematic as it may initially seem. Universals depend on 
strict  identity;  modes exhibit  irreducible similarities.  One can dump Platonic universals  without 
getting into metaphysical trouble.
In  causal  structural  realism,  we  will  take  the  structures  and  relations  as  actually  being 
constituted by both dispositional and qualitative  properties – properties being the "primitives" of 
our ontology. For that, we need reduce causality to dispositions, and that task is of some complexity 
and would probably require a thesis of its own. A few guiding ideas must suffice here. First of all, 
the Humean conception of things is turned around – laws are not generalizations of regularity found 
in contingent patterns in the world, but are actually derived – necessarily – from a dispositionalist 
account:
Dispositionalism, then, radically overhauls the relationship between 
dispositions  and  laws.  Instead  of  all  dispositions  depending  upon 
contingent laws, at least some important dispositions are irreducible 
features of the natural properties. Moreover, the sorts of laws which 
are  typically  used  to  ground  dispositions  are  —  according  to  the 
dispositionalist — necessary laws: corollaries of something essential 
in the natural properties. (Handfield 2009, p. 17)
Causation is also neither the mere observance of regularity or driven by contingent law, but the 
real thing: causal relations are manifestations of dispositions. For the dispositionalist, an analysis of 
causation will:
terminate in the essentially power-conferring natures of the basic 
properties. (Handfield 2009, p. 19)
Ladyman says that the idea of causal structuralism is that:
causal relations that properties bear to other properties exhaust 
their natures" (Ladyman 2007).
That is not quite correct – at least not in the present conception. It is rather both the dispositional 
and the  qualitative  properties,  which  come  part  and  parcel,  which  exhaust  their  natures.  The 
dispositional is more encompassing than the causal: the causal requires a manifestation. The idea 
that all properties are dispositional and not categorical (that is, qualitative without being effective) 
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means that there can't be a difference in the world in properties without there also being a difference 
in detectable ways. This is important later on in the philosophy of mind. To be blunt: 
All real properties have causal influence.
Heil summarizes his view on dispositions in this manner:
(1) Dispositions  are  actual,  not  merely  possible  features  of 
objects.159
(2) Dispositions  are  intrinsic  properties  of  objects  possessing 
them.160
(3) The nature of dispositions is not wholly revealed via a reductive 
conditional analysis.
(4) Dispositionality is not a contingent feature of the world.161
(5) Every  intrinsic  property  of  a  concrete  object  is 
dispositional . . 
(6) ...but not purely dispositional.
(7) Dispositions are not ‘higher-level’ properties.162
(8) The  manifestation  of  a  disposition  is  a  manifestation  of 
reciprocal disposition partners.
(9) One and the same disposition can manifest itself differently with 
different reciprocal disposition partners.
(Heil 2005b) 
I have said above that no ontological stratification should enjoy a priori pride of place. But there 
is the fact that physics is more robust than other sciences, and this needs accounting. It can be 
accounted for in the dispositionalist picture of things. Remember that we have negated a levelist 
conception of reality: that is, when we look at ever smaller systems in physics, we do not "go down 
159 Manifestations, on the other hand, need not be actual.
160 Heil distances himself from a relational account; the exact differences between Heil's intrinsic dispositions and 
divers relational accounts would need to be analyzed, but that would be taking things too far here.
161 This is the big anti-Humean step. The most important step to solve the mind-body problem.
162 This is the part where functionalism dies.
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levels",  but  zoom  in  on  the  microcausal  structure  of  reality.  We  can  then  ascribe  a 
dispositionalist/qualitative structure to the universe at the finest scale. This does not make it more 
real or less real than other "levels" of description. It is simply the scale where the dispositional 
account bottoms out. 
The universe is of a piece163. The development of ever-more fine-grained theories should be 
considered analogously to slicing – parts of reality are "sliced" off, looked at in ever more detail, 
with increasingly difficult to achieve causal isolation164. "Deeper" theories do not correspond to the 
uncovering of  hidden layers.  With these metaphysical  commitments,  for  creatures  living  inside 
reality,  the best  working philosophy to adopt is materialism or hylorealism. This is  not,  I  have 
hoped to make clear, to be confused with a picture of minuscule billiard balls bopping around in the 
spacetime box.
Materialism – at  least  the Bungean version  which I  assume as  starting point  –  asserts  that 
everything that exists exists in virtue of its causal interaction via energy. I like to think of energy as 
a currency of transaction or interaction; the more you have, the more you can interact, although if 
you distinguish structural causes and triggering causes, you may accomplish quite a lot with little 
triggering energy. Underlying this picture is of course one of fundamental powers; the world is 
conceived of as a power net.
A world containing properties with built in powers would be one in 
which objects are embedded in what Martin calls a ‘power net’ (Martin 
1993a)[(Martin 1993)]. An object’s behavior, then, would be the result 
of a confluence of influences grounded in the object’s properties and 
the properties of other objects that influence it and are in turn 
influenced by it. (Heil 2003, p. 95)
Another core aspect of materialism is the tenet that particularity is what counts in the real world 
and not abstraction, which is a "mere" tool: Smith's IDF-reality. Which leads us to the next section.
 3.1.4 A Mathematical Universe?
   As a mathematical discipline travels far from its empirical 
source, or still more, if it is a second and third generation only 
indirectly inspired by ideas coming from "reality" it is beset with 
163Mutually isolated regions notwithstanding; the causal structure can be pictured like a partial ordering, not a total 
ordering; but the "universal graph" is not separated into subgraphs.
164 Maybe the world is infinitely divisible, but the more you zoom in, the more boring things get. An indication for this 
could be recent work in quantum gravity Loll (2007).
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very grave dangers. It becomes more and more purely aestheticizing, 
more and more purely l'art pour l'art. This need not be bad, if the 
field is surrounded by correlated subjects, which still have closer 
empirical connections, or if the discipline is under the influence of 
men with an exceptionally well-developed taste. But there is a grave 
danger  that  the  subject  will  develop  along  the  line  of  least 
resistance, that the stream, so far from its source, will separate 
into a multitude of insignificant branches, and that the discipline 
will become a disorganized mass of details and complexities. In other 
words, at a great distance from its empirical source, or after much 
"abstract"  inbreeding,  a  mathematical  subject  is  in  danger  of 
degeneration. At the inception the style is usually classical; when it 
shows  signs  of  becoming  baroque,  then  the  danger  signal  is  up. 
(Neumann 1947) 
If we consider our universe as structural, relational – can we simply say that it is mathematical, 
as  Tegmark  (2007) suggest?  I  believe  not,  for  a  number  of  reasons.  An  obvious  one  is  that 
mathematics is full of wild abstraction, and gives us no handle at all  which mathematics describe 
the physical universe around us. So, the term ontic structural realism used above is already much 
less  charged  and  thus  preferable.  Above,  I  endorse  causal  structural  realism:  the  relations  and 
structures are themselves constituted by a more primitive modality, one that is at the same time 
qualitative  in  nature165.  But  the  position  is  still  sufficiently  close  to  ontic  structural  realism to 
delineate structuralism from a purely mathematical conception of the universe.
Some  remarks  on  the  nature  of  mathematics  are  in  order  before  we  can  proceed:  no 
sophisticated  philosophy of  mathematics,  but  rather  simple  considerations  of  how mathematics 
relates  to  language and thought  generally166.  Snow, in  his  celebrated book "The Two Cultures" 
sketched the rift between the sciences and the humanities, which can be expressed in a nutshell with 
the following sentence: 
A good many times I have been present at gatherings of people who, 
by  the  standards  of  the  traditional  culture,  are  thought  highly 
educated and who have with considerable gusto been expressing their 
incredulity at the illiteracy of scientists. Once or twice I have been 
provoked and have asked the company how many of them could describe 
the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The response was cold: it was also 
165 But then again – maybe the modal view is only the inside, timed, view of timeless structures, which would then be 
more fundamental. Who knows.
166 The thesis also wants to address an non-mathematically literate audience.
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negative.  Yet  I  was  asking  something  which  is  the  scientific 
equivalent of: Have you read a work of Shakespeare's? (Snow 1959, p. 
14-15)167
This rift has sprung up with the sophistication of mathematics necessary to comprehend modern 
science. Some people like to stay adrift in fuzzy concepts, whereas mathematics is the paragon of 
exactness. In a sense mathematics is the most precise means of communication – if you can make 
something explicit in mathematics, then you can communicate it – provided the receiver can make 
sense of your axioms. As mathematics can be reduced to set theory, and set theory is grounded in 
basic embodied metaphors accessible to all humans  (Lakoff & Nunez 2000) we have wonderful 
precision.  The  problem with  everyday  language  is  that  it  can  trigger  arbitrary  associations  in 
different humans (I guess this also happens to a reduced extent in mathematical communication, as 
when people unconsciously hold different intuitions about the infinite).
Many people drawn to the humanities do not recognize the importance of mathematics because, 
in their eyes, it is inapplicable abstract nonsense, not realizing that modern society depends largely 
on applied mathematics. The negligent attitude towards mathematics or even the natural sciences as 
a whole is probably the result of bad eduction. When a child is shown a table and told that this is to 
be named a "table", it knows what a table is. When the same child, a little older, sees "F = ma" on a 
blackboard, it can be difficult to relate this to the real world, especially with a bad teacher. From 
these early moments stems the misconception that mathematics is strange and otherworldly.
Mathematics is about ideas – precise ideas – and they are captured in a sometimes clear and 
sometimes an obscure symbolism. Mathematics is not about the abstract symbols themselves, but 
about relations, patterns, structure; mathematics is about concepts, which may or may not fit reality. 
The symbols themselves say nothing;  it  is  in our minds that mathematics comes to life.  Every 
human who can think can also think about mathematics; the better her love for precision, the more 
successful in discerning mathematical ideas. Mathematics means the renunciation of vagueness and 
the  abandonment  of  superfluous  assumptions.  Mathematical  precision  comes  from it's  rigor  – 
axioms, definitions, theorems, finite rules of inference; where this criteria of precision are not met, 
we can still continue to suspect, but not be certain.
The syntactic aspect of mathematics is the aspect of rule following. But it constitutes no arcane 
language; it is no different than English or German; only the concepts which are referred to are not 
167 A problem which has not gone away Nature (2009).
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so anthropocentric, more of the nature of the world actually. When higher mathematics is involved, 
the concepts become elusive, difficult to grasp; it  takes an effort to understand. Mathematics is 
successful symbolically not because of some strange magic, but because the notation enables one to 
offload thinking into the environment (paper, pencil, blackboard, computer). A well chosen notation 
is the essence of the symbolics of mathematics (but not of the conceptions; a superior mind could 
perform our mathematics in her mind without the help of notation). Good mathematical notation 
enables humans to perform simple cognitive algorithms for arriving at theorems of formal systems. 
In this one way mathematics is different from natural language: that for higher mathematics the 
offloading of thinking into the notation and environment can't be forgone. It is a gradual difference; 
a difference that comes about because of the complexity of the concepts involved or their removal 
from anthropocentric matters, not because of a strict delimitation of subject matters.
For instance, the decimal system lends itself well to do arithmetic, because of its positional 
structure, as opposed to the roman system which was very difficult to calculate with.  Compare 
trying to add XXXIII + IIC; and then try adding 33 + 98. The latter is not simpler because the 
numbers look more familiar – well, OK, that is part of the reason; but it's not the real reason. No, 
the decimal system is simpler because one has to learn less rules to perform addition. The rules are 
exhausted by learning the addition table for the numbers 0 to 9 and how to handle the carry. No 
system of similar simplicity exists for roman numerals. But in both versions we simply have to add 
two numbers – conceptually the task is the same, even if the notation will spawn very different 
brain processes.
So, the point is this: mathematics is not about the shuffling around of abstract symbols (although 
it is in a strictly formalist interpretation) but rather the building of elaborate conceptual structures, 
which can only be handled by our limited minds if  supplemented with an algorithmic notation 
which captures the structure of the theory – but to say more would be to venture too deeply into the 
philosophy of mathematics.
An especially problematic case of conceptualization is the infinite. Nowhere do we really have 
access to the infinite.  We never see a  real number all  at  once.  We can't have a concept of the 
infinite, because we can't see it anywhere. We can't live it, experience it; we do not have direct 
access to the Platonic concept of Infinity, which is a fantasy. Thought is matter organized in certain 
ways, due to lawful correlations with the environment. Concepts, to repeat, are formed in derivation 
of the world (concept empiricism) but with phylogenetic and embodied grounding (Kant's a priori ) 
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which have evolved in relation to this world. Concepts not derived from the world directly can be 
derived by processes of metaphor and analogy, but must be seen as that, and not more.  Lakoff & 
Nunez (2000, p. 158f) describe how the conception of the infinite arises in finite cognitive entities. 
They describe the BMI, the basic metaphor of infinity, which goes as follows:
• there is an initial state and
• an iterative process;
• a resultant state after each iteration and
• a final resultant state.
• Entailment: There is a final resultant state that is unique and follows every nonfinal state.
This conception is taken out of a source domain, and applied to a target domain, where one can 
forgo the real world observation that all iterations are finite and conceptualize an unending iteration 
with a final resultant state and arrive at the concept of actual infinity. So, even for "infinity", there is 
no need to go beyond embodied natural cognitive processes; we do not need a Platonic realm from 
which to draw our intuitions, but can make do with tracking the natural world.
What are the bounds of mathematical thinking? That depends on the axioms we choose. An 
interesting questions is why humans who do not have a strict axiomatic picture of mathematics 
nevertheless perform the same operations, think in the same idea-space? Because we implicitly 
model the physical reality around us  (Lakoff & Nunez 2000). Of course, there does seem to be 
something in mathematics that has a recalcitrance beyond the physical – otherwise it would not be 
intelligible why, apart from Euclidean geometry, elliptical or hyperbolic geometry are alternative 
conceptualizations, not immediately grounded in our geometrical environmental experience. But we 
have to be careful: these geometries are nevertheless grounded in more basic intuitions, which are 
themselves embodied.
I would say that, as mentioned in section 2.9.5, the concept of consistency also derives from our 
evolutionary  brain  architecture168,  and  we  construe  those  mathematical  structures  which  are 
consistent from our perspective. Everything that has been located in Platonia should be relocated to 
cognitive architecture; an architecture which evolved to track structure in the world, thereby making 
the previous eternal Platonic truths not arbitrary but more  in touch with the material world. The 
project of naturalizing mathematics is well underway:
168If somebody says that something does not have an evolutionary origin, I am always very interested from where else 
it should come from.
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Mathematicians frequently evoke their "intuition" when they are able 
to  quickly  and  automatically  solve  a  problem,  with  little 
introspection  into  their  insight.  Cognitive  neuroscience  research 
shows  that  mathematical  intuition  is  a  valid  concept  that  can  be 
studied in the laboratory in reduced paradigms, and that relates to 
the availability of "core knowledge" associated with evolutionarily 
ancient and specialized cerebral subsystems. As an illustration, I 
discuss the case of elementary arithmetic. Intuitions of numbers and 
their  elementary  transformations  by  addition  and  subtraction  are 
present in all human cultures. They relate to a brain system, located 
in  the  intraparietal  sulcus  of  both  hemispheres,  which  extracts 
numerosity  of  sets  and,  in  educated  adults,  maps  back  and  forth 
between  numerical  symbols  and  the  corresponding  quantities.  This 
system is available to animal species and to preverbal human infants. 
(Dehaene 2009) 
The idea of the "triangle" or the "sphere" – are abstractions of neural nets – confronted with a 
messy world which nevertheless contains approximations to such "ideal" objects. The possibility for 
abstraction  should  be  accepted  as  a  feature  inherent  in  the  material  world.  Abstraction  is  not 
mysterious – it is the leaving away of aspects in a representation. Basic concepts, such as motion, 
hardness etc are directly grounded via sensorimotor experience; upon these we build ever more 
abstract concepts, leading to hierarchies of abstraction, which ideally, retain some aspect of reality 
so that they are usable in inference tasks or even better, still refer in a sensible way.
But we also need to take care with the structures we create in mathematics. A mathematical 
theory becomes physico-mathematical when interpreted in a physical way. If a mathematical theory 
captures some structures of reality in a way that lends itself to prediction, then we can say that it is 
about relations persisting in the world. There are of course also purely abstract theories, which have 
no physical referents anymore. And that is one reason why it is unwise to conflate OSR with a 
"mathematical" universe; because in the mathematical universe,  the difference between physical 
mathematical structures and "fantastic" mathematical constructions gets lost169. To clarify, I repeat 
the above phrased a bit differently: Thoughts are the inside view of certain complex structures, and 
169It is also important to distinguish ontic structural realism from a form of Platonism which picks out only certain 
structures as real. In Platonism, reality is a mere shadow of the realm of perfection – the realm of forms. Ontic 
structuralism is in this sense very contrary to traditional Platonism: it does not say that existence is a mere shadow, 
an imperfect copy of some eternal object "out there" in some inaccessible realm, but in fact the relations  
(qualitative/dispositional properties) are all there is. No shadows, no caves, no torches; only the real things 
themselves.
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insofar thoughts are reflections of other structures they can be called knowledge. Thoughts which 
do not correspond to our immediate reality may correspond to other parts of reality, or to none at all 
– then they are fantasy.
Mathematics – and the functional relations described via mathematics – does not tell us how to 
interpret itself, how to relate it to the real world. For this, we need other relations lawfully relating 
the mathematics to the real world. One could all do it in a mathematical framework, but only in a 
Platonic one, and it does not solve the problems which relations hold, so we might as well go back 
to materialism. Materialism can then be seen as the philosophical position that not all mathematical 
statements are instantiated and that there is no abstract realm where mathematical sentences exist 
independent of material brains instantiating them. The recalcitrance of mathematics – the "kicking-
back" aspect comes from our commitment to the basic consistency learned from the physical world.
The philosophy of mathematics endorsed here is fictionalism, not Platonism170. Fictionalism can 
account for the fact that some mathematics tracks reality, and some mathematics does not, just as 
some stories are true and other stories are fantasies. The fictionalist account merges well with ISR 
and  the  conception  of  IDF-Reality;  the  relation  to  OSR  is  less  clear,  though  given  Esfeld's 
elaborations that OSR should subscribe to powerful structures  (Esfeld 2009a), the delineation to 
mathematics is recovered and we can reject Platonism, given that fictionalism offers a coherent 
account of the role of mathematics in the empirical sciences:
Nominalistic  scientific  realism  is  different  from  standard 
scientific realism. The latter entails that our empirical theories are 
strictly true, and fictionalists cannot make this claim, because that 
would  commit  them  to  the  existence  of  mathematical  objects. 
Nonetheless, nominalistic scientific realism is a genuinely realistic 
view; for if it is correct - i.e., if there does obtain a set of 
purely physical facts of the sort needed to make empirical science 
true - then even if there are no such things as mathematical objects 
and, hence, our empirical theories are (strictly speaking) not true, 
the  physical  world  is  nevertheless  just  the  way  empirical  science 
makes it out to be. So this is, indeed, a kind of scientific realism. 
What all of this shows is that fictionalism is consistent with the 
actual role that mathematics plays in empirical science, whether that 
role is indispensable or not. It simply doesn't matter (in the present 
170 Balaguer argues, interestingly enough, that what he calls full-blooded Platonism and fictionalism are the only two 
tenable philosophies of mathematics, and that the two are in fact indistinguishable (Balaguer 1998; Balaguer 2009). 
This then lets us reject Platonism for considerations residing outside the philosophy of mathematics.
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context) whether mathematics is indispensable to empirical science, 
because even if it is, the picture that empirical science paints of 
the physical world could still be essentially accurate, even if there 
are no such things as mathematical objects. (Balaguer 2009, p. 86)
 3.1.5 Functionalism Negated
For if one defines the operation of sawing as being a certain kind 
of dividing, then this cannot come about unless the saw has teeth of a 
certain kind; and these cannot be unless it is of iron.  (Aristotle 
PHYS) 
The philosophy above is very different from functionalism, which will occupy us in detail in 
section 4.4.3, but some remarks are in order here. What makes the present philosophy different from 
functionalism is the rejection of a leveled view of reality, and the problematization of the concept of 
multiple realizability. For instance, consider the traditional Picture Theory conception of pain as a 
higher-level  property,  which  is  then  multiply  realizable  (and  for  which  must  pay  the  price  of 
epiphenomenalism or dualism or other unpalatable -isms).
Not  so  in  the  present  view:  if  different  organisms  are  in  pain,  that  is  not  because  the 
function/predicate  pain  is  realized  in  different  ways  in  them,  but  rather  their 
dispositional/qualitative makeup makes them feel pain; and if they have a similar makeup, they will 
have similar qualitative states.
I have suggested that the felt need for higher-level properties in 
such cases is an artefact of the Picture Theory. A simpler explanation 
of the phenomena beloved by advocates of multiple realizability is 
that predicates taken to designate so-called higher-level properties 
are in fact satisfied by members of families of similar properties. 
These similar properties are just those properties standardly taken to 
be  realizers  of  the  higher-level  properties.  The  pain  predicate 
applies or would apply to creatures in virtue of those creatures' 
possession  of  any  of  a  possibly  open-ended  family  of  similar 
properties. These properties fall under the pain predicate because 
they are relevantly similar: similar, perhaps in the contribution they 
make  to  the  dispositional  and  qualitative  character  of  their 
possessors' states of mind. (Heil 2003, p. 153)
This aside, the case for multiple realizability is empirically problematic (Shapiro 2000).
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In sake of terminological clarity, it is also important to distinguish functions from mechanisms; 
there is a one-to-many relationship between function and mechanism (Mahner & Bunge 2001). An 
important  distinction  is  also  to  be  drawn  between  functions  as  internal  processes,  such  as 
mechanisms, and functions as relations,  for instance,  a stool functioning as a place to sit  for a 
human being (Bunge & Mahner 2004, p. 158f).
 3.1.6 Time and Space
A few qualitative intuitions on time and space shall be offered here, simply because these two 
categories are so essential for our experience that they deserve some special mention. The below 
expositions could be considered personal heuristics of thinking rather than a formal analysis.
"Time exists that not everything happens at once"171, and space, if I may add, that not everything 
happens at the same location. Both are relational phenomena, and since Einstein we know that they 
are intricately related.
An intuition I have come to concerning time is the following: from relativity theory we know 
that there is no universal now, and that the invariant between two "points" in the physical universe 
is neither distance nor time but spacetime distance taken together, where the duration of time or the 
distance of space alone between two events are different relative to observers in different inertial 
frames. A good way of thinking about special relativity is to consider everything as moving at the 
constant speed c through the block universe,  where there is  a trade off  between the movement 
through time and the movement through space. The faster you are going through space, the slower 
you will go through time, so that in the extreme case of photons moving at c through space, no time 
passes (fort them) as they traverse the universe.
Now let us for the moment consider the position of an observer, ourselves, for instance. Space 
can then be considered as the dimension over which I have control as a thinking subject. I can move 
left, right, up, down, front, back – three dimensions172. I can consciously change my relation to other 
objects, which continue on their trajectories through spacetime. But note that we are embedded in 
local spatial relations and only here do we find the freedom to return to locations we have visited 
previously. If we consider the movement of the Earth, the solar system, the galaxy, the supercluster 
etc, we can see that we can't control our location as exactly as we would initially think. The larger 
the scale of structures we consider, the more we enter the domain of time.
171 (Bourke )
172 For an interesting analysis why we may live in a (3,1)-dimensional universe see (Tegmark 1997).
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Time can be considered as nothing but the motion of all other objects in the universe in relation 
to oneself – even some "objects" of which "I" am made of, say, the cells in my body which divide, 
contributing to the process of aging, the flow of the bloodstream etc.
So, in a nutshell, the conception, from a first person perspective, is as follows: 
• Space encodes the concept of self moving in relation to everything else. We have partial 
control over our spatial whereabouts because that is just what our agency means: to be a 
power in the world.
• Time is the encoding of everything outside the self moving in relation to oneself. We can't 
freely explore the temporal direction because we can't control the motion of the rest of the 
universe173. This also affects systems very close to us: aging, for instance, is our body parts 
going through their motions (cell division etc) without our control (except for healthy living, 
slowing down the metabolism rate etc).
Time results from motions which I can't control, and space results from motions which I can 
control. So, in this sense, time and space are indeed very much alike – they just represent different 
points of view (self versus otherness).
Of course in the picture painted above we still need different "states" of the universe, so that the 
illusion of  the  flow of  time can appear174.  I  am a bit  unhappy with the term "state",  because it 
conveys a too simplistic picture, "state" usually referring to a precisely defined situation. I think that 
the states of the universe are more unruly than that – what Smith (1996) calls zest and spunk, a basic 
playfulness of universal nature.
Anyway, the best exposition of how a timeless universe works, that is, where time appears only 
in  the inside  view from a  purely relational  universe175 is  Julian  Barbour's  "The  End  of  Time" 
(Barbour 1999). I would just like to sympathetically nod to Barbour's program here, as I do not have 
the time to explore the issues.
What trouble are we getting into when assuming a timeless universe? Will pain, for instance, be 
eternal? No: experience, and the preconditions for experience, time and space, arise on the inside 
view –  only  the  hypothetical,  in  principle  unobservable  outside  view  is  timeless;  it  is  never 
experienced; experience demands a succession of states and therefore time. So, pain can only be 
173 Time travel is the fantasy of reversing or accelerating all motions outside the self.
174 For a review of the issue of time in physics, see Callender (Forthcoming).
175 Space, needless to say, is also conceptualized relationally here. For a detailed treatment of all the different views on 
these matters, see the excellent book of Dainton (2001).
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experienced in a  timely fashion.  An experienced moment is  never eternal,  on the contrary,  it  is 
always fleeting.
From the inside, the universe is merciful; and from outside, it is nothing at all (because there is 
no cognitive entity to interpret the "sum" of all relations). What about bad experiences of others in 
the past that you must think of as real now? Adopting a timeless view, even if only in principle, may 
lead  to  empathic  suffering  in  regard  to  those  moments.  Yudkowsky offers  a  placation  for  the 
troubled mind – and while it was offered for the multiverse, it works just as well for the timeless 
universe:
...horrible things happened during the 12th century, which are also 
beyond  your  ability  to  affect.  But  the  12th  century  is  not  your 
responsibility, because it has, as the quaint phrase goes, "already 
happened". I would suggest that you consider every world which is not 
in your future, to be part of the "generalized past".(Yudkowsky 2008g) 
An exact analysis of how a timeless universe resonates with the dynamic view proposed here 
would  need  more  careful  investigation.  But  for  practical  matters,  we  need  the  dynamic  view 
grounded in powers – the inside view. The other ruminations are only of metaphysical interest.
 3.1.7 Universal Darwinism
Often times it is criticized that evolution is applied in non-biological contexts, that the analogy 
or metaphor is badly chosen – the differences from biological evolution to other forms of evolution 
are stressed. But evolution is more than a biological phenomenon: it is a meta-principle which is 
valid in many domains in this universe; it is a universal algorithm176, substrate-neutral and mindless. 
Blackmore  (1999) calls  this  principle  Universal  Darwinism:  variation,  selection  and  retention 
(heredity in biological systems) operate algorithmically177.  Biological evolution is only a special 
domain where the evolutionary algorithm operates. Applied in wider contexts, there are theories that 
seek to explain the fine-tuning of our universe to life to evolution happening at cosmic scales – 
cosmological natural selection operating on universes being produced in black holes Smolin (1997). 
Also,  the  stability  of  the  macroscopic  world  we  experience  may  be  the  result  of  quantum 
Darwinism – stable states being selected by the environment Zurek (2007).
176 The word algorithm is employed in a broader context than that of computer science: the requirement of finite 
termination is dropped; and there is no extrinsic goal evolution wants to solve: the “goal” of replicating sufficiently 
often to stay in the world is implicit.
177 A detailed analysis can be found in Dennett (1995).
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Evolution is not directed; but does evolution lead to more complexity? Only subprocesses of 
evolution do: mutation and variation, left to their own devices, will lead to more variability in the 
units  of  selection.  Selection  itself  –  a  meta-effect  actually,  namely,  the  failure  to  replicate 
sufficiently often in a resource-constrained environment,  thus leading to displacement – curtails 
complexity.
A few words on ethics are in order. As Darwinism always seems to raise specters among some 
people, they should be banished quickly. When Darwin's theory of evolution is invoked, the focus 
usually lies on natural selection, the process of competition and the survival of the fittest178.
But that is only part of the story. Systems flourish when they are robust, that is, keep functioning 
under a wide variety of possibly opposing conditions. We can zoom out and view evolution as an 
algorithm which proliferates life as a whole (this view is possible without getting into teleological 
channels). The more diversity the processes of variation, mutation, recombination etc produce, the 
more  robust  the whole community of  living beings  will  be against  environmental  culling.  The 
proliferation of life  profits  from a large variety in the gene pool.  There is no such thing as an 
optimal biological blueprint. – maybe for a certain situation and environment, which will lead to 
very stable designs such as the class of sharks – but not in general for all times and situations. 
This line of reasoning stifles both racism in the biological sphere and totalitarianism in the 
memetic sphere at their roots; racism and totalitarianism are suboptimal strategies. The infosphere 
profits from a wide variety of theories and ideas much as humanity or life generally profits from a 
deep gene pool.
 3.1.8 Quantum Fairy Land
What  about  the  quantum?  Quantum  mechanics  is  routinely  invoked  to  either  justify  the 
inapplicability of rationality to the world or to justify crackpot theories. As soon as you enter the 
domain  of  quantum mechanics  you  find  yourself  in  a  place  of  myth  and  fantasy,  of  magical 
creatures,  powerful  wizards,  and,  to  take  some poetic  license,  beautiful  damsels.  This  is  most 
certainly due to the fact that no interpretation of quantum mechanics is currently satisfying. But the 
results of the present thesis do not depend on one or other interpretation being correct; they solely 
depend on what is certainly not correct, and to elucidate this is the goal of the present section179.
178 Or the likeliest (Whitfield 2007).
179 For the reader interested in easily accessible overviews of quantum mechanics and the problems the theory poses to 
classical conceptions of the world, there are a number of excellent texts available, among them Albert (1992); Rae 
(2004); Camejo (2006). For an excellent philosophical analysis see Putnam (2005).
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A good starting point for our investigation is a paper aptly named "Quantum Mechanics: Myths 
and Facts" by Nikolic, who starts out to list some myths:
...  myths  include  wave-particle  duality,  time-energy  uncertainty 
relation,  fundamental  randomness,  the  absence  of  measurement-
independent reality, locality of QM, nonlocality of QM, the existence 
of well-defined relativistic QM, the claims that quantum field theory 
(QFT) solves the problems of relativistic QM or that QFT is a theory 
of particles, as well as myths on black-hole entropy. The fact is that 
the existence of various theoretical and interpretational ambiguities 
underlying these myths does not yet allow us to accept them as proven 
facts. (Nikolic 2007)
Virtually everything of interest in quantum mechanics is disputed in some way or another. And 
indeed, paradigms accepted in one "interpretational community" are not taken seriously in another. 
The philosopher can only hope to extract some principles of the discourse which look like they will 
exhibit some stability.
Of special concern to the topic of the present work are the concepts of fundamental randomness 
and measurement-independent reality180.
So, what about fundamental randomness? Nikolic writes:
... classical dynamics is completely deterministic. On the other 
hand,  the  usual  form  of  QM  does  not  say  anything  about  actual 
deterministic  causes  that  lie  behind  the  probabilistic  quantum 
phenomena. This  fact is  often used  to claim  that QM  implies that 
nature is fundamentally random. Of course, if the usual form of QM is 
really  the  ultimate  truth,  then  it  is  true  that  nature  is 
fundamentally random. But who says that the usual form of QM really is 
the ultimate truth? (A serious scientist will never claim that for any 
current theory.) (Nikolic 2007)
It  often seems to  me that every opportunity at  destroying a deterministic  conception of the 
universe is seized upon by certain people, who in the process dump their scientific attitude. No 
theory  may  enjoy  a  priori  pride  of  place.  And  just  the  same  as  a  scientist  will  hold  totally 
deterministic  theories  tentatively,  she  will  hold  theories  implying  randomness  tentatively.  From 
180 The existence – or non-existence – of particles has basically been addressed in the way we plan to to ontology: 
particles are a commitment to certain microcausal structures dependent on a certain (robust, and therefore scientific) 
stratification.
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whence the wish to have indeterminacy as a fundamental feature of the world? I think it is the wish 
to  smuggle  in  free  will  or  some conception  of  agency independent  of  the laws of  nature.  But 
quantum indeterminacy will not suffice to buy this. More on that in section 4.1.
In either case, the relation between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics is not as easily 
painted in black and white as commonly assumed; it seems as Nikolic has overlooked some myths. 
Let us have a brief look at the literature. The surprise starts when reading a very respected textbook 
on Quantum Mechanics:
...the quantum correlation is always stronger than the classical 
one, except in the trivial cases [...]. Are you surprised? If so, this 
is  the  result  of  having  been  exposed  to  unfounded  quantum 
superstitions, according to which quantum theory is afflicted by more 
"uncertainty" than classical mechanics. Exactly the opposite is true: 
quantum phenomena are more disciplined than classical ones.  (Peres 
2002, p. 162)
Another of the "indeterministic" features of quantum mechanics is supposed to be complementarity:
Complementarity is the principal impossibility to measure two or 
more complementary observables with arbitrary precision simultaneously 
(Svozil 2007)
Svozil goes on to present how complementarity can arise in a finite state automaton – the most 
simplistic model of a deterministic system.
Since any finite state automaton can be simulated by a universal 
computer,  complementarity  is  a  feature  of  sufficiently  complex 
deterministic universes as well. To put it pointedly: if the physical 
universe is conceived as the product of a universal computation, then 
complementarity  is  an  inevitable  and  necessary  feature  of  the 
perception of intrinsic observers. It cannot be avoided. (Svozil 1996) 
But not only that quantum systems are very disciplined and not at all obnoxious to determinism, 
it seems that Newtonian Mechanics, the standard example for a clockwork universe, is not as well 
behaved as is commonly assumed181:
181 Norton gives mathematical proof for the claim. Note that I do not endorse Norton's anti-causal stance expressed in 
the cited paper. Although he sympathizes with the account given in Dowe (2007):
In this regard, the most promising of all present views of causation is the 
process view of Dowe, Salmon, and others (Dowe 1997). In identifying a causal 
process as one that transmits a conserved quantity through a continuous 
spatiotemporal pathway, it seeks to answer most responsibly to the content of 
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Even quite simple Newtonian systems can harbor uncaused events and 
ones for which the theory cannot even supply probabilities. Because of 
such systems, ordinary Newtonian mechanics cannot license a principle 
or law of causality. [...] an example of such a system fully in accord 
with Newtonian mechanics. It is a mass that remains at rest in a 
physical environment that is completely unchanging for an arbitrary 
amount of time—a day, a month, an eon.
Then,  without  any  external  intervention  or  any  change  in  the 
physical environment, the mass spontaneously moves off in an arbitrary 
direction with the theory supplying no probabilities for the time or 
direction of the motion. (Norton 2007, p. 22f)
Earman sums it up:
... in some respects determinism is a robust doctrine and is quite 
hard to  kill, while  in other  respects it  is fragile  and requires 
various  enabling  assumptions  to  give  it  a  fighting  chance.  [...] 
determinism is far from a dead issue. Whether or not ordinary non-
relativistic  quantum  mechanics  (QM)  admits  a  viable  deterministic 
underpinning is still a matter of debate. Less well known is the fact 
that in some cases QM turns out to be more deterministic than its 
classical counterpart. Quantum field theory (QFT) assumes determinism, 
at least  at the  classical level,  in order  to construct  the field 
algebra of quantum observables. Determinism is at the heart of the 
cosmic censorship hypothesis, the most important unsolved issue in 
classical general relativity theory (GTR). And issues about the nature 
and status of determinism lie at the heart of key foundation issues in 
the search for a theory of quantum gravity. (Earman 2007, p. 1369)
So we see that the common conception – that Newton's worldview was entirely clock like, and 
quantum mechanics has destroyed this view, is wrong. Where does this leave us concerning the 
determinism/indeterminism issue? Nowhere. Earman paints an interesting picture, taking a bird's 
eye view on the whole of physics182:
The  fortunes  of  determinism  are  too  complicated  to  admit  of  a 
summary that is both short and accurate, but roughly speaking the 
our mature sciences. Insofar as the theory merely seeks to identify which 
processes in present science ought to be labeled causal and which are not, it 
succeeds better than any other account I know.
182 See also Earman (2004).
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story for classical (= non-quantum theories) is this. In Newtonian 
theories determinism is hard to achieve without the aid of various 
supplementary  assumptions  that  threaten  to  become  question-begging. 
For special relativistic theories determinism appears so secure that 
it is used as a selection criterion for "fundamental fields." GTR, 
under the appropriate gauge interpretation, is deterministic locally 
in time; but whether it is deterministic non-locally in time devolves 
into  the  unsettled  issues  of  cosmic  censorship  and  chronology 
protection.
Quantum physics is the strangest and most difficult case. Ordinary 
QM is in some respects more deterministic than Newtonian mechanics; 
for example, QM is able to cure some of the failures of Newtonian 
determinism which occur either because of non-uniqueness of solutions 
or the breakdown of solutions. But the fortunes of determinism in QM 
ultimately  ride  on  unresolved  interpretational  issues.  The  main 
driving force behind these issues is the need to explain how QM can 
account for definite outcomes of experiments or more generally, the 
apparent definiteness of the classical world — an ironic situation 
since QM is the most accurate physical theory yet devised. Some of the 
extant responses to this explanatory challenge would bury determinism 
while others give it new life. (Earman 2007, p. 1428f)
And so on.
Nobody183 currently knows if the laws of nature are strictly deterministic or have a stochastic 
component. Maybe the question is not answerable in principle, because every answer will require 
assumptions which can be contested. The above is meant to dispel the smugness with which the 
destruction of the clockwork universe is sometimes pronounced.
But  the  issue  of  determinism is  orthogonal  to  a  scientific  and  naturalistic  world-view.  The 
methods of science guarantee best modeling practices in both cases. And indeterminacy in the laws 
of the universe does not make the cosmos any less naturalistic.
Of a quite different nature is the claim that there is no  observer-independent reality,  giving 
observers  (humans?)  special  pride  of  place,  leading  to  idealism and a  rejection  of  realism.  As 
already discussed in the section on RC, something which is usually ignored is that only the concrete 
observer herself enjoys this privileged real position; other humans are simply part of her physical 
183 In the solar system, at least.
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reality. That is usually not what is intended: people saying that reality is observer-dependent usually 
expand the status of observer implicitly to all  humans, not only to the speaker. The underlying 
ontological model seems to be one of humans being possessors of souls or spiritual essences; actors 
put into a world that is a mere stage.
Of course, that reality is observer-dependent does not follow from quantum mechanics: 
... QM does not prove that there is no reality besides the measured 
reality. Instead, there are several alternatives to it. In particular, 
such reality may exist, but then it must be contextual (i.e., must 
depend  on  the  measurement  itself).  The  simplest  (although  not 
necessary) way to introduce such reality is to postulate it only for 
one or a few preferred quantum observables. (Nikolic 2007) 
One possible  interpretation  which  singles  out  preferred  observables  is  Bohmian  mechanics 
(Duerr 2009). An interpretation which is more removed from common sense and attributes reality 
only to relational aspects is relational quantum mechanics (Smerlak & Rovelli 2007).
I like the way Heathcote puts the strife between idealist and realist conceptions of quantum 
mechanics:
The fault, however, does not lie entirely with Idealism – for there 
is an  ambiguity in  the term  ‘realism’ that  has been  exploited to 
create misunderstandings where there need be none. In the first sense, 
to be a realist about quantum mechanics is simply to think that we 
should  believe  in  the  entities  and  structures  that  subserve  its 
explanatory hypotheses. Put simply, belief goes along with explanatory 
success. […] On the other meaning of ‘realism’ to be a realist is to 
believe that Classical states exhaust the set of total states that a 
system might have – and therefore must be possessed by a system at all 
times. In short, classical states could not be dispositional. Quantum 
Mechanics only casts doubt on realism in this latter sense. Note, 
however, that the denial of this latter view does not automatically 
take one to Idealism but rather to realism in this first sense! […] 
In sum: the quantum state is an objective part of the real world; it 
may well even evolve in a purely deterministic fashion; the particles 
to which it belongs are capable of interacting causally and when they 
do their quantum states can become entangled – this entanglement is 
also something entirely objective. The quantum state gives rise to the 
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qualities  that  we  observe,  but,  contrary  to  the  tendencies  within 
Idealism, that state itself is far richer than the small window of 
observation is able to reveal. Our best reason for being realists 
about  this  state  is  that  it  is  our  only  means  of  explaining  the 
phenomena that are peculiar to quantum theory.
As I write, there is a light breeze stirring at some trees. Crows 
call invisibly, far off, and a winter sun streams through a break in 
some branches. All of these things are real. Quantum mechanics has not 
robbed them of that reality, rather it has made it plain that they are 
the  manifestation  of  something  with  truly  unforseen  complexity. 
Reality is not less than we thought – it is very much more. (Heathcote 
2003) 
An  intriguing  interpretation  of  quantum  mechanics  which  accounts  both  for  observer-
independent reality, is completely deterministic, and solves a host of other problems associated with 
quantum mechanics is the many worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics184, originally 
put forward by Everett (1957).
Indeterminism in  the  MWI only  arises  for  observers  restricted  to  the  "inside  view"  of  the 
universe.  An  intuitive  deterministic  model  of  a  "quantish"185 MWI-universe,  implemented  via 
simple gates, is given by Drescher (2006, p. 123f).
There  are,  perhaps  not  surprisingly,  different  variants  of  the  many  worlds  interpretation. 
Common to all of them is the explanation of quantum indeterminacy by the fact that  all possible 
outcomes of quantum measurements186 are realized and experienced in one world or another. The 
MWI hints at ontological and experiential riches which are so baffling that they may just be true – 
after all, why assume that reality is overly bounded? The MWI reminds me of the sentence in T.H. 
White's "The Once and Future King", written above every anthill tunnel entrance:
Everything not Forbidden is Compulsory. 
Ah, but what is allowed, what is forbidden, and why? It is intriguing that the quantum realm 
itself seems to impose serious restrictions on what is possible; I mentioned the stricter than classical 
correlations above; another obvious example is the Born rule which assigns different amplitude to 
different measurement outcomes; a better name for the many worlds interpretation would be the 
184 See Barrett (1999); Vaidman (2002) for introductions.
185 The "quantish" universe is a simplified version of a full-scale quantum-universe.
186 Measurements require neither experimental setup nor observers: it is better to speak of quantum interactions.
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"few worlds interpretation"187: not everything conceivable, and certainly not everything imaginable, 
happens. Rieffel writes:
A typical quote (Deutsch 1998): "There are even universes in which a 
given object in our universe has no counterpart – including universes 
in which I was never born and you wrote this article instead." The 
variety of imaginative examples suggest that anything we can conceive 
of, even the highly unlikely, happen, if only in a small number of 
universes.  But  much  of  the  surprise  of  quantum  mechanics  is  that 
certain things we thought would happen, even things we thought were 
sure to happen, do not happen at all.
Most  startling  are  events  that  were  predicted  to  happen  with 
certainty  by  classical  physics,  but  which  in  fact  happen  with 
probability 0. Thus, not only is it not true that everything we can 
conceive of is predicted to happen in some universe, but things we can 
hardly conceive of not happening do not happen, not in any universe. 
To emphasize this correction, I call it "the fewer worlds than we 
might  think"  interpretation  of  quantum  mechanics,  or  the  "fewer 
worlds" theory for short. (Rieffel 2007)
There seem to be serious nomic restrictions at work which are still beyond our comprehension. 
The  conjecture  of  the  existence  of  a  multitude  of  worlds  –  the  existence  of  all  quantum 
mechanically allowed worlds – seems to explain a bit more than there merely being one world, 
which  is  a  bit  arbitrary.  But  care  has  to  be  exercised.  If  one  introduces  many worlds  via  the 
quantum, why stop there? It leads us to the question: if all possible worlds exist, which worlds are 
possible? All physical worlds? Mathematically consistent worlds (Tegmark's Type IV multiverse 
(Tegmark 2007))? The latter position, while infinitely richer in worlds than traditional MWI, is still 
small compared to Lewis' modal realism (Lewis 1986), which seems to be near restrictionless.
But I feel qualms when speaking about many worlds. Speculations that go too far beyond the 
empirical are always in danger of becoming pure fantasy. I urge caution with MWI (and even more 
with the other many worlds variants):  they quickly become "explain-all"  theories. It  is  better  – 
scientifically more fecund – to stick with the one world we find around us. Relying on the MWI to 
have solved the mystery of quantum mechanics may be a form of dogmatic slumber; and anything 
187 The "few" worlds vastly surpass our most extreme forms of imagination in number.
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going  further  than  the  MWI (which  at  least  connects  with  empirical  experiment  through strict 
adherence to the quantum formalism) should at present be regarded as science fiction.
But we have ventured too far – the morasses are getting deep, and the water is already too 
murky to see anything worthwhile. But we can conclude that there is no reason to be found in 
quantum mechanics to leave the path of rationality. Maybe strict determinism – that every state s 
leads to a definite followup state f – is false. Maybe the world is stochastically deterministic, that is, 
propensities are real. Either way, we need to evaluate the evidence rationally. And we need to draw 
our conclusions rationally. Possible indeterminism does not return us to the magical and mythical 
universe of old.
 3.2 Panqualicism
 3.2.1 Monism
We spoke above of dispositions and relations. The other important point of consideration is the 
qualitative  side  of  the  equation,  informed  by  a  basic  monism or  identity  theory;  what  we  are 
interested here is a monist conception of mind and matter188. A good visualization of monism is the 
following: imagine you have magic glasses that highlight unphysical stuff – mind or soul or spirit-
essence or whatever – in white incandescent light. If you believe that there is something over and 
above those aspects of the world that are material, then when you put on your magic glasses you 
should start seeing white light around people and maybe also around other entities such as animals, 
depending on your creed. In monism, either everything shines, or nothing: you can have your pick, 
dependent on if you wish to see matter as mind or mind as matter; from monism simply follows that 
the  two are  identical.  Actually,  this  identity  follows  trivially  from our  ontological  ruminations 
above; but the mind-matter duality is so pervasive that it deserves special mention in this separate 
section.
From what may we derive monism? A starting point is the simple and obvious fact that physical 
changes in your brain change your thoughts (lesions, chemical imbalances, transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS), what have you). This is already strong evidence that the physical and the mental 
are not distinct; parallelisms and dualisms seem already strained from the beginning. 
In section 3.1.3 we spoke about structural realism and its causal version. Here we will hook up 
with the philosophy of mind; we said above that properties are causal dispositions. And that indeed 
188 For views like the one propounded in this chapter, see also Rockwell (2005) and Martin (2008).
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exhausts their nature – from the outside view; but there is also an inside view – what it is like to be 
such a property. The inside view is the property of  being, of  qualia. Let us call the inside view, 
generally, a qualicist state. Does this not contradict our experience of consciousness being a special 
state? No, because qualicist states will have very different forms of "inside views". There is an 
analogy from physics:  at  high  energies  we don't  find solids  and fluids  but  only gases  or  even 
plasma; so the same matter has different properties when different physical circumstances obtain. 
Mind would be a primary material property – the inside view – but only becoming "visible" as 
actual consciousness in certain matter configurations.
But first a closer look at the "canonical" form of monism which I merge into the present picture 
of the world:
Type-F monism is the view that consciousness is constituted by the 
intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities: that is, by the 
categorical bases of fundamental physical dispositions 
...
This view holds the promise of integrating phenomenal and physical 
properties very tightly in the natural world. Here, nature consists of 
entities with intrinsic (proto)phenomenal qualities standing in causal 
relations within a spacetime manifold. Physics as we know it emerges 
from the relations between these entities, whereas consciousness as we 
know it emerges from their intrinsic nature. As a bonus, this view is 
perfectly compatible with the causal closure of the microphysical, and 
indeed with existing physical laws. The view can retain the structure 
of physical theory as it already exists; it simply supplements this 
structure with an intrinsic nature.
...
In its protophenomenal form, the view can be seen as a sort of 
neutral  monism:  there  are  underlying  neutral  properties  X  (the 
protophenomenal  properties),  such  that  the  X  properties  are 
simultaneously responsible for constituting the physical domain (by 
their  relations)  and  the  phenomenal  domain  (by  their  collective 
intrinsic nature).
…
149
Living in a Natural World
One could also characterize this form of the view as a sort of 
panpsychism, with phenomenal properties ubiquitous at the fundamental 
level. One could give the view in its most general form the name 
panprotopsychism, with either protophenomenal or phenomenal properties 
underlying all of physical reality.
…
Overall, type-F monism promises a deeply integrated and elegant view 
of nature. No-one has yet developed any sort of detailed theory in 
this class, and it is not yet clear whether such a theory can be 
developed. But at the same time, there appear to be no strong reasons 
to  reject  the  view.  As  such,  type-F  monism  is  likely  to  provide 
fertile  grounds  for  further  investigation,  and  it  may  ultimately 
provide the best integration of the physical and the phenomenal within 
the natural world. (Chalmers 2003) 
This kind of monism has found positive reception in the literature  Lockwood (1989); Stoljar 
(2001); Strawson (2006); Strawson & Others (2006); it is a position which near forces itself on the 
naturalist  (Strawson  2006).  I  would  like  to  call  it  panqualicism  instead  of  panpsychism. 
Panpsychism smacks too much of the anthropomorphic; of animism and forest spirits. Panqualicism 
leaves the connotations where they belong: that  qualitative properties are normal “inside view” 
properties of the physical world. Type-F monism is not new territory, philosophically speaking; its 
modern form can be traced to the Russellian Theory of Mind (RTM)  (Russell 1927); or even to 
Schopenhauer:  the  inside  view is  the  "Will"  of  Schopenhauer  (1859) in  action.  The  RTM can 
quickly be characterized like this:
RTM takes as its point of departure a certain view concerning the 
nature of the concepts of physical theory, a view which I will also 
call  Russellian’.  According  to  this  view,  physical  theory 
characterizes  the  entities  in  its  domain  (including  properties) 
strictly  extrinsically, in terms of the causal, functional and other 
relations  in  which  they  stand  to  each  other  (and  to  experience). 
[Footnote 4] So, e.g., an electron might be characterized as an entity 
that sometimes behaves as a particle and sometimes as a wave, that has 
a  certain  mass  and  carries  a  certain  charge  whereby  it  attracts 
protons and repels other electrons and generates an electro-magnetic 
field upon moving, that plays a given role in the binding of atoms 
into molecules, ...and so on. All we have here is an account of causal 
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and functional relations in which electrons stand to other theoretical 
entities such as protons, electro-magnetic fields, mass, charge, atoms 
and molecules — which themselves are understood extrinsically. Nowhere 
in all this, according to the Russellian view, does physical theory 
inform  us  of  the  intrinsic  nature of  the  entities  that  are  so 
interrelated. [Footnote 5] So one could know everything that physical 
theory  can  tell  us  about  a  subject  domain  without  knowing  the 
intrinsic nature of anything in that domain. However (so it is argued)
all these entities can’t just be ciphers; they must have intrinsic 
natures.  Furthermore,  it  is  in  virtue  of  having  these  intrinsic 
natures that the entities have the causal powers and dispositional 
properties they do. The question is if we can ever know what the 
intrinsic natures are.
It  is  held  that  in  at  least  some  cases  we  can.  The  having  of 
conscious  experiences  gives  us  direct  cognitive  access  to,  or 
‘acquaintance’  with,  the  phenomenal  properties  of  those  very 
experiences, and these properties are intrinsic. The way is then open 
to  say  that  they  also  constitute  the  intrinsic  nature  of 
neurophysiological states. Neuro-physiological theory, like physical 
theory generally, characterizes its entities only extrinsically. But 
in this case, we are in the (perhaps unique) position of knowing by 
acquaintance the intrinsic nature of the entities of which the theory 
treats. [Footnote 6] (Holman 2008) 189
Chalmers calls this a property dualism because the view acknowledges structural-dispositional 
properties and intrinsic protophenomenal properties; I disagree; I subscribe to Heil's identity theory 
explicated above; categorical properties are not the bases for dispositional ones, they are one an the 
same, just viewed differently190. There is no intrinsic nature of the mental, when we take intrinsic to 
mean "a property not  dependent  on relations";  we can't  take  anything  in  the  world  out  of  the 
relations  it  stands  in.  The  conceptual  shift  in  going  from  categorical/qualitative  to 
dispositional/powerful is perspectival. One can view a statue from many different perspectives; one 
should not imbue this with ontological significance191. 
189 Holman goes on to differentiate different variants of RTM and spells out problems which need be addressed in this 
framework.
190 We have to make this move to avoid epiphenomenalism, which is untenable (Muller 2008).; and as naturalists we 
don't want to give up causal closure of the physical (which is motivated by empirical considerations, not wishful 
thinking, see below).
191 Apart from the fact that one can draw conclusions about the dimensionality of the world one lives in
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Similarly here, just because the inside view of structural-dispositional properties is mental in 
nature – that  is,  there  is  something it  is  "like" to  be structure – does not make this  position a 
dualism, not even a property dualism. The position is of course very related to property dualism as 
discussed in the literature, but combined with relationalism and the ontological commitment to a 
unified world,  that  is,  locating all  splits and divisions in epistemology192,  we can call  it  a pure 
monism with good conscience. This is not only terminological strife. The point is important because 
it stresses the relational nature of everything, even the inside view: otherwise – if we would admit 
pure intrinsic properties – we would have a categorical property which could be missing in some 
other possible world; leading to all kinds of metaphysical nonsense, such as zombies193 and other 
creatures of fantasy having sullied the halls of academe.
The view of monism as explicated above is in surprising harmony with Eastern philosophy. We 
find the following in Watts' beautiful “The Way of Zen”194:
According to the Yogacara the world of form is  cittamatra- "mind 
only"- or  vijnaptimatra- "representation only." This view seems to 
have a very close resemblance to Western philosophies of subjective 
idealism, in which the external and material world is regarded as a 
projection of the mind.
However, there seem to be some differences between the two points of 
view. Here, as always, the Mahayana is not so much a theoretical and 
speculative construction as an account of an inner experience, and a 
means of awakening the experience in others. Furthermore, the word 
citta is not precisely equivalent to our "mind." Western thought tends 
to define mind by opposition to matter, and to consider matter not so 
much  as  "measure"  as  the  solid  stuff  which  is  measured.  Measure 
itself, abstraction, is for the West more of the nature of mind, since 
we tend to think of mind and spirit as more abstract than concrete.
But in Buddhist philosophy citta does not stand over or against a 
conception of solid stuff. The world has never been considered in 
terms of a primary substance shaped into various forms by the action 
of mind or spirit. Such an image is not in the history of Buddhist 
192 Put differently: conceptual irreduction does not imply ontological irreduction.
193 Philosophical zombies are creatures exactly like us in every outward regard – they behave the same as we do in all 
situations, also when questioned on matters of consciousness – except that they don't have any internal experiences. 
Zombies are extensively discussed in Chalmers (1996a). For the impossibility of Zombies in the 
dispositional/qualitative identity view see (Heil 2003, p. 240-249)
194 I would like to be very clear that no Berkeleyian idealism is implied in any remote sense.
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thought, and thus the problem of how impalpable mind can influence 
solid  matter  has  never  arisen.  Wherever  we  should  speak  of  the 
material or physical or substantial world, Buddhism employs the term 
rupa,  which  is  not  so  much  our  "matter"  as  "form."  There  is  no 
"material substance" underlying rupa unless it be citta itself. (Watts 
1957, p. 72)
Before  this  all  sounds  to  fantastic,  I  would  like  to  point  out  the  following:  the  move  to 
panqualicism  is  rather  close to  eliminative  materialism195.  I  think  it's  rather  only  a  choice  of 
emphasis of words. The eliminative materialist focuses on the outside view; the panqualicist focuses 
on the inside view, how existence is experienced. Both views are firmly naturalistic. The seeming 
gaping  difference  –  that  eliminativists  say  that  certain  mental  states  do  not  exist  –  and  the 
alternative position, that everything is mental of a kind – is mitigated by the fact that the property in 
question, namely mentality, is ascribed or negated  indiscriminately. The current position is more 
coherent because it is in tune with experience.
 3.2.2 Anomalous Monism
What about Davidson's anomalous monism (Kim 2003, p. 113-136)? The core principles are the 
following: 
The Interaction Principle: Some mental events causally interact with 
some physical events
The Cause-Law Principle: Events related as cause and effect are 
covered by strict laws
The Anomalism Principle: There are no strict laws on the basis of 
which mental events can predict, explain, or be predicted or explained 
by other events
Monism: Every causally interacting mental event is token-identical 
to some physical event196 (Yalowitz 2004)
Anomalous monism, slightly adapted, fits perfectly into the current picture. Token identity of 
mental events with physical events, without the existence of physical bridge laws can be given a 
perfectly naturalistic explanation: the reason for the unavailability of bridge laws is the tracking 
195 Usually positions at opposite extremes have much in common: they come full circle.
196We do not need Davidson's supervenience principle due to a different metaphysics.
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nature  of  neural  states  and  its  dependence  on  the  individual  experience  and  ontogeny  of  the 
organism. Mental events thus are lawful, but the sequence of thoughts are associative in nature197. 
The associative connections are formed by causal events in the history of the organism. To know 
what  someone  thinks,  one  would  need  to  recapitulate  the  ontogenetic  history  of  the  specific 
individual neural net. But more on this in the next section.
 3.2.3 Being in a State
The moment is simply structured that way. Kurt Vonnegut 
Let us have a closer look at the perspectival aspect of the mind-matter problem. The structural 
and dispositional nature of reality can be communicated; that is done via scientific investigation, 
model-construction and dissemination among humans.
But apart from communication there is actual being – for instance, the experience of the color 
red or blue. Paradigmatic for this distinction between knowing and being – although it is usually not 
presented  that  way –  is  the  thought  experiment  concerning  Mary's  room  (Jackson  1982).  The 
thought experiment was devised to show that qualia are unphysical in nature. Mary is a scientist 
investigating the nature phenomenal concept of color from within the confines of a black and white 
room. Through her diligent scrutiny she gets to know everything physical there is to know about 
color. Having finished her investigation, she leaves the room – and actually sees color for the first 
time in her life. Does she learn something new?
Nida-Rümelin (2002) sums the argument up:
(1) Mary has all the physical information concerning human color 
vision before her release. 
(2) But there is some information about human color vision that she 
does not have before her release.
Therefore
(3) Not all information is physical information.
197 See the Jets and Sharks model in McClelland & Rumelhart (1988).
154
We have  here  before  us  the  distinction  between  "being"  versus  "knowing"198.  Why should 
knowing, which is  always  of something,  be the same as  that  very something? If  one takes the 
distinction of  being versus  knowing seriously,  and combines  it  with  a  panqualicist  attitude,  the 
debate between physicalism and the reality of qualia loses much of its force, some minor problems 
notwithstanding. Knowing is merely a subset of being; most being is not knowing – that is simply 
the commitment to a non-idealist view of the world. But there can never be knowing without being. 
Qualia are always incommunicable – that is the curse of indexicality; and the boon of being – what 
something feels like is the sum of all involved relationships (at a certain level of integration, see 
below). Every physical state has a feel to it. Of course, because most states are not dynamic, have 
no  memory,  no  data  filtering  via  perceptors  and  no  annexed  neural  nets  that  extract  useful 
information,  the  feel  of  most  states  would be quite  empty – maybe as  good as  not  being  any 
"feeling" worth calling a feeling at all. But nevertheless, the position is different from the position 
that there is no quality to physical states apart from in a brain.
We can  distinguish  raw feels,  qualia,  primary consciousness,  self-awareness.  Consciousness 
seems to come in degrees; and consciousness is not only what we usually perceive it to be:
Remarkably,  consciousness  does  not  seem  to  require  many  of  the 
things we associate most deeply with being human: emotions, memory, 
selfreflection, language, sensing the world, and acting in it. (Koch & 
Tononi 2008) 
To get a gist of how strange conscious states can be, one can have a look at the rich literature on 
brain pathology (Sacks (1985) is a good introduction), and we will encounter one such case below. 
Mental  states  can be very far  removed from what we normally perceive them to be,  removing 
somewhat the strangeness of conceiving of all physical states as being qualitative in one way or 
another.
So, what about a rock? Why not suppose that a stone has qualitative states, albeit very boring 
ones? The qualitative state of a rock would be in no way comparable to higher-level qualia of 
mammals or humans. Without memory, percepts, desires, beliefs, cognitive dynamics, without even 
a sense of individuation. But it is something to be a stone. It is being without awareness. Maybe it is 
Nirvana:
198 The distinction is not the same as Russell's "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description" (Egner & 
Denonn 2009, p. 191-198) though similar. The main difference is the dissolution of the last vestiges of mind-matter 
dichotomy implicit in Russell's philosophy.
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Nirvana literally means "extinction," as when a candle’s flame is 
extinguished. In Buddhist thought, nirvana has a very specific meaning 
and is perhaps the most misunderstood Buddhist concept among people of 
other religious traditions. Nirvana is not an "absence" or lack. It is 
instead a  state of  being. Nirvana  is strictly  defined as  a state 
without conditioned aspects. Nirvana is without arising, subsisting, 
changing, or passing away.
In Hindu thought nirvana is a state of liberation from individuality 
and the suffering of SAMSARA, the cycle of birth and death. But it 
also assumes the individuality is lost through merger with the divine, 
or Brahman. (Irons 2008, p. 370)
The brain is  ordered.  Only an ordered brain can entertain  complex thoughts;  the degree of 
consciousness  as  we  value  it  may  depend  on  the  degree  of  self-reflexivity;  awareness  comes 
through reflection  of  mind-stuff199,  self-awareness  through increased  reflexion.  Cognition is  the 
inside view of complex physical relations; the exact structure of which necessary for our kind of 
cognition to occur is the task of the empirical sciences to unravel.
Sounds strange?  Awareness  without  memory,  not  integrated  into  a  larger  personal  narrative 
would be difficult to notice. This will be illustrated later on with the strange case of Jimmie and his 
anterograde amnesia  (Sacks 1985). Imagine having a dream: while experienced dreams are often 
very vivid; sometimes we even remember them, but sometimes not,  they are not committed to 
memory. They tend to fade away. In a sense, it is as if they never happened. In this sense we can 
imagine basic qualitative states that have no access to memory structures such as present in brains. 
Of  course,  these  states  would  not  even  be  dreams,  because  dreams  operate  on  existing 
representations in brains; these basic qualia states would, from our perspective, be so uninteresting 
that we might not consider calling them qualia, if this would not conceptually reintroduce the rift 
just closed.
 3.2.4 The Intentional
In the present conception of things, the intentional is not “the mark of the mental” – or only 
insofar as everything is mental. It might just as well be called the mark of the physical. Both Heil 
and Smith (see the Appendix) give accounts of how intentionality can be incorporated into the 
natural view of things. Indeed, intentionality is necessarily coupled to ontology:
199 Mind-stuff is of course nothing other than ordinary matter.
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The prospects of a naturalistic grounding for intentionality can be 
appreciated only if we have some sense of what the natural world has 
to offer. (Heil 2003, p. 208)
And:
In any case, we have available a resource ideally suited to account 
for  the  kind  of  projection  associated  with  intentionality: 
dispositionality.  Dispositions  are  of or  for particular  kinds  of 
manifestation  with  particular  kinds  of  disposition  partner. 
Dispositions preserve the mark of intentionality in being of or for 
particular  kinds  of  manifestation  with  particular  kinds  of  non-
existent—possible, but non-actual—objects. This is not mysterious or 
spooky; it is a feature of dispositions possessed by rocks, or blades 
of grass, or quarks.
My suggestion is that we make use of the ‘natural intentionality’ 
afforded  by  dispositions  in  making  sense  of  the  kinds  of 
intentionality we find in the minds of intelligent agents. (Heil 2003, 
p. 222)
 3.2.5 Evolution of the Mental?
One argument for mind-matter identity is simply the strong empirical evidence from medicine, 
neurobiology, neuropathology etc; from this evidence follows that one needs to pay a high price for 
keeping some sort of dualism. But I think there is another strong argument in favor of monism: it 
seems to me that consciousness can't evolve. It must be a primitive property of the universe.
Why  this?  Evolution  always  acts  on  physical  configurations,  that  is,  DNA,  the  cellular 
environment etc. Morphological changes are selected for because they confer adaptive advantage. 
The  morphological  advantage  conferred  by  a  brain  is  its  utilization  of  certain  states  (such  as 
planning  and  memory)  to  enhance  survival.  But  consciousness  qua consciousness  must  have 
already "been there" in the first place. A bit as the laws of physics (especially aerodynamics) need to 
be in place so that the wing of a bird can evolve. Mind is here from the beginning, mind in itself 
does not evolve, only functions such as perceptions, memory, consciousness. What has evolved is 
not consciousness, but concrete algorithms and concrete correlations with external world such as 
planning, backward chaining, logic and self-representation – utilizing the basic mental properties of  
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material nature. Evolution can't bring forth basic constituents of reality such as electro-magnetism, 
mass200 etc, and consciousness.
After the panqualicist move – ascribing a state of “what its likeness” to all physical states – 
brains take on a different role; they are not needed to “generate” mind per se as in more dualistic 
conceptions, they only constitute the  specific kind of mind as we experience as human beings201. 
Perceptors correlate the brain with the environment. These correlations are integrated via neural 
mechanisms, that is, filtering and integration capacities such as Bayesian algorithms  (Doya et al. 
2007); many of these correlations are stored for future reference – memory. 
Brains  then  are  person  generators,  associative  memories  constituting  the  substrate  for  a 
narrative; and planning machines (prediction, modeling etc); and of course their complex structure 
account for higher order consciousness, that is, interesting conscious states; those we so value as 
human  beings.  The  complex  brain  structures  operate  on  the  representations  that  have  arisen: 
thinking, planning, reflexion; thought about thought. Without a brain there is no memory. Without 
memory, there is no person. But more on that below. But that does not mean that without a brain 
there is no state of being – of primordial likeness.
Another  consideration  works  in  favor  of  why qualia  must  be  there  in  the  first  place.  The 
problem is this: how does material evolution find the correct qualia to solve certain problems, that 
is,  pleasure  for  things  that  should  be  rewarded  and  pain  for  those  that  should  not?  A purely 
functional account fails to explain: if a state feels pleasurable  because it fulfills its function, the 
question  arises  why it  should  feel  like  anything  at  all,  if  the  function  is  performed anyway – 
epiphenomenalism rears its ugly head. Heil is puzzled by this also:
Even if we knew that neural tissue arranged in a particular way 
yielded a feeling of pain, the reason this arrangement yields pain 
rather than some other feeling (or no feeling at all) remains an utter 
mystery. (Heil 2003, p. 235)
The  picture  is  different  if  we  recognize  that  all  material  states  already  have  a  basic 
qualitativeness to them; then, evolution, just as it optimizes body plans and behavioral strategies to 
solve environmental problems, can start optimizing material configurations so that  configurations  
that are pleasurable are causally related to behavior that enhances fitness, and material states that 
200 Smolin (1997) and his cosmic evolution was already mentioned; that is evolution on another scale.
201 Note: brains do not cause minds. They are minds. Special kinds of minds.
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feel  bad  are  causally  related  to  behavior  that  is  contrarian  to  the  goals  of  staying  alive  and 
reproducing.
Imagine an organism that was wired “the wrong way”: it is wired in such a way that as soon as a 
massive nerve impulse from one of its limbs due to its having been injured arrives in the brain, the 
brain reacts with pleasure – such an organism would not survive long; it would seek states of injury, 
and thus die of any number of causes (bleeding to death, infection, getting eaten); it would most 
probably fail to have progeny. Only by assuming that material states directly are qualia states – and 
we reject  the possibility of  zombie  worlds  or  mechanisms disrupting the causal  closure  of  the 
physical – can evolution use qualia to operate on them.
 3.2.6 Binding Problem
In the literature the binding problem is often presented as especially problematic for monism, 
although I don't quite see why other positions should be exempt from solving it:
There  is  one  sort  of  principled  problem  in  the  vicinity.  Our 
phenomenology  has  a  rich  and  specific  structure:  it  is  unified, 
bounded,  differentiated  into  many  different  aspects,  but  with  an 
underlying homogeneity to many of the aspects, and appears to have a 
single subject of experience. It is not easy to see how a distribution 
of a large number of individual microphysical systems, each with their 
own protophenomenal properties, could somehow add up to this rich and 
specific  structure.  Should  one  not  expect  something  more  like  a 
disunified, jagged collection of phenomenal spikes? Chalmers (2003) 
We can call this the binding problem; is it a real problem? Some do not think so:
One of the motivations for models with quantum coherence in the 
brain was the so-called binding problem. In the words of James [...], 
‘‘the only realities are the separate molecules, or at most cells. 
Their aggregation into a ‘brain’ is a fiction of popular speech.’’ 
James’ concern, shared by many after him, was that consciousness did 
not seem to be spatially localized to any one small part of the brain, 
yet subjectively feels like a coherent entity.
However,  nonlocal  degrees  of  freedom  can  be  important  even  in 
classical physics, for instance, oscillations in a guitar string are 
local  in  Fourier  space,  not  in  real  space,  so  in  this  case  the 
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‘‘binding problem’’ can be solved by a simple change of variables. As 
Eddington remarked [...], when observing the ocean we perceive the 
moving waves as objects in their own right because they display a 
certain permanence, even though the water itself is only bobbing up 
and down.
Similarly,  thoughts  are  presumably  highly  nonlocal  excitation 
patterns in the neural network of our brain, except of a nonlinear and 
much more complex nature. In short, this author feels that there is no 
binding problem. Tegmark (2000) 
I agree with Tegmark for a simple reason. In the present conception of reality, time and space 
are  not  stages  on  which  matter  operates;  everything  is  a  unified  whole  and  stratifications  are 
imposed by us (see Smith's way of doing ontology above). The neutral monist substance, through its 
dispositional and qualitative structure, constitutes such things as time, matter and consciousness. 
The binding problem only arises from an ontology where one has forgotten to pay the price: a naive 
mechanistic  ontology  which  imbues  anthropocentric  concepts  of  mechanism  with  ontological 
significance.
 3.2.7 Truly at Home
A monk asked master Joshu: "Does a dog have Buddha-nature or not?" 
Joshu said: "Mu"202
Sitting quietly doing nothing
Spring comes, and the grass
grows by itself.
The wild geese do not intend
to reflect their images
The water has no mind to receive them.
An old tree preaches wisdom.
A wild bird is crying the truth.
202The Chinese character for “mu” means “absence”, “nothing”, “non-being” etc. But the Buddha said that all creatures 
have Buddha nature. Joshu does not want to engage the monk on a literal level. He wants to urge the monk to “unask 
the question” and thus transcend to a new level of understanding. (Yamada 2004, p. 29f)
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So,  in  a  nutshell  we  can  summarize  the  results  of  this  section  like  this:  Mind is  not  an 
ephiphenomenon,  because it  is the  very causal  dispositional  structure  of  the  universe.  It  is  the 
ultimate nature of existence,  not as a categorical  base,  but as a  categorical-powerful  identity – 
Schopenhauer's Will. But mind is something quite different than we humans think it is, because 
states of being (=mind) are more various than human minds can conceive.
There is  reality without  observation,  because observation  and reflection  are  already  special 
states of mind; not all mind must reflect on itself. To let all existence depend on these very human 
states, as idealism does, strikes me as the peak of human hubris and arrogance. The sun and the 
moon are not created by the creatures observing them. The observing creatures are instantiations of 
the same "material" as sun and moon, but in a more complex way due to aggregation of causes and 
natural  evolution.  So,  despite the prominent role  of mind, associating the present  position with 
idealism would locate it in the wrong camp completely.
As a materialist who acknowledges the qualitative aspect of matter, you are at home in the 
universe. You can even imagine that qualia like love etc feel roughly the same for different persons, 
as we share large parts of our cognitive architecture and, in the present view, due to the identity of 
qualitative and powerful properties, matter states that are similar will correspond to roughly the 
same qualia states. This integrated view opens up the possibility for closing the separateness felt by 
some as persisting between human beings in a wholly naturalistic way.
Coming from a Western context, the present metaphysics has left us in a strange world: the 
elimination  of  essences,  the  relational  character  of  knowledge about  the  world  and the  monist 
metaphysical conception of the universe as mind and matter being just two ways of speaking about 
the same underlying dispositional/qualitative entity. To Buddhist ears, this all should not sound so 
strange. Two doctrines deserve mention. The first one is sunyata: voidness, emptiness. This is to be 
understood as the impermanence of all being, that nothing has a enduring identity. The second one 
is  pratityasamutpada:  dependent  arising;  causal  powers  are  the  driving  forces  of  everything. 
Pratityasamutpada is the insight that current thoughts and actions depend on past ones and current 
ones will originate future ones; the mental underlies the laws of causation as much as does the 
physical; as it evidently is, in a monist universe.
Mind is everywhere. The basic monism is what allows knowledge and intentionality, reflection, 
compression,  representation,  “imported”  via  dispositional  effects  well  known  from  physical 
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relations.  Knowledge  is  possible  because  there  is  no  epistemic  gap  to  bridge.  Everything  has 
Buddha-nature.
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 4.1 The Will
 4.1.1 The Problem: Free Will
For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in 
our  soul  to  the  things  which  are  by  nature  most  evident  of  all. 
(Aristotle MET)
Macht ohne Siege. - Die stärkste Erkenntnis (die von der völligen 
Unfreiheit des menschlichen Willens) ist doch die ärmste an Erfolgen: 
denn sie hat immer den stärksten Gegner, die menschliche Eitelkeit. 
(Nietzsche 1879)
The issue of free will must be addressed in this work because misconceptions about the subject 
are a major hindrance against the adoption of a naturalistic world view. Physicists for instance have 
developed the “Free Will Theorem”:
It asserts, roughly, that if indeed we humans have free will, then 
elementary  particles  already  have  their  own  small  share  of  this 
valuable commodity. More precisely, if the experimenter can freely 
choose the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain 
measurement,  then  the  particle’s  response  (to  be  pedantic  –  the 
universe’s response near the particle) is not determined by the entire 
previous history of the universe. (Conway & Kochen 2008)
While the mathematical results of the paper are – to my knowledge – beyond reproach, the 
suggestive naming of "free will theorem" does not of course force itself at all. What is shown is that 
certain relations must hold between experimenters decisions and particle trajectories; one might as 
well call it the "No Free Will Theorem" if one chooses a different metaphysical lining. The problem 
is that such papers are not understood in public discussion – what often remains is the suggestion 
that physicists have "proved free will", which is of course nonsense.
I claim that free will does not exist. The claim of this statement is not as bold as it may seem at 
first glance. The proponent of the statement must elaborate at least on three things:
• Why we don't have free will.
• If we don't have free will, why do we have the persistent illusion of it?
• What is a sensible alternative conception to that of free will?
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The following section will try to address these points in turn. At first we need to clarify what we 
mean with free will, as for different people this concept means very different things. It is quickly 
evident that the very concept is incoherent. Especially in the question of free will terminological 
clarity is of the essence – and it can't be cleared up often enough. How does the intuition behind 
most people's conception of free will work?203
Now why go to such lengths to bring the discourse on free will in line with day-to-day speech, 
when philosophers have technical jargon at their disposal? I do not believe that the split into an 
"elite educated philosopher clique" discoursing in an ivory tower and an “uninformed” public is 
desirable; especially not concerning an important topic for our everyday lives such as free will. 
Here,  if  not  elsewhere,  it  is  the  responsibility  of  the  philosopher  to  talk  clearly  and  to  avoid 
obfuscation at all costs.
In  science,  it  is  inevitable  to  develop  jargon;  in  highly  specialized  domains  with  intricate 
modeling  and a  myriad  of  new entities  and  associated  mechanisms  –  think  of  the  proteins  in 
molecular biochemistry and their functions – the need for a new vocabulary arises to communicate 
quickly (see above). But in philosophy, when analyzing commonsense concepts such as free will, 
we should be careful with jargon; and if we develop sophisticated new concepts, we should give 
them new names. Many people turn to philosophy for guidance of what to believe and how to orient 
themselves and not, say, to molecular biology, so philosophers should speak and write in a way that 
is also accessible to the layman; at least on topics of interest to the layman.
Free  will  is  so strongly associated  with  supernatural  conceptions  of  the  self  in  the  general 
populace,  that  philosophers  obviously  can  only  add  to  the  confusion  by constructing  different 
models – naturalistic ones – and still calling the result "free will". I take it that for most people, free 
simply means that humans are in some way exempt from the laws of nature. The idea is that there is 
more to  our  consciousness  than  mere  chemical  processes  in  action.  One  can  be  free  to do 
something, and free of something. Freedom of something is usually taken to mean free of the laws 
of nature. So, here is the working definition of free will for the rest of the thesis:
203 I mean people who do not pursue thinking about free will professionally like neuroscientists, cognitive scientists, 
AI researchers, philosophers etc. Now of course many lay people will not even have an account like the one 
developed below and "free will" is simply the belief that a human being has it without even knowing what it is; it is 
a script, a cached thought, instantiated in certain cases to justify certain forms of behavior and reactions to oneself 
and to others. 
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Definition: Free will is the supposed ability of agents, notably humans, to decide 
in some way independent of the laws of nature; that is, their behavior is not fully 
determined by the laws of nature204.
Now,  by  laws  of  nature,  we  might  mean  either  strictly  deterministic  –  causal  –  laws,  or 
stochastic laws. Strict determinism means that there is a one-to-one mappings of states onto other 
states; whereas stochastic determinism is lawful behavior of the kind where one state at time t can 
map  into  different  states  at  time  t+1  with  a  probability  weighting  assigned  to  the  possible 
transitions.  In  this  section,  the  word  “determined”  will  always  include  the  case  of  stochastic 
lawfulness.
What I don't want to address under the rubric of free will here is the ability of some brain states 
to  override  other  brain  states;  first  of  all,  separating  determined  brain  processes  instantiating 
"willing" from those instantiating mere "action incentives" can hardly be called  free in the usual 
sense of the word. This intuition underlies conceptions of free will coming from the rationalist 
camp: free will  is  identified with the reflexive component  which is  supposed to override more 
“primitive” desires and drives.
But  this  conception  is  better  captured  by  akrasia: weakness  of  the  will.  Why  is  there 
procrastination? Why are people drug addicts, or unable to stop smoking though they want to? Why 
can't overweight people stop eating and do more exercise to lose weight, even though they would so 
much like to look that sexy commercial man? Seeing that we can have a weak will comes much 
closer to an explanation of what is at stake. But weakness and strength of will still have nothing to 
do with freedom of the will. If one has a weak will or a strong will, that is perfectly compatible with 
a strictly causal universe.  What is happening in the brain is that there is a neural battle between 
different neural regions. Every conception of free will has serious problems accommodating the 
influence of the unconscious; as the concept of willing strongly presupposes some Cartesian rational 
entity not influenced by "lesser" animal traits; such as emotional currents coming from the limbic 
system.
I suspect the rationalist intuition which insists on calling this “battle” free will still draws from 
remnants of Cartesian Dualism205:  some "real self" suppressing the subordinate animal, material 
204 Compatibilism is rejected because it uses words wrongly, violating our Confucian Principle mentioned above.
205 Which is very hard to purge from the system because of the failure of global updating. In the inferential system of a 
person, even if he/she says "I do not believe that the mind is independent of the physical, no, it supervenes ...." etc, 
they will often reason in other contexts as if the mind did indeed have a life of its own. This is because mind-body 
dualism is deeply ingrained in our intuitions and has been fostered, at least in Western culture, since our childhoods. 
Additionally we don't have access to our neural level, which also lets thoughts seem to pop up magically; out of 
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self. This kind of reasoning is better captured by the concept of optimal will, which I will propose to 
replace free will.
Freedom always suggest possibilities. That is the other sense of freedom mentioned above, the 
freedom to do something. And free will means – if the concept is worth anything – that an agent 
could have willed differently in a physically identical situation. That is of course possible if there is 
randomness at the bottom of the universe; but again, this is not what people usually mean when they 
speak of free will. Wouldn't our choices being random be even worse than if they were determined? 
What is important for people arguing this way is a moral issue: that, for example, a criminal could 
have decided differently in the past, that he was free to have taken a moral action instead of an 
immoral one. But the subject of morality, while interwoven with free will,  is a  different subject 
matter and will be addressed below.
There is another interesting scenario which highlights the problematic nature of the concept of 
free will. If you have free will, it should mean that you are free to change your will. For instance, if 
I have free will, I should be able to decide from one day to another to change my sexual orientation, 
to change my moral values, to stop being afraid of spiders etc. But clearly, I am not free to do any of 
these things. A quote attributed to Clarence Darrow comes to mind: 
I don't like spinach, and I'm glad I don't, because if I liked it 
I'd eat it, and I just hate it.
Could we want what we not want? Or not want what we want?206 Either you want (will) or not, 
or  you  are  uncertain,  and  the  uncertainty can  be  resolved  by deliberation,  that  is,  calling  into 
consciousness previous experiences or reasons grounded on such experiences; or by seeking new 
experiences. New experiences or new information can influence our will. And even silent reflection 
in the cold chamber of a high and forbidding tower is nothing but the continuation of the causal 
chains set in motion at the beginning of time. But it seems that this kind of free will – that is, the 
nowhere, actually. Not even reading a neuroscience paper will suddenly change all those neural connections built up 
since childhood which embody the concept of mind-body dualism. Getting rid of this intuition often takes years of 
work, applying the insight in ever new contexts (this corresponds to low-level neural reweighting in different 
associative contexts). See Papineau (Forthcoming)who argues that nearly everyone is in the intuitive grip of 
dualism. One possible reason for the iron grip of dualism are phenomenal concepts: phenomenal concepts possess a 
'faint copy' of the actual phenomenal experience, say, of the color red. Thinking of them recreates part of the 
experience when having perceived them. Third person concepts do not possess such a faint copy and thus feel 
utterly different (Papineau 2003b).
206 Proponents of free will usually do not mean that we are really free to change what we will, but that we are free to 
choose what we do. The minimal concession of a stout free-willer would be to speak of “free action” instead of “free 
will”.
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ability to really change yourself fundamentally without cause – is not what people want of free will; 
it is something else. I know not what.
Now on to the problematic – I say, incoherent – nature of free will is supernaturally conceived. 
There are, metaphysically, four interesting variants of how the world is organized in relationship to 
the free will issue:
1) completely deterministic, no extraphysical forces
2) completely indeterministic, no extraphysical forces
3) partly deterministic, partly random, no extraphysical forces
4) the indeterministic component in 2 or 3 is influenced by an extraphysical mind; maybe 
the quantum dice are loaded because of a realm of the mental (where a homunculus 
controlling the mechanical parts of the human body lives)
With positions one to three, I argue, it is  irresponsible to talk of free will. Which leaves case 
four,  which will  now be analyzed in more detail207.  The explication below is to be seen as the 
argument someone who believes  in  free  will  should give,  at  least  in  its  general  outline;  I  use 
quantum mechanics for the introduction of indeterminism, but nothing hinges on that. I will call 
what is argued for, for extra clarity,  supernatural free will and abbreviate it SFW in the text. The 
reasoning goes as follows, and, in accordance with the very human approach to reasoning taken in 
this thesis, psychological steps are included:
The intuition of supernatural free will in four steps
1) Many laws of nature are determined strictly. That means that a physical state s0 passes into 
state s1 by a transition function t_det which is completely lawful; it is especially not influenced by 
minds,  souls  etc.  This  is  the Newtonian picture  usually presented as a  straw man to begin the 
discussion and denounce the “outdated” views of scientists denying free will.
2)  Quantum  mechanics  entails  basic  physical  indeterminism208.  We  now  have  a  stochastic 
transition  function  t_stoch,  that  is,  it  the  state  s0  passes  into  states  s1_0,  s1_1,...s1_n ...  with 
weighted probabilities. We do not have strict determinism as in (1) anymore.
3) Mind is something over and above mere physical law, not mere matter in motion.
207 Conceptions such as Leibniz's preestablished harmony will be ignored completely.
208 We saw above that this is only true in some interpretations. But again, nothing hinges on this.
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4) So, the transition function t_ stoch does not define the successor state s1_x strictly – there are 
a number of – possibly infinitely many – successor states s1_n. Somewhere in the brain, at micro-
levels maybe not even detectable, the mind or the soul which is independent of the laws of physics 
influences the quantum indeterminacies, so that at the macroscopic level a decision emerges which 
is not the product of the laws of physics alone (be it t_det or t_stoch), but which has been nudged by 
the little homunculus (mind, soul) into some desired outcome state.
To be especially clear: the mind/homunculus is bullying the quantum wave function around (or 
whatever other poor stochastic law is at hand). That is, the quantum wave function would evolve 
differently were not a mind present directing it in some sense209.
The above is what I call SFW, and my denial of free will is dependent on my contention that 
only a model in the sense above,  where natural  law is actively influenced by an entity outside 
natural  law,  is  what  should be  called  free  will.  Now,  there  are  philosophical  positions  like 
compatibilism that build different models, with no separate homunculus transcending physical law. 
But for these other models, one should simply use different names to reduce confusion. An excellent 
paper on "free will" by Levy (2003), impeccable in both its premises and its conclusions, details 
“free will”  in a  completely naturalistic  sense.  The paper does have one flaw: at  the end,  Levy 
chooses to call his model "free will". 
The above conception – SFW – is not a straw man. Flanagan tells the following story210:
In the spring of 2000, I taught a mixed undergraduate and graduate 
level course on the philosophy of mind as a visiting professor at 
Boston University. Among other books, the students read Damasios's The 
Feeling of What Happens […] and Daniel Dennett's 1984 classic, Elbow 
Room: The Varieties of Free Will worth Wanting. They enjoyed both 
brooks greatly, but Dennett's made them nervous in a way Damasio's 
didn't. Why? Because, although both argue for a fully naturalistic 
conception of mind, Dennett  explicitly asserts that Cartesian free 
will is a variety of free will that (a) is not worth wanting and (b) 
you  can't  have  even  if  you  do  want  it  because  it  is  based  on 
209 For proponents of the Many Worlds interpretation of Quantum Mechanics free will is not an option at all: they 
contend that all states s1_n are realized; thus there can be no preferred state that a homunculus nudges the brain into. 
The model given above only works for interpretations which single out actual from non-actual histories.
210 To understand it, I have to say two things. The “Cartesian Version” of free will mentioned in the quote is a kind of 
SFW – an unphysical mind causing physical stuff to do things. Secondly, the distinction between the manifest image 
and the scientific image was introduced by Sellars (1962), where the manifest image is roughly the one underlying 
our everyday conception of the world, consisting of an humanistic image and an image of the world. The manifest 
image is often at odds with the scientific image.
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philosophically and scientifically incredible ideas, and is therefore 
incoherent,  impossible.  Over  several  weeks  of  seminar  I  heard  the 
refrain - “But, but, Dennett's conception of free will is not really 
free will!” 
It is the specifically Cartesian conception of free will that is 
part  of  the  manifest  image  and  thus  the  only  contender  for  an 
acceptable view of free will. It is  the variety of free will most 
everyone wants and thinks they need. (Flanagan 2002, p. 85f)
The passage of Flanagan goes on to support what was said in section  2.5.2 on the “Power of 
Words”:
When Damasio says free will is real, he definitely does  not mean 
Cartesian free will. But because the Cartesian conception of free will 
is the default view within the manifest image, he is not read as 
challenging that  view. The  words “free  will is  real” are  read as 
comforting, as meaning that Cartesian free will is real, even though 
when when coming from Damasio's pen, they definitely do not mean that.
(Flanagan 2002, p. 86)
Well then, here, I have defined SFW, said explicitly that it is incoherent, and will develop a 
different account below.
 4.1.2 The Strangeness of Supernatural Free Will
What is willing! We laugh at him who steps out of his room at the 
moment when the sun steps out of its room, and then says: “I will that 
the sun shall rise”; and at him who cannot stop a wheel, and says: “I 
will that it shall roll”; and at him who is thrown down in wrestling, 
and says: “here I lie, but I will lie here!” But, all laughter aside, 
are we ourselves ever acting any differently whenever we employ the 
expression “I will”? (Nietzsche Daybreak)(124)
SFW is strange. While strict determinism rules out free will as defined above, there is room in 
the stochastic deterministic case, but also only in a magical kind of way. We would need to assume 
that there is something to a person – a decider – over and above the physical instantiations, that can 
influence transition probabilities211. In SWN, there must always be some kind of  homunculus or 
211 A weaker claim may also be possible, namely that there is a kind of feedback of the physical system onto the 
transition probabilities – but that is again a very physical view of things, because if this kind of feedback exists it 
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mental  substance bullying  physical  law. The  mental  substance  needs  ways  to  interact  with  the 
physical brain212.
Let us look at what analytic philosophy has to say to  interactionism, the idea that there is a 
realm of the mental interacting with the realm of the physical.  The premises needed to kill  off 
interactionism are these:
RAP: The Real Argument for Physicalism
1. There are causal relations between the mental and the physical.
2. Causation involves the transference of energy.
3. Anything with energy is physical.
--------------------------------------------------
Thus: The mental is physical. Montero (2006)
Montero, it should be noted, does not endorse this kind of argumentation; she just shows what 
premises  are  needed  to  exclude  dualism.  As  always,  we  are  now  confronted  with  empirical 
questions. And empirical answers were found. Modern physics currently posits four fundamental 
forces: electromagnetism, gravity, the strong and the weak nuclear forces. All except gravity have 
been unified. Philosophers or scientists wanting to find a role for mental causation in this scientific 
backdrop will  be hard-pressed.  Physicalism is  not a philosophical  fad.  It  rose due to empirical 
investigations into physiology:
In the first half of the twentieth century the situation changed, 
and by the 1950s it had become difficult, even for those who were not 
moved by the abstract argument from general reducibility, to continue 
to uphold special vital or mental forces. A great deal became known 
about biochemical and neurophysiological processes, especially at the 
level of the cell, and none of it gave any evidence for the existence 
of special forces not found elsewhere in nature.
must again either be strictly causal or stochastic. McFadden (2002) for instance looks for free will in the EM field 
generated by the brain. But it wouldn't be, as Flanagan's students would say, real free will.
212 Descartes was consequent, believing the body to be purely mechanical, which we can equate with physical here, 
and the soul being immaterial and controlling the mechanical body. This soul-homunculus would then be the seat of 
free will and Descartes assumed that control – interaction – happened in the pineal gland.
171
Living in a Natural World
During the first half of the century the catalytic role and protein 
constitution of enzymes were recognized, basic biochemical cycles were 
identified, and the structure of proteins analyzed, culminating in the 
discovery  of  DNA.  In  the  same  period,  neurophysiological  research 
mapped  the  body's  neuronal  network  and  analysed  the  electrical 
mechanisms  responsible  for  neuronal  activity.  Together,  these 
developments  made  it  difficult  to  go  on  maintaining  that  special 
forces operate inside living bodies. If there were such forces, they 
could be expected to display some manifestation of their presence. But 
detailed  physiological  investigation  failed  to  uncover  evidence  of 
anything except familiar physical forces.
In this way, the argument from physiology can be viewed as clinching 
the case for completeness of physics, against the background provided 
by  the  argument  from  fundamental  forces.  One  virtue  of  this 
explanation in terms of two interrelated arguments is that it yields a 
natural  explanation  for  the  slow  advance  of  the  completeness  of 
physics through the century from the 1850s to the 1950s.  (Papineau 
2001) 
A detailed historical overview of the empirical rise of physicalism is given in Papineau (2002, p. 
232f).
Interactionism,  given  today's  evidence,  is  highly  implausible  and  in  serious  need  of 
experimental vindication if further attention should be given to it; all arguments for dualism are ad 
hoc to divert  the “most  terrible” of all  scientific-philosophical  results:  that  human beings are  a 
natural part of this universe. 
But let us consider interactionism for a moment; just for fun. The Cartesian conception of free 
will has a very strange metaphysics; the central question is: if there is a mental substance, how does 
it  know where and when to interact with physical matter, when to divert particles in their course? 
How  does  the  mental  substance  know  that  it  has  a  brain  to  deal  with  and  not  a  haphazard 
arrangement  of carbon and water molecules? If  the mental  substance would not  only influence 
brains but everything, it would hardly be able to qualify as mental but would be a normal physical 
law – similar to the present monist account. How does the mental substance know if a protein is still 
in food, say a hamburger, or in the mouth, in the stomach, in the bloodstream, or finally, when 
amino acids are transformed into neurotransmitters, integrated into the brain. Where should mental 
causation begin? At what stage should free will enter? How does "the soul", "the homunculus" 
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know when to  influence the matter  previously  out  of  its  lawful  reach? Or does the hamburger 
already have free will, as Conway & Kochen (2008), at least consistently, would probably suggest?
Proponents of free will should be able to give clear criteria not only how the homunculus can 
interact, but when it chooses (?)213 to do so; because clearly, purely physical effects can severely 
influence the ability to exercise "free will": alcohol, anesthetics, even something as banal as a good 
hit on the head. So it seems that Cartesian free will only works in special circumstances. And what 
about this mental substance which interacts with physical matter anyway: does it follow spirit-laws? 
– it must, if it only interacts with brains and not with “inanimate” matter.
Not only is Cartesian dualism/interactionism214 on a bad footing empirically, it also does not 
solve any problems; it only adds new ones. Detailed analysis of the free will issue in line with the 
my work is  given  in  Dennett  (1984);  Pereboom (2001a).  Nietzsche saw this  all  clearly over  a 
hundred years ago (Leiter 2007). But now to the issue of why the idea of free will is so enduring.
 4.1.3 The Enduring Fallacy
There are a number of reasons why people want to believe in free will and why they think they 
need it. We will now have a look at some of the reasons in turn.
 4.1.3.1 Theology
I am an Agnostic because I am not afraid to think. I am not afraid 
of any god in the universe who would send me or any other man or woman 
to hell. If there were such a being, he would not be a god; he would 
be a devil. Clarence Darrow215 
Theology has a vested interest in upholding the doctrine of free will. If you have the concept of 
an all-powerful and all-good God, you have to introduce free will to account for quite a number of 
things. For instance, in texts of Christian apologists, we read this (these books are published by 
Oxford University Press, in the case below as of 2005!):
… God wrongs no one if he allows them to ‘lose their soul’ in the 
course of an earthly life as a result of a long series of free choices 
213 Does the Cartesian homunculus have free will? Are there homunculi all the way up? Or down?
214 Occasionalism, epiphenomenalism and parallelism are even worse doctrines metaphysically. The rationalist may 
refute these positions as an exercise.
215 http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Clarence_Darrow; Quoted in an eulogy for Darrow by Emanuel Haldeman-Julius 
(1938). Retrieved 22.08.2009
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to do what they know to be bad, [Footnote 9] until they cease to be a 
moral agent. [Footnote 10] (Swinburne 2005, p. 215)
Where the first part of footnote 9 is this:
There are different kinds of free will according to how easy it is 
for someone to choose the good. There are advantages in God making it 
easy for us to choose the good, since making such a choice is a good 
thing.  There  are  also  advantages  in  God  making  it  somewhat  more 
difficult  for  us  to  choose  the  good,  since  we  then  have  the 
opportunity to make a more heroic and so a more committed choice of 
the good. So long as God makes it possible for us to choose the good, 
God does not wrong us. (Swinburne 2005)
And:
A central core of a plausible theodicy has always been the free-will 
defence—much human suffering is due to humans freely choosing to hurt 
each other (or through negligence freely choosing to allow each other 
to be hurt), and much suffering provides the opportunity for humans 
freely to choose to help each other; and it is very good that humans 
should have those significant choices.(Swinburne 2005, p. 260)
Now, it  is  clear that,  to save the concept of an all-powerful and benevolent God, you need 
human agents endowed with free will to account for some of the evil happenings in the world; God 
can remain benevolent, even though he does not stop crimes, because he weighs in the greater good 
of giving his subjects the ability to decide. It is an excuse for God (Leibniz's theodicy) not having to 
stop evil in the world. The theodicy solution fails for two reasons: firstly, natural catastrophes are 
not accounted for; when sentients die wholesale; this clearly a good God could prevent without 
interfering with the free will of the little creatures.
But the whole concept of free will to  choose the good and then  go to heaven, the sentiment 
expressed in the text of Swinburne above, is unnatural if you keep God all-powerful, and, hopefully, 
all-knowing/wise. Let us have a look at Earth from outer space. Seen from a superintelligence view 
– imagine advanced aliens observing the earth – the behavior of humans and the results of their 
behavior, that is, their cities, cultures and civilizations, would probably amount – remember, this is 
from a superintelligence perspective – to little more than something similar to an anthill, albeit of 
planetary dimensions. 
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Now, humans would never judge ants on their  morality; God as conceived by religion would 
certainly be the most advanced being in our universe, and so every believer would probably have to 
agree that the gap between humans and ants is smaller than the gap between humans and God. But 
how could such an advanced God be vindictive of humans not following his divine law? It would be 
comparable  to  a  human  torturing  or  killing  ants  because  they  failed  to  perform  well  on  an 
optimization problem (carry food to nest, cooperate etc) which the human has set up for, say, his 
amusement. Such behavior would be euphemistically be described as childish, more correctly as 
sadistic. So, why should God judge people exercising their free will who are so much more limited 
than him?
Secondly, the assumption of benevolence is violated all the same: if God were benevolent, why 
would he put souls in a situation where they can decide against his omnipotent will in the first  
place? Imagine you are a God, and you have some souls left over for deployment. So you create a 
world, and you know – you are omniscient after all – that some of them216 will decide against you, 
and that you have to send them to eternal damnation for that. After all, you want to stay true to your 
promises as a God.
But now we see why we have already violated the assumption of benevolence! Surely, if there is 
a heaven, living there is ultimately superior than living out a life on Earth will all its uncertainties 
and being able to, maybe even unwittingly, decide against heaven. Why not transfer all souls to 
heaven ab origine? The theodicy solution only works if  you assume that God has no power to  
change the soul-roulette (so now, omnipotence is at stake). Let's just leave it there, because going 
round in circles is boring, except when dancing.
Albeit a seriously broken argument, the gist of the theodicy is still a major motivation for many 
religious people to continue to believe in free so that they are able to uphold their other beliefs 
(heaven, God rewarding them for good behavior etc).
 4.1.3.2 Free Will as a Value
Free will is not what makes us valuable as human beings; it is not what adds meaning to life – 
what is often presented as evident is simply cultural backdrop. Life is meaningful qua being lived. 
Our value stems from being in the universe, not more, not less. Our value is built-in into use via our 
qualitative experiences (more on that in section 5.5).
216 You don't know which ones, because you give them free will: that is, you randomize some of their behavior in 
respect to your otherwise omniscient knowledge.
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We can learn to value an un-free rational mind-set:
One should note that our sense of self-worth, our sense that we are 
valuable and that our lives are worth living, is to a significant 
extent due to factors that are not produced by our volitions at all, 
let alone by free will. People place great value, both in others and 
in themselves, on beauty, intelligence, and native athletic ability, 
none of which are produced voluntarily. (Pereboom 2001b) 
 4.1.3.3 Morality and Responsibility
Irrtum vom freien Willen. - Wir haben heute kein Mitleid mehr mit 
dem Begriff »freier Wille«: wir wissen nur zu gut, was er ist - das 
anrüchigste  Theologen-Kunststück,  das  es  gibt,  zum  Zweck,  die 
Menschheit in ihrem Sinne »verantwortlich« zu machen, das heißt sie 
von sich abhängig zu machen... Ich gebe hier nur die Psychologie alles 
Verantwortlichmachens.  -  Überall,  wo  Verantwortlichkeiten  gesucht 
werden, pflegt es der Instinkt des Strafen- und Richten-Wollens zu 
sein, der da sucht. Man hat das Werden seiner Unschuld entkleidet, 
wenn irgendein So-und-so-Sein auf Wille, auf Absichten, auf Akte der 
Verantwortlichkeit  zurückgeführt  wird:  die  Lehre  vom  Willen  ist 
wesentlich  erfunden  zum  Zweck  der  Strafe,  das  heißt  des 
Schuldigfinden-wollens.  Die  ganze  alte  Psychologie,  die  Willens-
Psychologie  hat  ihre  Voraussetzung  darin,  daß  deren  Urheber,  die 
Priester  an  der  Spitze  alter  Gemeinwesen,  sich  ein  Recht  schaffen 
wollten, Strafen zu verhängen - oder Gott dazu ein Recht schaffen 
wollten...  Die  Menschen  wurden  »frei«  gedacht,  um  gerichtet,  um 
gestraft werden zu können - um schuldig werden zu können: folglich 
mußte  jede  Handlung  als  gewollt,  der  Ursprung  jeder  Handlung  im 
Bewußtsein  liegend  gedacht  werden  (-  womit  die  grundsätzlichste 
Falschmünzerei  in  psychologicis  zum  Prinzip  der  Psychologie  selbst 
gemacht war...). Heute, wo wir in die umgekehrte Bewegung eingetreten 
sind, wo wir Immoralisten zumal mit aller Kraft den Schuldbegriff und 
den Strafbegriff aus der Welt wieder herauszunehmen und Psychologie, 
Geschichte, Natur, die gesellschaftlichen Institutionen und Sanktionen 
von ihnen zu reinigen suchen, gibt es in unsern Augen keine radikalere 
Gegnerschaft als die der Theologen, welche fortfahren, mit dem Begriff 
der »sittlichen Weltordnung« die Unschuld des Werdens durch »Strafe« 
und »Schuld« zu durchseuchen. Das Christentum ist eine Metaphysik des 
Henkers... (Nietzsche 1888) 
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….human  beings  are  a  species  splendid  in  their  array  of  moral 
equipment, tragic in their propensity to misuse it, and pathetic in 
their constitutional ignorance of the misuse. (Wright 1995, p. 13)
In the mind there is no absolute or free will, but the mind is 
determined  to  this  or  that  volition  by  a  cause  which  is  also 
determined by another cause, and this again by another, and so on ad 
infinitum. (Spinoza 1677)
This doctrine contributes to the welfare of our social existence, 
since it teaches us to hate no one, to despise no one, to mock no one, 
to be angry with no one, and to envy no one. (Spinoza 1677)
Free will crops up in two situations: negatively, when it is used to assign blame and guilt: “You 
bad boy, you could have done otherwise!” And positively, when applied to goal-seeking behavior, 
intentionality, looking for meaning in life etc. The positive aspect will be covered by my concept of 
optimal will in section 4.1.4; the former will be addressed in this section. By splitting up these two 
components, matter will clear up more quickly.
So,  to  the  negative  component:  there  seems  to  be  a  concern  to  locate  moral  responsibility 
outside  of  strict  causation  –  why?  I  think  that  there  are  evolutionary  reasons  for  this:  moral 
enforcement is coupled with punishment, vindictiveness, feelings of anger. Deriving human actions 
from causal  chains  removes  the  potential  for  being  angry  at  someone;  after  all,  if  one  could 
calculate the motions of atoms and explain why a person acted in such and such a way, there would 
be little point of being angry at  her.  An explanation which leads to understanding removes the 
possibility of rationally holding negative feelings. And exactly this, I contend, is the biggest asset of 
dropping any appeals to actions having been freely willed. Taking away the “right” to be angry at 
someone will lead to a more compassionate world. The question “why did you do this” will be 
meant in earnest; causal explanations will be sought, and then optimal remedies for the situation 
found. 
The negative component of free will is directed toward the  past (if one wants to express the 
uncertainty of future actions, again, other words and concepts are more fruitful). The concept of free 
will,  when evaluating  past  actions,  actually  entails  that  the  agent  in  question  could  have  done 
otherwise, not only in future similar situations, but in that exact past situation.
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This evokes guilt and blame. While in regard to oneself feelings of remorse and self-loathing 
may prevail, in regard to other people the result is vindictive behavior: one feels, for instance, the 
right  to punish someone else,  even if  that  would not change her future behavior.  Now, in pre-
rational times, such emotions may well have been adaptive to enforce morally acceptable actions in 
society. But the rationalist can do better – again, she need not be unemotional; the rationalist will 
invest joyous emotions in the optimal pathway she chooses; but she will avoid suboptimal negative 
emotions.
So, do we have to sacrifice moral accountability217 when giving up free will, when we reject 
guilt and blame218? Not at all: that would be like saying that gas molecules were only bound to the 
laws of gravity if they had a free will to do so219:
Instead of treating people as if they were deserving of blame, the 
hard  incompatibilist  can  draw  upon  moral  admonishment  and 
encouragement, which presuppose only that the offender has done wrong. 
These methods can effectively communicate a sense of what is right and 
result in beneficial reform. Similarly, rather than treating oneself 
as blameworthy, one could admonish oneself for one's wrongdoing and 
resolve to avoid similar behavior in the future. (Pereboom 2001b) 
Responsibility comes with being an agent,  not by having free will.  But the responsibility I 
advocate here is of a milder form than full metaphysical responsibility usually invoked to justify 
moral accountability. Let us have a look at responsibility and where it comes from. I would like to 
introduce Strawson's  basic argument for why we are not  ultimately responsible.  First,  Strawson 
introduces some terminology which I will adopt:
“R”...“truly and without qualification responsible” 
“D”  to  abbreviate  “truly  and  without  qualification  deserving  of 
praise or blame or punishment or reward”
“U”  to  abbreviate  “ultimate”  when  prefixed  to  a  noun  and 
“ultimately” when prefixed to an adjective (Strawson 2001)
217 Incidentally, we are not even free in our moral judgments, which highly depend on situatedness: washing your 
hands, for instance, makes your subsequent moral judgments less severe (Schnall, Benton & Harvey 2008).
218 As human beings, we will continue to feel guilt and blame; indeed, these are important first evaluations of 
situations, telling us that something is amiss. The rationalist just suggests to after he has been alerted, he will not 
wallow in these feelings, but acknowledge their evolutionary function and move on to remedy the situation at hand. 
219 A hard incompatibilist asserts that we don't have the kind of free will to account for moral responsibility. I agree 
with the position of hard incompatibilism.
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Strawson then distinguishes RD – normal responsibility – and URD – ultimate responsibility. 
Strawson denies both, and I think he is right. But here I will simply diverge in terminology and use 
responsibility in  a  pragmatic,  legal,  sense,  and  use  ultimate  responsibility for  metaphysical 
responsibility requiring free will. One form of the basic argument then goes like this (Strawson also 
presents variants addressing different problems):
1.1 When you act, you do what you do — in the situation in which you 
find yourself [Footnote 7] —because of the way you are.
1.2 If you do what you do because of the way you are, then in order 
to be URD for what you do you must be URD for the way you are. 
But 
1.3 You cannot be URD for the way you are.
So 
1.4 You cannot be URD for what you do.
Version 1 of the Basic Argument has three premises, 1.1, 1.2, and 
1.3. I take premise 1.1 to be obvious and will not defend it. I think 
that 1.2 and 1.3 are also obvious, but I will give them — or close 
cousins of them — some explicit defense in due course. (Strawson 2001)
I also view the premises as obvious and will therefore not dwell on them. For a defence, see the 
cited article above. But the intuition that we can't be ultimately responsible for the way we are is 
quickly grasped: did you ask that you were born? Who your parents were? How they educated you? 
Whom you met? Your teachers, yours mates, your friends?
It is not implausible that good moral character is to a large extent 
the function of upbringing, and furthermore, the belief that this is 
so is common in our society. Parents typically regard themselves as 
failures if their children turn out to be immoral, and many take great 
care  to  raise  their  children  to  prevent  this  result.  Accordingly, 
people often come to believe that they have a good moral character 
largely because they were brought up with parental love and skill. But 
I suspect that hardly anyone who comes to this realization experiences 
dismay because of it. (Pereboom 2001b) 
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This  is  all  backed  by  empirical  evidence:  it  is  well  known  in  psychology  that  there  are 
intergenerational effects. For instance, if we have a look at our simian friends, we find that abusive 
parenting is transmissible:
Maternal  abuse  of  offspring  in  macaque  monkeys  shares  some 
similarities  with  child  maltreatment  in  humans,  including  its 
transmission across generations. This study used a longitudinal design 
and  a  cross-fostering  experiment  to  investigate  whether  abusive 
parenting in rhesus macaques is transmitted from mothers to daughters 
and  whether  transmission  occurs  through  genetic  or  experiential 
factors. Nine of 16 females who were abused by their mothers in their 
first month of life, regardless of whether they were reared by their 
biological mothers or by foster mothers, exhibited abusive parenting 
with their firstborn offspring, whereas none of the females reared by 
nonabusive  mothers  did.  These  results  suggest  that  the 
intergenerational transmission of infant abuse in rhesus monkeys is 
the result of early experience and not genetic inheritance. The extent 
to  which  the  effects  of  early  experience  on  the  intergenerational 
transmission of abusive parenting are mediated by social learning or 
experience-induced  physiological  alterations  remains  to  be 
established. (Maestripieri 2005)
The way you are now is dependent on people in the past you don't even know! How should we 
be responsible for things that happened before we were born?
Another problem is that empirical evidence shows that we are neither “good” nor “bad” people 
(we have differing dispositions of course), but that lack of or display of ethical behavior can depend 
on seemingly ethically irrelevant situational differences (Doris & Stich 2005).
But, however the world is, we still have to solve the same problems. And there will be agent-
actions that upset other agents, and for this we need morality, responsibility and the whole caboodle. 
But now on a naturalistic footing. A naturalist can anchor responsibility – only in a legal sense, to 
solve pragmatic problems, not to justify metaphysical vindictiveness – in (limited) agent autonomy, 
a characterization of which would go along the lines presented by Walter, who calls it  “natural 
autonomy”:
Freedom  of  will  is  an  illusion,  if  by  it  we  mean  that  under 
identical conditions we would be able to do or decide otherwise, while 
simultaneously acting only for reasons and considering ourselves the 
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true originators of our actions. We can do justice to many libertarian 
intuitions,  however,  with  a  neurophilosophical  concept  of  autonomy 
that includes mild forms of all three components(being able to do 
otherwise, acting intelligibly for reasons, and being originators of 
our actions). What remains is a kind of autonomy, that, loyal to the 
naturalistic approach, I call natural autonomy. 
Since natural autonomy is not the same as the free will in the 
strong  (libertarian)  sense,  part  of  that  interpretation  is lost. 
Natural autonomy can sustain neither our traditional concept of guilt, 
for example, nor certain attitudes and hopes about our lives. But we 
are also not mere marionettes nor puppets without thoughts and ideas 
that influence events in our lives. The lack of a strong form of free 
will does not imply that all moral order collapses or that we need 
abandon every concept of responsibility.
If deterministic chaos should in fact turn out to be a ubiquitous 
phenomenon within the nervous system, that would explain why we can 
make different choices in similar situations. It would explain why 
even in comparable situations we do not always take the same path, how 
we  keep  natural  alternatives  open,  and  why  our  thinking  is  so 
flexible. It would also explain why the subjective impression of being 
able  to  do  otherwise  seems  so  irrefutable.  Often  enough,  we  do 
experience  a  feeling  that  in  comparable  situations  we  would  act 
differently, although we cannot always explain it rationally. Not only 
can chaotic processes help explain quasi-indeterministic capacities to 
act otherwise and flexibility; under certain conditions, they also 
produce  stable  and  predictable  behavior.  Part  of  our  predictable 
behavior is presumably within the realm of intermittence — in a realm 
of order in the midst of chaos. (Walter 2001) 
Of course, if we recognize that there is no such thing as free will, we must teach different ethical 
conceptions; free will seems to be a requirement for ethics appealing to virtuous adherence to moral 
norms. The following experiment is a bit unfair:
In Experiment 1, participants read either text that encouraged a 
belief  in  determinism  (i.e.,  that  portrayed  behavior  as  the 
consequence of environmental and genetic factors) or neutral text. 
[sic] Exposure to the deterministic message increased cheating on a 
task in which participants could passively allow a flawed computer 
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program to reveal answers to mathematical problems that they had been 
instructed to solve themselves. Moreover, increased cheating behavior 
was  mediated  by  decreased  belief  in  free  will.  In  Experiment  2, 
participants who read deterministic statements cheated by overpaying 
themselves for performance on a cognitive task; participants who read 
statements endorsing free will did not. These findings suggest that 
the debate over free will has societal, as well as scientific and 
theoretical, implications. (Vohs & Schooler 2008) 
While the last sentence finds me in agreement, I think the experiments do not show us anything 
important about human morality in relation to "free will"; only about the reactions of humans with 
certain preconceptions about morality and "free will" and what happens if one selectively picks out 
and negates one of those preconceptions. The rule underlying the moral thinking of the probands in 
the experiment seems to be of this kind:
"You should act ethically because some authority commands it and you have been given free 
will to follow this command.”
At least in Western Culture, it is quite common to raise children by connecting morality and free 
will.  People  are  told  –  by their  parents  and  by reinforcement  through  society –  that  they are 
responsible for their actions because they have free will. Leaving this basic intuition intact and then 
telling participants of the experiment that they do not have free will,  will of course lead to the 
results described above. A serious experiment would need to examine the preconceptions of the 
participants and how these relate to the new information presented in the texts.
If you tell human beings about determinism, you should also speak about the signaling function 
of morality, the responsibility of agent action, the stark reality of qualia states, and the essential 
non-disconnection,  that  is,  the unified world of which humans are only a part.  Only the whole 
package can be sold without getting into trouble. Accepting that humans do not have free will calls 
for a large-scale adaptation of one's internal rule sets220.
A quick and dirty rule set which will suffice for most purposes after having been exposed to the 
fact that free will does not exist:
• I am currently considering an action X
• I am also considering the fact that I am actually not free. 
220 Why bother? Because it will lead to more compassion.
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• but then, certainly, I am in a highly reflexive state; and this means that I can bring to bear all 
the ethical rules I have at my disposal. 
• I  will  try  to  do the  most  ethical  thing  I  can  think  of,  and I  can  do this  because  I  am 
determined (double meaning!) to do this.
If you start thinking about determinism, you already are in an elevated, reflexive state of mind. 
No  excuses  remain  for  not  choosing  the  ethical  path.  And  hurting  other  people  (or  yourself: 
drinking, smoking etc) is never optimal; not with the naturalistic and science-friendly metaphysics 
proposed in this thesis. These rules have to be practiced, embodied; they have to be taken out of 
symbol space and neurally instantiated at all levels of brain organization221. Diligent practice is the 
way of the virtuous.
A more sophisticated rule  set,  which presupposes having read the thesis  to the end for full 
understanding, would go like this:
1. Ethical Premise 1: Agent autonomy is important
2. Ethical Premise 2: There are more and less desirable agent states 
3. Responsibility: I am an agent with natural autonomy and thus take responsibility for my 
actions. Taking responsibility for my action is nothing other than taking into account the 
real consequences of my actions and factoring these consequences into the state of the 
universe.
4. Causal Chain: In deliberating about what actions to take in situation X, I am aware that 
my concrete causal deliberation will lead to certain actions of my agent-self in situation 
X, and that indeed I can't delegate the computation of possible actions and actual action 
taken to others, unless I sacrifice responsibility, which I do not want to do because of 
ethical premise 1.
5. I should choose actions that do not impinge on agent autonomy and which increase more 
desirable agent states, in accordance with ethical premises 1 and 2.
Responsible agents see oneself as part of the universe who, through their actions and taking into 
account the real effects of their actions, can continue to behave ethically:
221 That is what Buddhists do in mettā meditation; where loving kindness is cultivated toward oneself, family, 
strangers, enemies and finally to all sentient beings.
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Despite initial appearances, the assumption that we lack the kind of 
free  will  required  for  moral  responsibility  does  not  threaten  the 
emotions and reactive attitudes that are crucial to our social life 
and moral development. Indeed […] the rejection of responsibility-
entailing free will holds out the promise of a life that is morally 
deeper (because less self-centred) and more fulfilling (because less 
prone to destructive anger).(Trakakis 2007)
Vohs  and  Schooler  (the  ones  who  conducted  the  cited  study  above)  should  have  let  their 
empirical results stand for themselves; unfortunately, they choose to foray into philosophy:
Although  the  concept  of  free  will  remains  scientifically  in 
question, our results point to a significant value in believing that 
free will exists. (Vohs & Schooler 2008) 
For a rebuttal, see above. They go on:
If exposure to deterministic messages increases the likelihood of 
unethical  actions,  then  identifying  approaches  for  insulating  the 
public against this danger becomes imperative. (Vohs & Schooler 2008)
Well, what if the fiction of free will is a positive one? Should we hide the truth from mortal 
man? No. This is never an option. A just society can't be built on a lie. The way forward is not to 
hide scientific evidence from the public, but rather to adjust the conceptions we have of ourselves 
and the world to the new evidence and live better lives with this new evidence. We can leave behind 
a childish ethics depending on a soul obeying the commands of God and going to Hell if it fails to 
do so. We can take responsibility for our actions by becoming part of the causal universe, and 
acknowledging that our causal thoughts shape the future of the real  world,  the only world that 
matters. This world is not a stage to prove one's worth for Heaven. 
With  knowledge  comes  responsibility;  the  more  knowledge  one  has,  the  greater  the 
responsibility; and for those of us who have accepted the un-freedom of the will, the responsibility 
is great; this knowledge requires a dedication to the well-being of all sentients to be used wisely; 
any lesser attitude must lead to catastrophe. That is why I urge that this question – of free will – can 
only be explored in the right metaphysical embedding. But when this is done, the beneficial aspects 
of facing nature as it is can't be denied:
...there may well be benefits flowing from a thoroughly naturalistic 
conception of the self and its choices. The retributive impulse, cut 
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off from its metaphysical justification in free will, might soften, 
leading to a less punitive culture. More attention might be paid to 
improving the social conditions shaping individuals, and no longer 
will  policy  makers  so  blithely  blame  the  victim  (remember  the 
multitudes in the U.S. who ‘chose’ to be homeless during the Reagan 
era?). On the personal level, dethroning the supervisory ‘I’ might 
help us become less self-conscious, more playful, and less likely to 
wallow in excessive self-blame, pride, envy, or resentment (see Breer 
(1989)).
Might we become less ambitious, once we see that we don’t ultimately 
choose  ourselves  or  our  projects,  and  that  our  successes  (and 
failures) result from thousands of combining circumstances? Perhaps, 
but  this  might  be  all  to  the  good,  given  that  the  unfettered 
accumulation  of  wealth  seems  likely  to  compromise  the  long-term 
sustainability of resources, or at least concentrate them in a very 
few hands. And after all, we need not worry that putting the self in 
its natural, causal context will extinguish desire, any more than we 
need  worry  that  it  will  undermine  our  rights  and  liberties.  Our 
selves, physically embodied, are virtually constituted by desire, and 
real freedom lies in having the opportunity to pursue our motives as 
we discover them arising in us. Seeing that the self neither has, nor 
needs, ultimate responsibility for itself may well lead to the more 
responsible use of such freedom. (Clark 1999) 
 4.1.3.4 The Legal System
When  another  person  makes  you  suffer,  it  is  because  he  suffers 
deeply within himself, and his suffering is spilling over. He does not 
need punishment; he needs help. Thich Nhat Hanh, Vietnamese Buddhist 
Monk222 
I would like to make a small detour into the legal system, because one objection against denying 
free will is that the legal system would break down, which is, of course, not true. We have laws to 
channel the behavior of human beings; moral accountability is the assertion that we want these laws 
to be followed. Morality has a signaling function. Social signals are sent to influence other agents, 
to direct them to moral behavior; indeed, social signaling, to work, presupposes a causal world.
222 Like all good quotes, it's all over the web without a serious source ascription.
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Let us look at criminal offense. In an ideal society, we could look closely at every single case, 
its causal history of origination; understand why the offender absolutely had to commit the crime in 
his place. From this would follow an analysis of how we could school, educate and train this person 
that he will not commit crimes in the future (special deterrence). Of course, in some persons we will 
find that no matter of training will change his disposition for criminal offense; these people will 
have to be detained so as to protect other agents; the justification for detention would follow the 
same reasoning applied in cases of quarantine:
A theory of crime prevention whose legitimacy is independent of hard 
incompatibilism draws an analogy between treatment of criminals and 
policy  toward  carriers  of  dangerous  diseases.  Ferdinand  Schoeman 
(1979) argues that if we have the right to quarantine people who are 
carriers of severe communicable diseases to protect society, then we 
also have the right to isolate the criminally dangerous to protect 
society.  Schoeman's  claim  is  true  independently  of  any  legitimate 
attribution of moral responsibility. (Pereboom 2001b)
Denying free will and advocating determinism does not imply excusing crimes or having to live 
with  criminals  simply because  they  can't  do  otherwise.  Now,  even  in  the  cases  where  perfect 
rehabilitation is possible, there will probably have to be some form of punishment, because this 
very punishment is deterministic input for other agents in their deterministic behavioral algorithms 
(general deterrence). If someone breaks the law, even if un-freely, a response must be made to keep 
the causal network of action and reaction in place.  Giving up accountability would  change the 
system humans are living in completely. 
Punishment need be enacted to make criminal behavior costly in regard to lawful behavior, thus 
enticing the agents to optimally choose lawful behavior: that is, defection under detection should 
always be more costly than cooperation223, to speak in game-theoretic terms. But there would be no 
more place for a concept such as "guilt", the secular refinement of "sin". The core concept would be 
causal  connection  and responsibility,  in  the  sense  that  the  autonomous  agent,  even  if  not 
metaphysically guilty or sinful, has certain problems in regard to peaceful coexistence with other 
members of the society which need be addressed. The details of a such a system would require a 
separate work in ethics, but there are no problems in principle.
223 We need to take one-time free riders into account, who condition their minds in such a way as to commit only one 
crime, but then are open for therapeutic intervention so as not to defect anymore.
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We have truly understood when we do not judge others on the criteria of their being good or 
evil, but when we categorize in cause and effect. Then we can rationally decide how to reach good 
outcomes by influencing other agents. The whole point of not fearing the scientific evidence against 
free will is that it actually will lead to increased humanization: removal of vindictiveness and more 
emphasis on healing and therapy.
A strange consequence of the current tension between a scientific causal worldview and the 
acceptance  of  "free  will"  is  the  following:  when  confronted  with  delinquents,  those  who  are 
obviously  different  in  their  evaluative  outlook  due  to  pathological  brain  structures  are  sent  to 
psychiatric institutions and receive treatment – rightly so, of course – but those who have "normal" 
brain structures, that is, where less intervention would lead probably lead to complete rehabilitation 
are sent to prison.
Vohs and Schooler end their paper thusly:
Or, perhaps, denying free will simply provides the ultimate excuse 
to behave as one likes. (Vohs & Schooler 2008)
In this thesis, a diametrically opposed sentiment is expressed:
Or, perhaps, denying the un-freedom of the will simply provides the ultimate excuse for locking 
people away instead of giving them benefit of therapy, the former being cheaper, less elaborate, and 
less challenging on our ethical and intellectual discriminatory faculty.
 4.1.3.5 Rationality
An idealist believes the short run doesn’t count. A cynic believes 
the long run doesn’t matter. A realist believes that what is done or 
left  undone  in  the  short  run  determines  the  long  run.  Sidney  J. 
Harris, Reader’s Digest, May 1979
Some say that  without  free  will  we can't  be rational,  or  even worse,  we must  succumb to 
fatalism. Both fears are ill-founded, which will be outlined in this section.
Being rational is, as we saw in the first part of the thesis, a way of tracking the world, not access 
to a realm of the mental disparate from the physical. That is, neural structures in human brains 
harmonize  with  developments  of  world states.  Determinism does  not  threaten  the  ability to  be 
rational, maximally the ability to be free to adopt rationalism (see fatalism below); if an organism 
deterministically correctly tracks its environment and acts in accordance with internal models to 
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fulfill its goals, then it is rational. Even when we go on to analyze our behavior at the micro-causal 
level  (“graininess”)  this  does  not  call  into  question  our  rationality;  “rationality”  is  simply  the 
ascription of certain properties to large-scale aggregations of matter. Because all our concepts and 
all our language are at the epistemic level (a process of “registering”), ontological reductionism – 
the  commitment  to  one  world  being  potent  at  a  micro-causal  level  –  can  never  threaten  our 
epistemic concepts, so also not rationality.
We can view it this way: thoughts, that feel so causal from the inside, are actually what it feels 
like if certain brain organizations go through their  physical causal patterns. Thoughts are neural 
connections which have become sufficiently dense (they, for example, fire in synchrony sufficiently 
often) that they become a "causal bundle" – a learned structure, ideally representing something 
about the environment, which is sufficiently robust to emerge from the subconscious (the latter is 
the sum of neural connections which do not form into aggregate wholes, that is, they direct the flow 
of  thought  without  becoming  conscious  thought).  We  can  of  course  also  call  the  thoughts 
themselves causal – if we bear token identity in mind, and see that nothing supernatural is involved; 
due to much danger of confusion here, I prefer to locate the causal in the  physical description. 
Thoughts should be viewed as causality aggregations. In this way we also vindicate the description 
of the rationalist: being rational means conforming your associative neural net in your brain to the 
laws of nature, that is: if in the "external" world A is causally followed by B, then the associative 
net presents B when given A. 
Indeed, rationality can even explain the persistence of the belief that we have free will. If we are 
moved by reflex or instinct or unconscious motivations the primacy of the purely causal nature of 
our behavior is apparent. And this unconscious is necessary:
From  the  accumulating  evidence,  the  authors  conclude  that  [...] 
various nonconscious mental systems perform the lion's share of the 
self-regulatory burden, beneficently keeping the individual grounded 
in his or her current environment.(Bargh & Chartrand 1999)
Conflict between physical and mental causation only seems to arise when conscious thoughts 
come into play, a “higher-order” function of the brain. A part of being rational is constructing plans, 
weighing their probability of success and the desirability of their outcomes and then deciding which 
one to implement. This latter decision looks like free will; but this decision was of course caused by 
all prior experiences and genetic factors etc. The illusion of free will arises because we do not have 
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access to all our brain states – unconscious thoughts etc – so the decision is "simply there" – it 
seems to have arrived by way of magic, uncaused, but is in fact only the result of the sum neural  
computation performed by your brain. The brain operates on a model of the body from which it 
draws its sensorimotor grounding. The illusion of separateness of the mind – and thus of free will – 
comes from the brain not having a  complete model of itself (qua brain).  The brain itself is not 
modeled; and that is why the mind-body duality and illusion of free will is so persuasive. A nice 
computational analysis and why the free will illusion224 is so persistent can be found in Yudkowsky 
(2008h).
The concept of free will is also useful  heuristic when reasoning about other people, thus also 
closely tied to rationality and goes to show why “free will” is such a persistent belief. The brain is a 
causality aggregator225. From the moment where the first cells of the brain are differentiated, the 
accumulation of causal history begins; of course, this happens in other body parts too, but the brain 
is the most interesting organ for this analysis because its influence on decisions is more salient, than 
say, the influence of the cells in your right toe. From the moment the human is conceived, causality 
begins to aggregate in his cellular make-up. From the moment the human has senses and these 
senses interact with the central nervous system, causality is also aggregated from more far away 
sources as the immediate cellular environment (smell: distribution of chemicals in environment; 
hearing: mechanical air perturbations; sight: photons from across the universe; etc. etc). All these 
impressions leave their neural imprint, however minute. Again, that is a lot of causality. Of course 
we can look back to the beginning of life itself; and before that, to the origin of the universe. That 
may not be very explanatory; but we must keep it in mind when we look at causal histories.
We never fully know what the other person has experienced, what his DNA encodes for etc. 
That is why humans have invented "free will" from a psychological perspective: we insert "free 
will"  for  our  uncertainty about  the behavior  of  the other  agent.  Of course,  we can  predict  the 
behavior of other people more often than not; that lies in the many commonalities we share, our 
phylogenetic and environmental history for instance.  That it  does not always work, that we are 
sometimes surprised by what others do, or even what we ourselves do – because we can't introspect 
at the causal level – is due to the perturbations assailing us from all corners of the universe; the 
chaotic nature of our brain processes; and the vast store of unconscious impressions directing our 
whims and wishes. "Free will" is a heuristic to sum over the possible experiences of the other. "Free 
224 See Wegner (2002) for an in-depth account.
225 The aggregation of causality has of course begun before conception via the selection of genes which gave rise to 
the concrete brain in the first place.
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will" is used to designate unpredictability: you will never know what others will do, and maybe not 
even what you yourself will do ("Free will" is ignorance about oneself). But again, we see that “free 
will” stands for something else in these cases than SFW, and thus we should use these other words 
and concepts because “free will” always opens the frame of SFW. 
 4.1.3.6 Fatalism
Das Publikum muss denken, dass der Schauspieler auf der Bühne anders 
hätte entscheiden können. Peter Simonis in Radio NÖ 23/24.01.07
Moreover, the [...] view that everything that ever has or ever will 
happen should be regarded as equally real has significant attractions 
of its own, and ones that are more firmly grounded, philosophically 
speaking. In  fact, the  denial of  the openness  of the  future can, 
paradoxically, prove very liberating. Specifically, those who manage 
really to take to heart the idea that all events are eternally real 
will no longer be tormented by thoughts of ‘what might have been’; no 
longer will they be constantly saying to themselves ‘If  only I had 
done such-and such’. For they will acknowledge that at no time are 
future events anything other than actualities lying in store for us. 
Any lingering inclination they may have to view their past lives as 
being littered with missed opportunities and avoidable mistakes will 
be  extinguished  by  the  thought  that  neither  the  seizing  of  the 
‘opportunities’, nor the avoidance of the mistakes, ever existed as 
genuine potentialities. It is, as they will now see it, merely our 
inability, in general, actually to foresee the future that blinds us 
to the fact that it is as much a part of reality as are the present 
and the past. (Lockwood 2005, p. 69f)
A simple example will clarify why "free" is not a necessary word in naturalistic accounts. I 
define a word ZIP which stands for either  deterministically,  or  somewhat deterministically with  
random input, or purely random (order emerging in some fashion in the last case). The point of ZIP 
is to cover all naturalistic cases of state transitions.
Now, we are going to describe a person's decisions with the help of ZIP:
Person A is confronted by environmental state E1. He is in a mind state M1 at which he has 
arrived by ZIP. Person A now wants to arrive at environmental state E2 because of his mind state 
M1 encoding certain preferences. His mind at M1 now computes a number of plans of how to arrive 
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at E2, the computations being effected by A's mind transitioning (via ZIP) into M2, M3, M4 etc, 
finally  arriving  at  M_N,  where  he  has  a  number  of  plans  PA,  PB,  PC  available.  Due  to  his 
knowledge of  the  world,  at  which  he  arrived  at  by ZIP,  he  thinks  that  PB is  the  best  plan,  a 
computation (choice) at which he arrives at again by weighing the plans against each other, by 
transitioning (via ZIP) through the mind states M_N+1 to M_N+L. Person A now enacts PB and, 
because  he  was  a  good  observer  and  got  his  correlations  with  world  states  right,  achieves 
environmental state E2.
So, we don't need freedom to arrive at choices. But does this lead to fatalism? Fatalism means 
not trying to achieve your goals anymore. You lean back and say: it's no use.
The best antidote against fatalism is rationality. The rationalist can convince himself easily that 
even if strict determinism holds, he will still have certain desires (albeit deterministically) and will 
have to exert effort to achieve the satisfaction of these desires. If you give up all of  your desires 
when hearing of fatalism, then you may indeed resign. But I am quite confident that you are not 
free to give up all of your desires.
Let us look again at the example above, in simplified form. It concerns an agent in a world 
where there is no such thing as free will:
Imagine that the agent starts in state A and wants to arrive at state E. Now let us suppose that to 
get from A to E it is necessary – strictly causally necessary – to perform the action steps: b-c-d. 
Now, the agent starts to (deterministically) think about achieving state E, and finds out that he must 
enact b-c-d. Well then, so b-c-d it is. There are no computational shortcuts, that is, the agent will 
have to perform the actual steps to get to the result.
Fatalism is the erroneous thought that if I am in A, and want to get to E, and it's ordained that I 
will arrive at E, I needn't bother to transit through b-c-d and instead I can go for a drink. That is not 
how it works in a lawful universe: here, even if I know that I have to pass through b-c-d, I will do it. 
That is the burden of the autonomous agent. The autonomous agent must actively strive to achieve 
goals. In a deterministic universe, an agent must become causally active to achieve goals. There is 
no "kismet" excuse, which in fact presupposes an acausal picture of the universe not in line with 
naturalism. 
Let us draw on a more dramatic example: Your family is caged in a metal box hanging from a 
rope above a firepit. In front of you is a button, and if you press it, your family will be saved. If you 
don't press it, the rope will be cut in thirty seconds and the cage will drop into the firepit. Now, 
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before you is also a TV screen which always shows the world at this place, but twenty seconds in 
the future. In the TV, you see yourself pressing the button and your family is saved. Watching your 
future self has let you forget the time – twenty seconds have passed; in ten more, the rope will be 
cut. What will you do? The fatalistic response would be to say it's all no use, and go home (leaving 
your family to fall into the pit and die). The cheeky and admittedly scientific approach would be not 
to press the button on purpose to try falsify the video and it's metaphysics of determinism; but I do 
assume that you love your family, and I think it is quite clear that despite even your foreknowledge 
of what you will do, and all your scientific avidness, you will still press the button. That is actually 
why the video  could show your future action: because the video showed yourself having already 
seen the video and, despite the foreknowledge, pressing the button.
Now, in the real world we usually don't have foreknowledge because matters are too complex 
and out of our immediate control. So when even foreknowledge does not imply a fatalistic stance, 
but calls us to act on our agent drives, even less so should a situation with no foreknowledge imply 
fatalism. Even if the future is as fixed as the past: there is no alternative to deliberate and perform 
committed action to achieve one's goals.
Maybe another metaphor will help to avoid falling into the fatalist mindset: think of the cosmos 
as a symphony. In a symphony, every musician must play the notes of the musical piece before him. 
Musicians do not lay down their instruments in disgust just because they know what they will be 
playing in the concert to come. Every single note is necessary to add to the beauty of the symphony. 
Not one may be omitted.  In a symphony, beauty only arises if  everybody fulfills  his role.  The 
symphony would  vanish  if  everybody could  play  as  he  wished.  Of  course,  beauty  also  arises 
because of variance from strictly deterministic playing; every musician adds a little personality. 
This would correspond to the aspect of  zest and  spunk in Smith's ontological view of things. But 
again insofar the universe has these properties, they are properties of the universe of humans only 
insofar as they are part of the universe. The least contributes to the beauty of the whole. See your 
actions  as  part  of  the  cosmic  symphony.  This  picture  also  removes  the  threat  of  the  "puppet 
metaphor" – that there is an independent "you", which, on a previous conception, was free, and 
under the naturalistic conception is not free. But there never was an independent "you" that is now 
bereft of it's will and enslaved to the laws of nature. You were the laws of nature in action all along. 
You are the sum of your experiences, and nature will guarantee that this experience will reflect itself 
quite deterministically in future actions. Craving free will is actually wanting to being more than 
you are.
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We are not "commanded" by physics to perform our actions; that what we are, what we think, 
our love and our hate, is simply and integral part of the universe brought forth by physical law as 
the stone or the tree. Graphically put:
The wrong conception:
The correct conception:
May we still speak about choice in these scenarios? Of course. The will is real. Choice is real 
(choice as the  implementing of one action out of several possible alternatives). There is just no 
sensible way in calling a choice "free". Autonomous, yes – meaning largely independent of current 
environmental  variables  –  but  that's  still  a  far  cry  from  free.  Choice,  the  selection  between 
alternatives can be perfectly deterministic226. Let us say you love chocolate ice and you absolutely 
hate vanilla ice. Now, once a month you eat ice cream, and every time you will choose chocolate 
before vanilla – you know it yourself; others know it; because it is determined by your taste – but 
it's a choice nonetheless. That is what choice means: an agent acting in the world according to his 
preferences.
Saying "Person A chose to do so-and-so" is actually the same (in kind) as saying: "The stone 
dropped to the floor". It is the lawful universe in action; only in a much more complicated system. 
226 The model of Marvin Minsky presented in the next section will elucidate this further.
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Illustration 3: 
(Yudkowsky 2008i)
Illustration 4:  
(Yudkowsky 
2008i)
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Imagine not a simple Newtonian clockwork, which may be rather depressing, but a playful brook 
meandering through a lush valley; sometimes moving swiftly, sometimes languishing in full sun in 
little pools; or sometimes flying through the air – a joyous waterfall breaking the smoothness of the 
flow. Be a brook, a river, an ocean; not a clock. The scientific conception behind this metaphor is 
that of deterministic chaotic systems.
When  judging  other  humans  we won't  get  far  by looking  at  micro-dynamics.  That  is  why 
psychology  should  (and  does)  concern  itself  with  belief  states,  emotions,  instincts,  reflexes, 
intuitions, mental models etc and not nonlinear calculations of complex systems.
There is a last difficulty: how about becoming a rationalist? Can we all become rationalists? I 
think not. If you are currently reading this thesis (and you've made it this far), chances are you are 
already a rationalist or are on your way to become one – strictly lawfully, of course. But there are 
certainly people in this world who, given their upbringing and experiences, are not able to choose to 
become rationalists (just as we can't choose our sexual orientation or our athletic ability). That need 
not be a bad thing in and of itself. There are different way to happiness; maybe they live a good life 
naturally; but if not, then it means that they will continue to strive for their goals in a suboptimal 
way, and that is a tragedy. What I hope to do in this work is to contribute that many people opt for a 
rational way of living: that they understand what is at issue and what is not; that they find the 
courage to adopt the rationalist way; and that they also adopt a good metaphysics, enabling them to 
strive for the right goals (that is, living a life filled with value, meaning and love).
Accepting the doctrine of the un-free will or even strict determinism should not change your 
behavior in any  immediately noticeable way: it is a minimal reweighting of the meta-knowledge 
about yourself. Behavioral weights can, on first approximation, stay the same. But in the long run, 
there will be effects on behavior, hopefully positive ones (see the next section on optimal will). And 
don't forget: always play as if you could have done otherwise.
 4.1.4 The Solution: Optimal Will
If  we relinquish the concept of  free will,  we need something new to describe our everyday 
activity – to describe that what feels like free will but is not – that delivers a better framing without 
being awkward. The concept I propose in its stead – is optimal will. 
In regard to the goal of improving your actions in the future, the concept of optimal will is much 
more interesting than free will. Optimality is directed toward the future. Past actions are analysed 
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and checked for sub-optimal outcomes. Goals are re-evaluated, new behavioral strategies thought 
through and maybe even practiced in safe environments (with friends etc). Reflexivity is schooled. 
"What did I do? Why did I do it? How would I have preferred to perform?" So, in the future, you 
can act differently under similar circumstances. And that is what we all strive for, or at least what 
we should strive for. The new conception automatically leads to the adoption of self-improvement 
techniques,  and  is  perfectly  compatible  with  a  deterministic  worldview.  Determinism  even 
guarantees improvement227 because past situations will have influence on the future, which free will 
does  not  guarantee.  Free  will,  being  locating  in  some  metaphysical  realm  of  dubious  nature, 
guarantees neither change nor betterment. It does not supply any cogent mechanism for improving.
Achieving optimal will is a difficult process. And optimality of course, begs for the question of 
what to  optimize.  Goal-optimizing,  yes,  but  which  goals?  That  means  looking  for  criteria  of 
eudaimonia, the good life, and ultimately, wisdom. Goals worth adopting could be enacting love 
and kindness towards other people228. But a closer look at this will have to wait till section 5. Here, 
let us dwell a bit more on optimality.
For instance, imagine the goal of leading a healthy life. Seeing the body as a machine is the first 
step to achieving optimality in this regard. The machine model of the body will start letting you 
think in term of causal mechanisms when considering nutrition, regeneration, sleep, exercise etc. 
The same holds for the mind. Seeing the mind as a machine will lead to a more rational life229. 
Seeing the mind as a machine will open yourself up to learn every day, to "install" new rules and 
"delete" bad ones.  Your identity will not be coupled to your current state of perceiving the world,  
but to the ongoing process of rational improvement.
Let us look at a model of cognition presented by Marvin Minsky. We will not concern ourselves 
with  the  merit  of  this  specific  model,  it  will  only  serve  for  illustrative  purposes.  He  models 
cognition as being made up of a layered hierarchy, from bottom to top:
Self-Conscious Reflection
Self-reflective Thinking
Reflective Thinking
Deliberative Thinking
227 If one is able to – deterministically – adopt the self-improvement goal in the first place.
228 If, for instance, you want more love, compassion and empathy in your life and your interpersonal relationships, you 
should better start being rational: being rational means you are working towards those goals. Are you fighting with 
loved ones? Do you do things which you regret? That is suboptimal behavior. Improve.
229 For viewing yourself as a machine see also Turkle (2005, p. 247f).
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Learned Reactions
Instinctive Reactions
Minsky (2006, p. 160)
We  of  course  know  from our  metaphysical  excursion  that  the  layered  model  is  not  to  be 
interpreted as their being actuals layers of being: the brain exists at one (better: no) level; the levels 
above rather represent modes of organization in the brain. The levelist picture captures our intuition 
that  there  are  processes  which  are  very  modular,  probably  innate  and  with  less  degree  of 
sophistication, and other, “higher” processes, which are the result of large scale integrated neural 
firing and more dependent on learning and experience. But sophistication in reality does not arise 
by abstraction and building hierarchies – as in human epistemic models – but by non-linear large 
scale  complexes  of  causal  interactions;  the  most  complex  are  those  systems  that  achieve  a 
homeostasis in the sense that they persist. In the following, talk of levels will be used to designate 
different modes of organization.
Now, no matter how many levels; or, no matter how large-scale the integration – we are finite 
beings, so there will be a level/scale where there is nothing beyond. That last level is as determined 
as the rest; but for the cognitive entity who examines “lower-level” thoughts with the “topmost” 
level it will feel as if the topmost level is the real self and exercises free will, because that level is 
not available for introspection. Now, the more access the topmost component has on lower level 
ones – that is, the better the self-representation – the more your behavior is amenable to evaluation 
and change. 
Now that we have put it this way, there is a sense in which we can speak of freedom: the more 
accurate our self-models and environmental models are, the more we know what we want and how 
we can get what we want, the more free – free in the sense of the ability to achieve that what we  
really want – we become. The more powerful the reflective skills – the building, step by step, of 
ever more levels of self- and world-representation – the greater the freedom for action. If there is 
such a thing as freedom – then it is attained by a long an arduous process of personal development; 
it is not a divine gift everybody has a priori; it is the prize you receive for a life full of virtuous 
striving. So, ironically, the acceptance of the un-freedom of the will and the modeling of the world 
in mechanismic detail will lead to more freedom. But, in line with everything said above, I will call 
this optimality and not freedom, to avoid association with SFW.
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An example of how adopting mechanismic models (instead of magical free will) can help to 
achieve goals is the process of scaffolding deployed to overcome shortcomings of willpower, which 
can be eroded:
Much of the time, what looks like sheer willpower is the result of 
more-or-less  well-orchestrated  attempts  by  individuals  to  arrange 
their lives in such a way as to  economize on willpower, by avoiding 
situations that call for its exercise. We refer to this as distributed 
willpower, since it involves individuals creating more than one locus 
of self-control. [Footnote 14]
Self-control  strategies  can  usefully  be  thought  of  under  four 
general categories, as part of a progression that involves movement 
away from the purely psychological toward the environmental. (Heath & 
Anderson Forthcoming) 
There are direct psychological, self-management, environmental and social strategies (Heath & 
Anderson Forthcoming). Environmental strategies consist of making desirable activities easy to do 
and undesirable  things hard to  do via  concrete  physical  arrangements.  Social  strategies  include 
selective association with certain people, to direct oneself into certain modes of being via group 
conformity etc.
A concrete example:
The importance of these environmental strategies can be seen in the 
phenomenon  of  “college  procrastination”  –  the  fact  that  college 
students, particularly during first and second year, experience much 
higher levels of “problem procrastination” than the general public. 
What is particularly interesting about this phenomenon is that it has 
little  predictive  significance,  when  it  comes  to  determining  work 
habits in other contexts. [Footnote 26]
From an internalist perspective this is perhaps mysterious, but when seen 
from  the  perspective  of  environmental  scaffolding  it  is  entirely 
unsurprising. College students are given a fairly high degree of autonomy, 
when it comes to determining a plan of work for themselves, yet they are 
deprived  of  all  the  scaffolding  that  they  have  used,  in  the  past,  to 
offload motivational resources. Often they are living away from home for 
the first time, and so are missing whatever “system” they had developed for 
the timely completion of tasks. For example, merely studying in the same 
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location has been shown to decrease procrastination among college students. 
[Footnote 27] (Heath & Anderson Forthcoming) 
So, environmental and social scaffolding can radically change our performance – a fact easily 
integrated into the view of optimality, but which every proponent of  free will will have problems 
accounting for. This of course also raises issues of paternalism – how much scaffolding the public 
should provide to prevent individuals from making suboptimal choices:
... many of the most effective support structures – especially the 
social  ones  –  are  not  built  by  us  but  built  for  us,  part  of  an 
institutional  and  material  heritage.  [...]  When  a  traditional 
institution such as the relatively early “last call” for drinks at 
British pubs is abolished, it is of course possible for people to 
institute,  perhaps  with  friends,  various  strategies  for  avoiding 
procrastinating about getting to bed on time. But such arrangements 
are  typically  effortful  and  fragile,  relative  to  taken-for-granted 
structures. To take just one example, consider the sleep-deprivation 
that  has  become  a  source  of  complaint  in  our  society,  which  can 
plausibly  be  attributed,  at  least  in  part,  to  a  tendency  to 
procrastinate going to bed on time. [Footnote 33] It used to be the 
case that TV stations would end their broadcasts at around midnight, 
bars and restaurants would close, subways and buses would stop running 
–  the  clear  message  being  sent  was:  “time  to  go  to  bed.”  These 
institutional arrangements also made it much easier to go to bed on 
time, since there was little else to do after a certain hour. Now 
individuals must exercise more self-control about when to go to bed. 
(Heath & Anderson Forthcoming) 
So, to wrap things up: the insight that we don't have free will – is it for everyone? I think yes,  
but only if embedded in the right metaphysics. For people who don't see themselves as foreigners in 
this universe but at home here – being an integral part of reality (“no-essential-disconnection”) – a 
reality which is constituted by moments, so that every moment already has some intrinsic value 
simply be being part of the real world – there is neither the danger of falling into fatalism nor into 
meaninglessness.
Freedom lies in the universe – in the universal exploration of all living and un-living moments; 
the laws of nature are playing out the freedom of the universe. Our part of universal "freedom" is 
our ontogenetic history, our specific becoming. If we can love our physical becoming and what it 
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represents, then we can love that this is what determines our future actions. We can let ourselves fall 
into the world. By realizing all this, we can, ironically, be freer than before. And we can maximize 
this freedom by trying to achieve optimal will.
 4.2 The Self
Having divested us  of free will,  the next  assault  on our self-conception will  be even more 
difficult to accept, at least to Western ears: the conception of the self as something of substance over 
and above informational patterns. Again, this does not reduce our value. Our value derives from the 
value that is inbuilt into the universe: qualia states, which encode value directly and which can't be 
reduced to functional descriptions on pain of confusing epistemology with ontology. But more on 
value in section 5.5.
We have the naive and stubborn feeling of a stable "I" to which our experiences belong. An idea 
of Drescher brought forward in a slightly different context – qualia – will let us take a first step to 
understanding what the “I” or the “Self” could actually be, if it is not a substance. Drescher likens 
qualia to certain symbols in the programming language LISP:
In  the  computer  language  Lisp,  a  gensym  (short  for  generated 
symbol)is an object that has no parts or properties, as far as Lisp 
programs can discern, except for its unique identity — that is, a Lisp 
program can  tell whether  or not  two variables  both have  the same 
gensym as their value [...] A Lisp program cannot examine whatever 
internal ID tag distinguishes a given gensym from any other; yet the 
program can tell whether or not something is indeed the same as that 
gensym.  Similarly,  we  have  no  introspective  access  to  whatever 
internal properties make the red gensym recognizably distinct from the 
green; Drescher (2006, p. 81) 
I do not know if it is helpful to understand qualia in this way. But we can use the account of 
Drescher to understand the representational structure of the “I” as a first approximation. The "I" 
symbol  –  that  is,  that  what  is  activated  in  one's  brain  when one  thinks  "I"  –  fits  the  gensym 
description nicely. 
The “I” symbol is a non-descriptive reflexive designator needed to performs certain cognitive 
functions, but which need not refer to anything particular230:
230 See also Sloman & Chrisley (2003); Pollock (2008).
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We  investigate  the  functional  role  of  “I”  (and  also  “here”  and 
“now”)  in  cognition,  arguing  that  the  use  of  such  non-descriptive 
“reflexive”  designators  is  essential  for  making  sophisticated 
cognition work in a general-purpose cognitive agent. If we were to 
build a robot capable of similar cognitive tasks as humans, it would 
have to be equipped with such designators.
Once we understand the functional role of reflexive designators in 
cognition, we will see that to make cognition work properly, an agent 
must use a de se designator in specific ways in its reasoning. Rather 
simple arguments based upon how “I” works in reasoning lead to the 
conclusion that it cannot designate the body or part of the body. If 
it designates anything, it must be something non-physical. However, 
for the purpose of making the reasoning work correctly, it makes no 
difference whether “I” actually designates anything. If we were to 
build a robot that more or less duplicated human cognition, we would 
not have to equip it with anything for “I” to designate, and general 
physicalist inclinations suggest that there would be nothing for “I” 
to designate in the robot. In particular, it cannot designate the 
physical contraption. So the robot would believe “I exist”, but it 
would be wrong. Why should we think we are any different? (Pollock & 
Ismael 2004) 
These accounts are strongly simplified. Additionally, it is not at all clear that a designator such 
as “I” is really necessary – see below231.  How an “I” can come about is  detailed in  Metzinger 
(2003), which is too technical for this section, and can thus be found in Appendix C: The Self. The 
self  can  also  be  conceptualized  as  a  dynamical  system,  incorporating  more  or  less  of  the 
environment, but this also leads us too far astray232 (Gelder 1998; Rockwell 2005). It suffices here 
to  know that  reductive computational/representational  accounts  of  the “I”  are  possible;  we can 
conceive of the “I” as a representational structure. In spite of the computational wording of the 
above,  these  insights  are  old;  see  Appendix  D:  A Question  of  King  Milinda for  a  beautiful 
traditional passage.
We see that there is something to the "I" – but it is not what it seems to be: it is, as the Buddha 
well knew, an illusion. If Eastern accounts are to be believed, there is merit in seeing through the 
illusion,  although,  again,  following through behaviorally is  more a  meditative task than one of 
231 I believe that it is necessary but has been evicted from symbol space in the case described below.
232 I would especially like to endear the book by Rockwell (2005) to the reader.
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theoretical insight. Seeing that there is nothing of import tied to the self, one can become less selfish 
and less fearful:
If there could be a [...] way for the sense of self to be lost, but 
with the consciousness remaining unimpaired, then this would compel 
the  philosopher  of  mind  to  think  about  consciousness  and  its 
capacities in a new and different light.[...] On this matter, the 
Eastern accounts of how  Arahants act in the world are telling. Not 
only are such persons reportedly able to ‘get by’; their ordinary 
actions – those normally associated with autonomy and survival – are 
depicted,  without  exception,  as  proceeding  more  effortlessly  and 
efficiently than the comparable actions from persons with a sense of 
self.  From  an  ethical  perspective,  their  conduct  is  invariably 
described  as  exemplary  in  its  virtue,  wisdom  and  compassion  – 
exceeding,  even,  Aristotle’s  phronimos.  Should  these  reports  be 
correct, they would raise a plethora of questions (Albahari 2006, p. 
210)233
In a similar vein Parfit, who also arrives at the conclusion that there is nothing of substance to 
the self (and to personal identity, more on that below):
It makes me less concerned about my own future, and my death, and 
more concerned about others. I welcome this widening in my concern. 
(Parfit 1984, p. 347)
And especially concerning death:
Instead of saying 'I shall dead', I should say, 'There will be no 
future experiences that will be related, in certain ways, to these 
present experiences'. Because it reminds me what this fact involves, 
this redescription makes this fact less depressing.  (Parfit 1984, p. 
281)
The  self,  we must remind ourselves, is a conceptualization like any other:  if  we imbue this 
concept with ontological significance, as is done when conceiving of the self as a “soul”, we have to 
pay a  price –  in this  case,  one pays  with  separateness.  The reductionist  account  of  the self  is 
actually giving back the concept and collecting the refund – unity.
233 An Arahat or Arahant has achieved liberation by destroying attachment, hatred and delusion.
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In case you find the views concerning self and identity expressed above and below disturbing, 
there  are  traditions  which  have  ample  experience  in  dealing  with  this  way of  viewing  things 
(Smullyan (1977); Goldstein (2002) are possible first ports of call).
 4.3 Identity234
What about our identity? We are agents: our agency captures our embodiment and our personal 
histories,  reflected  in  beliefs,  desires,  goals,  emotions  etc.  We  have  discarded  the  notion  of  a 
substantial self. What remains are fluctuating patterns of perceptions and reactions to perceptions; 
an identity always constructed on the fly from memory, from the body, from the environment. This 
follows already from all of the above: naturalism, causal structural realism, monism etc. That is 
ontological reductionism, contrasted with the supernatural  view that we have  Cartesian egos or 
souls. Noonan distinguishes the Complex View from the Simple View:
The proponent of the Simple View of personal identity will say that 
personal  identity  is  an  ultimate  unanalysable  fact,  which  resists 
definition in any other terms. By contrast a proponent of the Complex 
View  will  maintain  that  an  informative  account  of  what  personal 
identity consists in is possible, since personal identity is nothing 
over and above those observable and introspectable facts of physical 
and psychological continuity which provide the only evidence for it. 
Again  a  proponent  of  the  Simple  View  will  say  that  persons  are 
‘separately existing’ entities, distinct from their brains, bodies and 
experiences, whilst a proponent of the Complex View will say that 
persons  are  nothing  ‘over  and  above’  their  brains,  bodies  and 
experiences. (Noonan 2003, p. 93)
I follow the Complex View. What are we, actually? Material patterns in motion. In a naturalistic 
universe, everything changes – we, like the whole universe, conform to the laws of physics, and 
they guarantee that we always undergo gradual transformations. True isolation is impossible in this 
universe.  Real  things change,  and real  persons  change.  Our beliefs,  our goals,  our desires,  our 
emotions, yes, even the qualia we experience change235. Is there anything that stays constant? I think 
not – there are only varying degrees of constancy which may create the illusion of permanence.
234 This section can be skipped, as it contains nothing that does not already follow from our metaphysical 
commitments. I only want to show connections with the literature on identity. And, of course, reading will add to 
further understanding of what the metaphysical commitments entail.
235 For instance our feeling of wholeness and integrity increases with age.
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Even in our short lives, we undergo considerable transformations. The old man at the age of 
ninety  has  only  rudimentary  similarity  to  the  teenager  of  eighteen;  maybe  not  much  more  in 
common  than  some  memories  and  a  scar  acquired  at  an  early  age.  For  people  living  active 
intellectual lives and seeking the process of transformation – of improvement – transition times into 
new personality structures  may be  much quicker.  Personal  identity is  a  fickle  thing.  There  are 
various conceptions of personal identity floating around in the literature.  Staple points in every 
discussion of (diachronic) personal identity are examples of fission and fusion, that is, the splitting 
or merging of persons. As neither fission nor fusion constitute a problem for the naturalist view 
propounded here, I will not dwell on the subject.
For  practical  matters  –  to  judge,  for  instance,  who is  who over  the course of  normal  time 
periods, we still need a criterion of personal identity. For a detailed argument concerning matters of 
identity,  see  Parfit  (1984)236.  Parfit  considers  different  degrees  of  physical  and  psychological 
connectedness.  They constitute  the  physical  spectrum,  and the  psychological  spectrum.  We can 
traverse the physical  spectrum by replacing body parts  of a person.  This happens every day in 
yourself. Some body parts are shed (hair, nails, skin cells etc), others are built anew out of the food 
you eat. The atoms in our body are constantly changing via metabolism. What stays roughly the 
same is the pattern. We can imagine more extreme cases of physical changes like teleportation237, 
complete with malfunctions such as destruction of the original or multiplication of the original; or 
diverse forms of surgery. Then there is the psychological spectrum: here we can imagine varying 
degrees of connectedness via memories. Parfit argues that neither in the physical spectrum nor in 
the  psychological  spectrum –  both  combined  are  the  combined  spectrum –  is  there  are  sharp 
borderline where are person becomes a  different person. There is no  deep fact238 about personal 
identity  –  no  fact  over  and  above  similarities  and  continuities  constituted  by  the  physical  or 
psychological facts. Given our investigation into the nature of the self, this should not come as a 
surprise.
Roughly corresponding to physical  connectedness is  animalism in  the literature on personal 
identity. Personal identity is construed as coinciding with biological continuity:
if X is a person at t1, and Y exists at any other time, then X=Y if 
and only if Y's biological organism is continuous with X's biological 
organism (Olson 1997; DeGrazia 2005). Note that Y may or may not be a 
236 Another excellent book is Wilkes (1988).
237 As in Star Trek.
238 This is Parfit's terminology.
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person, which allows that X might be one and the same as a fetus or 
someone in a PVS. (Shoemaker 2005)239
But  here  we  see  immediately  that  identity  is  indeed  not  what  matters:  while  under  the 
conception of animalism you are identical with your comatose self, you yourself are more interested 
in psychological continuity:
instead, what matters has to consist in psychological continuity 
and/or connectedness (what Parfit calls “Relation R”). As long as that 
relation holds between me-now and some other person-stage — regardless 
of whether or not it holds one-one — what happens to me is just as 
good as ordinary survival. Call this the Identity Doesn't Matter (IDM) 
view. (Shoemaker 2005) 
In  the  real  world,  of  course,  psychological  continuity  usually  only  occurs  when  animal 
continuity is also the case. Psychological continuity without animal continuity becomes interesting 
when you believe in the ability of  uploading,  that is,  the transfer of your mind into a different 
substrate. More on that below. The intuition behind psychological continuity is correct – it is indeed 
what matters.
How devastating the loss of memory – and thus the disruption of psychological continuity – is 
to personal identity is illustrated in Sacks (1985). Sacks describes a patient, Jimmie, who developed 
severe  retrograde  amnesia  due  to  heavy drinking240.  Jimmie  was  around the  age  of  fifty when 
admitted to Sack's clinic. All his memories from his present age back to when he was twenty years 
old  had  been  "erased"  by  the  disease.  An  especially  chilling  episode  occurs  during  the  first 
interview of Sacks with Jimmie. Sacks recounts:
Jimmie was a fine-looking man, with a curly bush of grey hair, a 
healthy and handsome forty-nine-year-old. He was cheerful, friendly, 
and warm. ‘Hiya, Doc!’ he said. ‘Nice morning! Do I take this chair 
here?’ He was a genial soul, very ready to talk and to answer any 
questions I asked him. […]
‘And you, Jimmie, how old would you be?’ Oddly, uncertainly, he 
hesitated a moment, as if engaged in calculation. ‘Why, I guess I’m 
nineteen, Doc. I’ll be twenty next birthday.’ Looking at the grey-
haired man before me, I had an impulse for which I have never forgiven 
239 PVS is a permanent vegetative state.
240 Korsakov's syndrome.
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myself — it was, or would have been, the height of cruelty had there 
been any possibility of Jimmie’s remembering it. ‘Here,’ I said, and 
thrust a mirror toward him. ‘Look in the mirror and tell me what you 
see. Is that a nineteen-year-old looking out from the mirror?’ He 
suddenly  turned  ashen  and  gripped  the  sides  of  the  chair.  ‘Jesus 
Christ,’ he whispered. ‘Christ, what’s going on? What’s happened to 
me? Is this a nightmare? Am I crazy? Is this a joke?’— and he became 
frantic, panicked.
‘It’s  okay,  Jimmie,’  I  said  soothingly.  ‘It’s  just  a  mistake. 
Nothing to worry about. Hey!’ I took him to the window. ‘Isn’t this a 
lovely spring day. See the kids there playing baseball?’ He regained 
his color and started to smile, and I stole away, taking the hateful 
mirror with me. Two minutes later I re-entered the room. Jimmie was 
still standing by the window, gazing with pleasure at the kids playing 
baseball below. He wheeled around as I opened the door, and his face 
assumed a cheery expression. ‘Hiya, Doc!’ he said. ‘Nice morning! You 
want to talk to me — do I take this chair here?’ There was no sign of 
recognition on his frank, open face. (Sacks 1985, p. 23f)
Jimmie lives in an "eternal now", being reset every few minutes. Jimmie, being alive now, in 
effect died at the age of nineteen. But he did not die  when he was nineteen, because he lived a 
relatively normal life – albeit with alcohol abuse which led to his disease – until his  mid forties, 
when his retrograde amnesia started to develop. So, here was a human being who had lost half his 
life because his memories had been erased, or were inaccessible at the least.
What we value in ourselves are our relationships, our things, our anchoring in the world – but 
this is mediated through our memories; if a disease such as the above, or others such as Alzheimer, 
destroy our memories, we die despite still being bodily alive.
So, let us have a closer look at the psychological continuation criterion, adopted here in the 
variant explicated by Noonan (2003). But first some terminology: the Only x and y principle:
This is the principle that whether a later individual y is identical 
with an earlier individual x can depend only on facts about x and y 
and the relationships between them: it cannot depend upon facts about 
any individuals other than x or y. Otherwise put, what the principle 
asserts is that whether x is identical with y can only depend upon the 
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intrinsic relationship  between  them,  it  cannot  be  determined 
extrinsically. (Noonan 2003, p. 127)
We need the Only x and y principle to exclude some versions of psychological continuity which 
restrict identity when fission takes place. As mentioned above, fission, if possible, poses no problem 
for personal identity in a naturalistic account and thus is ignored in the present thesis. But we need 
to address it here simply for completeness sake. The psychological continuation criterion then goes 
like this:
what is crucial for personal identity is neither identity of body 
nor  brain,  but  psychological  continuity,  in  the  wide  sense  which 
includes other continuities as well as continuities of memory. Where I 
disagree with such psychological continuity theorists as Shoemaker and 
Parfit is in my adherence to the Only x and y principle, and my 
consequent rejection of any ‘best’ or ‘no rival candidate’ version of 
a psychological continuity account of personal identity. The crucial 
difference is that I am committed to saying that any sufficiently 
strong line of psychological continuity represents the history of some 
person irrespective of what fissions or fusions have taken place, or 
will take place. (Noonan 2003, p. 210f)
Now, psychological continuity is of course mediated by the brain (for differing opinions see 
again below). This leads to the question: is the person the brain? Many people think so, and this is 
certainly true in academia, where personal identity is strongly coupled to intellectual achievement. 
But what about a body-builder? A super-model? An athlete? Take away their bodies – what they 
have worked for years to shape with great effort – and you take away much of their identity: so 
there is also a strong sense in which the body qua body contributes to identity, quite apart from 
brain processes. It all depends on what matters to your conception of yourself in the first place; 
identity in this sense is agent-relative; what would constitute identity for one agent's self-conception 
may not hold for another's. Burwood (2009) goes even farther and considers bodies getting a "brain-
transplant". That view is too extreme241; but the body certainly has a great influence on the human 
being, so that a new body for an “old” brain would most probably constitute a new person, for all 
practical purposes.
Let me wrap everything up:
241 There is no narrative to lament the loss of the brain, only a narrative to lament the loss of a body.
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Bodily continuity ends when we die. But even psychological continuity is no guarantee to stay 
the  same person in  the  long run.  Imagine  that  we can  live  for  thousands  of  years.  To remain 
cognitively stable,  it  would be necessary to perform constant neural  pruning so that we do not 
drown  in  associative  memory  deluges.  In  other  words,  we  must  forget,  lest  we  suffocate  in 
memories242.  Let  us  meet  another  of  these  long-lived  people,  Mr.  Smith.  We  speak  with  him 
extensively and get to him quite well. Now, let us say that ten thousand years have passed, and we 
meet Mr. Smith again. Mr. Smith has experienced things undreamed of by us short-lived homo 
sapiens. He has read books; written books; enjoyed art and performed art. He has lived through 
hundreds of relationships. But there is a causal history from the first Smith to the second one. He 
never died. Every night, he went to sleep and the next day he woke up again. He possesses animal 
and psychological continuity.
Despite this, I think we can confidently say that the older Mr. Smith will not in any way be the 
same person as the younger Mr. Smith. Not in any sense as we use the word person. If we could 
meet the two Smith's simultaneously, we would not recognize any similarity between the two. If 
there is no soul carrying some meta-person responsible for essentialist personal identity – and the 
naturalist does not believe in souls – this leads to a gradual243 degradation of personal continuity: at 
some point (this is not a specific point in time), divergence of personal characteristics is so huge 
that we will not speak of the same person (this is movement along Parfit's psychological spectrum). 
It is happening to us right now: we change all the time; some people accept this and carry on their 
companionship with us; others say: this one has become a different person, I want no dealings with  
him. It depends on what is important to people; but there are certainly changes where everybody 
would agree that personal continuity is not present anymore.
We can construe personal identity as largely parallel to bodily identity only because we are a 
short-lived species, and most of us do not change significantly after having stabilized as mature 
personalities. But identity has nothing to do with physical continuation. As shown above, physical  
continuity does not preclude personal discontinuity. 
That does not mean that bodily continuity is not necessary: our memories constitute who we are; 
but we can't extract our memories from our brains like blood from our arteries – memories are too 
much causally imprinted into the neural net which constitutes our selves.  In this sense, then, our 
bodies – our brain being part of our body – constitute who we are.
242 Read Borges (1942) for a fantastic account.
243 Sorites-style. See below.
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 4.4 Material Beings
 4.4.1 Q-Beings, N-Beings and P-Beings and Ethics
Qualia, as argued above, are an ontic and perspectival property of dispositional structures. But if 
we make this move to solve the mind-body problem, another problem opens up: we must decide 
which qualia bearing structures can be targets of ethical concern. 
We can discern two criteria interesting for morality: agency/personhood244 – I will use the terms 
largely interchangeably in what follows; and the ability to have qualia of a certain sophistication, 
most notably the ability to feel pain, but also other states such as boredom, longing etc. 
Our desire for ethical behavior from others stems from  our feelings (qualia) – we feel pain, 
disillusionment, sadness; but also happiness and joy. If it wouldn't be  like anything for us, there 
would be no incentive for ethics and morality. In short, one could say: no qualia, no ethics. But in a 
panqualicist  universe that  is  not  a  very exclusive claim.  Of course,  a rock is  evidently not  the 
concern of ethics (but see Foridi's information ethics (Floridi 1999; Stahl 2008). I will use the term 
Q-Being for an entity which is  sophisticated enough to be eligible for ethical  considerations245, 
where Q-Being is short for Qualia-being. What is a Q-Being is an empirical question in the end, 
and,  needless to say,  much care must be exercised given the momentous consequences of such 
evaluations. Some possible criteria for evaluating Q-Beingness are presented below.
First of all, a strong indicator is similarity to human beings. Indeed, we infer that other people 
are conscious from ourselves being conscious, and other people being similar to ourselves. The 
same most probably holds for higher mammals. The farther removed organisms are from our make-
up,  the  more  difficult  it  will  be  for  us  to  reliably judge  what  they feel  and  of  what  they are 
conscious of. We will have to fall back on behavioral criteria or general assumptions about what 
makes entities conscious.
244 There can be no morality if there is only one entity (only a God), or no entity at all (a lifeless universe). The 
question of ethics may very well apply to those scenarios – albeit in a form not interesting to most humans. Ethics 
has a broader focus than morality; ethics is about inquiry into questions of meaning, value and moral conduct in the 
broadest possible sense; ethics asks question about a good life per se. Morality has a narrower focus; here, I will use 
morality to designate the evaluation – in a normative sense – of behavior. Morality comes into play as soon as agents 
interact with one another. We still need qualia – agency is no substitution for that; for qualia-less agents – such as 
simple software agents – interaction rules are simple coordination or transaction rules; rules of protocol. To make 
norms between agents moral norms, I contend that we need qualia.
245 This is not a work of ethics. That is why I do not explore the question of when a being is sophisticated enough. I do 
not know the answer anyway. What is enough for the present thesis is that the naturalist conception of things is 
ethically more expansive – see below – than traditional (religious) conceptions.
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We will  sometimes be wrong, but  the direction is  clear:  we will  be  more expansive in  our 
assignment of ethical value to other beings than we are today. Debates on ethics which deviate from 
the current dominant view have the peculiar  nature of deteriorating quickly246.  To be especially 
clear, I would like to define a clausula expansiva: whatever the current state of affairs is, the ethics 
endorsed by the present metaphysical view wants to expand ethical concern, minimize suffering and 
generally improve the quality of the living experience of all living sentients. If you read what I write 
in a different way, there must be some misunderstanding involved.
An example for the expansiveness is the inclusion of animals: when we feel pain – one of the 
primary qualia serving as an example here – this is an evolutionary adaptive trait – it is feedback at 
the organizational level of the central nervous system about remote bodily events. The organism 
should change it's behavior. It would be very astounding if pain qualia should suddenly spring into 
existence fully formed in the human brain, and animals just behaved as if they had it; the conjecture 
that pain evolved in central nervous systems having the right categorical/dispositional properties and 
was kept because of its adaptiveness is much more plausible. But if animals feel pain and other 
qualia – why should they be exempt from moral considerations? Why should it not be forbidden to 
cause unnecessary harm to an animal? The same as we have overcome tribalism and and racism (at 
least in theory), we should overcome speciesm  (Singer 1993; Bernstein 2004). From a Buddhist 
perspective, this is nothing revolutionary:
For Buddhism, humans are a part of the community of sentient beings 
in a conditioned world where suffering is endemic. Humans are not seen 
as  set  over  non-human  nature  as  ‘stewards’,  but  as  neighbours  to 
other, less intelligent, sentient beings. The spiritual potential of 
humans means that they are to be more valued than members of other 
species,  but  that  very  potential  is  expressed  and  enhanced  by 
compassionate regard for any being. To kill or harm another being 
deliberately is to ignore the fragility and aspiration for happiness 
that one has in common with it. When it comes to indirectly causing 
harm to sentient beings, Buddhism’s emphasis on an ethic of intention 
means  that  such  actions  are  not  necessarily  blameworthy.  Yet  its 
246 Especially in German speaking countries ethical debates get out of hand quickly:
In a country where memories of the Nazism still haunt the national psyche, 
some questions have become taboo, tainted by their association with the Third 
Reich. One such taboo is euthanasia and one professor who dared write about 
it is Norbert Hoerster [...]. The result was a hail of protest leading to his 
resignation. (Niemann 1999) 
Niemann aptly calls reason a victim of Nazi Legacy. Singer includes an Appendix: “On Being Silenced in Germany” in 
his “Practical Ethics”. (Singer 1993, p. 337-359)
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positive emphasis on compassion means that the removal of causes of 
harm to beings is praiseworthy. (Harvey 2000, p. 185)
There a different theories of how consciousness as we value it arises247. The most compatible 
with the general gist of this work are given by Edelman, Tononi and Koch (Edelman & Tononi 
2000; Koch 2004; Tononi 2004; Koch & Tononi 2008; Tononi 2008).
In  all  these  approaches,  some  kind  of  integration  is  performed;  Edelman  assigns 
consciousness248 to reentrant processes in the dynamic core – which is mainly the thalamocortical 
system sending reentrant signals to itself. Reentry is used here in the following sense:
Reentry is a dynamic process of ongoing spatiotemporal correlation 
occurring  between  functionally  segregated  neural  areas  that  is 
mediated by signaling through massively parallel, reciprocal fibers 
(Edelman & Gally 2001)
Tononi gives his approach – the integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) – a more 
information-theoretic249 coloring:
According to IIT, consciousness implies the availability of a large 
repertoire of states belonging to a single integrated system. To be 
useful, those internal states should also be highly informative about 
the world. (Koch & Tononi 2008)
and:
… IIT, is grounded in the mathematics of information and complexity 
theory and provides a specific measure of the amount of integrated 
information generated by any system comprising interacting parts. We 
call that measure Φ and express it in bits. The larger the value of Φ, 
the larger the entity’s conscious repertoire. (Koch & Tononi 2008)
I  would  like  to  stress  the  following:  the  approach  detailed  by  Tononi  et.  al.  seems  to  be 
functional, because it measures the repertoire of states of a system and the degree of integration the 
system is able to perform. But in the above quoted passage, we also read "those internal states 
should also be highly informative about the world"; again we face the problem of how meaning 
247 These are all “easy” problems. The “hard problem” has been answered by the commitment to monism.
248 Edelman sees consciousness as an integration of many different qualia.
249 For the relevant mathematics, see Tononi (2008).
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enters the systems. I think that the criterion of information integration given by Tononi is necessary, 
but not sufficient for consciousness. We also need what I call deep integration. More on that below.
One can hope that methods such as the one developed by Tononi will be refined enough in the 
future that one can – together with theoretical assumptions – directly evaluate a species for the 
presence of sophisticated qualia states. 
Q-Beings are those entities in the universe which can be and should be the  subject of ethical 
concern; in Kant's words: a Q-Being is an entity which is an end in itself. Consciousness and qualia 
are  not  a  prerogative  of  humans  but  result  from certain  matter  configurations.  Other  possible 
candidates  for Q-Beings  are aliens,  and,  given the restrictions250 mentioned in  the next  section, 
Artificial  Intelligences  (AIs).  I  have  already mentioned the  most  obvious  contender  for  ethical 
concern, animals251.
That is not to say that agents without qualia can never be the target of moral consideration. In a 
complex world, things are never so clear cut. In human society we will need a derivative ethical 
status from agency – or potential agency – alone. There are two cases imaginable: reduced qualia, 
and no qualia. 
If  agents  have  reduced qualia,  it  would  nonetheless  be  unacceptable  to  interfere  in  their 
autonomy. For instance, there exists the (fortunately) rarely occurring affliction252 of being unable to 
feel pain. You could argue that there would be no moral commitment to abstain from inflicting 
injury on these humans, because they would not feel pain. But their autonomous agency would be 
compromised; even if they would not feel pain, injured body parts are detrimental to their agent 
status.  They would impede or  at  least  aggravate  the  attainment  of  agent  goals.  Of  course,  the 
inability  to  feel  pain  does  not  make  these  people  unable  to  feel  happiness,  sadness  and  other 
emotions. So, even if aspects of agency creep in, we can still  ground ethical  concerns in other 
qualitative agent states.
250Concerning AIs I recall the materialist doubt, but, just to be perfectly clear, not any "soul-doubt". AI's, if possible, 
will have to be materially created, not programmed on traditional sequential/linear hardware.
251 See Kemmerer (2006) for an introduction.
252 Congenital insensitivity to pain with anhidrosis (CIPA)
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If there is a permanent total absence of qualia253, such as in brain dead patients254; they would 
still be objects of ethical consideration because of their families. Quite differently is the evaluation 
of coma-patients: here, an ever so slight possibility of regaining qualia makes them ethical subjects 
of course (see N-beings below). To be especially clear on a sensitive topic again, I would like to 
insert a quote which I fully endorse:
...soll  hier  unmissverständlich  festgestellt  werden,  dass  aus 
evolutionär-humanistischer Perspektive jeder Mensch von Geburt an – 
und  dies  ungeachtet  seiner  geistigen  Kapazitäten!  -  das 
uneingeschränkte  Recht  auf  Leben  (incl.  der  damit  einhergehenden 
Menschenrechte)  besitzt,  das  nur  in  extremsten  Sonderfällen 
(Notwehrprinzip, Tyrannenmord) in Frage gestellt werden darf.  Dieses 
unbedingte Recht zum Leben bedeutet jedoch keineswegs eine “unbedingte 
Verpflichtung zum Leben”. (Schmidt-Salomon 2006, p. 127)
A being which is the subject of ethical concern is a bearer of  rights. Agency and personhood 
also  makes  one a  bearer  of  obligations  –  only persons  can  be targets  of  moral  norms. So not 
everybody has the same obligations and the same rights255. At the moment you have qualia, you 
have a certain set of minimal rights. At the moment you have agency, you have an increased set of 
minimal rights and obligations, among those the duty to behave morally. Let us call a Q-Being that 
is a person a P-Being, short for Person-Being. How to differentiate P-Beings from Q-Beings? First 
of all, in the real world there will always be cases where there is no sharp distinction:
Contemporary thought and experimental studies indicate that there is 
no sharp dividing line between persons and non-persons. For example, 
if newborn babies are not persons because they lack the capacity for 
self-consciousness and rational thought, then there is no exact point 
at which they become persons. Likewise, if we contend on empirical 
253 There is a case imaginable where there are no qualia at all, but agent status is present. Chalmer's philosophical 
zombies (Chalmers 1996a) are beings of this kind: they are ill equipped to be subjects of ethical considerations – 
they do not feel love, pain, passion, kindness, empathy and what have you.
254 As we see here, there exist organically human beings, possibly being kept alive with machines, which are not Q-
Beings anymore. The set of human beings is neither identical nor a subset (nor a superset, to make things complete) 
of possible Q-Beings.
255 Persons are also bearers of additional rights to those of a Q-Being who is not a person. A core right of all persons 
should be self-ownership (More 1997). With increasing aptitude, rights may also increase, but only slightly. Usually, 
such rights will be those which come with great responsibility, such as to wield a technology for which it is 
necessary to be very diligent. Such rights may be acquired by taking diverse tests and for which thus not all will 
qualify to pass. We already have this situation today: the right to drive a car is associated with the ability to pass the 
test for a driver's license. Not every person will be able to pass this test. Obligations, on the other hand, will rise 
correspondingly with rights: consider the measure of negligence: this measure will be quite different for different 
sentients (imagine super-intelligences being able to monitor more parameters than we humans are able to).
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grounds that chimpanzees, gorillas and dolphins (or some other species 
of being apart from humans) are persons then we might admit also that 
there are some other species about which there will be no clear answer 
to the question: Are some adult members of this species persons or 
not? For example, perhaps, orang-utans fit into this grey category of 
being neither clearly person nor clearly non-person. This indicates 
that there is no sharp moral dividing line between persons and non-
persons. (Thomson 2008) 
But we can give a distinction for most practical purposes. An old blunder by Aristotle's will 
helps us in this because it has drawn the attention of philosophers, leading to work which will come 
in handy. So, how to decide who is a P-Being and who is not? Aristotle distinguished between 
persons and natural slaves, which could be likened to Q-Beings that are not P-Beings:
We should, then, state baldly Aristotle’s argument on  behalf of 
slavery (BS):
1 Slavery is just if and only if there are natural slaves.
2 There are natural slaves.
3 So, slavery is just.
Importantly – and this is yet another reason for facing Aristotle’s 
brief  for  slavery  head  on  rather  than  indulging  in  cultural 
apologetics – it follows directly from (BS-1) that the enslaving of 
those who are not natural slaves is unjust. As he says, ‘No-one would 
say that someone is a slave if he did not deserve to be one’ (Pol. 
1255a24–25). Consequently, since there are in fact no natural slaves, 
slavery is, by Aristotle’s argument, unjust.
Or are there natural slaves? What can be said on behalf of (BS-2)? 
It is in fact a bit difficult to determine who Aristotle takes the 
natural slaves to be. We know they lack deliberative faculties (Pol. 
1253b9–32, 1254a10, 1255b36–37). Happily, they are not Greeks, but are 
drawn  from  the  inferior  barbarian  hordes.  Perhaps  the  suggestion 
should be that as a matter of fact half the Greeks, the male half, all 
arrive on the face of the earth with sound deliberative faculties, 
which would preclude their being enslaved. Why mental faculties should 
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be distributed thus unevenly is nowhere explained – or explicable. 
(Shields 2007, p. 371)
Carol Rovane has given an apt response to Aristotle by her definition of what constitutes a 
person, and I will adopt her definition for my P-Beings. For Rovane, a person is an entity that 
possesses full reflective rationality:
…  something  cannot  qualify  as  rational  unless,  in  addition  to 
conforming to the requirements of rationality, it also grasps those 
requirements and apprehends their normative force. In other words, a 
rational being must see that it ought to be rational. [Footnote 1]
Let us call this kind of rationality full reflective rationality. It 
is the kind that persons possess. […] Being reflective, persons can 
inspect their own thoughts and actions and evaluate the extent to 
which they do and don't conform to the requirements of rationality. 
When they don't conform, they can respond to such rational failure by 
engaging  in  self-criticism  and  efforts  at  self-improvement.  These 
self-critical  activities  show  that  persons  are  committed  to  being 
rational, and it is by virtue of this commitment that they can qualify 
as rational even in the face of rational failure. [Footnote 2] (Rovane 
2004, p. 321)
So, P-Beings are Q-Beings who possess full reflective rationality. In what way is this a response 
to Aristotle? Because with this definition people can only deny other persons their status as persons 
in an obviously hypocritical way:
…  rational  modes  of  influence  are  ubiquitous  in  interpersonal 
relations.  In  fact,  they  are  the  distinguishing  mark  of  all 
distinctively  interpersonal  relations.  Whenever  persons  treat  one 
another  specifically  as  persons,  they  are  engaging  one  another's 
points of view and interacting with them from within the space of 
reasons. We have just seen that this is so even when persons are 
disrespectful and abusive of one another. Even in such cases they are 
usually treating one another as persons as opposed to mere things, 
precisely because they are appealing to and exploiting their common 
rational nature. […]
There is no doubt that to embrace this definition and equation is to 
take a somewhat exclusionary view of persons. We would deliberately 
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exclude  from  the  kind  “person”  anything  that  we  can't  treat  in 
distinctively  interpersonal  ways—for  example,  fetuses,  the  severely 
insane, the irretrievably comatose, and the hopelessly senile. But if 
this seems unduly exclusive, consider that the definition is highly 
inclusive as well. It entails that if we can treat something  as a 
person, then it is a person. And herein lies its moral advantage. For, 
whenever  we  find  we  can  engage  something  in  distinctively 
interpersonal ways—for example, in conversation and argument—then we 
cannot deny that we are confronted with a person. Any attempt at such 
a denial would be a form of prejudice.
Moreover, it would be a hypocritical form of prejudice, because one 
would be explicitly denying someone's personhood while at the same 
time implicitly acknowledging it through interpersonal engagement. So, 
for example, it was necessarily hypocritical of the slave owners of 
the American South to deny that their slaves were persons, given that 
they implicitly acknowledged their personhood whenever they talked to 
them (and, even more revealingly, when they passed laws against their 
education). In contrast, it would not be hypocritical to deny that 
fetuses,  the  irretrievably  comatose,  the  severely  insane,  and  the 
hopelessly senile are persons (note that it would be nonsensical to 
pass laws against educating them). In making such a denial one would 
not  be  depriving  these  human  beings  of  ethical  significance.  They 
would remain objects of affection, concern, respect, legal rights, and 
so  on.  All  one  would  be  doing  is  registering  that  there  is  an 
important ethical kind to which they do not belong, namely the kind 
that can engage one another in rational ways and, thereby, treat one 
another specifically as persons. (Rovane 2004, p. 326f)
Not treating “fetuses, the severely insane, the irretrievably comatose, and the hopelessly senile” 
as persons is not problematic in an ethics based on Q-Beings256. Fetuses simply are not reflectively 
rational as opposed to persons. But fetuses are interesting because of something else: they have, as 
opposed to, for example, mice257, the potential to become full P-Beings. And that should account for 
another distinction.
To  all  beings  that  have  not  yet  achieved,  but  can achieve,  the  status  of  full  autonomous 
personhood, that is, all Q-beings that can become P-Beings, we should adopt the stance of nurture; 
256 See the remarks above for the especially problematic case of comatose individuals.
257 Both are Q-Beings!
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we should try to do everything in our ken to lead them to full personhood. Let us call these beings 
N-Beings, for Nurture-Beings. There are of course beings which are Q-Beings but neither P-Beings  
nor N-Beings, such as cats (or mice as in the above example). We should treat these creatures with 
respect all the same; albeit not with the intention of turning them into P-Beings. The distinction 
between Q-Being and N-Being is very difficult and less clear cut than that between P-Being and Q-
Being; because the former depends on technological possibilities. For instance, what if we develop 
technologies that can radically enhance cognitive abilities? Do we have the obligation to “uplift”258 
creatures or even whole species, that is, turn Q-Beings that don't even have the potential to become 
P-Beings into the latter? Imagine, given the possibility of turning your cat into a person, opting for 
not doing this. Is this unethical? But these questions are for another time and day.
The  taxonomy  of  Q-Beings,  N-Beings  and  P-Beings  is  especially  important  for  weaker 
sentients.  The  strongest  (rational)  species  on a  planet  can  opt  to  define the maximal  criteria  it 
possesses as being necessary to qualify as an ethical agent. This is the status of current mainstream 
ethics,  which  focuses  on  humans  and  ignores  living  beings  which  do  not  have  a  language  to 
articulate their suffering. Basing ethics on Q-beings automatically leads to more compassion with 
all living beings; and it can be justified rationally, as opposed to the singling out of species. In the 
long run, humans can hope that this kind of ethical taxonomy is adopted by all rational sentients.
Imagine super-intelligent aliens that require higher conditions for their equivalent of P-Beings 
than humans are able to meet. Then humans should hope that they do not possess a species-centric 
ethic, but one similar to the one proposed here. For then at the very least we are Q-Beings, and 
maybe even N-Beings for their kind of personhood. 
The sketch of an ethical system presented here scales well – even if we are not the biggest fish 
in the pond.
 4.4.2 Deep Integration
Given the naturalist outlook of this thesis, and the elaborations above, it is time to tackle an 
important question – will AIs be conscious? To answer this question is of utmost importance, so as 
not to inadvertently create entities that are then forced into slavery of humanity. The question is also 
of interest in its own right, because it elucidates the question of what actually is conscious259. In the 
258 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_uplift
259 Again, it should be stressed that this is now the question of what is necessary for specific kinds of consciousness, 
such as those giving rise to personal narratives, having memory etc. The primitiveness of qualia is already accounted 
for.
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following, when I speak of consciousness, I will refer to conscious states which have content and 
intentionality; phenomenal states will simply mean conscious states. All these aspects deserve their 
individual discussion, but for here, it is OK to conflate the concepts.
Above, I have stated my suspicion that maybe brains "only"260 contribute to planning, prediction 
and memory; a brain is an introspective machine, that is, a complex physical structure which is 
capable of traversing through a multitude of states, where some states mirror inside processes of the 
brain itself. 
What about meaning? – meaning is not generated in the brain; meaning depends on the external 
environment. The classic argument for meaning externalism is given by  Putnam (1975): Putnam 
imagines another planet, Twin Earth, which is exactly like Earth except in one respect: water is not 
made  up  of  the  chemical  compounds  H2O,  but  of  XYZ;  XYZ  behaves  just  like  H2O  in  all 
noticeable respects. When an inhabitant of the Earth now refers to water, he clearly means H2O and 
not XYZ; from which follows that meaning is dependent on external circumstances. The thought 
experiment  only  works  correctly  in  our  ontology  if  we  note  that  H2O  and  XYZ  are  still 
distinguishable somehow; but maybe not by Earthen and Twin-Earthen laymen. That is enough to 
make the example work (and this conception coincides with Putnam's account).
Let us take a walk again and have a look at the Ferrari we encountered above. We naively think 
that the Ferrari is "red" and that the car is the bearer of that property; but a tangential familiarity 
with science already reveals  this  thought  to  be mistaken:  "red" is  only a relational  property of 
ambient light, the reflective properties of the material under scrutiny (here the the lacquer of the 
car), which results in specific light frequencies being absorbed and reflected, and the specific neural 
and  sensory makeup  of  the  perceiving  organism.  This  position  is  different  from naive  realism 
(locating "red" out there) and radical constructivism (locating "red" solely in the mind):
Colour  experiences,  on  the  view  defended  here,  are  mutual 
manifestations  of  reciprocal  dispositionalities  of  incoming  light 
radiation and the visual system. (Heil 2003, p. 202)
260 It's enough for starters.
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What  follows from the above is  semantic  externalism261 –  the  position  that  meaning is  not 
located  in  the  head  (alone).  Well,  then,  how does  meaning  arise  in  a  physical  system?  Good 
contenders for this are teleological theories of mental content:
According to teleological theories of content, what a representation 
represents depends on the functions of the systems that use or (it 
depends  on  the  version)  produce  the  representation.  The  relevant 
notion of function is said to be the one that is used in biology and 
neurobiology in attributing functions to components of organisms (as 
in "the function of the pineal gland is releasing melatonin" and "the 
function of brain area MT is processing information about motion"). 
Proponents of teleological theories of content generally understand 
this notion  to be  the notion  of what  something was  selected for, 
either by ordinary natural selection or by some other natural process 
of selection. (Neander 2004) 
Note that, as mentioned in the quoted passage, the sense of function which is used here is not 
the same as the sense of functionalism in the philosophy of mind, but more what Bunge & Mahner 
(2004, p. 158f) have in mind with "fungieren"262 – playing a role in a physical system. Teleological 
theories of content, while coming in different guises, notably input-based and output-based ones, 
agree on one thing: namely that semantics should be derived from functions: 
the  content  of  beliefs  [is  analyzed]  in  terms  of  actions  they 
prompt. (Papineau 2003, p. 26)
Input-based  theories  such  as  indicator  semantics  look  at  the  conditions  which  produce  the 
beliefs – raising the problem of misrepresentation263. Of course, output-based views also require that 
261 Heil himself does not subscribe to externalism. His position is internalism where he locates the acquiring of 
intentionality and meaning in the dispositionality of the system in question. I try to synthesize the two positions.
262 Bunge and Mahner would prefer the term teleonomic function, and not teleological function, though.
263 This problem is the target of Fodor's assymetric dependency theory: 
...we can define a predicate, "x is locked onto y," to capture this 
asymmetric causal structure:
A symbol "S" is locked onto property F just in case:
1 there’s a (ceteris paribus) law that F causes tokenings of "S";
2 tokenings of "S" are robust: i.e. are sometimes caused by a property G 
other than F;
3 when Gs (other than Fs) cause tokenings of "S," then their doing so 
asymmetrically depends on (1) i.e. on the law that F causes "S"s, 
where X’s causing Ys "asymmetrically depends" on a law, L, if and only if 
X’s causing Y wouldn’t hold but for L’s holding, but not vice versa: L could 
hold without X’s causing Y. Thus, smoking’s causing cancer, depending upon 
many laws, asymmetrically depends upon Newton’s, since Newton’s doesn’t 
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the functional roles have been selected for – the "historical-etiological" view, so in a sense, input is 
imported via the backdoor:
The  historical–etiological  account  of  function,  by  contrast, 
explicitly restricts attribution of functions to traits that have in 
some sense been designed to produce the effect cited as the function. 
On  this  account  of  function,  functions  are  the  upshot  of  prior 
processes of selection. A trait has a function if it has been designed 
by some process of selection to produce some effect.  (Macdonald & 
Papineau 2006, p. 10)
Put as briefly and generally as possible, the etiological account 
says that functionality arises because some individuals in a group 
acquire  novel  traits  with  capacities  that  are  favourable  to  their 
ability  to  reproduce.  Such  features  are  transmitted  to  their 
descendants,  proliferating  within  the  group  in  the  process.  Those 
features  will  then  have  as  their  function  the  exercise  of  the 
favourable capacity. (Macdonald & Papineau 2006, p. 11)
and:
In such cases, it is natural to adopt teleological terminology, and 
say that, in the normal case, the trait exists because of an effect 
the trait can produce, or in order to fulfill its function. (Macdonald 
& Papineau 2006, p. 11)
What about actual beliefs and desires, which do not (proximately) depend on a phylogenetic 
evolutionary history, but on the ontogenetic history of the actual thinking being?
This kind of ontogenetic selection has been termed ‘vicarious’ or 
‘secondary’ selection by Donald Campbell (1974). Campbell’s thought is 
that  the  relevant  developmental  mechanisms  have  themselves  been 
selected for by genetically based natural selection to be non-genetic 
selectors. They operate so as to be less severe selectors than death, 
permitting learning and other adaptational processes to occur.
Campbell  developed  an  explicit  ‘blind-variation-and-selective-
retention’  (BVSR)  model  of  learning.  There  were  three  essential 
aspects to Campbell’s BVSR model:
depend upon smoking’s causing cancer. Fodor’s proposal about content then is:
(M) if "S" is locked onto F, then "S" expresses F
(Martinich & Sosa 2001, p. 458)
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(a) mechanism(s) for introducing variation,
(b) consistent selection processes,
(c)  mechanism(s)  for  preserving  and/or  propagating  the  selected 
variants. 
(Macdonald & Papineau 2006, p. 15)
This means that non-genetic selection – through individual learning processes for instance – 
also plays a role in assigning representational functions.
I think that one should not opt for input-based theories/output-based theories in exclusion of one 
for the other: that beliefs arise in a certain way is due to their causal history; but their output, that is, 
that the actions they give rise to lead to the satisfaction of desires, is the necessary feedback to cull 
misrepresentations. Taking heed of both aspects can shed light on things left in the dark by focusing 
on one approach only.
From the question of semantics and their external nature we must differentiate the question of 
qualia:  are  they,  at  least,  in  the  head,  or  not?  Remember  that  we  have  already  committed  to 
panqualicism above – the question is not if other physical states than brain states are qualia-like, the 
question if these other states are required such that  brain states themselves experience the qualia 
that they do – it is a question of the distribution of qualia states.
There is a funny thing about consciousness: if it truly resides only in the brain, this means that 
your real skull – not the one you are thinking about, which is only the internal representation, but 
the real, physical one – is actually beyond everything you currently represent: look over the fields; 
look over the sea; look out into space – your real physical self will be beyond those, because what 
you are “looking” at is actually only representations. This picture is strange enough that it may call 
into question the natural intuition we have that qualitative states are located strictly in the brain. So, 
maybe it isn't that strange that qualia also should not be in the head264.
So, in the present account – which could already have been guessed at  in the metaphysical 
section – intentionality, phenomenal states and meaning arise through causal connections with the  
external world, going in both directions – from the world to the organism and from the organism 
back to the world. An organism has access to meaning only in regard to its environment in which it 
264 This view is proposed in Dretske (1996).
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evolved – much like a computer program, which must be embedded in the correct context to be 
executed correctly.
But what if one were to duplicate my neural structure exactly, down to every atom? What if 
these process would happen through mere chance? Would meaning, intentionality, consciousness be 
present in that system? This is what Swampman (Davidson 1987) is all about, and it has raised both 
much consternation and discussion.
Davidson enters a swamp and is hit by lightening and dies. Another lightning hits a tree stump 
and lets molecules spontaneously assemble into a new Davidson, absolutely indistinguishable from 
the  "real"  Davidson.  Swampman  now  leaves  the  swamp  and  carries  on  with  Davidson's  life. 
Nobody notices anything unusual. But does Swampman have intentional states?265
First of all some metaphysical objections: even though Swampman may be correctly constituted 
at  some level of description,  he violates the one world conjecture in  that  his  connections have 
formed spuriously; in a way which will certainly not happen in this world, and probably not in any 
world (see the “few worlds of quantum mechanics” above). Swampman will probably break apart in 
the near future due to internal stress, because the microcausal structures are not perfectly aligned. 
But we are being too realistic for philosophy here. Assume that Swampman is really identical. Let's 
play along; maybe there is something to learn here. 
The physicalist response would be to say that of course Swampman would have intentional etc 
states, because these  supervene on physical configurations and these are, in the present case per 
definitionem, the same. 
Now, there is the strategy to deny that Swampman is in possession of contentful states; and if 
one let's consciousness go hand in hand with contentful states also deny that he possesses conscious 
states. That is advocated by Dretske (1995, p. 141f) who let's a Twin Tercel266 appear – a perfect 
replica – produced, as a such things go, by lightning – of a normal Tercel; there is one difference 
though: the gas-gauge pointer of the Twin-Tercel is not responsive to the amount of gas in its tank. 
Is it broken? That might be the initial reaction of an onlooker. But, after all, Twin Tercel was not  
designed. Twin Tercel is a random aggregation of molecules, so it would be false to ascribe an 
intended functionality to  its  gas-gauge,  and therefore  also  false  to  contend that  it  was  broken. 
Maybe, in the same sense, it would also be false to ascribe intentional states to Swampman.
265 Or, put differently, is duplication of specific states of consciousness possible?
266 A Tercel is a car.
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Michael Tye constructs a similar example, thereby arguing for  qualia externalism. Qualia, the 
same as meaning, seem to be a property which are deeply integrated into the micro-structure of the 
world. Tye imagines the planet Xenon. On Xenon, pod plants grow which contain an organic stuff 
that resembles human brains. By coincidence, one pod – XP1 – is infused with electricity – by 
lightning of course267 – and thereby becomes the exact microphysical duplicate, for fifteen minutes, 
of a woman having sex on Earth:
XP1, then, is not a brain. It was not designed by nature to function 
as a brain, nor has it become a brain by taking on the appropriate 
control role with respect to a body. Does XP1, for the period of time 
during  the  storm  in  which  it  is  microphysically  identical  to  a 
particular human brain, undergo experiences phenomenally identical to 
experiences of the relevant human on Earth? Indeed, does XP1 undergo 
any experiences? It seems to me that the intuitive answer to both of 
these questions is No. There is something it is like for the human 
being during the specified 15 minutes. She experiences a variety of 
pleasurable tactile, visual, gustatory, and olfactory sensations. But 
intuitively,  I  would  say,  there  is  nothing  it  is  like  for  XP1. 
[Footnote 13] The Xenon example provides us with a possible case in 
which a standardly embodied creature with a brain and a microphysical 
duplicate of that brain differ phenomenally (or so it seems to me 
intuitively). (Tye 2009, p. 195f)
Tye believes that physical indistinguishable individuals have different phenomenal states due to 
different histories:
If microphysical duplicates can have different histories, different 
beliefs,  and  different  desires,  and  if  they  can  see  and  touch 
different objects, why not also hold that (in some possible cases) 
they  can  be  acquainted  with  different  phenomenal  characters?  If 
meanings ain’t in the head, then why insist that qualia are in there?
[Footnote 15] For the thoroughly modern materialist, the thesis of 
phenomenal  internalism,  like  the  doctrine  of  phenomenal  concepts, 
should be ‘‘committed to the flames.’’ [Footnote 16] Only then will 
all  vestiges  of  Cartesianism  be  eliminated  from  the  materialist 
worldview. (Tye 2009, p. 199)
267 What would philosophers do without lightening?
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So  Tye  would  say,  in  analogy  with  his  pod  plant,  that  Swampman  does  not  experience 
phenomenal  states.  Others  hold  that  Swampman  is  a  refutation  –  or  at  least,  a  weakening  in 
argumentative force – of external semantics (Heil 2003, p. 214f). I contend that the position taken 
up by Heil – that the content is grounded in the dispositional intrinsic nature of the agents, and 
therefore internal, is not so much at odds with external semantics as it may seem at first. I would 
like to repeat, due to its importance, a quote already presented in the section on intentionality:
In any case, we have available a resource ideally suited to account 
for  the  kind  of  projection  associated  with  intentionality: 
dispositionality.  Dispositions  are  of or  for particular  kinds  of 
manifestation  with  particular  kinds  of  disposition  partner. 
Dispositions preserve the mark of intentionality in being of or for 
particular  kinds  of  manifestation  with  particular  kinds  of  non-
existent—possible, but non-actual—objects. This is not mysterious or 
spooky; it is a feature of dispositions possessed by rocks, or blades 
of grass, or quarks. (Heil 2003, p. 222)
Certainly, subtle points will differ if one favors a purely externalist account or a dispositional 
internalist account268. But those are of no concern to me here; I will gladly leave those feuds to the 
ivory tower of philosophy – what is important to take out of both approaches is where they both 
agree – there is a nexus with the world in both accounts: externalism looks for some kind of causal 
grounding, dispositionalism derives its grounding – its  of-ness and  for-ness –  from metaphysics 
directly. Heil's version is more elegant, but probably more prone to misunderstanding in the current 
philosophical climate. This  nexus with the world, this ineluctable connection, is what I call  deep 
integration. It is a final renouncement of every Cartesian conception concerning the mind.
On  Heil's  account,  Swampman  is  conscious  and  intentional  because  he  has  the  right 
dispositional states, no matter that the causal connections are spurious. Swampman mimics those 
very  connections  exactly –  that  is  the  incredible  coincidence.  The  more  the  exact  mimicry 
degenerates,  the less  likely the resulting entity will  still  be conscious  in  any discernible  sense; 
maybe we will find gradual degradation here.
268 But I am not sure if these are real world differences. After all, they usually depend on bizarre thought experiments – 
stupendously impossible events giving rise to complex causal structures which usually require complicated 
evolutionary histories to arise. I think that external semantics correctly captures the intuition that meaning depends 
on the world around us; but the dispositional account is metaphysically more correct, namely, that at the end of the 
day, physically indistinguishable objects have indistinguishable phenomenal states. The merger of the two happens 
in the real world: where real states have real histories, not fairy-tail ones.
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The important  point  is  this:  if,  in  this  world,  Swampman is  created by chance as an exact 
duplicate, he will indeed be intentional and conscious because the very matter he is constituted of 
mimics, by near impossible chance, the complex dispositional structure which usually only arises 
through  intricate  evolutionary  histories.  But  what  grounds  the  intentional  states,  lastly,  is  the 
dispositional nature of his makeup, which is apt to interact (in the "correct" way) with the rest of the 
world.  That  is  quite  different  from pure internalism.  What  would happen if  one would lift  the 
physical brain out of its environment – say, into a different universe? Then no consciousness or 
intentionality would be present, because it would not be in the right physical environment for which 
the dispositional interactions were apt to constitute content.
Imagine a key – a key has intrinsic properties, and because of these, it is able to unlock a certain 
lock; that it is able to unlock that lock of course also depends on the shape of the lock – where it 
different, the key would not be able to unlock it269. Such is the way to imagine deep integration – 
consciousness and intentionality as the key, the world as the lock; both are necessary to go together. 
Internalism disregards  the  latter  intuition.  Internalism is  like  a  key without  a  lock.  And a  key 
without a lock, as everybody knows, is useless.
This conception of things could solve a problem in another domain. While Swampman here on 
Earth would be a veritable curiosity, in a cosmological scenario, he is not so seldom – in fact, he 
should be the rule, and comes under the name of a Boltzmann Brain (BB):
A century ago Boltzmann considered a "cosmology" where the observed 
universe  should  be  regarded  as  a  rare  fluctuation  out  of  some 
equilibrium  state.  The  prediction  of  this  point  of  view,  quite 
generically, is that we live in a universe which maximizes the total 
entropy of the system consistent with existing observations. Other 
universes simply occur as much more rare fluctuations. This means as 
much as possible of the system should be found in equilibrium as often 
as possible.
From this point of view, it is very surprising that we find the 
universe around us in such a low entropy state. In fact, the logical 
conclusion of this line of reasoning is utterly solipsistic. The most 
likely fluctuation consistent with everything you know is simply your 
brain (complete with "memories" of the Hubble Deep fields, WMAP data, 
etc)  fluctuating  briefly  out  of  chaos  and  then  immediately 
269 This example is inspired by (Heil 2003, p. 124).
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equilibrating  back  into  chaos  again.  This  is  sometimes  called  the 
"Boltzmann’s Brain" paradox... (Albrecht & Sorbo 2004)270
A simple visualization makes everything clear271:
A normal history point in a universe that is not a farce would be A or B, both of which would 
look into the past when looking “downward”. A farcical BB would be located at point C – complete 
with a history pointing back to a Big Bang. C, of course, is a random fluctuation much more likely 
than the one in which A and B live.
This scenario can definitely be avoided by an externalist account of content – BBs would have 
no contentful states at all. But also Heil's account is sufficient, if one acknowledges that the view as 
a metaphysical whole is inimical to the conception of the world arising out of a random mess. In 
Heil's view, the world has the structure it has because of the dispositional character of the objects 
therein. An agent has intentional states because of his dispositional makeup – but this only makes 
270 See Boltzmann (1895), the last paragraph.
271 (Carroll 2006) 
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sense with dispositional interaction partners; you can't take such a dispositional creature out of his 
world; that intuition is Cartesian.
With the tool of deep integration tucked away in our backpack, we are fit for the next leg in our 
journey.
 4.4.3 Computational Functionalism in the Philosophy of Mind
 4.4.3.1 Computationalism and Functionalism
It is often argued that because brains and computers basically are 
composed of the same atomic and electrical components, there is no 
reason ‘in principle’ why computers could not some day be capable of 
having inner experiences such as sentience and consciousness. Yet all 
matter is basically composed of particles with electrical charges, but 
that does not prevent the elements in the periodic table from having 
quite different properties and causal powers based on their atomic 
numbers. Moreover, the atomic composition of substances, such as CO2 
and  HCl  or  NaOH  and  H2SO4,  makes  all  the  difference  as  to  their 
properties  and  causal  capacities,  despite  their  being  basically 
electrical. The chemical composition of genes is not protein but that 
of nucleic acids. Should not the fact that our neural networks, unlike 
computers,  are  chemical-electrical  along  with  being  internally 
programmed  by  evolution  make  a  crucial  difference  as  to  their 
capabilities? (Schlagel 1999)
The following section is a bit technical. The reader who has no investment in computational 
functionalism (CF) may skip it; although it may be interesting for the purpose of understanding how 
materialism differs from functionalism, two doctrines often held and endorsed simultaneously by 
scientists272.  Those  who believe  that  a  computation  can  lead  to  consciousness  qua (functional)  
computation  – independent of physical considerations – are the main audience of the following 
section. What is at issue is the following273:
There  is  a  common  intuition  among  people  to  the  effect  that 
computers and robots lack an essential aspect of what makes us human. 
[...] The most outspoken advocate of the exclusionist view, however, 
is John Searle. As we saw in the case of chess, Searle’s main argument 
272 Indeed, CF comes from the wish to accommodate consciousness in a materialist worldview. Consciousness can be 
accommodated, but not by CF, because, as we will see, it clashes with materialism.
273 In fact, the position advocated here is similar to Searle's Biological Naturalism (Searle 2007).
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is based on the putative lack of original meaning in computers. Like 
Nagel,  however,  he  is  also  concerned  with  consciousness,  which  he 
takes to be a direct product of “the causal powers of the brain” 
(2002: 67). Thus, although he poses “no objection in principle to 
constructing an artificial hardware system that would duplicate the 
powers  of  the  brain  to  cause  consciousness  using  some  chemistry 
different  from  neurons,”  he  argues  that  “computation  by  itself  is 
insufficient to guarantee any such causal powers” (ibid.). Searle’s 
main argument relies on his famous thought experiment of the Chinese 
room, (Ekbia 2008, p. 81)274
The contrary position is, of course, that consciousness can be "lifted" from the substrate – by 
ascribing it to computational processes, not to causal features of matter.  Let us bring some order 
into the debate. Computationalism275 can be defined in a harmless way:
Computationalism is the view that intelligent behavior is causally 
explained by computations performed by the agent’s cognitive system 
(or brain). (Piccinini 2009) 
There is nothing problematic about explaining behavior computationally; indeed computational, 
mechanistic  models  are  very  good explanations  for  cognitive  processes.  But  this  question  is 
independent (as Piccinini also later notes) as to how cognition and mind relate to the brain. It could 
well be that computationalism is a good epistemic shortcut for describing cognitive states which 
themselves are something quite different. 
This  all  raises  the  question  of  what  exactly  we  mean  with  computation.  We  can  view  a 
computation as a process that produces outputs from inputs. Together with a liberal view of states – 
every physical state is a computational state – we will find computational processes everywhere. 
Saying that everything is a computing system in this sense simply boils down to the assertion that 
the  universe  follows  (strict)  laws.  Computationalism  can  also  signify  processes  that  perform 
information  processing;  again,  we will  find  very many computational  processes  of  this  sort  in 
nature.
But  I  will  concentrate  on  a  more  stringent  kind  of  computationalism here  --  the  notion  of 
computation  prevalent  in  computer  science  and  mathematical  logic,  namely  that  of  Turing 
computability or effective  mechanisms. Effective mechanisms is an informal notion formalized – 
274 The reference (2002) is to (Searle 2002).
275 Computationalism as used here is not opposed to connectionism.
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according  to  the  Church-Turing  Thesis  (Church  1936;  Turing  1936) –  with  the  equivalent 
formalisms  of  the  Universal  Turing  Machine,  the  Lambda  Calculus  or  Recursive  Functions. 
Computationalism as relevant here is then Putnam's machine state functionalism:
According to Putnam's machine state functionalism, any creature with 
a mind can be regarded as a Turing machine (an idealized finite state 
digital computer), whose operation can be fully specified by a set of 
instructions (a “machine table” or program) each having the form:
If the machine is in state  Si, and receives input  Ij, it will go 
into state  Sk and produce output  Ol (for a finite number of states, 
inputs and outputs).
A  machine  table  of  this  sort  describes  the  operation  of  a 
deterministic automaton,  but  most  machine  state  functionalists  […] 
take the proper model for the mind to be that of a  probabilistic 
automaton: one in which the program specifies, for each state and set 
of inputs, the  probability with which the machine will enter some 
subsequent state and produce some particular output. (Levin 2004)
The core assumption of functionalism is substrate independence: what counts is the relation of 
inputs to outputs and internal states; if they are realized by carbon creatures or silicon computers is 
of no concern:
Stones,  trees,  carburetors  and  kidneys  do  not  have  minds,  not 
because they are not made out of the right materials, but because they 
do  not  have  the  right  kind  of  functional  organization;  their 
functional organization does not appear to be sufficiently complex to 
render  them  minds.  Yet  there  could  be  other  thinking  creatures, 
perhaps even made of Swiss cheese, with the appropriate functional 
organization. (Shagrir 2005)
I would like to point out for the sake of clarity that computationalism and functionalism are 
logically independent:
To  get  functionalism  from  computationalism,  we  also  need  an 
additional assumption, such as that the nature of mental states is 
(entirely) computational. To get computationalism from functionalism, 
we also need the independent assumption that all functional states are 
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computational. Both of these assumptions are controversial; neither is 
especially plausible. (Piccinini 2009) 
So  here,  I  will  take  a  look  exactly  at  this  “implausible”  combination  –  computational 
functionalism (CF), which AI researchers in the strong AI276 community nevertheless hold, at least 
implicitly.
CF then asserts that:
• mental states are computational states, and only computational states
• all functional states are computational in nature
This position is of interest because it holds promise that one can program an AI. Denying CF 
makes this project largely hopeless. To be precise: it does not make AI  per se hopeless, only the 
notion of programming one.
The materialistic view – that matter matters, and function is not enough -- is often deemed 
chauvinistic, because it seems to accord special pride of place to  organics such as humans. That 
may be so; but the present view is more subtle. Let us proceed slowly. First of all, my motivation, as 
can be guessed from everything written above,  is  not to reserve any special  place for mind or 
humans  in  the  order  of  things.  The  denial  of  CF  proposed  here  especially  has  no religious 
overtones; the rejection of CF follows for  ontological reasons alone. CF is a result of the picture 
theory, and must be thrown out together with the picture theory.
What I also do not intend to say is that human minds are more powerful than "mere machines". 
It should be noted that Turing's conception of a Turing machine places limits on human cognition 
(Dresner 2008); anybody who claims that human minds are superior to computers is welcome to 
compute a function that a Universal Turing Machine can't compute. 
What is at issue here is not a cognitive superiority of humans to machines -- an attitude which is 
totally foreign to this thesis. -- but the question of if the fundamental physical structure of the world, 
and thus, consciousness which is the "inside view" of certain physical  structures, is completely 
captured  by a  high-level  computational  view.  Maybe,  of  course,  the  universe  as  a  whole  is  a 
276 Strong AI is the doctrine that it is possible to create thinking machines, not merely intelligent machines.
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computation – pancomputationalism277 – and then mind is trivially also part of this computation – 
more on this below.
The CF view of mind is deeply related to conceiving the mind and ourselves as machines. But 
there are machines and there are machines. We can continue to conceive of ourselves as machines 
without adopting CF. Following Harnad it is is difficult to see how we could not be machines:
...if we do follow this much more sensible route to the definition 
of "machine," we will find that a machine turns out to be simply: any 
causal physical system, any "mechanism." And in that case, biological 
organisms are machines too...(Harnad 2003) 
This  can,  I  think,  be  taken  for  granted  by  every  scientifically  minded  person;  and  indeed 
conceiving of yourself as a machine in such a way can be a very healthy process, because it leads to 
inquiry into mechanisms of behavior and the adoption of strategies to optimize behavior – we saw 
this above in the section on optimal will. But physical machines need not be Turing Machines; that 
would be committing the Church-Turing Fallacy, which
is to believe that the Church–Turing thesis, or some formal or semi-
formal result established by Turing or Church, secures the following 
proposition:
If the mind–brain is a machine, then the Turing-machine computable 
functions provide sufficient mathematical resources for a full account 
of human cognition. (Copeland 2004)
This is not true:
But Turing had no result entailing that “a standard digital computer 
...can compute any rule-governed input–output function.” What he did 
have was a result entailing the exact opposite. The theorem that no 
Turing machine can decide the predicate calculus entails that there 
277 Piccinini has something funny to say about pancomputationalism in one of his papers:
I have encountered two peculiar responses to pancomputationalism: some 
philosophers find it obviously false, too silly to be worth refuting; others 
find it obviously true, too trivial to require a defence. Neither camp sees 
the need for this paper. But neither camp seems aware of the other camp. 
(Piccinini 2007) 
This is also true of other philosophical positions. Something that is regarded as obvious in one research community is 
regarded as unbelievable in another. I have encountered this phenomenon a number of times in my interdisciplinary 
ventures. I say this because many people may hold the philosophy of computational functionalism to be obviously 
wrong, and not understand why I am at pain to show that it can't be held upright. Functionalism is far from dead 
(Buechner 2008).
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are rule-governed input–output functions that no Turing machine is 
able to compute – for example, the function whose output is 1 whenever 
the input is a statement that is provable in the predicate calculus, 
and is 0 for all other inputs. There are certainly possible patterns 
of responses to the environment, perfectly systematic patterns, that 
no Turing machine can display. One is the pattern of responses just 
described. The halting function is a mathematical characterization of 
another such pattern. (Copeland 2004) 
The CF view is stricter than merely saying that we are machines: CF is closely related to the 
idea that we could take the computational description of ourselves at certain levels and build a new 
version  of  ourselves  with  this  description,  in,  say,  another  substrate,  a  substrate  which  can 
instantiate all the relations of that the level under scrutiny.  These are the ideas underlying whole 
brain emulation (WBE):
An important issue to be determined is whether […] a cut off exists‐  
in the case of the human brain and, if it does exist, at what level. 
While this paper phrases it in terms of simulation/emulation, it is 
encountered  in  a  range  of  fields  (AI,  cognitive  neuroscience, 
philosophy of mind) in other forms: what level of organisation is 
necessary for intelligent, personal, or conscious behaviour? 
A key assumption of WBE is that, at some intermediary level of 
simulation resolution between the atomic and the macroscopic, there 
exists at least one cut off such that meeting criteria 1a and 1b at‐  
this level of resolution also enables the higher criteria to be met. 
(Sandberg & Bostrom 2008, p. 12)
Where 1a and 1b are
1a: An inventory of all objects on a particular size scale, their 
properties and interactions. (Low level neural structure, chemistry, 
dynamics accurate to resolution level.)
1b: A complete 3D scan of a brain at high resolution.
(Sandberg & Bostrom 2008, p. 11)
And higher levels include:
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'Mind emulation': The emulation is truly conscious in the same way 
as a normal human being. (Sandberg & Bostrom 2008, p. 11)
While Sandberg and Bostrom do acknowledge details of organic processes, they express the 
view that there is  a  functional description  at a certain level which can be emulated; and then, 
optimally, the emulation will be as conscious as the original brain. If that is not the picture theory at 
work, I know not what.
I have, like Searle, two main objections against the CF view278. In my case, they come from the 
metaphysical  picture  painted  in  this  thesis  –  one  coming  from the  notion  of  meaning and  the 
concept  of  deep integration,  the other  from notion of  the identity of dispositional  (causal)  and 
qualitative powers. Let us have a look at each in turn.
 4.4.3.2 Meaning
One of the most well known arguments for the problematic nature of meaning in computational 
systems is the Chinese room argument put forth by Searle (1980). A human sits inside a room, and 
manipulates Chinese symbols according to instructions – the human does not understand Chinese, 
but manipulates the symbols in a purely "mechanical" way. As computers do nothing but manipulate 
symbols mechanically, they, as well, do not understand. Searle is opposing strong AI: the idea that 
formal symbol manipulation can lead to actually thinking machines. Searle's intention was to show 
that meaning lies at the heart of understanding, not mechanical symbol manipulation.
In short, programs can't, qua running as program, constitute understanding, intentionality etc:
We  might  summarize  the  […]  argument  as  a  reductio  ad  absurdum 
against Strong AI as follows. Let L be a natural language, and let us 
say that a "program for L" is a program for conversing fluently in L. 
A computing system is any system, human or otherwise, that can run a 
program.
278 There is a third objection. The moment we accept that digitizing persons and copying them arbitrarily is possible, 
we make a farce of science and the universe. Bostrom argues that in the case future civilizations will actually run 
simulations of the past (and thereby also simulating your current experience), we are probabilistically forced to 
believe that we already live in a simulation now (Bostrom 2003).
Marchal goes even further; in an argument of eight steps he shows that in case we assume that persons can be "run" on a 
computer, we must conclude that physics follows from the sum of all (Platonic) computations (Marchal 2004). The 
argument has some problems in detail, but the core point is this: if there is a possibility to make duplicates of 
yourself, and you assume that these duplicates are actually run, then what you expect to happen in your next 
moment of experience depends on what happens to the majority of your duplicates – indeed, the physical world 
loses it's power if enough virtual worlds exist which simulate your continuations.
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(1) If Strong AI is true, then there is a program for Chinese such 
that if any computing system runs that program, that system thereby 
comes to understand Chinese. 
(2) I could run a program for Chinese without thereby coming to 
understand Chinese.
(3) Therefore Strong AI is false.
The  second  premise  is  supported  by  the  Chinese  Room  thought 
experiment. The conclusion of this [...] argument is that running a 
program cannot create understanding. (Cole 2004)
The computer does not understand anything, because it is only manipulating symbols without 
any intrinsic sense. And indeed, if we look at the bootstrapping process for a computer, there is 
nothing but machine language, relating to itself; gates switching and switching and switching...it 
has come about by human designers, having their own goals in mind; goals of calculation, of exact 
mechanical behaviour etc
Meaning is grounded – via evolution – in reality. This grounding is so basic that it is easy to 
miss. That does not mean that it is impossible to create thinking, feeling, conscious machines; it is 
just that restrictions are more severe than initially supposed.
The fact that the primary function of the central nervous system in 
higher organisms seems to have evolved to represent a world to these 
creatures  explains  the  difference  in  meaning  of  ‘designation’  and 
‘interpretation’ for humans compared to computers. Although proponents 
of AI attempt to mask this difference by referring to ‘the symbol 
manipulating machine’ and ‘neural net representations,’ the physical 
symbols  lack  designation  and  cognitive  meaning,  while  by 
‘representation’  in  neural  nets  is  actually  meant  the  encoding  of 
patterns  of  physical  stimuli,  not  an  actual  representation  in  the 
sense in which our brains represent a world.
In  fact,  consciousness  would  seem  to  consist  mainly  in  having 
representations,  which  is  why  consciousness  is  not  attributed  to 
computers, however marvelous their computational abilities. (Schlagel 
1999) 
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We  are  selected  by  evolution  to  represent the  world  –  that  is  one  of  the  points  of  deep 
integration. Computers are not selected in this way. A prediction of deep integration would be that 
AI's must be  trained in the physical environment to develop sufficient meaning; they must learn 
meaning via perceptors and actuators, feeding back into a representational substrate; meaning can 
not  be  programmed  via  symbols.  But  that  is  not  enough279.  Apart  from  that,  in  accord  with 
materialism, the representational medium can't be ignored – even if we accept Tononi's functional 
account of information integration – not every material, it seems, can achieve a  sufficiently dense 
kind of information integration. Which kinds of matter are sufficient to generate interesting kinds of 
consciousness  are  empirical  questions.  What  we  can  exclude  is  that  something  that  was  not 
conscious, such as a computer, becomes conscious by running the right kinds of programs on it. But 
now we turn to dispositions.
 4.4.3.3 Dispositions Again
A computational description is primarily that: a description at a certain level of abstraction.  
Here is where the tension arises: the physical world is all about particularity, specificity, and detail; 
and  mathematics  is  all  about  abstraction,  equivalence  classes,  and  structural  similarities. 
Mathematical  equivalence does not  smoothly translate  into physical  equivalence.  We could,  for 
instance, construct a computer out of silicon, or even out of some more outlandish ingredient – 
Chinese people, for instance (Block 1980). If we were to draw a state space diagram with possible 
nomological  transitions  of  the  systems  in  question  (the  silicon  computer  on  the  one  hand,  the 
Chinese people computer on the other), these would turn out to be  completely different; in fact, 
different beyond recognition. Yet functionally – when we draw maps of the computations they can 
perform – they would be indistinguishable. Now, one can follow through with functionalism and 
ascribe  mental  states  to  the  Chinese  people  computer;  but  that  is  clearly  not  physicalism  or 
materialism anymore, because then we do not look at nomological (physical) properties. Mental 
states are attributed to systems solely due to functional relations they instantiate at some level or 
other.
But matter matters. Let us consider a harmless fellow – the gecko. The gecko's abilities depend 
on the very physical world he lives in:
Geckos  have  evolved  one  of  the  most  versatile  and  effective 
adhesives known. The mechanism of dry adhesion in the millions of 
279 That is, sensorimotor grounding will not be enough, as Kiverstein (2007) argues. Sensorimotor grounding will most 
probably be necessary, but not sufficient.
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setae on the toes of geckos has been the focus of scientific study for 
over a century. We provide the first direct experimental evidence for 
dry adhesion of gecko setae by van der Waals forces, and reject the 
use  of  mechanisms  relying  on  high  surface  polarity,  including 
capillary adhesion. (Autumn et al. 2002)
If physics were not as it were, the gecko would not have his cool adhesive toes. There is no 
functional abstraction – adhesiveness – that is satisfying for the gecko. Certainly, we can define a 
predicate “adhesiveness” and categorize different forms of physically occurring adhesiveness under 
this one form. But the abstraction we make would come at a cost: we could not be sure that the kind 
of adhesiveness we mean is the kind of adhesiveness we need in a physical situation. The gecko 
would be very unhappy with office-glue type adhesiveness, for instance.
Why should mind be independent of material properties, when adhesiveness is not? That seems 
very Cartesian/dualist  to  me.  Relying on functional  relations  entails  a commitment  to  substrate 
independence; that there is a reasonable abstract level of description below which we are free to 
substitute  different  matter  elements  to  fulfill  the  role  prescribed  by  the  functional  description. 
Computer gates can be realized by semiconductors, relays, vacuum tubes, water pipes and troughs; 
but their behaviour will differ (in reliability, speed of computation, ease of reading off of results, 
size of the system, effectiveness under different environmental conditions such as winter, summer 
etc). But clearly, even here we can't abstract away from  all material properties: for instance, we 
couldn't  work  with  air  exclusively.  There  is  the  tension  again  between  material  processes  and 
abstract descriptions thereof. Materialism takes nomological properties of matter seriously. Causal 
patterns are considered relevant,  down to the  finest  granularity of  detail.  But abstraction is  the 
deathsman of detail.
Kary and Mahner give illustrative examples of how function can't be separated from material 
properties:
Now consider a slightly more demanding process, namely what one 
might call ‘wheeling’. Recall that the difference between what one 
might in general call a ‘roller’, namely anything with a round cross-
section, and a wheel, is the presence of a hub and axle. We find that, 
while  solids,  liquids  and  even  gases  might  roll,  and  that  while 
rollers do occur frequently in nature, only solids can be used to 
build wheels, and no wheels occur naturally. Furthermore, not every 
combination of solids makes for a good wheel: for one to be used in a 
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simple pushcart, for example, the materials must be chosen so that 
among other things, the friction between the outer rim and the ground 
is always appropriately greater than the friction between the hub and 
the axle. Thus, not only are there new restrictions placed on the 
possible  components,  but  also  upon  the  internal  structure  of  the 
system (the friction at the hub), the external structure (the friction 
between  the  rim  and  the  ground),  and  even  upon  the  relationship 
between the internal and external structures. 
The point of this example is to show that the more complex and 
specialized the function, the more it becomes tied to the special 
properties of specific materials and systems. This is only a general 
rule of thumb; sometimes even very simple properties are tied very 
specifically  to  special  systems.  Consider  for  example  the  atomic 
property of being able to join together with like atoms to form long 
chains and branched molecular systems: there is but one atom that has 
this property, namely the carbon atom. There is a simple molecule that 
has a similar property, namely SiO, silicone; but the dissociation 
energy of such bonds between SiO molecules is significantly greater 
than  that  between  carbon  atoms,  so  only  carbon  is  suitable  as  a 
biomolecular building block for the temperatures encountered here on 
planet Earth.
It is then simply a reflection of the facts of nature that while 
some process classes are very large, others are extremely small. (Kary 
& Mahner 2002) 
Or consider Wieland280 the Smith,  a character out of Germanic mythology281.  He forged the 
formidable sword Mimung. He forged it three times anew: every time he fragmented the sword into 
little metal shavings, mixed them with wheat and let geese eat them. He then remade the sword out 
of the geese droppings; the final sword was incredibly strong and sharp. In modern terms, what 
Wieland did was to perform the process of nitrogen hardening of steel (the nitrates being contained 
in the bird excrement). We see that the addition of only a few key chemical elements changes the 
property  of  the  whole  significantly.  A  more  modern  example  would  be  the  doping  of 
semiconductors to change their electrical properties. In this case, often only as a few as one atom 
per hundred million atoms is needed to change the properties of the material in question.
280 Anglosaxon: Veland.
281 Thidrekssaga, 57-79
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Let us move closer to biology and the brain. First of all, neurons come in all forms and shapes. 
That should surly make a difference. But let us concentrate on something else: neurotransmitters, 
which also come in great variety and types (Kalat 2007, p. 59f). Most neurotransmitters are amino 
acids, proteins. When we look at proteins, we discover primary structure – the amino acid sequence; 
secondary structure – alpha helix or beta sheet; and tertiary structure – the fold of the protein due to 
mainly noncovalent interactions. Even a quaternary structure – multiple-subunit proteins – can be 
discerned. All these structures make a difference in one setting or another. Eliminate the structure 
and you eliminate the function.
What about the relation of carbon and silicon? In philosophy there is a well known class of 
arguments that go by the name of Sorites-Paradoxes282: they highlight the vagueness of language. A 
classical Sorites-style argument is the “inability” to make a  heap of sand from sand  grains. One 
sand grain is not a heap of sand; two neither; and the addition of one more sand grain can certainly 
not make a heap of this allotment; and so on. One can also do this argument the other way round by 
beginning with a heap of sand and consecutively removing grains; at the end, one will have a heap 
without any grains in it! This is of course only a conundrum for philosophers afflicted by the picture 
theory or those who suffer from even more serious conditions283.
Now let's start, sorites-style, substituting silicon neurons for the real thing in the brain. Surely, 
one silicon neuron will not make a person much different; and certainly not unconscious. And, so 
the  computationalist  reasoning  goes,  if  we  only  keep  functional  equivalence  we  can  go  on 
substituting biological neurons for silicon: at the end we should have a conscious entity – the same 
person actually – but made out of silicon instead of carbon284. The problem is of course this: at what 
level do you want to  ascribe functional equivalence? At the material level, silicon and carbon (to 
pick out two main chemical ingredients) are certainly not equivalent, otherwise they would not have 
been called differently by chemists and would not merit different entries in the periodic table. The 
reader may convince himself of the different properties of carbon and silicon in every elementary 
chemistry textbook285.
282 "soros" is Greek for "heap". The sorites-puzzle is attributed to having been first presented by Eubulides of Miletus 
(Hyde 2005).
283 Computer scientists should have no problem debunking sorites style arguments: consider highly available computer 
systems which operate with redundancy – you can let some parts break, and the system will still work; with luck, 
when the load isn't high, nobody will even notice anything. But go too far with this game, and the system breaks 
down. The system will definitely not be highly-available when all supporting computers have broken down.
284 Read carbon as pars pro toto for all matter that makes up a neuron.
285 For instance Zumdahl (2007).
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Different material  properties at  the micro-physical  granularity have big consequences in the 
macroscopic world: the properties of silicon and carbon, while being mutually more similar than 
any one of them compared with an element of a different group, give rise to very different structures 
when aggregated. They differ in their dispositional properties, and that means, under the present 
metaphysics, also in their  qualitative properties. There is no "higher-level" functional substitution 
that leaves the qualitative properties intact.
So,  a  gradual  substitution  with  silicon  neurons  will  eventually  lead  to  different  qualitative 
properties; a single silicon neuron will most probably not make a difference; substituting the whole 
brain definitely will. Maybe there are silicon substitutions that will be able to sustain conscious 
states – if they support enough information integration as in Tononi's theory. But if that is the case, 
that will be because silicon can support consciousness – silicon consciousness – sui generis, and not 
because of functional equivalence.
It is also interesting to consider altered states of consciousness. Drugs – alcohol as the most 
common form – alter states of consciousness. More invasive is anesthesia; in all these cases, the 
alteration of the current material makeup – even if only temporary, that is, the mere alteration of the 
causal "runtime" behaviour – can alter or even eliminate conscious states. The functionalist will 
simply say that  function has been disrupted. But how? By the introduction of different  materials 
into the conscious system. Again, material properties do the actual work.
The  functionalist  or  computationalist  will  be  hard-pressed  to  suggest  material  substitutions 
which have no effect. In short, I do not see how changing the material substance – which always 
suggest  changing the  dispositional  and  qualitative  nature  of  the  entity in  question  –  can  leave 
conscious states unaltered. But if this is not possible, then functionalism (or computationalism) as a 
metaphysical doctrine is false (albeit epistemologically helpful). It means, in effect, that there is no 
"substitution" level in human beings where neurons can be replaced by something else and lead to 
the same qualitative states.
Because a computer lacks neurons and the chemical components of 
neural  transmitters,  such  as  dopamine  and  serotonin,  one  does  not 
expect  computers  to  develop  schizophrenia  or  Alzheimer’s  disease, 
although  they  can  ‘crash’  for  other  reasons.  But  sentience  and 
consciousness are dependent upon the same chemical components, so why 
should one reject the former and expect the latter? More over, because 
it is believed that dopamine is the chemical that also plays a major 
role in creating the sensation of pleasure, it is unlikely that such 
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sensations will occur in mediums that lack that chemical, as well as 
the underlying organic structure in which it functions. Considering 
how  the  slightest  chemical  imbalance  or  deficiency  in 
neurotransmitters  in  an  organism  can  affect  its  experience,  is  it 
likely  that  consciousness  or  sentience  might  emerge  in  machines 
entirely devoid of chemicals? (Schlagel 1999) 
Little changes in neurotransmitter levels amount to big changes in experience – so why should 
big changes (circuits instead of organic compounds) not lead to big changes in experience, so big as 
to maybe even lead to no experiences?
Our consciousness is not independent of micro-states realizing the same higher-level functional 
states– that is a Picture Theory fantasy. Functionalism is scientifically respectable because it gives 
high  level  descriptions  of  regularities  of  interest  to  human  beings.  Functional  descriptions  are 
epistemic shortcuts of the unified, complex world. The functionalist account extracts higher order 
regularities  but  should  not  be  imbued  with  ontological  significance.  In  this  restricted  sense 
functionality certainly plays  a  role286,  but  the functional  role  can't  be abstracted away,  rather  it 
depends both on the causal history which led to exactly that kind of function in the organism and on 
the current microcausal structure (which of course originated historically).
We  are the  finest  level  of  reality  in  operation.  We  are  the  quantum287.  There  is  no  atom, 
molecule, cell, organ or organism independent of the quantum. The smallest "parts" we are made of 
are just the smallest dispositional causal slices we can make of the world: that is, when we look 
with great precision at the fundamental constituents of nature, we are not actually discovering lower 
levels which can support independent higher levels, but rather we are discovering the fundamental  
causal entities. We may, with technical prowess, isolate causal entities -- slice them off – and then 
discover how they behave in isolation (as when we isolate atoms for experiments) but we are never 
looking at a "lower level". We are the "lowest" level in the first place.
To continue Harnad's machine quote above:
… and the answer to our question "Can a machine be conscious" is a 
trivial "Yes, of course." We are conscious machines. Hence machines 
can obviously  be conscious.  The rest  is just  about what  kinds of 
machines can and cannot be conscious, and how -- and that becomes a 
286 That qualia are tightly related to function is explicated in Cole (2000).
287 If that is the finest level.
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standard  empirical  research  program  in  "cognitive  science"..(Harnad 
2003)
Indeed. What kinds of machines are conscious? Remember that Harnad defines machines as 
causal physical systems. That is something different than a Turing machine. Sloman recognizes this 
point: 
… there are (at least) two very different concepts of computation: 
one of which is concerned entirely with properties of certain classes 
of  formal  structures  that  are  the  subject  matter  of  theoretical 
computer  science  (a  branch  of  mathematics),  while  the  other  is 
concerned with a class of information-processing machines that can 
interact causally with other physical systems and within which complex 
causal interactions can occur. Only the second is important for AI 
(and philosophy of mind). (Sloman 2004) 
Could AIs be conscious in the sense of strong AI288? First of all, there is no theory whatever 
which predicts that such a thing were not possible. Consciousness is very much part of the fabric of 
the world. And, we observe strong "I's" (intelligences) every day: your fellow humans, yourself etc. 
We are conscious, and we live in this physical world, made of the same physical stuff as everything 
else. Our consciousness is a property of the matter we are made of, not something magical tacked 
on as an afterthought. Physical matter configurations can become conscious; so much is clear.
Now, in  line  with panqualicism,  different  kinds  of  matter  –  not  only carbon compounds  – 
probably  will have mental states – that is,  if these different kinds of matter can form sufficiently  
complex structures. Here carbon compounds do enjoy considerable advantage over other materials. 
But, if mind arises, it will be a different kind of mind than a human mind; mind can't be abstracted 
and lifted onto another substrate. Different substrate, different mind. And another point is important: 
if these other entities are conscious, they will not be conscious in virtue of computational properties 
but in virtue of material properties.
Maybe the necessary and sufficient criteria for consciousness are the following: what we need is 
a material substrate which supports highly complex parallel interactions, satisfying Tononi's IIT 
288 Separate from the question of consciousness is the question of intelligence; weak AI is trivially possible, indeed, we 
already have it. Weak AI is about simulating intelligent behavior. The behavior need be connected neither to 
understanding, insight, nor consciousness. Simulation, it should be noted, is not the real thing. To bring well-known 
examples: a simulated fire is not hot, a simulated stomach does not suggest, and a simulated thunderstorm is not 
windy, cold, and wet. Now, a simulated stomach may not digest, but maybe an artificial stomach having the right 
causal powers will digest; again, we are driven back to the question of what the right causal powers are – not what 
the right computations are.
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criterion, standing in the right causal relations to the world so as to give rise to representational 
structures. Currently,  these conditions are satisfied by certain biological organism. Maybe,  with 
good  engineering  –  including  molecular  biology and  nanotechnology –  we  can  build  artificial 
entities that are also conscious. But the solution will be in matter, not in computations.
To connect all this with our discussion on identity above: while psychological continuity is very 
important for identity, it seems we  can't change the material substrate just so. So psychological 
continuity is largely mediated by  animal continuity, in line with animalism; the present position 
does justice to both intuitions on identity.
Those  who  are  not  satisfied  by  the  objection  from  meaning  and  the  objection  of  right 
dispositionality I refer to Appendix E: Maudlin's Olympia.
 4.4.4 A Computational Universe?
Maybe there is a method to reconcile some aspects of computationalism with our attaching the 
utmost  importance  to  material  differences:  namely  that  computationalism  is  not  a  theory  of 
cognition  but  is  more  apt  to  be  a  tool  for  modeling  causal  relations,  especially  micro-causal 
relations. That is, computationalism may be well alive as a physical doctrine, not one of cognition, 
when the  whole  universe  or  at  least  “local  patches  of  flux”  are  conceived  of  as  computations 
(Fredkin 1992; Fredkin 2003; Svozil 2005; Lloyd 2006); also Schiff (2008) 
The notion of the universe as a computer has other problems. I do not have the time to dwell, I 
just want to clarify that these are separate issues. Ruling out a computational theory of mind does 
not a priori rule out a computational theory of micro-causal relations. Of course, mind would then 
also be a micro-causal (computational) relation, but not one separable from the material substrate.  
Such a theory of computational mind would then be fundamentally different in kind than current 
computational theories of mind which have functionalist (abstract) connotations and which want to 
explain mind in computational terms, as opposed to just “carrying it along”. The explanation of 
mind in the present picture is given by the qualitative/dispositional account. 
An  example:  carbon  has  a  different  nomological  state  space  than  silicon.  Spoken 
computationally,  one could say that carbon  supports different computations than silicon. Maybe 
only the complex computations of carbon (what we normally refer to as its material properties) can 
give rise to sufficiently complex structures that have a mind worth speaking of. Clearly, nowhere do 
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we speak here of cognition anymore. Computation conceived in this way does not pick out anything 
special about minds, and thus would not be explanatory in cognitive science:
If pancomputationalism is true, so that everything is a computing 
system, then minds are computing systems too. But at the same time, 
computation ceases to be a specific kind of process among others. If 
the fact that minds are computing systems follows trivially from the 
fact that everything is, it is unclear how computation could explain 
how minds exhibit their peculiarly mental characteristics. (Piccinini 
2007) 
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 5.1 Introduction
The Sage falls asleep not
because he ought to
Nor even because he wants to
But because he is sleepy. 
(Smullyan 1977, p. 3)
In this last chapter, we will see what follows for us human beings in the world as painted above. 
Ethics have already been touched above, but will concern us again, from a slightly different angle. 
But  first  it  is  time  to  touch  on  a  few  spiritual  matters.  Why  does  spirituality  feature  in  a 
philosophical text aimed at locating humans in the natural world? Because that is a perfectly natural 
thing to do. Many humans have spiritual desire. Why should the naturalist be bereft of the right to 
exercise this desire? Spirituality is about finding  your relation to the universe; your place in the 
world. In this sense, it is also clear why ethics is tied closely to spirituality in many traditions: 
because other agents are also part of the universe to which you relate289.
But now to the subject at hand. The physicist Steven Weinberg writes:
The more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems 
pointless.
But if there is no solace in the fruits of our research, there is at 
least some consolation in the research itself. Men and women are not 
content to comfort themselves with tales of gods and giants, or to 
confine their thoughts to the daily affairs of life; they also build 
telescopes and satellites and accelerators, and sit at their desks for 
endless hours working out the meaning of the data they gather. The 
effort to understand the universe is one of the very few things that 
lifts human life a little above the level of farce, and gives it some 
of the grace of tragedy. (Weinberg 1977, p. 149)
That is the kind of writing which gives the scientific worldview a bad image. Why should such a 
reduced view of value follow from the scientific worldview? It may seem that by placing humans 
289 I will draw (only lightly) from existing spiritual traditions. I am always somewhat ambivalent when presenting 
connections with traditional texts; they contain deep insights, but also a lot of historical nonsense – often the 
metaphysics went awry at some point, leading to false conclusions. How, then, to tell the difference between insight 
and nonsense? By applying the standards of rationality, of course.
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thoroughly in the material world there can be no place left for value – but nothing could be further 
from the truth. A whole universe – literally – of value arises. Discarding the supernatural or the 
immaterial spirit/mind does not mean that we also have to discard the values that we hold; they just 
receive a different justification. 
We  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  mental  states  are certain  matter  states;  that  is,  the 
qualitative dimension of our experience is  built into the very fabric of the universe. Meaning, in 
fact, is everywhere: meaning lies in our experiences, and these experiences are natural, physical 
states; they do not need a further purpose derived from outside the universe; from a God; or from a 
teleology;  or  an  eschatology.  When  I  love  someone,  why should  this  be  devalued  by being  a 
physical state? Love can stand for itself – it is no less real or important just because it is a normal 
aspect of the physical universe. On the contrary, it is more real. Many people hear of such things as 
ethics  and  value  only  if  they  are  embedded  in  religious  discourse.  If  you  show  the  religious 
discourse to be largely untenable, the impression may arise that meaning is lost too. But that is only 
because the two are cognitively intertwined in respective human beings, not because of logical or 
metaphysical necessity.
We should see that everything real around is is actually everything we had from the beginning, 
and that is enough. The spring flower is enough. The loving couple is enough. The cat playing in the 
garden is enough. And yes, also the game of life and death in the jungle – is enough. The universe is 
a playful place; an insight captured in the vedantic doctrine of Lila:
Brahman is full of all perfections. And to say that Brahman has some 
purpose  in  creating  the  world  will  mean  that  it  wants  to  attain 
through the process of creation something which it has not. And that 
is impossible. Hence, there can be no purpose of Brahman in creating 
the world. The world is a mere spontaneous creation of Brahman. It is 
a Lila, or sport, of Brahman. It is created out of Bliss, by Bliss and 
for Bliss. Lila indicates a spontaneous sportive activity of Brahman 
as distinguished from a self-conscious volitional effort. The concept 
of Lila signifies freedom as distinguished from necessity."  (Misra 
1998) 
We can imagine that Lila is the splitting Godess; enacting reality as a playful sport. Eternity is a 
long time; you have to be quite imaginative to pass it; why not play a little? – and take joy in this 
play:
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 the perfect devotee does not suffer; for he can both visualize and 
experience life and the universe as the revelation of that Supreme 
Divine Force (shakti) with which he is in love, the all-comprehensive 
Divine Being in its cosmic aspect of playful, aimless display (lila) - 
which precipitates pain as well as joy, but in its bliss transcends 
them both. (Zimmer & Campbell 1969)
This is not the time to indulge in Indian religious scholarship; I will have to gloss over the 
concepts above and just take what comes easily. On Brahman, we read that one possible translation 
is:
the ultimate Reality; the ground of the universe; the Absolute; the 
Divine...It has nothing similar to it and nothing different from it, 
and  it  has  no  empirical  distinctions  from  the  acosmic  viewpoint. 
(Grimes 1996) 
For present purposes I will  equate Brahman with the Dao, as I am more familiar  with that 
terminology. The Dao is playful; it enacts everything, and we are part of this enactment. We can 
take joy in this.
 5.2 Why the Ultimate is not God
The most preposterous notion that Homo sapiens has ever dreamed up 
is  that  the  Lord  God  of  Creation,  Shaper  and  Ruler  of  all  the 
Universes, wants the saccharine adoration of His creatures, can be 
swayed by their prayers, and becomes petulant if He does not receive 
this flattery. (Heinlein 1973)
Tung-kuo Tzu asked Chuang-Tzu (Chuangtse), "Where is that which you 
call Tao?" Chuang-Tzu said, "Everywhere". Tung-kuo Tzu said "You must 
be more specific". Chuang-Tzu said, "It is in this ant". "In what 
lower?" "In this grass" "In anything still lower?" "It is in tiles". 
"Is it in anything lower still?" Chuang-Tzu said, "It is in ordure and 
urine". Tung-kuo Tzu had nothing more to say.(Creel 1970, p. 31)
If I use the word “Dao”290. to refer to ultimate reality – all of it; the ineffable suchness of being 
transcending any  one description,  some people  are  bound to  ask:  is  the Dao not  simply God? 
Everybody has different conceptions of God. But we can dispel some conceptions, and what is left 
will not mean God for most people, at least in the Western tradition.
290 A wonderful introduction to the Dao and Daoism for Western minds is Smullyan (1977).
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First of all, the Dao, as is even expressly said in the Dao Dejing, is something different than 
God:
The Tao is like a well: used but never used up.
It is like the eternal void: filled with infinite possibilities.
It is hidden but always present. I don't know who gave birth to it.
It is older than God. (LaoziMitchell 1995)(4)
The Dao also has no beliefs, desires and intentions. It knows not good and not evil. It is the 
mother of all things but does not lord it over them. It does not command and it does not punish:
The Tao doesn't take sides; it gives birth to both good and evil. 
(LaoziMitchell 1995)(5)
The Tao is called the Great Mother: empty yet inexhaustible, it 
gives birth to infinite worlds. (LaoziMitchell 1995)(6)
The Tao is infinite, eternal. Why is it eternal? It was never born; 
thus it can never die. Why is it infinite? It has no desires for 
itself; thus it is present for all beings. (LaoziMitchell 1995)(7)
The Way is like a great flooding river. How can it be directed to 
the left or right? The myriad things rely on it for their life but do 
not distinguish it. It brings to completion but cannot be said to 
exist. It clothes and feeds all things without lording over them. 
(LaoziMitchell 1995)(34)
The Dao, above all, is not a person; and it does not reserve a special place for human beings. 
Humans ride on the meaning of the universe, they do not play a privileged role in it.
In recent years, a number of prominent scientists have written on the topic of "the sacred"; most 
prominently Kauffman (2008). Sacred can mean a number of things, among them "forbidden" and 
"deserving  absolute  respect".  The  concept  of  Dao  has  no  connection  with  either  of  the  two 
meanings. The Dao is not sacred. It simply is. It does not want to be revered. It does not want 
anything. When thinking about the Dao, laugh
The Dao is also very different from God in another respect:
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In the Judeo-Christian religions, one hears much of “fear of God” 
and “love of God” - also “obedience to God”. In early Chinese Taoism, 
one speaks not so much in terms of “love of Tao” – and certainly not 
“fear of Tao”! - but rather of “being in harmony with the Tao”.
Fear of Tao is completely ludicrous! Tao loves and nourishes all 
things, but  does not  lord it  over them!  Tao is  something totally 
friendly and benevolent – friendly to all beings, not just those who 
believe in it or “accept it as their Saviour!”. Thus Tao is the sort 
of thing which is impossible to believe in without loving. But the 
loving  of  Tao  is  not  stressed  for  the  simple  reason  that  it  is 
obvious. To command love of Tao would be as silly as commanding one to 
love his closest friend. (Smullyan 1977, p. 50)
 5.3 Redemption: The Materialistic Soteriology of Change
Religion does not only talk about ethics, meaning and God, but also about an afterlife. Wouldn't 
an afterlife be cool? Humans seem to think so, otherwise they wouldn't strive for it. There is the 
hope to overcome death by processes such as cryonics (Ettinger 1964) or “uploading” of the mind, 
that is, transferring a person from an organic substrate into a different physical substrate, one which 
is amenable to digital manipulation.
Cryonics may work  (Merkle 1992). That depends on the development of nanotechnology and 
the ability to manipulate, in detail, complex biochemical processes. There is no principled reason 
why it should not work. As such, it  is a way to ensure psychological continuity in accord with 
animalism. Medicine is about life extension: sicknesses that would lead to death are cured, thereby 
postponing death. Cryonics is the continuation of this idea: if a person is sick in such a way that he 
is dead according to  current medical standards, the state of the body is stabilized via the cryo-
process to keep the causal structure making up the person intact until a future age where the person 
can be healed. Death, if cryonics works, only occurs when the causal structure constituting a person 
is irretrievably lost, radiated out into the environment by physical processes.
However, with cryonics, one is still bound to an organic material substrate, and it is questionable 
that even excellent rejuvenation medicine would lead to  eternal life. But it is a good bet for life 
extension. Some people hope for more. They hope to transit to an age where they can change to a 
substrate – go digital – where life is less fragile. But our investigation into computationalism above 
has shown that it is highly unlikely that this should work. Uploading a person will fail not because 
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the human mind is not a machine, but because the material processes in a brain – and the qualitative 
dispositions  –  are  so  very  different  from  those  in  a  different  material  medium.  Achieving 
immortality in that way seems to be barred by metaphysical reasons. 
This is actually a happy thought: imagine that it were possible to upload your personality onto a 
digital medium. Then it would be possible to make as many copies of your personality as possible. 
Sounds like heaven? Personal Backups? Eternal life in virtual scenarios? Well, it seems you can't 
create heaven without creating hell; because in such a scenario your  utmost priority would be to 
safeguard your digital copies; if someone else would get hold of them, he could start duplicating 
you, make slaves out of you; or torture you in virtual environments.
But,  as  I  said,  metaphysics  seems to  rule  out  eternal  life  in  a  computer  simulation  after  a 
personality-preserving upload.  The same metaphysics  also rules out negative scenarios – where 
your copies are stolen and abused. Such is the soteriology of a materialistic universe: that while 
there is no heaven, there also is no hell.
It seems that the price of community – that we can share experiences with each other – is death. 
To communicate, we have to have a world to refer to; that is, we need to be situated in a physical 
world and not be disembodied, eternal souls occupied in internal dialogue. A world which is static 
can't develop enough complexity to support cognitive entities. The world needs to be dynamic and 
full of change to give evolution a handle to build complex structures out of simpler constituents, 
complex structures which then relate to the world. But the cognitive entities thus generated, being 
of this world, have to underlie the very laws of the world and the conditions of change. This implies 
that beings of this world can't be immortal – because everything about these beings will change 
with time, so much so that finally we will have to admit that something has died and something new 
was born – see the next paragraph. Being immortal would mean possessing some invariable aspect 
that does not underlie change – at least some "core" aspect of you – what religions call the soul. It is 
not clear what purpose immutable souls could serve except providing some kind of ID-function. I 
do not think that that is what religions have in mind. Our meaning lies in our becoming – in the way 
we relate to the world and continue to relate to the world. What we are – our value – is I think more 
about what we have become – given our heritage and our possibilities – and what we can, will and 
want to become; rather than what we are at  a single snapshot at  time t.  So our very ability to 
dynamically relate to other beings – that which makes life ultimately worthwhile – is what also 
forces us to die – in one way or another.
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Some people will not be satisfied by this – they want heaven badly. So let us have a look at what 
it could possibly mean to live for eternity (as is usually the case in the afterlife). Let's start with 
shorter time spans: imagine that you are a conscious entity and that you will live for billions of 
years – remember Mr. Smith above? After a while, things will become boring. Cognitive dissonance 
will arise; and you can either try to search for new challenges, which will be ever more difficult to 
attain; or choose a simpler path: forgetting. And complete forgetting simply means living anew. 
Enjoying the world and each experience for the first time again. There is of course also the option 
of expanding your cognition abilities beyond recognition and keep total recall; again, I think this 
could be equated with your death as a human being.
A return to forgetful bliss – what is forgetting but dying and being born again? It is the circle of 
life and death. The knowledge that there is no substance to the self, that there is nothing over and 
above current physical instantiations, combined with panqualicism, is a doctrine of hope. Death is 
not the termination of a soul irretrievably lost, but just a transformation, a forgetting, a deletion of 
certain causal correlations (especially in the brain of the deceased). Experience continues elsewhere. 
A completely scientific view of persons is liberating:
When I believed the Non-Reductionist View, I also cared more about 
my inevitable death. After my death, there will no one living who will 
be me. I can now redescribe this fact. Though there will later be many 
experiences, none of these experiences will be connected to my present 
experiences by chains of such direct connections as those involved in 
experience-memory, or in the carrying out of an earlier intention. 
Some  of  these  future  experience  my  be  related  to  my  present 
experiences in less direct ways. There will later be some memories 
about my life. And there may later be thoughts that are influenced by 
mine, or things done as the result of my advice. My death will break 
the more direct relations between my present experiences and future 
experiences, but it will not break various other relations. This is 
all there is to the fact that there will be no on living who will be 
me. Now that I have seen this, my death seems to me less bad. (Parfit 
1984, p. 281)
An  ethical  aside291:  you  may  ask  why  we  should  care  about  our  future  states  when  all 
experiences are universal anyway – what would constitute a special relationship with our future 
states  as  opposed  to  the  future  states  of  someone  else?  First  of  all,  we  see  in  this  kind  of 
291 These things are deeply interrelated.
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consideration the rational core of ethics – that there is no essential difference between you and me. 
We should292 not  react  by not  caring about  our future  selves,  but  caring about  the future  (and 
present) selves of others too.
There is an answer to the question of why we think more about our future states than those of 
other beings: it is because we have a privileged connection to our own future experiences due to our 
agency and our privileged control of our future states. While our future is  influenced by many 
factors  outside of our control, it is undeniably the case that  agency confers on us some power to 
actively participate in the universe. We do not need free will for this, only causal power, and that is 
what we have. The weighing of alternatives (plans) and the possibly deterministic decision for one 
or another of these plans suffices.
Take  smoking:  I  can,  through  rational  deliberation  weigh  alternative  plans  and  compare 
outcomes and then choose the optimal course of actions, namely, for any situation X, not to smoke 
in situation X. I can not do this for another agent. Insofar as we can influence the future states of 
other people, we should assume moral293 responsibility.
But back to eternity: eternity, that is quite a bit longer than a few billion years. It means living 
through  cycles  of  universal death  and  creation  –  crunches  and  bangs  or  other  more  strange 
contortions of matter. Immortality,  in a way, is already equivalent to Godhood – but if one has 
become a God – what is there to do but split up again into the myriad shards of becoming and 
restart the sport of Lila?
Up to now we have dealt  with  physical conceptions of immortality – ones still  tied to this 
universe. But what about Heaven? What do people actually believe in when they want to become 
immortal and go to Heaven? Is it to be maximally happy forever? To live the lives they have failed 
to live now? I think people look for certainty in heaven; that things will be good; and that they will 
not  stop  being  good.  But  certainty is  stagnation.  Certainty is  absence  of  development,  lack  of 
surprise. Again, if you have eternity to spend, you have to be imaginative about what you are going 
to do294. But what is there to do in Heaven? Either Heaven presents a challenging (immortal) life, 
and thus will be quite similar to the physical world. To be challenging, it must encompass the mode 
292 Hypothetically should – if you are at all interested in being an ethical creature.
293 I do not want to distinguish moral and prudential concern here. When we dissolve the concept of person, the two 
become very similar.
294 People in Egan (1994) who have achieved immortality react for instance by "turning off" certain reflective routines 
and go into blissful repetitive states, such as mountain climbing or wood carving. Persons become sphexish and go 
into infinite loops of happiness.
251
Living in a Natural World
of failure. Thus Heaven need also contain adverse conditions, which seems a little contradictory to 
the notion of Heaven. 
Or maybe, in Heaven, you merely enjoy a state of eternal bliss – a state which is of dubious 
desirability, as I will remark on in section 5.5.1.2.
Now, I am not blowing in the same horn as neo-luddites295:
Raise the topic of cryonics, uploading, or just medically extended 
lifespan/healthspan, and some bioconservative neo-Luddite is bound to 
ask, in portentous tones:
"But what will people do all day?"
[...]
That doesn't mean it's a bad question.
(Yudkowsky 2008i)
As Yudkowsky admits, it isn't a bad question. Now, I support Yudkowsky's conception of  fun 
theory:
Fun Theory, then, is the field of knowledge that would deal in 
questions like:
• "How much fun is there in the universe?" 
• "Will we ever run out of fun?" 
• "Are we having fun yet?" 
• "Could we be having more fun?" (Yudkowsky 2008i) 
Yudkowsky (2009) presents thirty one possible laws of fun; aspects worth striving for in a better 
world. I agree with most points. But I believe that human fun space is limited, in the sense that 
human fun space does not scale to  immortal fun space (and time scales), and to transcend human 
fun space we would need to engage in large scale personal/societal transformation – so as to, for 
295 This whole thesis is about optimism about the future, the ability to change ourselves, and make the universe a better 
place – with the help of reason and the products of reason, especially technology.
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instance, engage in ever increasing novelty, a method for generating fun (Yudkowsky 2008j).  But 
what is large scale transformation other than personal death? 
Why attach  so  much  importance  to  a  continuation  of  psychological  experience,  when  the 
continuation will  be  severed along the way? The persons we are now, even if  we could "live" 
forever, would "die" along the way. If someone wants to follow this path, then nobody should stand 
in her way. I just  want to alleviate  angst which could ensue from trying to reach “immortality 
regions”.  It  is,  on  reflection,  not  so  important.  I  do  not  argue  against  the  possibility  of 
transformation per se. I argue against the opinion that this constitutes personal survival.
In other words, I question the importance of the goal of personal survival as opposed to survival 
of sentience per se (which is a quite different question). The extreme significance attributed to 
personal survival is of course ingrained in us by evolution, and traditional worldviews piggy-back 
on this. But the attitude stems from not having fully accepted what it means to be a material state in 
a material universe. That does not mean that you need embrace death. Only that it need not be 
feared.
The  basic  property  of  the  cosmos  –  eternal  change  –  is  it's  redeeming  feature.  Whatever 
suffering there is, it is not forever. Compared to the vastness of being, it is as nothing. That is the 
regulatory principle of the materialistic universe missing in certain religious conceptions of eternal 
reward or punishment. Change then is the soteriology of the material universe. Things are forgotten 
so that new things may arise. Maybe Leibniz was right. Maybe we do live in the best of all possible 
worlds (Leibniz 1710).
 5.4 Religion and Ethics
The relationship between religion and ethics is very problematic. While religions often claim 
that they are necessary for ethics, this is neither backed empirically nor stands up to conceptual 
analysis. First of all, there are different ways religions can operate: either with concepts like guilt, 
sin and authority296, like the monotheistic religions; or with concepts of compassion, unity with the 
universe  and  respect  for  other  beings;  at  the  core  of  many  of  the  eastern  religions  (Daoism, 
Shintoism, Buddhism, Jainism etc). Here I will just highlight one problematic aspect of the former.
The main problem of monotheistic religion today is not that it  clashes with science; but its 
deficient  ethics;  an ethics suitable for tribesmen of two thousand years past,  but not fit  for the 
296 The way these religions operate can be devastating for the individual (see Buggle (1992) for psychological effects) 
and damaging for society as a whole. (See Deschner (1986) for a “criminal history” of Christianity in ten volumes, 
nine of which have appeared.)
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current age of weapons of mass destruction and the global society. The deficiency of this ethics is 
elaborated in the literature and need not be repeated here  (Deschner 1986; Buggle 1992; Harris 
2004; Dawkins 2006). One example will suffice to illustrate the whole problematic nature of an 
authoritative God as conceived in the monotheistic tradition.  Hartung examines religious moral 
belief, drawing on empirical results delivered by Tamarin around the 70s:
The  world's  major  religions  espouse  a  moral  code  that  includes 
injunctions  against  murder,  theft,  and  lying  —  or  so  conventional 
19th-  and  20th-century  Western  wisdom  would  have  it.  Evidence  put 
forth here argues that this convention is a conceit which does not 
apply to the West's own religious foundations. In particular, rules 
against murder, theft, and lying codified by the Ten Commandments were 
intended to apply only within a cooperating group for the purpose of 
enabling that group to compete successfully against other groups. In 
addition, this in-group morality has functioned, both historically and 
by express intent, to create adverse circumstances between groups by 
actively promoting murder, theft, and lying as tools of competition. 
Contemporary efforts to present Judeo-Christian in-group morality as 
universal morality defy the plain meaning of the texts upon which 
Judaism  and  Christianity  are  based.  Accordingly,  that  effort  is 
ultimately hopeless. (Hartung 1995) 
The problematic empirical result is this:
The Israelites' campaign to carry out their god's commandment to 
commit genocide against the native inhabitants of Canaan-cum-Palestine 
took several generations. It began with Joshua's massacre at Jericho. 
Contrary to the Christian song "Joshua Fought the Battle of Jericho," 
according to scripture there was no battle at all. It was a siege, at 
the end of which all of the city's inhabitants were killed except 
Rahab the prostitute (she and her family were spared in exchange for 
helping Joshua plan his strategy, Joshua 6:16-17, 19, 21, 24, RSV):
Joshua said to the people, "Shout; for the LORD has given you the 
city. And the city and all that is within it shall be devoted to the 
LORD for  destruction ...  But all  silver and  gold, and  vessels of 
bronze  and  iron  are  sacred  to  the  LORD;  they  shall  go  into  the 
treasury of the LORD." ... Then they utterly destroyed all in the 
city, both men and women, young and old, oxen, sheep, and asses, with 
the edge of the sword ... And they burned the city with fire, and all 
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within it; only the silver and gold, and the vessels of bronze and of 
iron, they put into the treasury of the house of the LORD.
The half-life and penetrance of such cultural legacies are often 
under-appreciated. Some 3,000 years after the fall of Jericho, Israeli 
psychologist  George  Tamarin  (1966,  1973)  measured  the  strength  of 
residual  in-group  morality.  He  presented  Joshua  6:20-21  to  1,066 
school children, ages 8-14, in order to test "the effect of uncritical 
teaching  of  the  Bible  on  the  propensity  for  forming  prejudices 
(particularly the notion of the 'chosen people,' the superiority of 
the  monotheistic  religion,  and  the  study  of  acts  of  genocide  by 
biblical  heroes)."  The  children's  answers  to  the  question  "Do  you 
think  Joshua  and  the  Israelites  acted  rightly  or  not?"  were 
categorized as follows: " 'A' means total approval, 'B' means partial 
approval or disapproval, and 'C' means total disapproval." Across a 
broad  spectrum  of  Israeli  social  and  economic  classes,  66%  of 
responses were "A," 8% "B," and 26% "C."
...
As a control group, Tamarin tested 168 children who were read Joshua 
6:20-21  with  "General  Lin"  substituted  for  Joshua  and  a  "Chinese 
Kingdom 3000 years ago" substituted for Israel. General Lin got a 7% 
approval rating, with 18% giving partial approval or disapproval, and 
75% disapproving totally. (Hartung 1995, p. 10f)297
The Bible, it seems, should definitely not be a part of children's education. We also do not need 
religion to give us a basis for ethics. A naturalist conception of the universe lends itself to support 
an ethics of its own. And that is why we will now turn to matters of value, meaning, morality and 
ethics.
 5.5 You: Universal Values
For if moral norms don't reduce to norms of reason or rationality, 
then we must ask in what sense moral norms could be authoritative. 
(Smith 2005, p. 2009)
297 The references in the quote are to Tamarin (1966); Tamarin (1973). RSV refers to the Bible, Revised Standard 
Version.
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Is there universal value, that is, value that can or must, due to reason, be accepted by everyone? 
Acceptability  by  reason  is  a  basic  condition  for  further  discussion;  otherwise  we  already pre-
commit to power struggle and there is no need for argument (see already above the chapter on 
rationality). Speaking of universal value does not mean that I commit to categorical imperatives or 
objective ethics in the sense that there is something writ in stone. It is rather an examination of the 
universe we live in and how it feels like to be part of this all which will lead to insight. Insight that 
can be attained rationally. As naturalists, committed to reason, we are in an excellent position to 
tackle ethical  questions298.  Universal  value is  not identical  with ethics, but intertwined with the 
topic.
I  believe that  there  is  universal  value.  But the issue is  subtle.  What is  important  is  to first 
completely  draw  away from parochial  moral  assumptions.  Greene  (2002) highlights  the  many 
problems inherent in current ethical dialogue in his thesis, the most prominent problem being that 
everybody thinks that their morality is right:
Our minds trick us into thinking that we are absolutely right and 
that they are absolutely wrong because, once upon a time, this was a 
useful way to think. It is no more, though it remains natural as ever. 
We love our respective moral senses. They are as much a part of us as 
anything. But if we are to live together in the world we have created 
for ourselves, so unlike the one in which our ancestors evolved, we 
must know when to trust our moral senses and when to ignore them. 
(Greene 2002) 
So let us for the moment ignore our moral senses. Nothing in universal value will be related to 
human concerns. Universal value – value that should be acceptable by every rational agent – is 
above all  universal value in a more literal sense: value inherent in the  physical  universe. When, 
above, I say that this universal value should be acceptable by  everyone, I also mean to include 
reasoning alien species evolved elsewhere in this universe. I don't think that any single clear-cut 
ethics for human beings will follow from universal value. It is a guiding principle – a nourishing 
principle – standing behind concrete moral considerations which will be more related to the time, 
place and actors involved.
298 Moore's “open question argument” poses no problem to a naturalist ethics. Arguments can be looked up in Casebeer 
(2003); Sturgeon (2006).
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What do I believe that universal value is? Diversity. Diversity is the universal value (or is it a 
meta-value? – I  think it  is  both).  Diversity in  this  sense is  not  only tolerated or  accepted,  but 
actively desired – diversity celebrates the multifarious aspects of material configurations299.
I have come to this belief through a number of considerations:
• value as intrinsic to the universe
• the fragmentation of value; and the failure of hedonism to account for value alone
• evolved multi-agent systems
• the boon of diversity in evolutionary settings
All of these considerations are naturalistic. And while I can't exclude that there still is some 
basic, human prejudice in all of the above, I am at least optimistic that there is very little  such 
prejudice present.
Let us have a look at the points above in turn.
 5.5.1.1 Intrinsic Value
Values are built into the very fabric of the universe. From panqualicism and the identity theory 
concerning the dispositional and the qualitative, we know that all our feelings, our qualia states, are 
real in a powerful way. They are not epiphenomena or metaphysical surplus baggage. There is no 
metaphysical possibility for the physical world to be as it is without it also having the qualitative 
aspects we observe.
The feelings of love and value are as much real as the negative charge of an electron. Of course, 
feelings like love or, say, the appreciation of liberty, are complex states, building on more primitive 
values, such as simple sensations, or pleasure and pain. But when combined in a complex web of 
causal interactions, such that psychological states arise, the experienced value will ultimately derive 
from those qualities right there from the beginning. Of course, (complex) intrinsic value need not  
be aligned with universal value, nor with any concrete ethics. Intrinsic value is simply that: a state 
of a physical system experiencing value. It is a primitive building block, that does not by itself yield 
anything more. We can, at this moment, only assert that “there exists a physical state X containing a 
mind Y which values Z".
299 We may compare the sum of all material configurations with the universal form of Krishna, visva-rupa, if we are in 
a mythological mood.
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We now have our grounding for value: together with other features of the physical universe – 
especially rational agency and evolution – we can build the conception of the universal value of 
diversity.
Note that here I differ fundamentally from Drescher, who writes:
But a merely mechanical state could not have the property of being 
intrinsically  desirable  or  undesirable;  inherently  good  or  bad 
sensations,  therefore,  would  be  irreconcilable  with  the  idea  of  a 
fully mechanical mind. (Drescher 2006, p. 77)
Drescher is implicitly in the grip of Cartesian dualism, though he explicitly renounces it. In the 
metaphysical picture painted here – causal physical300 states are necessarily qualitative. Why should 
a physical state  not have intrinsic value? The Cartesian intuition is revealed in the next passage, 
where qualia are given this origination-story:
Actually, though, it is your machinery’s very response to a state’s 
utility designation — the machinery’s very tendency to systematically 
pursue or avoid the state — that implements and constitutes a valued 
state’s seemingly inherent deservedness of being pursued or avoided. 
Roughly speaking, it’s not that you avoid pain (other things being 
equal)  in  part  because  pain  is  inherently  bad;  rather,  your 
machinery’s  systematic  tendency  to  avoid  pain  (other  things  being 
equal) is what constitutes its being bad. That systematic tendency is 
what you’re really observing when you contemplate a pain and observe 
that it is ‘‘undesirable,’’ that it is something you want to avoid. 
(Drescher 2006, p. 77f)
While the contortion to accommodate qualia in a purely mechanistic picture is admirable for 
intellectual  ingenuity,  it  is  not  necessary301:  the present  account  of dispositional  and qualitative 
identity does not feel so „forced“ – and explains intuitively how dispositional states with the „right“ 
300 Drescher speaks of mechanical states. I would like to avoid this. Drescher seems to equate „mechanical“ with 
„computational“ and „physical“:
This book seeks to integrate several lines of inquiry that attempt to 
reconcile the mechanical nature of the physical universe (Drescher 2006, p. 
xiii)
... our […] cognitive abilities and phenomena—are indeed implemented 
mechanically, computationally, by our neurons. (Drescher 2006, p. 40)
As we have seen above, we must keep the three notions logically – and most plausibly also practically – distinct.
301 And, I believe, ultimately fails: because why, again, should the tendency to avoid or pursue states feel like anything. 
It seems that mind, while being paid lip-service, is actually eliminated. There is – I believe – no way around a 
panqualicist theory for a naturalist committed to the existence of consciousness.
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qualia  are  selected  by evolution  –  because  their  dispositionality  can't  be  separated from their 
qualitativity.
 5.5.1.2 Fragmentation of Value and Orgasmium
I do not believe that the source of value is unitary – displaying 
apparent multiplicity only in its application to the world. I believe 
that value has fundamentally different kinds of sources, and that they 
are reflected in the classification of values into types. Not all 
values  present  the  pursuit  of  some  single  good  in  a  variety  of 
settings. (Nagel 1979, p. 131-132)
But the topic of value is also one where many different views are at 
least initially attractive. Some of these views value competing states 
of human minds, such as pleasure, knowledge, and virtue; others value 
patterns of distribution across these states, such as equality or the 
proportioning of happiness to virtue; yet others compare or aggregate 
goods differently, while a final group values states of the nonhuman 
environment. The debate between these views is not easily resolved, 
but  its  sharpness,  and  the  way  the  competing  positions  all  make 
plausible claims, only underscores the importance and fascination of 
issues about intrinsic value. (Hurka 2006, p. 377)
There is a lot of value in the world; decisions are difficult because many trade-offs are involved.
The  introductory  quotes  illustrate  the  fact  that  many  philosophers  believe  that  value  is 
fragmented. And there are good reasons to believe why they do not seem fundamentally reducible to 
something  simpler,  such  as  pleasure  or  pain,  as  hedonists  would  have  it.  Value,  it  seems,  is 
fundamentally fragmented by evolutionary necessity. Yudkowsky puts it well in this passage302:
And when we finally learn about evolution, we think to ourselves: 
"Obsess all day about inclusive genetic fitness? Where's the fun in 
that?"
The blind idiot god's single monomaniacal goal splintered into a 
thousand shards of desire. And this is well, I think, though I'm a 
302 The blind idiot god of the passage below is of course evolution:
... Darwin discovered a strange alien God - not comfortably "ineffable", 
but really genuinely different from us. Evolution is not a God, but if it 
were, it wouldn't be Jehovah. It would be H. P. Lovecraft's Azathoth, the 
blind idiot God burbling chaotically at the center of everything, surrounded 
by the thin monotonous piping of flutes. (Yudkowsky 2007g)
259
Living in a Natural World
human who says so. Or else what would we do with the future? What 
would we do with the billion galaxies in the night sky? Fill them with 
maximally efficient replicators? Should our descendants deliberately 
obsess about maximizing their inclusive genetic fitness, regarding all 
else only as a means to that end?
Being a thousand shards of desire isn't always fun, but at least 
it's  not  boring.  Somewhere  along  the  line,  we  evolved  tastes  for 
novelty, complexity, elegance, and challenge - tastes that judge the 
blind  idiot  god's  monomaniacal  focus,  and  find  it  aesthetically 
unsatisfying.
And  yes,  we  got  those  very  same  tastes  from  the  blind  idiot's 
godshatter. So what? (Yudkowsky 2007h) 
We  value  certain  states  because  of  our  evolutionary  heritage.  But  evolution  operates  in  a 
complex  world,  and  this  complexity  is  mirrored  in  the  plentifulness  of  goals  that  have  been 
correlated with pleasurable qualitative states. But just because our value is grounded in qualitative 
states – such as those of pleasure and contentment  – does not  mean that  they  reduce to  those 
building blocks in any meaningful way beyond the grounding. If there were a single value – such as 
pleasurable  qualia  states  –  we  should  be  able  to  achieve  the  best  possible  ethical  state  by 
maximizing this state.
For  example,  experiencing  an  orgasm  is  very  pleasurable.  If  we  could  reduce  value  to 
qualitative states and assume for the time being that orgasm is the best possible qualitative state, 
then the best universe would be one where all matter is in a state of perennial orgasm (where matter 
in a state of orgasm will be called orgasmium). But this conclusion seems absurd.
It would take so much of value out of the lives that we know. It seems that in our lives we care 
more about just being "blissed out" in eternal orgasm. This does not seem to be a good life to live. 
Yudkowsky hones in on the same point:
When I met the futurist Greg Stock some years ago, he argued that 
the joy of scientific discovery would soon be replaced by pills that 
could simulate the joy of scientific discovery. I approached him after 
his talk and said, "I agree that such pills are probably possible, but 
I wouldn't voluntarily take them."
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And Stock said, "But they'll be so much better that the real thing 
won't be able to compete. It will just be way more fun for you to take 
the pills than to do all the actual scientific work."
And I said, "I agree that's possible, so I'll make sure never to 
take them."
Stock seemed genuinely surprised by my attitude, which genuinely 
surprised me.
[...]
It is an undeniable fact that we tend to do things that make us 
happy, but this doesn't mean we should regard the happiness as the 
only reason for so acting. First, this would make it difficult to 
explain how we could care about anyone else's happiness - how we could 
treat people as ends in themselves, rather than instrumental means of 
obtaining a warm glow of satisfaction.
[...]
The best way I can put it, is that my moral intuition appears to 
require  both  the  objective  and  subjective  component  to  grant  full 
value.
The value of scientific discovery requires both a genuine scientific 
discovery, and a person to take joy in that discovery. 
[...]
So my values are not strictly reducible to happiness: There are 
properties  I  value  about  the  future  that  aren't  reducible  to 
activation levels in anyone's pleasure center; properties that are not 
strictly reducible to subjective states even in principle.
Which means that my decision system has a lot of terminal values, 
none of them strictly reducible to anything else. Art, science, love, 
lust, freedom, friendship...
And I'm okay with that. I value a life complicated enough to be 
challenging  and  aesthetic  -  not  just  the  feeling  that  life  is 
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complicated, but the actual complications - so turning into a pleasure 
center  in  a  vat  doesn't  appeal  to  me.  It  would  be  a  waste  of 
humanity's  potential,  which  I  value  actually  fulfilling,  not  just 
having the feeling that it was fulfilled. (Yudkowsky 2007i) 
But  why  does  happiness  alone  not  suffice?  Do  we  need  the  tension?  The  possibility  of 
unforeseen change? The drama? Maybe we are simply lying to ourselves and it is only that we can't 
appreciate the full force of the argument – that, given evolution, all our valued states are indeed 
only instrumental, and that the perfect state of matter is to be orgasmium.
Maybe  hypothetically.  I  do  not  know.  We  can  rule  out  such  speculations  in  multi-agent  
scenarios,  because  orgasmium will  be  unable  to  compete  in  evolutionary  settings.  In  the  real 
universe, we do have multi-agent scenarios. That is enough for the fragmentation of value to take 
hold, and for agents having been built by evolutionary algorithms in this universe to genuinely value 
this fragmentation303.
 5.5.1.3 Multi-Agent Systems
The basic building blocks of value and meaning are present in the fabric of the universe in the 
sense of qualia-ness, likeness. No qualia, no value. There is no value in a Zombie world. But value 
can constitute itself into quite different arrangements, dependent on the physical parameters of the 
system in question. Intrinsic value of physical states come into alignment with ethical and moral 
values via their selection in evolutionary settings, in agent-societies; indeed, it is only there that 
moral considerations apply in the first place. Above, we said: no qualia, no value. Here we can add: 
no agents, no morality. So, the two requirements for morality are the existence of qualia states and 
the  existence  of  agents  (P-Beings).  We can  imagine  the  possibility  of  “bad”  alignments  when 
imagining a human being who takes pleasure in seeing others suffer. Seeing others suffer has value 
for that person; of course, this kind of value is not tied to behavior or morality in an human society 
in any acceptable way. That is why this kind of behavior will not be tolerated and selected against.
So, evolution brings – at least, for most creatures in the population (there is always variation) – 
intrinsic  pleasurable  states  into  alignment  with  evolutionarily  successful  ones.  We  know  from 
303 Nowhere are we committing a naturalistic fallacy here. The naturalistic fallacy actually splits up into eight sub-
cases – see Curry (2006). In fact, it is time to stress the other side of the equation – the anti-naturalistic fallacy:
...we must recognize that while not all natural facts are relevant to 
ethical or moral discourse, all facts that are relevant to ethical and moral 
discourse will nonetheless be natural facts. To hold that values are non-
natural facts is to commit the anti-naturalistic fallacy. (Walter 2006) 
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simple games that altruism and cooperation can (and will) arise in evolutionary settings304 (Axelrod 
1984), see also  Binmore (2005) and  Nowak (2006). Drescher presents the following analysis for 
rational actors and (correctly) locates altruism in subjunctive reciprocity (Drescher 2006, p. 273f), 
thereby foregoing the need for strict causal links between reciprocal actions:
The claim here is that rational moral regard reduces to subjunctive 
(not necessarily causal) reciprocity: roughly, you act as you want 
others to act toward you, because if that were the rational choice for 
you, it would like-wise be the rational choice for them; and if they 
are (more or less) rational choosers, they would (probably) make what 
is  the  rational  choice  for  them,  which  would  then  be  to  your 
advantage. (Drescher 2006, p. 289)
The message of this section is summed up by the following passage:
Rather  than  recommending  particular  solutions  to  problems, 
evolutionary  game  theory,  coupled  with  the  theory  of  bounded 
rationality and recent work bridging the gap between psychology and 
economics, provides what appears to be a radical restructuring of the 
foundations of moral theory. [...] the recommendations, constraints, 
and obligations imposed by moral theories are real and binding – but 
also somewhat arbitrary. If we were different kinds of creatures, and 
if  our  societies  were  structured  differently,  our  lives  would  be 
composed  of  very  different  interdependent  decision  problems. 
Consequently, the moral theories which legislate certain actions as a 
means of solving those problems would also be different. This means 
that our moral beliefs are simultaneously relative to our evolutionary 
history and our cultural background, but at the same time objectively 
true. Insofar as our moral beliefs provide solutions to interdependent 
decision problems, we cannot say that any one solution is better than 
any  other  –  in  an  abstract  sense  –  because,  detached  from  our 
preferences, there is no absolute standard from which to judge. Given 
our preferences, and from our own personal point of view, there can be 
an objective moral theory that prescribes the best way of satisfying 
those preferences. (Alexander 2007, p. 291)
304 The most well-known example of such a game is the Iterated prisoner's dilemma. Iteration is important, because 
cooperation can only evolve where agents interact over time. The tit-for-tat strategy is the most successful one this 
game, winning even against complex strategies: tit-for-tat always starts with cooperation, and never defects by itself. 
But it retaliates when another player defects.
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We have experiences – qualia – and there are pleasant ones and not so pleasant ones. If we don't 
think about humans alone, but about all of possible qualia space (inhabited by super-minds etc) - 
then we will find that in the qualia landscape there are locations that are enjoyable and others that 
are less so. For a universe made up of agents – having to deal with "others" – there will be pleasant  
qualia states attainable in harmony with other agents, that is, that do not lead to behavior that  
induces unpleasant qualia states in other agents. And that is about as "objective" as the naturalist 
ethics endorsed in the present thesis will get. But it is a lot. And it is a far cry from relativism; albeit 
still being able to encompass a lot of diversity:  the diversity found in evolved structures will be 
reflected in a diversity of values.
 5.5.1.4 Evolution
I already commented on the boon of diversity for evolution in section  3.1.7 and immediately 
above; the basic point is simple: as we can't foresee future environmental changes, the greater the 
diversity  in  life-forms  and  behavioral  habits  the  better.  The  principle  of  diversity  applies 
everywhere where evolution is at work, not only in biological contexts.
 5.5.1.5 You
I have put this section on universal value under the heading of “you” for a simple reason: while 
diversity comes in many material forms, not all of which are conscious in an interesting sense, when 
we speak of value and agent systems our interest immediately shifts to those Q-Beings which are 
our partners in this world. The you is then the basic recognition that diversity begins with the other. 
The  you represents  the  universal  value  of  diversity.  I  value  that  you  exist,  and  I  value  your  
difference from me305.
From the recognition that we are simply material patterns in motion,  going through various 
transformations  –  indeed,  from our  elimination  of  the  concept  of  person  for  all  but  practical 
purposes – we can arrive at the position of universal love306. We can call the structure – the concrete 
structure constituting a  person – a  cosmic  perspective307.  But  no perspective  can  be  given  any 
reasonable  privileged  position.  The  feeling  of  being  “yourself”  does  not  correspond  to  a 
305 That is not to exclude the importance of the many aspects that we share. But in ethical considerations, it is usually 
the differences that are more problematic.
306 Kolak for instance argues that there is only one person, making this the basis for ethics (Kolak 2004). Arguing for 
the no-person view or the one-person view is, from the concerns of this thesis, beside the point. The no-person view 
is more in line with the present metaphysics.
307 People who inquire into the nature of things are the universe discovering itself.
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metaphysically interesting fact: it is only the presence of neural structure encoding an indexical in a 
brain.
The elimination of soul-essence and the insight into the nature of indexical being is a crucial 
step into the equality of being. The question: "why am I myself" and not someone else only makes 
sense in a soul-setting – the implicit belief that you are a soul and have been randomly assigned a 
"body" and a "life". When you eliminate the soul, the question "why am I myself" can be posed by 
any entity and the answer will always point back to the questioning entity itself, because there never 
was a combination of previously separate structures. What is experienced now – by you – is only 
one of a multitude of experiences in the universe. It is in no way privileged in time, in space or 
otherwise. All is equal.
As we begin to know our true nature – as the ultimate causal structure of the world reveals itself 
– and we try to reflect this knowledge on ourselves and our fellow living beings we find that we all 
underly the same conditions of suffering and joy; that we have the same desires, the same hopes, 
and the same wishes (at least among humankind). The ultimate instantiation of qualia states in us is 
beyond  our  control;  so  the  most  we  can  hope  for  is  helping  each  other attain  a  better  life. 
Compassion comes with knowledge. What's more, the rationalist knows that there is no one else 
except the agents in the universe who can change things for better or for worse. From this stems the 
urge to work for the happiness of agents, and quell suffering.
One may construct a more traditional argument for universal love, such as done by Flanagan:
1. If there is something I desire for its own sake and recognize 
that everyone else wants the same thing, then I ought to believe that 
everyone has a right to that thing.
2. Whenever I recognize that I ought to believe something, I believe 
it.
3. I desire to flourish (not suffer, be happy).
4. I recognize that everyone else wants to flourish (not suffer, be 
happy).
5. I ought to believe that everyone has a right to flourish.
6. I believe that everyone has a right to flourish.
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This argument is valid or can be made so. If it is, then everyone 
who believes the premises must believe that everyone has equal right 
to flourish. (Flanagan 2007, p. 214)
It is now time to move on to domains that are more down to earth than the present section – and 
see what we can derive for societies in a naturalistic setting.
 5.6 We: The Polity and the Stars
 5.6.1.1 A Polity of Toleration
You can only protect your liberties in this world by protecting the 
other man’s freedom. You can only be free if I am free. Clarence 
Darrow / Address to the court in People v. Lloyd (1920) 
I  would  defend  the  liberty  of  consenting  adult  creationists  to 
practice whatever intellectual perversions they like in the privacy of 
their own homes; but it is also necessary to protect the young and 
innocent. (Clarke 1984, p. 265)
Given that our nourishing principle is diversity, toleration will play an important role in human 
culture. But toleration alone is not enough – one also needs a  Gemeinwesen, a community where 
toleration can be practiced. Many people grow up and are socialized in parochial communities. In 
todays society, everyone sooner or later realizes that there is more than one way to view the world: 
this  may come as a shock. Some react by becoming xenophobic,  staving off other worldviews; 
others  embrace  relativism,  and  disillusioned  by  having  their  childhood  "truths"  destroyed 
acknowledge no truth at all. The mature reaction, I contend, is to realize that there are arbitrary 
human  conventions,  sometimes  enforced  as  absolute  truths  but  which  are  only  historical 
contingencies (such as religion or local customs); and apart from that there are facts about the world 
which are quite independent of humans or other cognitive agents. These latter facts should be the 
foundation for our community.
To  have  a  community,  there  must  be  shared  experience  and  shared  language.  We  share 
experiences because we live in the same universe and are very similar in physical structure. As to 
the language, we find a direct connection to the metaphysical aspect of the thesis, where we spoke 
of the process of registering:
[…] all of human communication lies in this middle region, between 
identical  and  incommensurable  registration  schemes.  Not  only  that, 
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when we get back to the proper metaphysical story,[...] it will emerge 
that, far from being undermined by it, registration is designed to 
cope with this middle region of partial commensurability.
[...]  developing  a  more  adequate  metaphysics  is  not  only 
intellectually viable, but also politically urgent. The aim is to give 
metaphysical  grounding  to,  and  support  for,  communicative  and 
political  struggles  among  people  whose  experience  of,  and 
participation in, our world is different. (Smith 1996, p. 255)
Now as was argued above, science give us  robust registries of the world – concepts that are 
invariant from many different points of view. Thus, the concepts of science can deliver the basis for 
a global language and thus the basis for global community. Science is about discovering the shared 
environment, making ever more features of reality available for communication. I would like to call 
the framework given by science the  polity. It is the public space of quanta, corresponding to the 
communicable world; in the polity, people can interact, empathize, co-operate, help each other. The 
polity is a haven of discourse, a forum of discussion and consensus:
Wissenschaft ist viel mehr als nur eine Ansammlung von Fakten. Sie 
ermöglicht Menschen, die durch Ozeane voneinander getrennt sind, in 
unterschiedlichen Dekaden leben, verschiedene Sprachen sprechen oder 
anderen Ideologien unterliegen, wechselseitig auf den Entdeckungen der 
jeweils anderen aufzubauen. (Wilson 2006) 
The polity must be open to encourage diversity and guarantee the playful unfolding of events. 
This leads to More's proactionary principle and a positive view of technology308:
People’s freedom  to innovate  technologically is  highly valuable, 
even critical, to humanity. This implies a range of responsibilities 
for those considering whether and how to develop, deploy, or restrict 
new technologies. Assess risks and opportunities using an objective, 
open, and comprehensive, yet simple decision process based on science 
rather than collective emotional reactions. Account for the costs of 
restrictions and lost opportunities as fully as direct effects. Favor 
measures that are proportionate to the probability and magnitude of 
impacts, and that have the highest payoff relative to their costs. 
Give  a  high  priority  to  people’s  freedom  to  learn,  innovate,  and 
advance.
308 For more on the proactionary principle, see Appendix F: The Proactionary Principle.
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…
Most activities involving technology will have undesired effects as 
well as desirable ones. Whereas the precautionary principle is often 
used to take an absolutist stand against an activity, the Proactionary 
Principle allows for handling mixed effects through compensation and 
remediation  instead  of  prohibition.  The  Proactionary  Principle 
recognizes that nature is not always kind, that improving our world is 
both natural and essential for humanity, and that stagnation is not a 
realistic or worthy option. (More 2005)
The proactionary principle  is  contrasted with the precautionary principle  –  which comes in 
various degrees of strength and averseness to technology – prevailing today.  The precautionary 
principle is detrimental to development:
The precautionary principle has at least six major weak spots. It 
serves us badly by:
1. assuming worst-case scenarios 
2. distracting  attention  from  established  threats  to  health, 
especially natural risks 
3. assuming that the effects of regulation and restriction are all 
positive or neutral, never negative 
4. ignoring  potential  benefits  of  technology  and  inherently 
favoring nature over humanity 
5. illegitimately  shifting  the  burden  of  proof  and  unfavorably 
positioning the proponent of the activity 
6. conflicting with more balanced, common-law approaches to risk 
and harm. 
...
If the precautionary principle had been widely applied in the past, 
technological and cultural progress would have ground to a halt. Human 
suffering would have persisted without relief, and life would have 
remained  poor,  nasty,  brutish,  and  short:  No  chlorination  and  no 
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pathogen-free water; no electricity generation or transmission; no X-
rays; no travel beyond the range of walking. (More 2005) 
The idea, of course, is not to engage in Panglossian naiveté; but to restore symmetry to the 
process of weighing the pros and cons of innovation.
The polity is guarded by science; no other enterprise can stand in its place, because science is 
per definition the most refined methodology of studying the space of communicable facts – were 
better methods discovered, they would simply become part of science's arsenal. 
And that is also where tolerance and liberalism must be weighed against the good of protecting 
the  future  of  the  polity.  Toleration  is  a  strange  beast.  We  must  distinguish  between 
indifference/neutrality – things or situations we simply don't care about one way or another; and 
affirmation – states of affairs that we actively endorse. Then again there are those opinions and 
deeds which are so destructive to the life of a community – such as criminal behavior – that all 
communities which care to function forbid them.
Toleration is called for when we encounter behavior, opinions and deeds which we think are 
wrong; wrong in such a way that they endanger core values we hold. Of course, we need not stand 
passively by states of affairs that we oppose but tolerate – we can fight with arguments – but not 
with the method of censure and prohibition. Toleration stands on the verge of prohibition. But who 
is to decide what is still allowed and what prohibited? Frederick Schauer for instance says:
Freedom of speech is based in large part on a distrust of the 
ability of government to make the necessary distinctions, a distrust 
of governmental determinations of truth and falsity, an appreciation 
of  the  fallibility  of  political  leaders,  and  a  somewhat  deeper 
distrust of governmental power in a more general sense. (Schauer 1983) 
And that is an important point. Who is to decide were tolerance ends and prohibition begins? 
This is not the place to solve this issue; I do not think that there is a solution in the abstract – those 
things will have to be negotiated by the actors at  hand. I just want to highlight that this  is the 
linchpin of success or failure for a society based on diversity – to find the right balance between 
tolerance of practices which may even contradict the goals of a society endorsing diversity, and the 
prohibition  of  opinions  and  practices  which  are  too  extreme  and  dangerous  and  endanger  the 
continuity of diversity. While there are no solutions in the abstract, there are practical guidelines:
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that the practice of toleration has to be sustained not so much by a 
pure principle resting on a value of autonomy as by a wider and more 
mixed range of resources. Those resources include an active skepticism 
against fanaticism and the pretensions of its advocates; conviction 
about  the  manifest  evils  of  toleration’s  absence;  and,  quite 
certainly, power, to provide Hobbesian reminders to the more extreme 
groups that they will have to settle for coexistence. (Williams 1996, 
p. 26f)
Things are not settled when we have constructed a society of toleration and formal liberal rights; 
because such a system can be undermined. Scanlon addresses this issue:
I began by considering the paradigm case of religious toleration, a 
doctrine that seemed at first to have little cost or risk when viewed 
from the perspective of a secular liberal with secure constitutional 
protection against the “establishment” of a religion. I went on to 
explain  why  toleration  in  general,  and  religious  toleration  in 
particular,  is  a  risky  policy  with  high  stakes,  even  within  the 
framework of a stable constitutional democracy. The risks involved lie 
not so much in the formal politics of laws and constitutions (though 
there may be risks there as well) but rather in the informal politics 
through  which  the  nature  of  a  society  is  constantly  redefined.  I 
believe in tolerance despite its risks, because it seems to me that 
any alternative would put me in an antagonistic and alienated relation 
to  my  fellow  citizens,  friends  as  well  as  foes.  The  attitude  of 
tolerance is nonetheless difficult to sustain. It can be given content 
only  through  some  specification  of  the  rights  of  citizens  as 
participants in formal and informal politics. But any such system of 
rights will be conventional and indeterminate and is bound to be under 
frequent attack. To sustain and interpret such a system, we need a 
larger attitude of tolerance and accommodation, an attitude that is 
itself difficult to maintain. (Scanlon 1996, p. 238)
A free society is an on-going project. The best guarantee to repel the “frequent attacks” against a 
system of rights upholding a tolerant society is – apart from stable economic conditions – education 
and schooling in the art of rationality. Rationality as defined in this thesis is intrinsically inimical to 
intolerance.
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 5.6.1.2 The Stars
There is hopeful symbolism in the fact that flags do not wave in a 
vacuum. A.C. Clarke as quoted in (Merchey 2004, p. 31)
The polity is one aspect of society. Another is a vision of the future. I have already mentioned 
this  aspect above in section  2.9.7 on existential risks. It is important to realize that a scientific 
rational worldview does not preclude large-scale visions of the future of humanity; on the contrary, 
these  thoughts  are  encouraged.  The  vision  is,  of  course,  space309;  either  to  connect  with  other 
sentients, or, if we are alone, to ensure the continuation of life.
Intelligent life may once even be responsible for the very fate of the universe. That the universe 
will end under standard cosmological models is common knowledge  (Adams & Laughlin 1997). 
But these calculations do not take into account the advent of intelligent agents. Agents are ways of 
matter  organization  which  start  engaging  with  other  matter  in  feedback  loops.  From complex 
systems science, we know that new macro-behavior will most likely result  (Waldrop 1992), thus 
changing the equations of the future development of the universe.  In a scientific conception of 
things, sentients are not puppets in a theological game of good versus evil, but empowered actors 
shaping the fate of the universe310:
Stars are born and die; galaxies go through their cycles of creation 
and destruction; the universe itself was born in a big bang and will 
end with a crunch or a whimper, we're not yet sure which.[...]The 
mindless  mechanism  of  the  universe  is  winding  up  or  down  to  a  I 
distant future, and there's nothing intelligence can do about it.
That's the common wisdom. But I don't agree with it. My conjecture 
is that intelligence will ultimately prove more powerful than these 
big impersonal forces. [...] 
So  will  the  universe  end  in  a  big  crunch,  or  in  an  infinite 
expansion of dead stars, or in some other manner? In my view, the 
primary  issue  is  not  the  mass  of  the  universe,  or  the  possible 
existence  of  antigravity,  or  of  Einstein's  so-called  cosmological 
constant. Rather, the fate of the universe is a decision yet to be 
309 While the colonization of space may be economically less attractive than first colonizing less hospitable parts of the 
Earth, such as Antarctica, the deep sea or diverse deserts, it is the visionary aspect which makes space the more 
important longterm choice; that, and the advantage of not limiting humanity to one celestial body, which is risky.
310 See also Dyson (1979); Hartung (1996).
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made, one which we will intelligently consider when the time is right. 
(Kurzweil 1999, p. 258f)
Maybe this sounds too much like science fiction. It is not important to decide on this issue now.
The polity can be seen as a gem in the void – an abode of sentients who have committed to the 
living universe.  What then,  is  the Utopia of the polity? A society of eternal enlightenment and 
eternal disputation. A society which values life and consciousness, which recognizes how precious 
every living thing and every living moment is in and for this universe. The ethics of this society will 
be an ethics of diversity and possibility – of self-expression and it’s sharing. The ethics of diversity 
will be restrained by compassion. Technology will be valued greatly, but not to enslave thinking 
beings, but to serve them: it will guarantee the survival of thought; enhance our full potential as 
creative and sentient beings, and make this universe a friendlier place to live in.
 5.7 I: To Live
There is no point telling people to promote the good without telling 
them what the good is.(Hurka 2006, p. 357)
The primary experimental result in hedonic psychology - the study of 
happiness - is that people don't know what makes them happy.(Yudkowsky 
2008i)
There are two aspects which I want to address in this last section. The first is metaphysical in 
nature: metaphors one can use to embrace the life in a completely naturalistic universe. The other is 
more practical: what conclusions to draw for one's personal life.
First to the metaphysical aspect: the vastness of the cosmos does not make us insignificant: on 
the contrary, the realization that the cosmos is so empty and that this earth and life are so rare shows 
the preciousness of this all. We are not what the universe was made for; but we are manifestations in 
this universe, valuable manifestations; no more, no less. We have a duty toward the universe, and 
this duty is: To Behold! To Think! To Live!
There are many ways to relish the cosmic perspective. Barbour expresses it most beautifully, 
having first established that the only theory of the cosmos worth taking seriously is one that sees it 
as a "heavenly vault" where the "music of the spheres" are sounding. He goes on:
You will naturally ask why we do not hear this music of the spheres. 
Keats provides a first answer: 'Heard melodies are sweet, but those 
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unheard Are sweeter'. But Leibniz may have given the true answer. In 
his monadology, he teaches that the quintessential you, everything you 
experience in consciousness and unconscious, is precisely this music. 
You are the music of the spheres heard from the particular vantage 
point that is you. (Barbour 1999, p. 326)
This is in tune with the vedantic "tat tvam asi" – "that thou art", a Mahavakya (Great Saying) 
from  the  Chandogya  Upanishad311.  It  says  what  has  in  this  thesis  been  called  "no  essential 
disconnection".
The biggest help in accepting a naturalist conception of the universe is lent to us by Nietzsche; 
who has embraced naturalism and all its consequences for persons on a personal level more than a 
hundred years ago. Here, finally, we arrive at the liberating message of materialism and science:
If we affirm one single moment, we thus affirm not only ourselves 
but  all  existence.  For  nothing  is  self-sufficient,  neither  in  us 
ourselves nor in things; and if our soul has trembled with happiness 
and sounded like a harp string just once, all eternity was needed to 
produce this one event – and in this single moment of affirmation all 
eternity  was  called  good,  redeemed,  justified,  and  affirmed. 
(Nietzsche Will to Power, p. 532-533)312
We must understand this radical affirmation of life – of this earthly, material, bodily life, against 
the backdrop of the doctrine of the eternal return, articulated beautifully here:
The greatest weight. — What, if some day or night a demon were to 
steal after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This 
life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once 
more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, 
but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything 
unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, 
all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider and this 
moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The 
311 The other Mahavakyas are:
• Prajnanam Brahma; "Consciousness/Knowledge is Brahman" (Aitareya 
Upanishad) 
• Ayam Atma Brahma; "This Atman is Brahman" (Mandukya Upanishad)
• Aham Brahmasmi; "I am Brahman" (Brhadaranyaka Upanishad),
where (probably to the horror of scholars in Hinduism) I will equate Atman 
with the Self and, as above, Brahman with ultimate reality, the Dao.
312 I would like to dedicate this passage – especially "and if our soul has trembled with happiness and sounded like a 
harp string just once" – to Ainur, who has given me this moment.
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eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, 
and you with it, speck of dust!" Would you not throw yourself down and 
gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once 
experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: "You 
are  a  god  and  never  have  I  heard  anything  more  divine."  If  this 
thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or 
perhaps crush  you. The  question in  each and  every thing,  "Do you 
desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie upon your 
actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to 
become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than 
this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?  (Nietzsche GayScience) 
(341)
Of course,  the  eternal  return  thus  conceived  is  not  terrible  at  all  –  the  experiences  would 
coincide if they where exactly the same; so, maybe we live our lives in eternal recurrence – we 
would not notice. Maybe we also live our lives in infinite variation, in case there is room for an 
even more benign soteriology than the materialist one presented above (Steinhart 2004). But that is 
not the point. The point is to love every moment; in such a way that you can love it even if it would 
recur eternally and you knew about these recurrences in the respective moments. It is a powerful 
imperative to live one's life now and not squander it – and especially not delegate it into an afterlife, 
be it of the religious or also scientific kind (the uploading scenario, or infinite life extension); it is 
the ultimate affirmation313 (Reginster 2006).
After these rather heavy metaphors some more down to earth advice.
What does it mean to lead a good life? To lead a good life, we must314 first consider what is the 
case – we must try to form a correct world model; that is where rational and scientific processes 
step in. This includes evaluating our current agent situation – our embodiment as human beings. 
Then we can ask what goals we want to achieve – and I am sure that many possible answers can be 
313 There is of course also the option of viewing life and the universe purely as an aesthetic phenomenon:
For we need to be clear on this point, above everything else, to our 
humiliation and ennoblement: the entire comedy of art does not present itself 
for us in order to make us, for example, better or to educate us, even less 
because we are creators of that art world. We are, however, entitled to 
assume this about ourselves: for the true creator of that world we are 
already pictures and artistic projections and in the meaning of works of art 
we have our highest dignity — for only as an aesthetic phenomena are 
existence and the world eternally justified — while, of course, our 
consciousness of this significance of ours is scarcely any different from the 
consciousness which soldiers painted on canvas have of the battle portrayed 
there. (Nietzsche Birth of Tragedy) 
314 This is only valid for those who are interested in a good life, of course. Only hypothetical imperatives in this world.
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given; after all, value is fragmented. As rationalists we can see that there are states worth attaining, 
and states that are worth avoiding. We can then plan to attain states that are worth attaining.
For all this, we need knowledge. What purpose serves knowledge? First, to unlearn. We must 
learn to unlearn everything false that we have been imprinted with by our culture and our elders. We 
must  observe and think and reflect  to  eliminate  all  superstition,  spurious correlations  and false 
causal models in our minds. The knowledge that most of our knowledge is false – and will be false 
in the future – is the starting point for abandoning our "self-imposed immaturity"315. So learning 
first of all means: unlearning and forgetting. 
The next step is to acquire positive knowledge; knowledge which reflects the states of the world 
and  their  transitions;  that  is  the  process  of  growth.  Knowing  is  essential  for  acting;  calling 
something knowledge means that the models such described have enough correlation with the world 
to enable successful action. The more in tune with the world the models are, the more potential 
there  is  for  action;  this  is  vividly  seen  by  considering  technology  as  "embodied"  knowledge. 
Ignorance condemns one to inaction and passivity; and make plausible appeals to fate and to the 
conception of being helpless puppets in either an inimical universe or at the mercy of a God.
Growth  of  knowledge  on  the  one  hand  is  increased  potential  for  action.  But  this  must  be 
combined with ethical diligence, lest one become a tyrant. In psychological terms, growing means 
above all:  letting  the  ego become small.  Not  taking the self  too seriously;  to  see how we are 
dependent  on  everything  around  us;  how we  are  caused  by past  events  on  which  we  had  no 
influence. And how future events will be influenced by us; and our responsibility for other agents 
when we act.
Now science seems well apt to fill both roles: that of furthering the goal of increased action 
potential but also of making us small (think of the Copernican, Darwinian and Freudian turns in our 
conceptions of ourselves as human beings). That is why we should heed the results of science in our 
personal lives. While knowledge alone does not make one a better human being, there is certainly 
no growth without knowledge. Science is the only reliable method to obtain knowledge of the world 
and of ourselves. Science shows us our place in the world – our potential and our limits. Both 
science and ethics are principally about a curtailing of the "self" and a recognition of the other. 
Without  the  other,  the  self  becomes  empty.  Recognizing  this  is  the  precondition  for  further 
development.
315(Kant 1784) 
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This leads to the concept of wisdom. Wisdom, indeed, is even more broad than the age-old 
question of a happy life, eudaimonia. Wisdom is rationality bent back on itself; assessing one's 
goals and thinking about which ones are worth pursuing and which ones are not. Goals are available 
for updating. Are there physical constraints? Can I change them? We have to accept environment 
and agent body as given; indeed, we saw that without these, it is hard to see how one could be 
rational at all. But, then, given these, we can find values through rational reasoning which apply us 
humans.
There is a lot of merit to be found in the Buddhist way (although I do not endorse the more 
religious aspects of Buddhism). Given that it is impossible to invent a workable ethics from scratch, 
it is rational to draw on ethical traditions which are close to a scientific ethics:
Buddhist  values  are  rooted  in  the  project  of  overcoming 
greed/attachment, hatred and delusion, which are seen as the roots of 
unwholesome actions and the key causes of suffering. Greed is to be 
overcome by generosity and sharing, combined with restraint from theft 
and cheating, with subtler forms of attachment overcome by monastic 
training and meditative training. Hatred and anger are to be dealt 
with by restraint from behaviour harming others, cultivation of loving 
kindness and compassion, and insight into the distorted vision that 
makes  hatred  possible.  Delusion  is  to  be  overcome  by  avoiding 
intoxication, and cultivating the mental clarity that allows one to 
see things directly ‘as they really are’. This project begins with 
moral virtue, but also entails the other aspects of the Buddhist path: 
meditative  development  and  the  cultivation  of  insight.  It  has 
implications  for  individual  conduct  as  well  as  inter-personal 
relationships and social ethics. (Harvey 2000, p. 122)
In  the  same  way  that  the  path  of  rationality  is  not  easily  embodied,  ethics  is  neither. 
(Schwitzgebel & Rust Forthcoming) – ethics has to be grown into behavioral structures. An ethical 
way of living must be cultivated and shaped every day by concrete actions.
While  above  we  discussed  value  in  a  very  abstract  sense,  we  humans  are  faced  with  the 
challenge of finding meaning in our lives. Advice can be found in the excellent book of Flanagan 
(2007):
Everything [...] is compatible with the picture of persons that 
emerges  from  neo-Darwinian  theory  and  from  the  best  current  mind 
science. According to that picture, we are fully embodied thinking-
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feeling animals who live and achieve meaning — if we do — in a world 
that is fully natural. We are agents, and we act freely. But we do not 
possess  any  non-natural  faculty  of  free  will  that  permits 
circumvention of natural law. When we die, our career as a conscious 
being is over. But we leave effects. Our karma, good or bad, carries 
on. This matters. So it is wise to live well, in a way that makes 
meaning and sense in a manner that alleviates suffering and equips 
others to pursue what our common humanity makes us seek. If you live 
with your eye on the prize, then when you die, although you won’t go 
to heaven, you’ll have lived in a worthy way and have something to be 
proud of. (Flanagan 2007, p. 61)
When asking about what to actually do with your life, it is good to extract subquestions from 
the “big” question of the meaning of life:
Instead of asking "What is the meaning of life?" we can ask such 
tame but very difficult questions as these:
• How shall I (or we) live?
• What ways of being and living produce fulfillment and meaning?
• What attitudes and beliefs about such matters as my place in the universe 
is it sensible to adopt?
• How can I understand my life’s meaning, given that I am mortal?
• Given what I know about my talents, aspirations, hopes, and expectations, 
and given what I know about the existing network of social support, what 
sort of sensible plan can I make about how to live?
I will not spell out my own answers. I can’t do so fully; they are 
unfolding  —  works  in  progress.  We  are  each,  with  social  support, 
supposed  to  find  our  own  way  to  the  answers.  Spiritual  and 
philosophical traditions often do the following work: They give us a 
head  start  in  asking  and  answering  these  questions  by  being 
repositories  of  past  "good  answers."  Aristotle,  Confucius,  and 
Buddhism, all in different ways, see productive and respectful social 
relations  as  time-tested  ingredients  of  meaningful  and  fulfilling 
lives. (Flanagan 2007, p. 202f)
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And death, finally, need not be feared. I am aware that fear will not subside by reading the 
paragraph below; but I can assure the reader that fear will subside  after deep meditation on this 
question, and then the below will read like the most natural thing in the world:
Many spiritual traditions moralize death by embedding a life story 
in what […] I called a karmic eschatology. There is a payoff system 
that kicks in after you die. Your fate is determined by the moral 
quality of your earthly life, and in a surprising number of cases, by 
whether you believed in the ‘‘true God.’’ This last idea can be said, 
but it can’t be asserted.
Here is the way I think about my own death, given that I think 
karmic eschatology(ies) makes no sense (I don’t even get why anyone 
would  find  the  idea  of  living  forever,  even  blissfully,  very 
appealing). I recently heard a wise Buddhist friend say that ‘‘death 
is the ultimate absurdity, you lose everything you care about.’’ This, 
it seems to me, is not true. Furthermore, it is not a particularly 
Buddhist way (even for a secular Buddhist) to see things. Here is a 
better way: If you live well, then when you die you lose nothing you 
care about. Why? Because you are no longer there. You are just gone. 
That which is gone has nothing to lose. That which was once something, 
but is now nothing, cannot suffer any loss. But assuming the world and 
the people in it, including your loved ones remain, then your good 
karmic effects continue on. This is something to be proud of and happy 
about while alive. Your goodness, your presence, your worth are why 
the living feel your loss, and are sad, possibly very sad. But you are 
not sad, you neither suffer nor experience any loss because you are 
gone. Nothing absurd has occurred. True, dying could be miserable, but 
your own death is nothing to worry about. (Flanagan 2007, p. 203f)
There is but one fear we should entertain, and that only in the fashion that it spurns us to right 
action: that of not living to our full potential. And when we notice that we have failed to meet our 
potential in the past, we should not be filled by remorse, but look forward with a smile on our face 
and say: from today on, I will do better.
So, from rationality flows affirmation of every living moment. Ultimate rationality means being 
completely  in  tune  with  reality.  Processes  in  the  finite  brain  model  as  optimally  as  possible 
processes in the world; thus, all actions are in tune with the Dao. Automatically, no evil is done – 
because the  fundamental  unity of  all  being  is  seen;  love  of  life  and  consciousness  guide  your 
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behavior. If we see ourselves as manifestations of the Dao – as necessary beings in tune with reality 
that have never been separate from the universe, as instantiations of playful physical abandon – we 
can  be  comfortable  with  simply  being now  and  here.  A person  is  a  bundle  of  contingencies, 
produced by the universe to enjoy its fullness.
And if, in some hour of despair, the transvaluation of values proposed here seems to be too 
much to bear – never forget Egan's Law:
"It all adds up to normality" (Egan 1992, last page)
However we come to view the world – it is as it always has been. It is the world in which you 
grew up in as a child. It is the world which has given you happiness, joy, grief; friendship and love. 
There is nothing to fear. From the beginning, you have been at home.
And whatever else you take with you after reading this thesis, I hope to have inspired you to this 
attitude:
This doctrine contributes to the welfare of our social existence, 
since it teaches us to hate no one, to despise no one, to mock no one, 
to be angry with no one, and to envy no one. (Spinoza 1677)
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It will be helpful to introduce some terminology from the philosophical system of Mario Bunge. 
Overviews can be found in Mahner & Bunge (1997); Mahner & Bunge (2000); Bunge & Mahner 
(2004); Bunge (2006). The portions reproduced here have been excerpted from Mahner & Bunge 
(1997). The system of Mario Bunge is to be seen as a starting point, not a dogmatic position. It 
provides  a  clear  basis  for  venturing  into  more  difficult  philosophical  territory.  The  postulates, 
definitions, theorems and corollaries are presented in the order as they appear in cited book. Some 
comments  are  interleaved,  identifiable  by being  in  standard  font.  I  have  only excerpted  those 
passages which are of immediate relevance to the present work, but have kept the numbering of the 
cited book in place; apart from direct quotes, some parts are paraphrased.
Postulate  1.1.  The  world  (or  universe)  exists  on  its  own  (i.e., 
whether or not there are inquirers).
Postulate 1.2. Every object is either a thing or a construct, i.e., no 
object is neither, and none is both.
Postulate  1.2  asserts  methodological  dualism,  not  ontological  dualism;  constructs  have  no 
independent existence from material processes, but it is well to distinguish them conceptually. See 
also immediately below.
Postulate  1.3.  The  world  is  composed  exclusively  of  things  (i.e., 
concrete or material objects).
Definition 1.1. Let x represent a bare substantial individual and call 
P(x) the collection of all the (known and unknown) properties of x. 
Then the individual together with its properties is called the thing 
(or concrete or material or real object or entity) X; i.e., X =df <x. 
P(x)>.
Definition  1.2.  The  scope  S of  a  property  is  the  collection  of 
entities possessing it.
Scope is an ontological concept defined on properties, not to be confused with the semantical 
concept of extension defined on predicates.
Definition 1.3. If P and Q are (essential) properties of things, then 
P  and  Q  are  said  to  be  lawfully  related  if,  and  only  if, 
S P ⊂S QorS Q⊂S P  .
Postulate 1.4. Every essential property is lawfully related to some 
other essential property. That is, for any two essential properties, P 
and Q, either S P ⊂S QorS Q⊂S P  .
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Bunge  calls  this  the  ontological  principle  of  lawfulness;  where  laws  are  constant  relations 
between properties, and not propositions about these relations. Bunge takes essential properties to 
be those without which a thing would be a different thing.
Postulate 1.5. Every thing changes.
Theorem 1.1. Every thing can undergo only lawful changes (i.e., events 
or transformations).
Note that Bunge does not restrict  lawful behavior to strict  causality – stochastic lawfulness 
suffices.  Conceptualized somewhat abstractly,  things can change in the nomological state space 
spanned up by the axes representing properties they possess. The theorem is inferred from postulate 
1.4.
Corollary 1.1. There is no total disorder, and there are no miracles.
Definition 1.4. A complex event, i.e., one formed by the composition 
of two or more events, is called a process.
An event is an ordered pair of states.
Definition 1.5. For any x: x is a  concrete (or  material, or  real) 
thing (or entity) =df x is changeable.
Definition 1.6. For all x: x is an ideal (or abstract or conceptual) 
object (or construct) =df x is neither unchanging nor changeable.
Bunge  is  clear  to  stress  that  this  definition  does  not  imply  the  autonomous  existence  of 
abstractions – it is, again, just a conceptual classification.
Postulate  1.6.  Every  concrete  thing  is  either  a  system  or  a 
component of one.
Postulate 1.7. Every system, except the universe, is a subsystem of 
some other system.
Postulate 1.8. The universe is a system, namely the system such that 
every other thing is a component of it.
Definition 1.7. A relation between a thing x and a thing y is a 
bonding relation if, and only if, the states of y alter when the 
relation to x holds.
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Bunge describes a method of analyzing systems, the so called CES Analysis, where C stands for 
composition, E for environment and S for structure:
• The collection of all parts of a system s – its composition – is designated by C(s).
• The environment of the system s is called E(s). The environment is always relative to the 
system. Of interest is the proximate environment, not the whole universe.
• A system has an internal structure, that is, relations holding among the elements of C(s) – 
the endostructure – and also possesses external relations that elements of C(s) undergo with 
elements of E(s). The union of the two is called the structure S(s). The relations can be 
bonding and non-bonding relations, where bonding relations are usually more interesting.
• One can then qualitatively define a system m by the following ordered triple:
m(s) = <C(s), E(s), S(s)>
m  is  called  the  CES  model  of  a  system;  with  this  definition,  one  can  also  easily  define 
subsystems of systems etc.
Definition 1.9. Let P represent a property of a thing b. P is an 
emergent property of b if, and only if, either
(i) b is a complex thing (a system), no component of which possesses 
P; or
(ii) b is a thing that has acquired P by virtue of becoming a 
component of a system (i.e., b would not possess P if it were an 
independent or isolated thing).
This conception of emergence is compatible with the one endorsed in this thesis, that is, weak 
emergence  coming  about  through  manifestations  of  mutual  dispositions.  The  dual  notion  of 
emergence is submergence.
Postulate  1.9.  All  processes  of  development  and  evolution  are 
accompanied  by  the  emergence  or  the  submergence  of  (generic) 
properties.
Now on to the important distinction between fact and phenomenon. A fact is the being of a thing 
in a given state or an event occurring in a thing. Neither constructs, theories, data or propositions 
are facts. Phenomena are perceptions, occurring in neural systems, and as such are also facts; facts 
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designating a subject-object relation. The same fact may appear differently to different perceiving 
agents, and thus one fact may appear in many subject-object fact relations, giving rise to different 
phenomena in different agents.
Postulate 1.10. Let    designate the totality of possible facts 
occurring in an animal b and its (immediate) environment during the 
lifetime of b, and call   the totality of possible percepts of b 
(or the phenomenal world of b) during the same period. The    is 
properly included in  , i.e. ⊂ .
Causation is defined by Bunge as event generation by energy transfer from one entity to another, 
energy being the single property which all  material  things possess (this conception would need 
some clarification in regard to the ontology of the present thesis; space does not permit this, but 
nothing fundamental is at stake). 
He  distinguishes  strong  energy  transfer  from  weak  energy  transfer  (signaling),  which 
corresponds  roughly  to  structural  causes  versus  triggering  causes.  While  Bunge  construes  the 
scientific world view as deterministic, he does not require strict causation for determinism to hold. 
Determinism only  requires  lawful  behavior  –  which  can  also  include  probabilistic  laws  –  but 
excludes the occurrence of miracles and posits the principle of ex nihilo nihil fit. 
Can reasons be causes? Reasons are constructs, but the process of reasoning is a material brain 
process, which can be a cause.
Now on to philosophical semantics.
Intension: the intension, or sense, is practically prior to the extension, as you need a predicate to 
build the extension. The proposition "b is an F" corresponds to 'Fb' where F is a function. The sense 
of a proposition is the set of all propositions it entails or is entailed by.
Extension:  predicates  define  extensions  over  the  properties  they  designate.  Example:  the 
predicate M defines the following extension: E(M) = { x e S |  Mx} where S is an appropriate 
domain. It is possible that predicates have empty extensions, such as the predicate G: "is a ghost": 
E(G) = {} 
Reference class: from the extension one must distinguish the reference class; the reference class 
is the domain over which the x or b range. The reference class is conceptual, whereas the extension 
refers to actually existing material entities; to build the extension, one needs the concept of truth, 
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because only those elements for which M holds can be part of the extension. On the other hand, the 
reference class may consist of purely theoretical or even fantastic entities – like in the case of ghosts 
– the reference class is open to all kinds of possible entities being able to pass for a ghost. Another 
difference between  reference classes and  extensions is  that  in  n-ary predicates,  where n>1,  the 
extension  is  a  set  of  ordered  n-tuples,  while  the  reference  class  continues  to  be  composed  of 
individuals; finally, the reference class does not change when applying negation, disjunction etc.
The meaning of a construct c is the sense together with its reference.
Definition 3.3. The knowledge of an animal at a given time is the set 
of all items it has learned and retained up until that time.
where
Postulate  3.3.  Learning  is  the  specific  function  of  some  plastic 
neuronal system.
Definition  3.6.  An  animal  b  has  acquired  some  (partially  true) 
perceptual knowledge of some items in its environment E if, and only 
if, b possesses a plastic neuronal system n such that some events in E 
are mapped into events in n.
Postulate  3.5.  Any  knowledge  of  factual  items  is  not  direct  or 
pictorial but symbolic.
From this follows that knowledge is not an abstract platonic ideal, but always some process in a 
cognitive system. This completely naturalistic conception of knowledge as consisting of certain 
neural processes makes it independent of either objectivity or truth. Also, books etc do not contain 
knowledge per se, but encode the knowledge of one cognitive entity so that other cognitive entities 
may reconstruct that meaning with their own neural processes. 
Successful communication consists in the construction or (re)creation 
of similar processes in the brains of the animals involved in the 
interaction.
Concerning knowledge, the following distinction is useful:
...if subject s knows p, then (a) s has explicit knowledge of p iff s 
also knows that s knows p or knows how to express p in some language; 
(b) otherwise s has tacit knowledge of p.
Public or intersubjective knowledge is shared by more than one agent. But intersubjective is not 
equivalent with objective:
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Definition  3.4.  Let  p  designate  a  piece  of  knowledge.  Then  p  is 
objective if, and only if,
(i) p is public (intersubjective) in some society, and
(ii) p is testable either conceptually or empirically.
Bunge goes on to define belief:
Definition 3.5. Let s denote a subject and p a piece of knowledge. Then 
(i) s believes p =df s knows p and gives assent to p
(ii) s is justified in believing p =df s knows p and s knows that p is 
reasonably well confirmed;
(iii) s is justified in disbelieving p =df s knows p and s knows that p 
has been disconfirmed.
Now on to truth. While for the formal sciences consistency is enough, for the factual sciences 
this is not so. When you state propositions, if they are to be true, they need to stand in some relation 
to the real world; it calls for a correspondence theory:
Consider a thing   internal or external to an animal a endowed with 
a brain capable of learning. Call e an event occurring in thing  , 
and e* the corresponding perceptual or conceptual representation of e 
in  the  brain  of  a.  Then  we  say  that  a  has  gained  true  partial 
knowledge of fact e if, and only if, e* is identical to the perception 
or  conception  of  e  as  a  change  in  thing    (rather  than  as  a 
nonchange  or  as  a  change  in  some  other  thing).  The  true  (though 
partial) knowledge that a has acquired of event e is the neural event 
e*; and the correspondence involved is the relation between the events 
e and e*.
We have so far been talking about thoughts, i.e., concrete events, not 
constructs, which we have defined as equivalence classes of thoughts. 
To arrive at propositions, we form the equivalence class of thoughts 
e* constituting true (though usually partial) knowledge of e: [e*]. 
Note that no two members of the class [e*] are likely to be identical, 
for  they  are  thoughts  of  a  given  animal  at  different  times,  or 
thoughts of different animals, and in either case they differ in some 
respect or other. However, they are all equivalent in that every one 
of them constitutes true partial knowledge of e; that is, for every 
member e* of [e*], e* happens if, and only if, e is (or has been or 
will be) the case. We identify the proposition p = "e is the case" 
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with that equivalence class of thoughts, i.e., we set p = [e*]. And we 
stipulate that p is true if, and only if, e happens or has happened. 
Thus, the correspondence relation holding between a mental fact and 
some other (mental or nonmental) fact carries over to propositions in 
relation  to  facts.  Accordingly,  truth  and  falsity  are  primarily 
properties  of  perceptions  and  conceptions  (e.g.  propositional 
thoughts), and only secondarily (or derivatively) attributes of those 
equivalence classes of thoughts we call 'propositions'. (p. 130)
Now, how to determine if our [e*] are in fact in correspondence with reality? That is where truth 
indicators enter the stage, such as: 
• empirical confirmation or disconfirmation, that is, empirical adequacy; 
• conceptual indicators such as theory-internal and external (in relation to other knowledge) 
consistency; 
• unifying power and 
• predictive power;
• heuristic power (in the sense of furthering scientific advancement); 
• stability (not toppled by every new incoming datum) and 
• depth (of theoretical entities and mechanisms); 
• simplicity.
When all these tests are applied, propositions and theories can be assigned a qualitative degree 
of confirmation in the sense of "very strong, strong, indecisive, weak or very weak".
Postulate 3.4. We can get to know the world, although only partially, 
imperfectly (or approximately), and gradually.
This  is  the  postulate  of  epistemological  (critical)  realism  which  together  with  ontological 
realism is the cornerstone of scientific realism. Epistemological constructivism is counterbalanced 
by epistemological naturalism and evolutionism, which defeats radical constructivism. The position 
is both fallibilist and meliorist. Finally, scientism is advocated, the thesis that
anything knowable and worth knowing can be known scientifically, and 
that science provides the best possible factual knowledge, even though 
it may, and does, in fact, contain errors. (p 135)
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Below I have excerpted important passages from (Smith 1996). They are intended as appetizers 
to reading the whole book. All page numbers refer to (Smith 1996).
Particularity:
By particularity, first, I mean simply that our everyday notion of 
an object – the base case, on which any more abstract versions rest – 
is of a located patch of metaphysical flux. By 'particular,' that is, 
I mean something like 'occurrent': something that is located or that 
happens, something that is embodied, something for which there is a 
Steinian "there there." (p. 117)
Individuality:
By individuality, on the other hand, I mean whatever it is about an 
entity that supports the notion of individuation criteria – something 
that  makes  'object'  a  count  noun,  something  that  makes  objects 
discrete.  Somehow  or  other,  an  individual  object  is  taken  to  be 
something of coherent unity, separated out from a background, in the 
familiar "figure-ground fashion. (p. 119)
to separate the sense of the very specific or local or 'peculiar," 
to be associated with particularity, from the quite different sense of 
being discrete or chopped up into distinct units or wholes, to be 
associated with individuality. Thus the toys strewn around on the lawn 
outside,  as  I  write,  have  both  properties:  they  are  particular 
individuals; whereas the water lapping on the rocks far below them 
remains particular - even exquisitely so-without thereby requiring any 
such "division" into discrete individual parts. (p. 120)
The deviation from traditional  ontological  bare particulars  is  illustrated on p.  123 in  Smith 
(1996).
Nature and Naturalism:
From here forward, that is, 'nature' will be taken to be another 
name  for  the  unnameable  world,  'natural'  to  mean  part  of  this 
unnameable world, and 'naturalism,' to shift back to its epistemic or 
metatheoretic sense, to be our mandate, as theorists, to show how 
everything is part of this world-i.e., to show how the world is One, 
in chapter 3's sense of being entire or complete. In sum: 
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Naturalism is realism's methodological correlate.
Note that this construal does not give the physical any logical or 
metaphysical pride of place. Nor does it imply the existence of, or 
probability of, or even the commitment to look for, anything that 
would warrant being called a "unified theory of science." To think 
that would be to commit an error of scope. Naturalism as I understand 
it, that is, is not so much a desire for an integrated understanding 
of nature, as a desire for an understanding of an integral nature. To 
see how the world is One, however that is accomplished. (p. 140)
Criterion of Ultimate Concreteness:
No naturalistically palatable theory of intentionality - of mind, 
computation,  semantics,  ontology,  objectivity  -  can  presume  the 
identity or existence of any individual object whatsoever.
The  name  "Criterion  of  Ultimate  Concreteness"  is  appropriate 
because, as will soon be evident, one of the things that individuals 
have,  that  physical  phenomena  lack,  is  concreteness's  opposite: 
abstraction. (p. 184)
Given  …  the  commitment  to  honor  the  Criterion  of  Ultimate 
Concreteness, that translates into the following more specific goal: 
to understand how a conception of objects can arise on a substrate of 
infinitely extensive fields of particularity. (p 191)
Except of course that this is an untenable way to phrase it. To say 
"a conception of objects" makes it sound as if the achievement is the 
subject's,  by  assuming  a  split  between  conception  and  what  is 
conceived of. It also fails by making it sound as if the achievement 
is cognitive. Nor is anything gained by striking a more traditionally 
realist stance, and asking "how objects can arise on a substrate of 
infinitely extensive fields." That puts the achievement too squarely 
on the object. Both ways of putting it violate the mandate of avoiding 
an  a  priori  subject-world  split.  In  place  of  these  dichotomous 
formulations, therefore, I will speak, unitarily, of registering the 
world. (p 191)
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Register:
By 'register' I mean something like parse, make sense of as, find 
there to be, structure, take as being a certain way- even carve the 
world into, to use a familiar if outmoded phrase. (p. 191)
Flex and Slop:
The world is fundamentally characterized by an underlying flex or 
slop - a kind of slack or "play" that allows some bits to move about 
or adjust without much influencing, and without being much influenced 
by, other bits. (p. 199)
Even if we were to discover that every macroscopically observable 
regularity was the product of such amplified long-distance effects of 
microdisturbances,  it  would  still  be  true  that  far  and  away  the 
majority  of  microdisturbances  quickly  die  away.  In  our  world, 
especially to the extent that we find it coherent, effects by and 
large dissipate. Think 1/r^2. (p. 200)
Smith sets out to put intentionality on a good footing:
Overall, my aim in this book is to show that the world's primordial 
flex or play does two crucial things: (i) establishes the problem that 
intentionality  solves;  and  (ii)  provides  the  wherewithal  for  its 
solution. (p. 200)
Because of the dissipative nature of the playing field, an enduring 
entity cannot, at any given moment, be affected by things that, at 
that  same  moment,  are  beyond  what  I  will  call  effective  reach. 
Effective reach is not a yes/no affair; rather, this is essentially 
the  gradual  falling  off  or  dissipation  of  influence  familiar  from 
physics. (p. 201)
In all these situations, what starts out as effectively coupled is 
gradually pulled apart, but separated in a such a way as to honor non-
effective long-distance coordination condition, leading eventually to 
effective reconnection or reconciliation. There is a great deal more 
to  intentionality  than  that,  and  a  great  deal  to  say  about  what 
constitutes coupling, coordination, and so on, but in various forms 
these  notions  of  connection,  gradual  disconnection,  maintenance  of 
coordination  while  disconnected  or  separated,  and  ultimate 
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reconnection  or  reconciliation  permeate  all  kinds  of  more 
sophisticated example. There is nothing more basic to intentionality 
than this pattern of coming together and coming apart, at one moment 
being fully engaged, at another point being separated, but separated - 
this is the point - in such a way as to stay coordinated with what at 
that moment is distal and beyond effective reach. (p. 206)
Intentionality is a way of exploiting local freedom or slop in order 
to establish coordination with what is beyond effective reach (p. 208)
The  underlying  spatio-temporal  extended  fields  of  particularity 
throw tufts of effective activity up against each other, and let them 
fall apart, fuse them and splinter them and push them through each 
other,  and  generally  bash  them  around,  in  ways  governed  by  the 
pervasive  underlying  (physical)  laws  of  deictic  coupling.  For  a 
subject to begin to register an object as an individual is, first, for 
a region of the fields (the s-region) not to be connected to another 
region (the o-region), but in the appropriate way to let go of it. Not 
in  the  sense  of  dropping  connection  forever,  but  in  a  way  that 
maintains an overall pattern of coordination-a pattern that in all 
likelihood  will  allow  it,  among  other  things,  to  come  back  into 
connection with it again, at other times and places, and perhaps in 
other  ways.  The  coordination  requires  establishing  appropriately 
stable (extended in the s-region) and abstract (extended in the o-
region)  focus  on  the  o-region,  while  remaining  separate.  The 
separation helps in maintaining a somewhat abstract focus on the o-
region, by insulating the s-region from being buffeted by every nuance 
and vibration suffered by the o-region. (p. 241)
Commensurability:
As should be clear from even as much of the metaphysical picture as 
has been suggested so far, all of human communication lies in this 
middle  region,  between  identical  and  incommensurable  registration 
schemes. Not only that, when we get back to the proper metaphysical 
story, as was promised earlier, it will emerge that, far from being 
undermined by it, registration is designed to cope with this middle 
region of partial commensurability. (p. 255)
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In sum, it is important that shifting registers is hard. But it is 
not hard so much in the sense of there being metaphysical limits. What 
is important, rather, is that communicating across registers is hard 
work. This is what will make the metaphysical picture substantive. It 
is also a conclusion that underwrites a claim made in chapter 3: that 
developing  a  more  adequate  metaphysics  is  not  only  intellectually 
viable, but also politically urgent. The aim is to give metaphysical 
grounding to, and support for, communicative and political struggles 
among people whose experience of, and participation in, our world is 
different. (p. 255)
Connection and Encounter:
So the story must be broadened and made more symmetrical: to include 
patterns of connection and encounter as well as coordinated patterns 
of disconnection and separation. (p. 292)
Connection or encounter is important, first, because this is where 
things happen; this is even what it is to happen-the locus of all 
struggles  and  trials  and  engagements  and  meetings,  the  pure  and 
unvarnished bumping and shoving of the world. This is the realm of the 
effective, of which so much of computer science (or so at least I 
claim) is a nascent theory. This is what has to be implemented if you 
want to build something that plugs into the wall and gets something 
done. It is what was lacking in the properties Searle attributed to 
the wall in his office. And it is the locus of what is right about 
physicalism (though physicalism gets its own intuition wrong by trying 
to formulate it ontologically). The connected is the realm of force, 
struggle, energy, encounter. Connection or encounter is how the whole 
thing works. (p. 292)
The virtues of Connection and Disconnection:
If abstraction is virtuous withdrawal we equally need virtuous re-
engagement. (p. 311)
Formality is discreteness run amok:
Formality is discreteness run amok. On the picture being painted 
here, in contrast, the world is not presumptively discrete - indeed, 
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it is as completely opposite of formal as it is possible to imagine. 
It is instead permeated by: 
1.  Indefiniteness  at  the  edges  of  given  objects,  such  as  the 
boundaries of the region on the wall where I ask you to write your 
name (there being no metaphysical need for determinate edges); 
2. Indefiniteness between and among objects of the same type, such 
as whether you are standing on this sand dune or the neighboring one; 
or whether the massif above our campsite consists of three mountains 
or four; 
3. Indefiniteness  among different types, such as among chutzpah, 
bravado, ego, self-confidence, and brashness; 
4.  Indefiniteness  among  the  notions  'concept,'  'type,'  and 
'property'  -  as  for  example  in  debates  between  philosophers  and 
psychologists on the nature of concepts: about whether they are mental 
or abstract, and about what it is that people can and cannot share (do 
we share a concept of red? do we each have private concepts that 
represent the same abstract property? or do we all have different 
concepts?); 
5.  Indefiniteness  between  objects  and  the  types  they  exemplify, 
implying  that  the  "instance-of"  relation  is  itself  approximate, 
contested, and potentially unstable - as for example in whether the 
headache you have this morning is the same one you had last night, or 
a different one of the same type; and similarly for patches of color, 
fog, and "the rain"; and 
6.  Indefiniteness  between  and  among  different  realms  of  human 
endeavor,  such  as  the  political,  the  social,  the  technical,  the 
religious, the esthetic, the psychological, etc. 
The ubiquity of this gradualism shows once again why it was so 
important to avoid making sharp theoretic distinctions in advance. 
This  was  especially  true  in  the  case  of  the  classical  dualisms: 
between  subject  and  world,  mind  and  body,  abstract  and  concrete, 
nature and society. I initially motivated avoiding these binarisms for 
two reasons: in order to avoid making inscription errors, and in order 
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to keep theoretician's and subject's ontology (registration) distinct. 
Third, I avoided them because of their expense. (p. 324f)
The relationship of ontology, registration, world, representation and subject:
Ontology  is  the  projection  of  registration  onto  the  world. 
Representation is the projection of registration onto the subject or 
vehicle. (p. 349)
Remarks on Mathematics:
Compared to the partial merger of representation and ontology, and 
the  attempt  to  steer  a  tenable  course  between  constructivism  and 
realism, the third consequence of the metaphysical lack of categorical 
decisiveness may seem less important. But it is still dramatic enough. 
Mathematics will need to be overhauled. 
To see why, note first how present-day (i.e., modernist) mathematics 
orders its explanations: 
I. Discreteness is assumed to be primitive and absolute, exemplified 
for example by sets, natural numbers, and many other 
such properties (being even, being irrational, etc.); 
2. Continuity is then defined in terms of discreteness, with the 
usual apparatus of Dedekind cuts, convergent Cauchy sequences, and the 
like; and 
3. Finally, if at all, vagueness, or at least a little bit of 
vagueness, is modeled (as for example in the current fashion for fuzzy 
logic4). 
This is the world view captured in Kronecker's famous dictum: that 
"God  made  the  integers;  all  else  is  the  work  of  man."5 If  my 
metaphysical picture is right, Kronecker's order of explanation is 
close  to  backwards.  Metaphysical  indefiniteness  is  the  base  case, 
continuity needs to be extruded from the flux, and then discreteness 
won, at a very high price, from that. 
That  is  to  put  it  metaphysically.  It  may  be  more  revealing  to 
approach it epistemically, however - or at least we should look at it 
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from  that  angle  as  well,  given  that  the  two  are  never  wholly 
separable.  At  a  minimum,  the  proposal  will  require  exhuming 
mathematical practice, as recommended for example by intuitionists, 
and explicating this  achievement of mathematical results by giving 
mathematicians  partial  ontological  as  well  as  partial  epistemic 
responsibility  for  their  acts  -  some  ontological  responsibility, 
rather than none; some epistemic responsibility, rather than all. This 
is not to give unrestricted license to idealism or formalism, because 
of realism's second constraint: mathematicians themselves, the very 
ones to which this metaphysical respect is to be granted, must be 
recognized as part of the same reality as the numbers they extrude. 
This recognition that mathematicians are as much part of the world 
as the numbers they study puts the lie to the sharpness, and perhaps 
even  to  the  coherence,  of  the  distinctions  among  three  allegedly 
alternative ways in which mathematics is traditionally understood: 
1. Empirical: true of the physical or material world, even if at a 
relatively abstract level or high order; 
2. Platonist: true of an independent mathematical realm; and 
3.  Intuitionist: characteristic of our native mental or cognitive 
capacities. 
At  a  minimum,  on  the  present  metaphysics,  the  first  and  third 
positions, empirical and intuitionist, begin to merge. For suppose 
that the empirical view is right: that (what we come to register as) 
mathematical  properties  are  high-level  abstractions  of  ordinary 
material situations. Suppose, that is, that "threeness" is first and 
foremost  a  property  of  those  worldly  states  of  affairs  that  we 
register  as  consisting  of  three  individuals.  This  essentially 
empirical view is compatible with the intuitionist's claim, to put it 
into  current  language,  that  our  ability  to  register  situations  as 
exemplifying  threeness  depends,  inexorably,  on  architectural  facts 
about our native registrational capacities. (p. 354f)
The Middle Ground:
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...that material objects - and the material world more generally - 
occupy  what  we  might  call  a  middle  ground  [Footnote  12], halfway 
between (the predecessor era's notion of) the physical world, and (the 
predecessor  era's  notion  of)  the  intentional  world.  The  resulting 
median nature of materiality has numerous theoretical consequences, 
only a few of which have even been touched on here. For example, it 
undergirds  the  fact  that  objects  themselves,  not  just  their 
representations, are culturally, historically, and socially plural - 
and yet not just products of the imagination or intentional whim of a 
person, society, or community, either, but made of the stuff of the 
world, as resistant and wily and obstreperous as the rest of us. (p. 
363)
But the proposal is not to get rid of syntax, and to leave the two 
realms unconnected. On the contrary, I am arguing that all of ontology 
lives in the intermediate realm. You can see this in the moves I have 
made. On the one hand, I have "lifted" material objects up from the 
bottom,  claiming  that  they  depend  inherently  on  intentional 
(registrational) practices of subjects. At the same time I have driven 
semantics and content down, claiming that thought is intrinsically 
material,  giving  priority  to  non-conceptual  content,  arguing  that 
connected practices are a constitutive part of intentionality, and the 
like. It is the thick participatory mix to which I have given the 
label "middle ground." (p. 365)
One World:
For  the  account  has  supplied  what  would  otherwise  have  been 
impossible: ontological pluralism sustained by metaphysical monism.
There is only one world - that is what was important about realism. 
But its unity transcends all ability to speak. (p. 375)
298
Appendix C: The Self
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Here  I  will  sketch  a  very  bare-bones  variant  of  Metzinger's  model.  All  quotes  are  from 
(Metzinger 2003). An intriguing account for the illusion of the self from a Buddhist perspective is 
given by Albahari (2006).
First of all we will need the concept of mental representation:
Mental Representation: RepM (S, X, Y)
• S is an individual information-processing system.
• Y is an aspect of the current state of the world.
• X represents Y for S.
• X is a functionally internal system state.
•  The  intentional  content  of  X  can  become  available  for 
introspective attention. It possesses the potential of itself becoming 
the  representandum  of  subsymbolic  higher-order  representational 
processes.
• The intentional content of X can become available for cognitive 
reference.  It  can  in  turn  become  the  representandum  of  symbolic 
higher-order representational processes.
• The intentional content of X can become globally available for the 
selective control of action. (p. 21)
Important is Metzinger's concept of transparency of phenomenological properties:
Transparency  is  a  special  form  of  darkness.  With  regard  to  the 
phenomenology of visual experience transparency means that we are not 
able to see something, because it is transparent. We don’t see the 
window,  but  only  the  bird  flying  by.  Phenomenal transparency  in 
general, however, means that something particular is not accessible to 
subjective experience, namely, the representational character of the 
contents of conscious experience. This analysis refers to all sensory 
modalities and to our integrated phenomenal model of the world as a 
whole  in  particular.  The  instruments of  representation  themselves 
cannot  be  represented  as  such  anymore,  and  hence  the  experiencing 
system, by necessity, is entangled in a naive realism. (p. 169)
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Metzinger then introduces a phenomenal self-model (PSM):
The content of the PSM is the content of the conscious self: your 
current bodily sensations, your present emotional situation, plus all 
the contents of your phenomenally experienced cognitive processing. 
They  are  constituents  of  your  PSM.  Intuitively,  and  in  a  certain 
metaphorical sense, one could even say that you  are the content of 
your PSM.  All those  properties of  yourself, to  which you  can now 
direct your attention, form the content of your current PSM. Your 
self-directed thoughts operate on the current contents of your PSM: 
they  cannot operate on anything else. When you form thoughts about 
your  "unconscious  self"  (i.e.,  the  contents  of  your  mental self-
model), these thoughts are always about a conscious representation of 
this "unconscious self," one that has just been integrated into your 
currently active PSM. If you want to initiate a goal-directed action 
aimed at some aspect of yourself—for example, brushing your hair or 
shaving  yourself—you  need  a  conscious  self-model  to  deliberately 
initiate these actions. (p. 299)
The last theoretical entity we need is a phenomenal model of the intentionality relation (PMIR):
What is the phenomenal model of the intentionality relation? It is a 
conscious  mental  model,  and  its  content  is  an  ongoing,  episodic 
subject-object relation. Here are some examples, in terms of typical 
phenomenological descriptions of the class of phenomenal states at 
issue: "I am someone, who is currently visually attending to the color 
of the book in my hands"; "I am someone currently grasping the content 
of the sentence I am reading"; "I am someone currently hearing the 
sound of the refrigerator behind me"; "I am someone now deciding to 
get up and get some more juice." (p. 411)
And:
The overall picture that emerges is that of the human self-model 
continuously integrating the mechanisms of attentional, cognitive, and 
volitional  availability  against  a  stable  background  formed  by  the 
transparent representation of the bodily self.
Please note how the PMIR has a phenomenally experienced direction: 
PMIRs are like arrows pointing from self-model to object component.(p. 
413)
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With  the  above  in  place,  the  paragraph  below  becomes  decipherable  and  gives  us  a  first 
scientific approximation of how the illusion of a “substantial” self comes about:
Subjectivity, in the theoretically interesting sense of being bound 
to an individual, consciously experienced first-person perspective, is 
something that can only be conceptually analyzed and turned into an 
empirically tractable feature of consciousness by introducing the two 
new  theoretical  entities  I  presented  in  this  chapter,  namely,  the 
transparent PSM and the transparent PMIR. We can now see how full-
blown subjective consciousness evolves through three major levels: the 
generation of a world-model, the generation of a self-model, and the 
transient integration of certain aspects of the world-model  with the 
self-model. What follows is a minimal working concept of subjective 
experience:  Phenomenally  subjective experience  consists  in 
transparently modeling the intentionality relation within a global, 
coherent model of the world embedded in a virtual window of presence. 
Call this the "self-model theory of subjectivity" (p. 427)
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Now Milinda the king went up to where the venerable Nâgasena was, 
and addressed him with the greetings and compliments of friendship and 
courtesy,  and  took  his  seat  respectfully  apart.  And  Nâgasena 
reciprocated  his  courtesy,  so  that  the  heart  of  the  king  was 
propitiated.
And Milinda began by asking, [Footnote 1] 'How is your Reverence 
known, and what, Sir, is your name?'
'I am known as Nâgasena, O king, and it is by that name that my 
brethren in the faith address me. But although parents, O king, give 
such a name as Nâgasena, or Sûrasena, or Vîrasena, or Sîhasena, yet 
this, Sire,- Nâgasena and so on – is only a generally understood term, 
a designation in common use. For there is no permanent individuality 
(no soul) involved in the matter. [Footnote 2].'
Then Milinda called upon the Yonakas and the brethren to witness: 
'This  Nâgasena  says  there  is  no  permanent  individuality  (no  soul) 
implied in his name. Is it now even possible to approve him in that?' 
And turning to Nâgasena, he said: 'If, most reverend Nâgasena, there 
be no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in the matter, who is 
it, pray, who gives to you members of the Order your robes and food 
and lodging and necessaries for the sick? Who is it who enjoys such 
things when given? Who is it who lives a life of righteousness? Who is 
it who devotes himself to meditation? Who is it who attains to the 
goal of the Excellent Way, to the Nirvâna of Arahatship? And who is it 
who destroys living creatures? who is it who takes what is not his 
own? who is it who lives an evil life of worldly lusts, who speaks 
lies, who drinks strong drink, who (in a word) commits any one of the 
five sins which work out their bitter fruit even in this life? If that 
be so there is neither merit nor demerit; there is neither doer nor 
causer of good or evil deeds; there is neither fruit nor result of 
good or evil Karma - If, most reverend Nâgasena, we are to think that 
were a man to kill you there would be no murder, then it follows that 
there are no real masters or teachers in your Order, and that your 
ordinations are void.- You tell me that your brethren in the Order are 
in the habit of addressing you as Nâgasena. Now what is that Nâgasena? 
Do you mean to say that the hair is Nâgasena?'
'I don't say that, great king.'
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'Or the hairs on the body, perhaps?'
'Certainly not.'
'Or is it the nails, the teeth, the skin, the flesh, the nerves, the 
bones, the marrow, the kidneys, the heart, the liver, the abdomen, the 
spleen, the lungs, the larger intestines, the lower intestines, the 
stomach, the faeces, the bile, the phlegm, the pus, the blood, the 
sweat, the fat, the tears, the serum, the saliva, the mucus, the oil 
that lubricates the joints, the urine, or the brain, or any or all of 
these, that is Nâgasena?'
And to each of these he answered no.
'Is  it  the  outward  form  then  (Rûpa)  that  is  Nâgasena,  or  the 
sensations (Vedanâ), or the ideas (Saññâ), or the confections (the 
constituent  elements  of  character,  Samkhârâ),  or  the  consciousness 
(Vigññâna), that is Nâgasena?'
And to each of these also he answered no.
'Then is it all these Skandhas combined that are Nâgasena?'
'No! great king.'
'But is there anything outside the five Skandhas that is Nâgasena?'
And still he answered no.
'Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no Nâgasena. Nâgasena is a 
mere empty sound. Who then is the Nâgasena that we see before us? It 
is a falsehood that your reverence has spoken, an untruth!'
And the venerable Nâgasena said to Milinda the king: 'You, Sire, 
have been brought up in great luxury, as beseems your noble birth. If 
you  were  to  walk  this  dry  weather  on  the  hot  and  sandy  ground, 
trampling under foot the gritty, gravelly grains of the hard sand, 
your feet would hurt you. And as your body would be in pain, your mind 
would  be  disturbed,  and  you  would  experience  a  sense  of  bodily 
suffering. How then did you come, on foot, or in a chariot?'
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'I did not come, Sir, on foot. I came in a carriage.'
'Then if you came, Sire, in a carriage, explain to me what that is. 
Is it the pole that is the chariot?'
'I did not say that.'
'Is it the axle that is the chariot?'
'Certainly not.'
'Is it the wheels, or the framework, or the ropes, or the yoke, or 
the spokes of the wheels, or the goad, that are the chariot?'
And to all these he still answered no.
'Then is it all these parts of it that are the chariot?'
'No, Sir.'
'But is there anything outside them that is the chariot?'
And still he answered no.
'Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no chariot. Chariot is a 
mere empty sound. What then is the chariot you say you came in? It is 
a falsehood that your Majesty has spoken, an untruth! There is no such 
thing as a chariot! You are king over all India, a mighty monarch. Of 
whom then are you afraid that you speak untruth? And he called upon 
the Yonakas and the brethren to witness, saying: 'Milinda the king 
here has said that he came by carriage. But when asked in that case to 
explain what  the carriage  was, he  is unable  to establish  what he 
averred. Is it, forsooth, possible to approve him in that?'
When  he  had  thus  spoken  the  five  hundred  Yonakas  shouted  their 
applause, and said to the king: Now let your Majesty get out of that 
if you can?'
And Milinda the king replied to Nâgasena, and said: 'I have spoken 
no untruth, reverend Sir. It is on account of its having all these 
things - the pole, and the axle, the wheels, and the framework, the 
ropes, the yoke, the spokes, and the goad - that it comes under the 
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generally  understood  term,  the  designation  in  common  use,  of 
"chariot."'
'Very  good!  Your  Majesty  has  rightly  grasped  the  meaning  of 
"chariot." And just even so it is on account of all those things you 
questioned me about - the thirty-two kinds of organic matter in a 
human body, and the five constituent elements of being - that I come 
under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, of 
"Nâgasena."  For  it  was  said,  Sire,  by  our  Sister  Vagirâ  in  the 
presence of the Blessed One:
'"Just as it is by the condition precedent of the co-existence of 
its various parts that the word 'chariot' is used, just so is it that 
when the Skandhas are there we talk of a 'being.'"'
'Most wonderful, Nâgasena, and most strange. Well has the puzzle put 
to you, most difficult though it was, been solved. Were the Buddha 
himself  here  he  would  approve  your  answer.  Well  done,  well  done, 
Nâgasena!' (Davids 1890)
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Here I will take a look at Maudlin's Olympia (Maudlin 1989) which will bring additional force 
into the argument for the incompatibility of materialism and computationalism, especially for those 
who still  adhere to some levelist conception of reality. A rough sketch of Maudlin's paper is in 
order; as the point is important but not well known.
Central  in  the  following  discussion  is  the  concept  of  supervenience  of  consciousness  on 
physical  and computational  states.  Maudlin  assumes  that  the  computational  supervenes  on  the 
physical,  and  consciousness  –  mind  –  supervenes  on  the  computational.  But  he  derives  a 
contradiction by showing that supervenience of mental states on the physical depends on physical 
activity;  while  supervenience  of  mental  states  on  the  computational  depends  on  counterfactual  
structure alone, with no additional physical activity necessary. Both concepts of supervenience can't 
be held at the same time.
What is supervenience exactly?
A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no 
two  things  can  differ  with  respect  to  A-properties  without  also 
differing with respect to their  B-properties. In slogan form, "there 
cannot  be  an  A-difference  without  a  B-difference".(McLaughlin  & 
Bennett 2005)
A simple example: imagine the predicate even/odd; it supervenes on the natural numbers.
1 = odd; 2 = even; 3 = odd; 4 = even
You can't have an A-difference – changing even to odd – without also changing the underlying 
number. In regard to mental states, it works this way: once a physical state is fixed, the mental 
content (mind state) – your thoughts – are fixed. To get at another mind state, you need to change 
the physical state. The mind state is determined by a certain physical state. Physical supervenience 
means that mind supervenes on this current and actual physical activity.
Now on to computationalism. We will – actually,  must,  to not make the claim vacuous and 
arrive  at  pancomputationalism  –  assume  that  the  kind  of  computationalism  advocated  here  is 
operating  on  a  higher  abstraction  level  than  naked,  finest-grained  reality316.  We will  make  the 
assumption  that  we can  abstract  away from material  properties  and  still get  cognition.  We are 
316 In this sense, the following argument can also be seen as deriving a straight contradiction form a levelist conception 
of reality.
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entering the levelist conception of reality, the Picture Theory. Maudlin is quite explicit with what 
computationalism actually means:
the computational structure of the brain is what bestows mental 
properties.  We  must  abstract  away  the  particular  physical, 
biochemical, and neural features of brains (Maudlin 1989) 
Maudlin  also  differentiates  between  functionalism and  computationalism, in  a  somewhat 
different  way than  we  have  above.  Computationalism is  directly  defined  via  Universal  Turing 
Machines (UTM). UTMs consist of machine tables with transition rules that subjunctively govern 
input/output  relations  and  are  capable  of  having  internal  states.  Maudlin  requires  that  the 
computation be nontrivial, that is, it really is a computation – giving different outputs for at least 
some different inputs. Functionalism, as described by Maudlin, would be more in line with standard 
materialism  as  presented  in  this  thesis,  because  he  requires  a  strong  physical  connection  for 
functional  relations  to  hold.  He  brings  the  example  of  a  valve  lifter:  for  a  valve  lifter  to  be 
functional, it needs to posses certain material properties, such as hardness, for instance. I will call it 
M-functionalism (M for Maudlin) to avoid confusion with other kinds of functionalism.
Maudlin now seems to endorse the following hierarchy:
• physicalism,  which  says  that  ultimately  material  properties  count;  I  equate  this  with 
materialism as used in this thesis.
• M-functionalism, which  says  that  matter  and function  count;  but  different  matter  may 
support the same function317.
• Computationalism,  which  asserts  that  for  all  practical  purposes  only abstract  properties 
count,  but  these  even  in  their  counterfactual  implications.  The  connection  to  physical 
systems is very weak: it suffices that the physical system is able to support states, machines 
tables and account for I/O. 
The assertion of both physicalism and computationalism combined then is this: 
• a Turing machine running a non trivial program is 
◦ necessary for consciousness, and
◦ sufficient for consciousness and 
317 This view is actually quite acceptable, if one rejects the Picture Theory and its corollary that linguistic predicates 
must have real-world counterparts.
311
Living in a Natural World
• consciousness also supervenes on the physical.
The problem is that  these three propositions are inconsistent318.  Maudlin shows this with an 
ingenious  machine,  Olympia319.  Olympia  is  a  machine  with  minimal  physical  activity that  still 
supports consciousness – a phenomenal state PHI. Maudlin is clear that he does not want to cheat 
by deploying tricks of philosophy: for instance, state transitions must conform to physical activity. 
Searle's  wall  implementing  a  word  processor  is  ruled  out  –  it  employs  physically meaningless 
(Goodmanesque) predicates (Goodman 1983; Searle 1992). Maudlin's refutation is also not related 
to either Block's Chinese People computer (Block 1980) or Searle's Chinese room argument320. 
Three conditions must be satisfied by the machine to guarantee this:
• a machine must run through the states from s1 to s1000 and
• read a tape structure – the input – and
• it  must  have  counterfactual  structure;  that  is,  react  differently  under  different  inputs, 
otherwise the program would be trivial.
Imagine we already have machines which instantiate a certain program PI, and this program PI 
supports phenomenal consciousness PHI for every input; that is, after all, what computationalism 
asserts. Let us call a machine of this type Klara. They are very simple and mechanical machines. 
Now Maudlin proceeds to construct the machine mentioned above, Olympia. Olympia consists of 
water, troughs, and other simple mechanical contraptions; and the states of Olympia correspond to 
different configurations of these mechanical pieces. Olympia, at the start, always transits from state 
s1 to s1000 on a fixed input TAU. Not more. That is, for a different input TAU_DIFF, it would 
probably compute the wrong result, because it would again simply transit from state s1 to s1000.
Olympia needs counterfactual  structure so as not  to  be computationally trivial.  So Maudlin 
proceeds to attach other machines – the Klaras – to Olympia. In fact, one Klara is attached at every 
mechanical point where a state transition can occur. But they are set up in a way that they only 
spring into action if the input of the tape on that state varies from TAU. That is, if the tape contains 
TAU, then Olympia will not need the attached machinery, but simply run on its own predetermined 
course and make the state transitions from s1 to s1000. Only if the tape differs from TAU, will one 
318
319 The name is inspired by one of the figures in E.T.A Hoffmann's "The Sandman".
320 Incidentally, why always the Chinese?
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of the attached Klaras take over – namely, the one where the tape first varied – and this Klara will 
continue to perform the rest of the computation. 
The  situation  is  now  as  such:  Olympia  corresponds,  computationally,  to  a  single  but 
constructionally overly complex Klara. Olympia is originally a very simple machine, which, when 
given  input  TAU  will  only  run  on  its  original  parts,  and,  by  assumption,  this  will  lead  to 
phenomenal state PHI; she only needs the more complex additional machinery in case of deviation 
from TAU. Olympia clearly instantiates PI: for every tape input, she will give the correct output; not 
matter that for all but one tape input she delegates activity to the Klaras inside her.
And here we get the inconsistency: we can add the counterfactual structure by adding material, 
which, for a concrete run on tape TAU, is physically inert. We already have all the physical activity 
we need by the running of the simple Olympia in the first place. 
Where  is  the  inconsistency  located  exactly?  Computationalism  says  that  a  computation  is 
sufficient for PHI: Olympia computes PI for every TAU, so has sufficient power to support PHI. 
The computationalist also requires that the counterfactual structure be present: the computational 
power  is  necessary  for  PHI.  But  supervenience  on  the  physical  requires  that  consciousness 
supervenes on physical activity and not on causally inert matter. Thus, in the case where Olympia 
runs on the tape TAU, consciousness supervenes already on the simple Olympia without need for 
the inert Klaras. These positions contradict each other: according the computationalism, Olympia 
with the inert Klaras would be conscious, but Olympia without the inert Klaras would not be; which 
contradicts the  physical supervenience principle – a physical state which was unconscious before 
would be made conscious by adding material that does not contribute physically to the computation. 
That, then, is the difference between physical (causally active) and computational (counterfactual,  
inactive) supervenience space. The physical activity in both cases is exactly identical.
To  be  especially  clear  on  this  point:  consciousness,  in  case  of  computationalism  would 
supervene on physically inert material. A computationalist needs both sufficiency and necessity – 
otherwise it isn't computationalism any more. So, Maudlin concludes, something must be wrong 
either  with  physical  supervenience;  or,  with  computationalism.  Giving  up  computationalism is 
certainly more conservative and in line with current scientific evidence; and given the ontology 
advocated here, mandatory321.
321 Counterfactuals enter the physical picture in quantum mechanics. One appetizer:
In interaction-free measurements [...], an object is found because it might 
have absorbed a photon, although actually it did not. This idea has been 
applied to "counterfactual computation" [..], a setup in which the outcome of 
313
Living in a Natural World
It gets worse. Maudlin adds further fine points, such as the " argument by subtraction" – the 
mechanisms that would activate the Klaras in case of a diverging tape input could be mechanically 
weakened by attrition – rust for instance; the activation of a relevant Klara would then fail, because 
the mechanical link would break. He also presents an "argument by addition" – adding mechanical 
blocks that hinder an activation of a relevant Klara – the blocks need not even touch the rest of the 
machinery. With these methods, the physical difference between a "normal" machine instantiating a 
program PI and the mechanical Olympia can be made arbitrarily small322.
Barnes  (1991) raises  objections  to  Maudlin's  argumentation.  He  thinks  that  the  rigging  of 
Olympia to a certain input tape state – the TAU – makes her too “introspective”. Consciousness 
only  appears  if  there  is  real interaction  with  the  environment;  that  would  make  Barnes  an 
externalist. 
Barnes first defines "generally appropriate activity conditions" (GAA) for computations, which 
coincide with the ones given by Maudlin (that is, a machine must have states, a transition table, and 
perform the  correct  computation  for  different  inputs).  Barnes  now objects  that  while  Olympia 
performs a GAA computation, she does not do so because of active causes – that is, the concrete 
tape input TAU. She is rigged to run on TAU solely on causes internal to her.
Barnes constructs a dreamer/bell system to drive home his point:
• We have a text in a book, a dreamer and a bell.323
• The dreamer dreams with open eyes, but he is asleep. He dreams of the text and verbalizes 
his dream. His eyes trace the text – to an onlooker, it would seem as if the dreamer were 
awake and reading from the book; but this is not the case.
a computation becomes known in spite of the fact that the computer did not 
run the algorithm (Vaidman 2008).
That is why the universe being computational at the fundamental level would not encounter similar objections as the 
ones presented above – but maybe different ones. I can not explore this here; a full discussion must wait for another 
day and paper. But what is at stake here is computationalism as a theory of the mental; not computationalism as a 
theory of the physical. That is why it is of no concern here.
322 Another problem which computationalists face is the problem of clock slowdown: Imagine a computer going 
through states s1 to s1000, and this is necessary and sufficient for the arising of phenomenal states. We can now do 
something perverse: we let the computer run s1, then make a backup, disassemble the computer, wait a thousand 
years, build a new computer, install the backup, run to s2 etc and finally reach s1000 after a billion years ; it would 
still support PHI if computation is sufficient for consciousness.
Computationalism is actually even weirder: a computationalist should have no problem if the successive states are 
mixed in their order of appearance; here, the platonic anti-materialist roots of computationalism begin to show 
visibly. An exploration of these ideas can be found in Egan (1994).
323 The setting does have a Buddhist flavour about it.
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• There is a bell in the room – most probably magical324 – that rings and wakes up the dreamer 
just in case he dreams of a word that is not in the text as his eyes are upon the relevant 
section. The dreamer wakes up because of the bell, and then carries on reading the text with 
his normal reading abilities.
The dreamer will always read the whole text; if he dreams "correctly" without any active causal 
connection to the text whatsoever; all the active causes are internal to the dreamer. But can we call 
the activity the dreamer performs reading? Barnes does not think so. Barnes claims that, to speak of 
cognition, the object which is the focus of cognition must play an active causal role leading the 
subject's thinking of the object. He labels this condition for cognitive activity as the "causally active 
object condition" (CAO).
He concludes that if a subject/object system meets GAA and not CAO, this does not suffice for 
cognition. But maybe GAA and CAO together do – he does not elaborate, but remarks that CAO 
probably has to be fulfilled in a particular way. Computation is, according to Barnes, "intrinsically 
a reciprocal, active causal interaction". Barnes concludes:
Olympia, while she succeeds in performing a GAA computation, does 
not  succeed  in  performing  a  GAA/CAO  computation.  Hence  Maudlin's 
argument entails the following conclusion: the status of a system as 
conscious cannot supervene on a system simply in virtue of its GAA 
computational structure. There is nothing in his argument which counts 
against the possibility that a system is conscious simply in virtue of 
its GAA/CAO computational structure. For those of us who take 'GAA/CAO 
computation'  as  simply  equivalent  to  the  ordinary  notion  of 
"computation,"  this  amounts  to  Maudlin's  failure  to  refute  a 
computationalist theory of consciousness.
Well; whatever the "correct” notion of computation is – we have left the abstract behind us and 
have entered the domain of the physical world and its metaphysical categorization. And rightly so, 
because that is where solutions to worldly problems should be sought. Taken this way, the above 
results  can  be  seen  as  defeating  a  purely  abstract  conception  of  cognition  as  computation – 
performing the right computations is not sufficient to be conscious.
324 Barnes does not say.
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The  problem above,  incidentally,  is  reminiscent  of  Swampman.  Olympia  performs  a  GAA 
computation, but not a GAA/CAO computation. The same holds for Swampman, computationally 
construed: he computes GAA-like, but not GAA/CAO-like. 
In any case, a causal connection to the world seems to be required; better: the causal connection 
ensures that in truth there is no real separateness of world and cognitive entity, only one world 
which  contains  a  cognitive  subsystem.  The computationalist  may reach  this  conclusion  via  the 
requirement of CAO. The metaphysical monist may locate this connection in dispositionality.
316
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More distinguishes nine principles underlying the proactionary principle:
1. Freedom to innovate: Our freedom to innovate technologically is 
valuable to humanity. The burden of proof therefore belongs to 
those who propose restrictive measures. All proposed measures 
should be closely scrutinized. 
2. Objectivity:  Use  a  decision  process  that  is  objective, 
structured, and explicit. Evaluate risks and generate forecasts 
according  to  available  science,  not  emotionally  shaped 
perceptions; use explicit forecasting processes; fully disclose 
the  forecasting  procedure;  ensure  that  the  information  and 
decision  procedures  are  objective;  rigorously  structure  the 
inputs to the forecasting procedure; reduce biases by selecting 
disinterested experts, by using the devil’s advocate procedure 
with judgmental methods, and by using auditing procedures such 
as review panels. 
3. Comprehensiveness: Consider all reasonable alternative actions, 
including  no  action.  Estimate  the  opportunities  lost  by 
abandoning a technology, and take into account the costs and 
risks of substituting other credible options. When making these 
estimates,  carefully  consider  not  only  concentrated  and 
immediate  effects,  but  also  widely  distributed  and  follow-on 
effects. 
4. Openness/Transparency: Take into account the interests of all 
potentially affected parties, and keep the process open to input 
from those parties. 
5. Simplicity: Use methods that are no more complex than necessary 
6. Triage: Give precedence to ameliorating known and proven threats 
to human health and environmental quality over acting against 
hypothetical risks. 
7. Symmetrical  treatment:  Treat  technological  risks  on  the  same 
basis as natural risks; avoid underweighting natural risks and 
overweighting human-technological risks. Fully account for the 
benefits of technological advances. 
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8. Proportionality:  Consider  restrictive  measures  only  if  the 
potential impact of an activity has both significant probability 
and  severity.  In  such  cases,  if  the  activity  also  generates 
benefits, discount the impacts according to the feasibility of 
adapting  to  the  adverse  effects.  If  measures  to  limit 
technological  advance  do  appear  justified,  ensure  that  the 
extent of those measures is proportionate to the extent of the 
probable effects. 
9. Prioritize  (Prioritization):  When  choosing  among  measures  to 
ameliorate unwanted side effects, prioritize decision criteria 
as  follows:  (a)  Give  priority  to  risks  to  human  and  other 
intelligent  life  over  risks  to  other  species;  (b)  give  non-
lethal threats to human health priority over threats limited to 
the environment (within reasonable limits); (c) give priority to 
immediate threats over distant threats; (d) prefer the measure 
with the highest expectation value by giving priority to more 
certain  over  less  certain  threats,  and  to  irreversible  or 
persistent impacts over transient impacts. 
10.Renew and Refresh: Create a trigger to prompt decision makers to 
revisit the decision, far enough in the future that conditions 
may have changed significantly.
(More 2005)
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Abstract
The thesis consists of three parts: the first being on rationality and its import in tackling all 
questions facing us in our lives, not only a reduced domain of scientific investigation; the second, 
metaphysical in nature, forming an essay on the nature of the world, especially as informed by the 
principles of rationality sketched in the previous part; and the third, applying the findings of the 
previous sections to sentient agents – among them humans – in this universe.
I argue that the rational approach is the best way to approach all questions facing us in our lives. 
Only by being rational can we extract as much information from our environment as possible. Our 
best way of gaining knowledge should quite naturally also influence our spirituality, our ethics, our 
view of the meaning of life and so on. It is important to apply the open standards of rationality to all 
areas of interest to humans. The agent centric approach is central to the thesis. For individuals, 
knowledge means having a  good mental  model  of  the world:  the closer  to the actual  effective 
factors  in  the  world,  the  more  potential  there  is  for  action  leading  to  achievement  of  goals. 
Ignorance condemns one to inaction and passivity. The litmus test for knowledge – and philosophy 
– is this: does it change the way we view the world, our life, and, ultimately and most importantly, 
the way we act?
Rationality quickly leads  to  two metaphysical  commitments:  to  naturalism,  and to  monism. 
Naturalism, in any non-trivial  or question-begging sense,  must mean that there  are  no separate 
realms – neither for spirits,  gods, or minds.  Monism, the doctrine that there is certain sense of 
oneness about seemingly differing subject matters, is here proposed in a radical form: the oneness 
of the world, indifferent to categories of human inquiry and categorization. Central to the thesis is 
mind-body monism, the idea that mind and matter are not distinct, but different aspects of the same 
thing.  The  core  metaphysical  assumption  of  the  thesis  is  that  ontological  stratifications  can  be 
variously drawn and always come at a price; that the adoption of ontic structural realism reduces 
this price; and that levelism is false and lies at the heart of many philosophical errors. Dispositional 
and causal structure are presumed to be fundamental. Considerations from philosophy of mind lead 
us to the astonishing conclusion that neither meaning nor qualia are in the head, but arise from 
causally induced representations of the world.
Humans are only a subset of possible persons and this forces us to rethink our place in the 
universe. Consciousness and qualia are not a prerogative of humans, but result from certain matter 
configurations. Furthermore, ethics will not require persons as subjects, but qualia bearers. Also, 
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there is no “essential” self to a person, but the self arises as a matter of representation. Finally, the 
concept  of  free  will,  where  the  word  “free”  actually  means  anything,  is  shown  to  be  largely 
incoherent: it  presupposes the disconnection of humans in regard to the universe.  I will offer a 
different concept, optimal will, to replace “free will”. Achieving optimal will is a difficult process; 
but one worth pursuing and which will achieve (in the limit) what philosophers probably have in 
mind when speaking of “free” will.
In  the  universe  meaning arises  only in  relation  to  the  environment.  That  does  not  make it 
relative in a nihilistic way, but in an exploratory way. We know that here and now, certain sets of 
values  befit  us  and  our  situation.  But  it  is  also  possible  to  transcend  them,  and  the  more  we 
transcend our current limitations the different our values will become. In closing, a deeply rational, 
naturalistic view of the universe leads not to despair, but to hope and to a vision for the future.
Kurzfassung
Die Dissertation besteht aus drei Teilen: der erste behandelt Rationalität und deren Bedeutung 
für alle Fragen des Lebens, nicht nur für einen reduzierten – für wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen 
reservierten  – Teilbereich der  Welt;  der  zweite  Teil  ist  metaphysischer  Natur  und skizziert  den 
postulierten Aufbau der Welt anhand der im ersten Teil erläuterten Prinzipien. Im dritten Teil frage 
ich – und gebe vorläufige Antworten – wie die Ergebnisse der vorherigen Teile unseren Blickwinkel 
auf empfindsame Wesen des Universums – darunter Menschen – ändern.
Nur wenn wir  rational  sind können wir  das  Maximum an Information  aus  unserer  Umwelt 
extrahieren. Unser beste Weg zum Erkenntnisgewinn sollte auch Leitfaden für unsere Spiritualität, 
Ethik, unsere Ansichten über den Sinn des Lebens etc sein. Es ist wichtig die sich mit unserem 
Erkenntnisstand  ändernden  Standards  der  Rationalität  auf  alle  menschlichen  Unterfangen 
anzuwenden.  Für  Individuen  bedeutet  Wissen  gute  mentale  Modelle  der  Welt  zu  besitzen:  je 
genauer effektive Faktoren in der Welt gespiegelt werden, umso besser können angestrebte Ziele 
erreicht werden. Unwissenheit führt zu Inaktivität und Passivität. Die Bewährungsprobe für Wissen 
und Philosophie ist die: werden durch sie die Art und Weise wie wir die Welt, unser Leben, und – 
letztlich am Wichtigsten – die Art und Weise wie wir handeln verändert?
Rationales Denken führt schnell zur Adoption zweier metaphysischer Annahmen: Naturalismus 
und  Monismus.  Ein  nicht-trivialer  Naturalismus  bedeutet,  dass  es  keine  verschiedenen 
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„gesetzlichen“  Ebenen  für  Geister,  Gott,  das  Bewusstsein  etc  gibt.  Monismus  in  der 
gegenständlichen Arbeit bedeutet das Postulat der Einheit der Welt, unabhängig von menschlichen 
Kategorisierungen.  Von besonderer  Bedeutung ist  die  Einheit  von Geist  und Körper:  Geist  und 
Körper  sind  nur  verschiedene  Aspekte  derselben  zugrunde  liegenden  Sache.  Die  zentrale 
metaphysische  Annahme  der  Dissertation  ist,  dass  ontologische  Gliederungen  auf  verschiedene 
Arten und Weisen gezogen werden können, aber immer einen Preis haben; dass der ontologische 
strukturelle Realismus diesen Preis minimiert, und dass ontologisches Ebenen-Denken falsch und 
verantwortlich für viele  philosophische Fehler  ist.  Die fundamentalen ontologischen Kategorien 
sind dispositionale und kausale Strukturen. Erwägungen aus der Philosophie des Geistes führen zu 
dem erstaunlichen Schluss dass weder Bedeutung noch Qualia im Kopf verankert sind, sondern 
durch kausal induzierte Repräsentationen der Welt entstehen.
Menschen sind nur  eine Teilmenge möglicher  Personen – dies  zwingt  uns  die  Stellung des 
Menschen im Kosmos zu überdenken. Bewusstsein und Qualia  sind ebenfalls  kein Privileg der 
menschlichen  Spezies,  sondern  resultieren  aus  spezifischen  Materiekonfigurationen.  Ethik  wird 
zudem nicht auf Personen beschränkt sein, sondern auf alle Qualia-Träger ausgedehnt werden. Auch 
gibt es keine “Essenz” einer Person – das gefühlte “Selbst” ist eine spezifische Eigenrepräsentation. 
Schlussendlich wird gezeigt  dass  das  Konzept  des  freien Willens  inkohärent  ist  – es setzt  eine 
Spaltung von Mensch und Umwelt voraus die schwer aufrecht zu erhalten ist. Ich entwickle ein 
anderes Konzept – das des optimalen Willens – das den freien Willen ersetzt. Optimalen Willen zu 
erreichen ist ein schwieriger Prozess – aber ein Prozess auf den es Wert ist sich einzulassen, und an 
dessen Ende das steht was Philosophen gemeinhin mit “freien” Willen zu umschreiben versuchen.
Im Universum entsteht Sinn nur in Relation zur Umgebung. Das macht den Sinn nicht relativ in 
einem nihilistischen Sinne, sondern in einem explorativen Sinne. Wir wissen, dass hier und jetzt 
gewisse Werte uns und unserer Situation angemessen sind.  Aber  es ist  möglich diese Werte  zu 
transzendieren, und je mehr wir unsere jetzigen Limitationen überschreiten, je mehr werden sich 
unsere  Werte  weiterentwickeln.  Abschließend  bleibt  zu  sagen,  dass  ein  tief  gehend  rationaler, 
naturalistischer  Blick auf das Universums nicht zu Sinnleere führt, sondern zu Hoffnung und zu 
einer Vision für die Zukunft.
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